Author: admin

Legal Updates (November 02 – November 14, 2026)

CASE UPDATES

Mere production of a dishonoured cheque is insufficient under Section 138 NI Act when the complainant fails to establish the chitty liability through account statements and supporting records      

The Kerala High Court in the case of A.M Gopalan vs State of Kerala [Criminal. A No. 1414 of 2011] dated November 11, 2026, has held that mere production of a dishonoured cheque is insufficient under Section 138 NI Act when the complainant fails to establish the chitty liability through account statements and supporting records. The Court reiterated that a complainant must prove the transaction that gave rise to the cheque and the existence of a legally enforceable debt. Mere production of the cheque is not enough. 

The High Court noted that the complainant’s power-of-attorney holder admitted that he could not state how much had been repaid by the accused or how the outstanding figure was calculated without referring to the records. Further, the accused’s contention that the cheque had been issued as a security cheque, coupled with the complainant’s failure to prove the liability, created sufficient doubt to justify acquittal. 

The Court noted that the complainant’s power-of-attorney holder was unable to provide crucial details regarding the chitty transaction. He could not state how much amount had actually been repaid by the accused, the number of instalments paid, or the exact defaults without referring to records. Although he admitted that documents relating to the chitty and accounts existed, those records were never produced before the court. 

The Court also found a major inconsistency in the complainant’s own case. The Court further observed that although the accused admitted being a subscriber to the chitty, such admission did not automatically establish the specific liability claimed by the complainant. In the absence of account statements, chitty documents, and reliable evidence explaining how the outstanding amount was calculated, the complainant failed to substantiate the alleged legally enforceable debt.     


Even though a company ceases to operate after dissolution, Section 250 preserves its capacity to continue proceedings relating to realization of dues or discharge of liabilities and obligations      

The Madras High Court in the case of Amarkantak Orchards Pvt Ltd vs P.A Joseph [AS(MD) No. 265 of 2008] dated November 13, 2026, has clarified that a company struck off under the Companies Act can continue litigation concerning contractual obligations but refuses specific performance where the purchaser failed to establish a genuine survey, timely action, and sustained willingness to complete the transaction.  

The Court found that the purchaser’s conduct was inconsistent with the requirements of Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act. There was no reliable evidence showing that the alleged shortage in land extent was communicated to the vendors or that the purchaser consistently pursued completion of the transaction. Since the agreement in favour of the purchaser was unregistered and there was no evidence that subsequent buyers had notice of it, the Court held that the later purchasers were bona fide purchasers for value without notice of the earlier agreement. 

The High Court clarified that even though a company ceases to operate after dissolution, Section 250 preserves its capacity to continue proceedings relating to realization of dues or discharge of liabilities and obligations. Since the litigation concerned enforcement of contractual obligations arising from a sale agreement, the appeal remained maintainable despite the companies having been struck off.     


While a legal heir who has not executed loan or guarantee documents cannot be made personally liable for the debt, the creditor is entitled to proceed against the estate of a deceased guarantor inherited by such legal heir       

The Madras High Court in the case of Arun vs Indian Bank [CMP. No. 18568 of 2023] dated November 12, 2026, has held that while a legal heir who has not executed loan or guarantee documents cannot be made personally liable for the debt, the creditor is entitled to proceed against the estate of a deceased guarantor inherited by such legal heir. Therefore, a plaint seeking recovery from the inherited estate cannot be rejected merely because the legal heir was not a party to the original loan transaction. 

Emphasising that a creditor can continue recovery proceedings against the estate left behind by the deceased guarantor, the Court said that a legal heir’s non-signatory status is not a ground to reject the plaint when the bank seeks recovery from the deceased guarantor’s estate in the heir’s hands. 

The Court noted that there was no dispute regarding the education loan transaction or the execution of the guarantee agreement by the parents of the borrower. The real issue was whether liability arising from the guarantee could be enforced after the guarantor’s death and, if so, against whom. 

The Bench observed that the death of a guarantor does not extinguish the liability arising under the guarantee. However, such liability can be enforced only against the estate left behind by the deceased guarantor and inherited by the legal heirs. The Court also clarified that a legal heir cannot be made personally liable for the entire debt merely because of his status as a legal heir. His liability is limited to the extent of the assets or estate inherited from the deceased guarantor. 

The Court further observed that issues relating to the prior settlement deed, the nature of the property sought to be proceeded against, and the non-impleadment of another legal heir were factual matters requiring evidence and adjudication during trial. Such questions could not be decided at the stage of an application seeking rejection of the plaint.    


Separate deeds of hypothecation cannot defeat the substance of a guarantees, and held that obligations undertaken under loan documents made them corporate guarantors of the principal borrower       

The New Delhi Bench of the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT) in the case of Bindu Kapoor vs Mamta Binani [Company Appeal (At)(Insolvency) No.933 of 2026] dated November 06, 2026, has emphasised that separate deeds of hypothecation cannot defeat the substance of a guarantees, and held that obligations undertaken under loan documents made them corporate guarantors of the principal borrower. 

The NCLAT ruled that merely describing a company as a ‘hypothecator’ is not decisive. If the loan documents create an obligation to repay a borrower’s debt upon default, the entity can be treated as a corporate guarantor. A contract of guarantee need not be contained in a single document. Courts can determine guarantor status by reading loan agreements and security documents together.  

Where loan documents make an entity jointly and severally liable for repayment and require it to meet shortfalls from any source, such obligations may amount to a guarantee. Once CIRP against the principal borrower is pending before a particular NCLT, insolvency proceedings against its corporate guarantor must be filed before the same tribunal, notwithstanding the guarantor’s registered office being located elsewhere. 

The Tribunal examined the loan agreements and found that the appellant companies were expressly included within the definition of “Obligors”. The loan documents made all obligors jointly and severally liable for repayment of the lender’s dues and further required them to discharge shortfalls from any source in the event of default. According to the Tribunal, these obligations went beyond a mere charge over hypothecated assets. 

The NCLAT observed that the deeds of hypothecation could not be read in isolation. When read together with the loan agreements, they clearly demonstrated that the appellant companies had undertaken liability to repay the debt upon default by the principal borrower. Therefore, the substance of the arrangement indicated a guarantee obligation notwithstanding the nomenclature adopted in the documents.  

Relying on the Supreme Court’s decision in China Development Bank v. Doha Bank QPSC [(2025) 7 Supreme Court Cases 729], the Tribunal held that the title of a document is not decisive. What is relevant is whether the covenants contained in the document create an obligation to discharge another person’s debt upon default. The covenant requiring payment of the lender’s dues and recovery of any shortfall was held to possess the essential characteristics of a guarantee.      


Scrutiny of property documents and sanction of a housing loan do not, by themselves, certify the seller’s title for the purchaser’s benefit. A bank’s scrutiny cannot substitute the purchaser’s independent legal verification, unless there is an agreement to the contrary        

The Karnataka High Court in the case of HDFC Bank vs State of Karnataka [CRL.P No. 8395 of 2025] dated October 12, 2026, has clarified that scrutiny of property documents and sanction of a housing loan do not, by themselves, certify the seller’s title for the purchaser’s benefit. Essentially, a bank’s scrutiny cannot substitute the purchaser’s independent legal verification, unless there is an agreement to the contrary. 

The Court observed that a purchaser is expected to independently verify the seller’s title. However, the principle of “buyer beware” does not, by itself, decide another person’s criminal liability. A bank ordinarily scrutinises title documents to assess its proposed security and protect its own financial interest. Such scrutiny and loan sanction do not automatically amount to a title certificate or assurance to the purchaser, unless otherwise agreed. 

The Court held that sanctioning a housing loan after examining property documents cannot, without further material, establish the dishonest intention or common intention necessary for cheating under Section 420 read with Section 34 of the IPC. The complaint disclosed no specific act of fraudulent or dishonest inducement by HDFC Bank, nor material showing that it knowingly joined any arrangement with the seller to deceive the purchaser. Hence, criminal proceedings against the Bank could therefore not be sustained merely because it had scrutinised the documents and sanctioned the loan. 

No material showed that HDFC Bank had agreed to guarantee title or independently represented that the property was free from encumbrances. The complaint disclosed no specific dishonest inducement by HDFC Bank or material showing its knowing participation in an arrangement to deceive the purchaser. Loan sanction alone could not establish dishonest or common intention under Section 420 read with Section 34 IPC. Accordingly, the Court quashed the criminal proceedings only against the Bank.     


Bank’s use of SARFAESI proceedings, participation in the borrower’s CIRP, and invocation of the corporate guarantee were legally permissible remedies and does not indicate any fraudulent or malicious intent       

The New Delhi Bench of the National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT) in the case of Indian Bank vs Mahamaya Exports [IB-687/PB/2020] dated October 16, 2026, has held that liability under a corporate guarantee is co-extensive with that of the principal borrower, and a financial creditor is not required to first exhaust remedies against the principal borrower before proceeding against the guarantor under Section 7 of the IBC. 

Allegations regarding release of securities, fraud, management disputes, Section 185 violations, account certification, and pending civil proceedings were held insufficient to rebut the documentary evidence establishing debt and default. The Tribunal held that the principal borrower’s letter acknowledging continuing liability saved limitation, particularly because the guarantee deed treated such acknowledgment as binding on the guarantor as well. 

The Tribunal observed that Section 5(8)(i) of the IBC specifically includes liabilities arising from guarantees within the definition of ‘financial debt’. Therefore, a corporate guarantor need not receive direct disbursement of funds for a financial debt to arise. The Tribunal also recognised the co-extensive liability of a corporate guarantor and permits proceedings under Section 7 against the guarantor. 

The Tribunal further observed that the Bank’s participation in the CIRP of the principal borrower did not extinguish the separate liability of the corporate guarantor. A creditor is entitled to proceed simultaneously against both the borrower and the guarantor, subject to adjustment of any recoveries to prevent double recovery. 

The NCLT also rejected the contention that reversal of bank-guarantee entries defeated the insolvency case. It noted that those entries had already been removed from the revised claim and that substantial defaults under the term loan facilities remained outstanding. The Tribunal also declined the corporate debtor’s request for action against the Bank under Sections 65, 72 and 75 of the IBC, holding that the Bank’s use of SARFAESI proceedings, participation in the borrower’s CIRP, and invocation of the corporate guarantee were legally permissible remedies and did not indicate any fraudulent or malicious intent.     


A bona fide increase in share capital undertaken to meet genuine business requirements cannot be treated as an act of oppression merely because it results in dilution of an existing shareholder’s percentage holding       

The Bombay High Court in the case of Rajiv Kant Laxman vs Bobby Electronics [Company Appeal No. 30 of 2014] dated November 05, 2026, has held that a bona fide increase in share capital undertaken to meet genuine business requirements cannot be treated as an act of oppression merely because it results in dilution of an existing shareholder’s percentage holding. In an appeal under Section 10F of the Companies Act, the Court cannot interfere with factual findings of the Company Law Board unless they are shown to be perverse, unsupported by evidence, or legally unsustainable. 

Allegations of oppression, illegal appointments, siphoning of funds, and procedural irregularities must be substantiated by cogent evidence and continuous oppressive conduct. Even assuming some irregularity in the conduct of the EGM, the Court held that a solitary incident is insufficient to establish oppression unless there is proof of continuous burdensome and prejudicial conduct. 

On the allegation of siphoning of funds, the Court held that the appellant was essentially challenging factual findings already examined by the Company Law Board. The High Court found no perversity in the CLB’s conclusion and observed that the increase in share capital was driven by a bona fide requirement to reconstruct the factory premises. The appellant failed to establish conduct amounting to oppression or departure from the standards of probity and fair dealing required under Sections 397 and 398 of the Act. 

Regarding the appointment of additional directors, the Court observed that the appellant had failed to show that his consent was necessary for such appointments. The challenge was raised after substantial delay and the appellant was unable to establish any enforceable right to a directorship. The Court also noted that directorship is a personal fiduciary office and cannot be inherited or claimed through testamentary arrangements.        


Financier’s contractual right to repossess a vehicle, subject to proof of the borrower’s default, does not authorize recovery agents to seize it at gunpoint       

The Allahabad High Court in the case of Sadab Ahmad vs State of UP [WRIT – C No. – 36407 of 2026] dated October 26, 2026, has held that financier’s contractual right to repossess a vehicle, subject to proof of the borrower’s default, does not authorize recovery agents to seize it at gunpoint. Such rights must be enforced through a judicial forum or arbitrator.  The Court found that HDB had not specifically denied the allegation that its recovery agent intercepted Ahmad’s vehicle, seized it at gunpoint and compelled him to sign the repossession inventory. 

The Court preserved the lender’s contractual right to repossess, subject to proof of default, but held that enforcement must proceed through a judicial forum or arbitrator, not private force. The Court tentatively found regular instalment deposits and thirteen bounced cheques whose payments appeared to have been made good with charges. 

The Court treated the gunpoint seizure illegal and observed that a finance company’s contractual recovery rights, subject to proof of default, do not authorise recovery agents to intercept a borrower and seize a vehicle through violence or intimidation. The contractual provisions did not confer State-like coercive powers.   


Merely because directors belong to the same family or exercise control over the company does not justify lifting the corporate veil. A company is a separate legal entity and that directors cannot be personally saddled with corporate liabilities merely because they control or manage the company  

The Madras High Court in the case of Salma Export Import Agency vs Eastern Chrome Tanning Corpn. Pvt Ltd. [CS No. 497 of 2019] dated October 26, 2026, has reiterated the settled principle that merely because directors belong to the same family or exercise control over the company does not justify lifting the corporate veil. The Court reaffirmed that a company is a separate legal entity and that directors cannot be personally saddled with corporate liabilities merely because they control or manage the company. 

Allegations that the company was a family-run concern or was being used to evade liabilities were not supported by specific pleadings or cogent evidence. In the absence of proof of fraud, personal guarantees, or misuse of the corporate form, the directors could not be held personally liable. 

The Court observed that where a party relies on a part-payment to obtain a fresh period of limitation under Section 19 of the Limitation Act, the burden lies on that party to establish not only the payment but also compliance with the statutory requirements. The Court held that the plaintiff’s ledger entries alone could not establish such payment. While entries in regularly maintained books of account are relevant under Section 34 of the Evidence Act, they are insufficient by themselves to fasten liability.   


Mere printing of company name on alleged counterfeit tin sheets cannot attract Copyright Act in the absence of any allegation regarding infringement of a copyrighted artistic logo, and merely using a company’s name on products is different from using its logo  

The Bombay High Court in the case of Shadab Sheikh Qayyum Sheikh vs State of Maharashtra [Criminal Application [APL] No. 918 of 2026] dated November 06, 2026, has ruled that mere printing of “JSW Steel Ltd.” on alleged counterfeit tin sheets cannot attract the Copyright Act in the absence of any allegation regarding infringement of a copyrighted artistic logo. The Court clarified that merely using a company’s name on products is different from using its logo, and the FIR contained no allegation that any copyrighted logo or artistic work of JSW Steel Ltd. had been copied or infringed. 

The complaint did not assert that the name “JSW Steel Ltd.” constituted an artistic work protected under the Copyright Act, nor that any copyright in such work had been infringed. According to the Court, sale or storage of alleged counterfeit goods bearing a company’s name could, at best, attract Section 104 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, relating to false trade marks. 

The High Court observed that copyright under Section 13 of the Copyright Act subsists only in specified categories of works, including original literary, dramatic, musical and artistic works. While a logo may qualify as an artistic work capable of copyright protection, the FIR in the present case did not allege that any logo of the company was used by the applicant. 

The Court noted that the FIR merely alleged use of the company’s name on tin sheets. It emphasized that there is a clear distinction between a company’s name and its logo. The FIR did not state that the name “JSW Steel Ltd.” was an artistic work, that any copyright subsisted in it, or that any such copyright had been infringed. According to the Court, the allegations disclosed a case of sale or possession of counterfeit goods bearing a false trade mark rather than copyright infringement. Therefore, the facts, even if accepted as true, could at best attract Section 104 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, and not Sections 51 and 63 of the Copyright Act. 

The Court further found that, under Section 115(4) of the Trade Marks Act, search and seizure in such matters must be conducted by a police officer not below the rank of Deputy Superintendent of Police after following the statutory procedure. However, in the present case, the search and seizure had been conducted by a Police Sub-Inspector, contrary to the mandatory requirement of law. This rendered the investigation and consequent proceedings legally defective. 

The Court clarified that although an FIR is not expected to contain every minute detail, it must nevertheless disclose the commission of a cognizable offence. Since the allegations failed to make out an offence under the Copyright Act, continuation of the proceedings would amount to abuse of the process of law.  


Once the alleged violation under Section 227(3)(d) of the Companies Act, 1956 was compounded by the competent authority, the very foundation of prosecution under Section 233 ceased to survive  

The Patna High Court in the case of Subodh Kumar Goel vs State of Bihar [Criminal Miscellaneous No.61998 of 2017] dated November 02, 2026, has held that once the alleged violation under Section 227(3)(d) of the Companies Act, 1956 was compounded by the competent authority, the very foundation of prosecution under Section 233 ceased to survive. The Court therefore quashed criminal proceedings initiated against auditor for alleged non-compliance with accounting standards under the Companies Act, 1956. 

Relying on V.L.S. Finance Ltd. v. Union of India [(2013) 6 SCC 27]8, the Court reiterated that offences under the Companies Act can be compounded even after institution of prosecution and such compounding carries the consequence of discharge of the concerned officer or company. 

The Court found that the prosecution under Section 233 of the Companies Act, 1956 was entirely founded on the alleged contravention of Section 227(3)(d). Once the competent authority had compounded the very contravention forming the basis of the prosecution, the foundation of the criminal case itself ceased to exist. Relying on the Supreme Court’s decision in V.L.S. Finance Ltd. v. Union of India [(2013) 6 SCC 278], the Court noted that statutory compounding can take place even after institution of prosecution. 

The High Court further observed that although the record did not show that the Registrar had formally communicated the compounding order to the trial court, such a procedural lapse could not justify continuation of a prosecution for an offence that had already been compounded by the competent statutory authority. The Court emphasized that the compounding order remained valid and had not been challenged or set aside by any authority.  


MSME promoter cannot be excluded under Section 29A(b) IBC merely because companies where he serves as director appear in wilful-defaulter records, and a person cannot be disqualified from submitting a resolution plan merely because a company in which he is a director has been categorized as a wilful defaulter  

The National Company Law Tribunal (Bengaluru Bench) in the case of V.V.S.R Anjaneyulu Vattem vs Gullapalli Kishore Babu [I.A No. 150, 341, 511 & 1079/2026] dated October 28, 2026, has ruled that MSME promoter cannot be excluded under Section 29A(b) IBC merely because companies where he serves as director appear in wilful-defaulter records, and personal classification as a wilful defaulter must be established. The NCLT held that a person cannot be disqualified from submitting a resolution plan merely because a company in which he is a director has been categorized as a wilful defaulter. 

The Tribunal reiterated that promoters of MSME corporate debtors continue to enjoy exemption from Section 29A(c) and 29A(h), though not from Section 29A(b). The Tribunal observed that Section 29A creates statutory disqualifications and each clause must be examined independently. It noted that under Section 240A of the IBC, promoters of MSME corporate debtors are exempted from the applicability of Section 29A(c) and Section 29A(h), though not from Section 29A(b). 

The Tribunal found that the material placed before it did not show that the applicant himself had been classified as a wilful defaulter. The records only reflected that the companies in which he was a director were categorized as wilful defaulters. Merely being a director of a company appearing in wilful-defaulter records does not automatically make a person a wilful defaulter under Section 29A(b). 

The Bench emphasized that it is necessary to determine whether the individual himself has been classified as a wilful defaulter in accordance with RBI guidelines. In the absence of material establishing such personal classification, the disqualification under Section 29A(b) could not be invoked solely because companies associated with the applicant were appearing in the wilful-defaulters list. 


Unpaid dues arising from coal supply and transportation services remain Operational Debt, and repayment arrangements, interest clauses, and mortgage security cannot convert trade debt into Financial Debt under the IBC  

The Bengaluru Bench of the National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT) in the case of V.V.S.R. Anjaneyulu Vattem vs Resolution Professional of Sri Balaji Cement and Power Limited [I.A No. 341 & 1079/2026] dated November 02, 2026, has held that unpaid dues arising from coal supply and transportation services remain Operational Debt, and repayment arrangements, interest clauses, and mortgage security cannot convert trade debt into Financial Debt under the IBC. Further, where the claim arose from supply of coal and transportation services, it constitutes Operational Debt notwithstanding subsequent settlement arrangements. 

The NCLT clarified that an acknowledgment of liability coupled with structured repayment terms cannot transform a trade debt into a borrowing carrying the characteristics of a financial transaction. The creation of a mortgage or registered charge over the Corporate Debtor’s assets merely secures the existing liability and does not alter the underlying nature of the debt. Further, in the absence of disbursal against consideration for the time value of money, a claim cannot qualify as ‘Financial Debt’ under Section 5(8) of the IBC. 

The NCLT observed that there was no dispute that the original transactions between the Corporate Debtor and P.D. Enterprises arose solely from the supply of coal and related transportation services. The outstanding amount represented unpaid trade dues accumulated over time. The Tribunal also noted that for a claim to qualify as a Financial Debt under Section 5(8) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, there must be a disbursement against consideration for the time value of money or a transaction possessing the commercial effect of borrowing. Merely because parties subsequently execute a settlement arrangement, provide a repayment schedule, stipulate interest, or create security, the debt does not automatically become a Financial Debt. 

The Tribunal emphasized that the existence of MoUs, a mortgage deed, or a registered charge only acknowledged and secured the existing liability. These documents did not alter the fundamental nature of the underlying transaction, which remained a commercial supply arrangement between a purchaser and supplier. Relying on judicial precedents, the Tribunal held that a mere obligation to pay under a settlement agreement does not amount to a financial transaction involving the time value of money. It further observed that allowing operational debts to be converted into financial debts through subsequent agreements would defeat the distinction carefully maintained under the IBC between Financial Creditors and Operational Creditors.  

 

Clients’ Experiences

Latest Articles

Internship & Articleship

Error: Contact form not found.

Disclaimer

By proceeding further and clicking on the “I ACCEPT” button below, you acknowledge that you of your own accord wish to know more about SNG & Partners (“The Firm”) for your own information and use. You further acknowledge that there has been no solicitation, invitation or inducement of any sort whatsoever from SNG & Partners or any of its employees, partners, associates or members to create an attorney-client relationship through this website. You further acknowledge having read and understood this Disclaimer.

This website is a resource for informational purposes only and is intended, but not promised or guaranteed, to be correct, complete, and up-to-date. While SNG & Partners has taken utmost care to ensure accuracy and completeness of the information contained on this website, the Firm does not warrant that the information contained on this website is accurate or complete, and hereby disclaims any and all liability for any loss or damage caused or alleged to have been caused to any person by relying on any information contained on this website. The contents of this website should not be construed as an opinion, legal or otherwise, on any issue or subject. 

SNG & Partners further assumes no liability for the interpretation and/or use of the information contained in this website, nor does it offer a warranty of any kind, either expressed or implied. The owner of this website does not intend links from this site to other Internet websites to be referrals to, endorsements of, or affiliations with the linked entities. The Firm is not responsible for, and makes no representations or warranties about the contents of websites to which links may be provided from this website.

Furthermore, the owner of this website does not wish to represent anyone desiring representation based solely upon viewing this website or in a Country/State where this website fails to comply with local laws and ethical rules of that state. You may note that the use of the internet or email for conveying confidential or sensitive information is susceptible to risks of disclosure associated with sending email over the internet.

The Firm advises against the use of the communication platform provided on this website for exchange of any confidential, business or politically sensitive information. User is expected to use his or her judgment and such information shared will be solely at the user’s risk.

Communication through this website in any form shall be for the purpose of enquiries only and shall not hold good for service of any kind of court proceedings, summons, advance notice, pleadings etc. For service of any such document and/or notice to the Firm and/or to any of its partners under the act or rules including under CPC, Cr. PC and/or any other law shall be served at our concerned office or to the concerned advocate dealing with the matter.