Legal Updates (July 27 – Aug 01, 2026)
Legal Updates (July 27 – Aug 01, 2026)
CASE UPDATES
The moratorium under Section 14 of the IBC is limited to the corporate debtor and cannot be automatically extended to directors, promoters, associated entities, or landowners
The Supreme Court in the case of Tejas J. Shah vs Mantri Technology Constellations [Civil Appeal Nos.4289-4290 of 2025] dated July 27, 2026, has held that a moratorium under Section 14 of the IBC is confined to the corporate debtor alone and cannot be extended to shield other respondents who are not themselves protected by any statutory moratorium. Therefore, where a consumer complaint is pending against multiple parties, the mere commencement of CIRP against one corporate debtor does not justify freezing or indefinitely adjourning the proceedings against the remaining non-corporate-debtor respondents. Essentially, the Court has reaffirmed that the moratorium under Section 14 of the IBC is limited to the corporate debtor and cannot be automatically extended to directors, promoters, associated entities, or landowners.
The Court also laid down that an adjudicatory forum cannot refuse to proceed against non-protected parties by prematurely assuming that no liability can arise against them, especially when that very issue remains to be decided. The existence or absence of privity, maintainability, or independent obligation under the agreements are matters for adjudication on merits and cannot be used at the interlocutory stage to shut down the proceedings altogether against such respondents.
The Court made it clear that the scope of the moratorium cannot be expanded beyond the statute. It observed that Section 14 applies only to the corporate debtor and does not automatically protect other persons or entities such as subsidiary companies, directors, managers, promoters, or personal guarantors unless the law specifically says so. Referring to earlier precedents, the Court reiterated that proceedings can continue against non-corporate-debtor parties even if the corporate debtor itself is protected by moratorium.
Intent to deceive or proof of actual damage is not a necessary element in a passing off action, and Section 34 of the Trade Marks Act cannot be invoked by a subsequent user whose use postdates the prior user’s adoption of the mark
The Delhi High Court in the case of TV Today Network vs Surashtra Aaj Tak [CM APPL. 80300/2025] dated July 30, 2026, has held that a disclaimer-based mandatory injunction is an inadequate and erroneous remedy when the elements of passing off are fully satisfied. The prior user of a mark can maintain a passing off action irrespective of registration status, and registration merely recognises pre-existing common law rights. The Court also emphasised that an addition of a geographical prefix to an established and distinctive mark does not dispel confusion but may reinforce the likelihood of association. Further, the intent to deceive or proof of actual damage is not a necessary element in a passing off action, and Section 34 of the Trade Marks Act cannot be invoked by a subsequent user whose use postdates the prior user’s adoption of the mark.
On the element of goodwill and reputation, the Court relied on the earlier Delhi High Court judgment in Living Media India Limited v. Jitender V. Jain [2002 SCC OnLine Del 605], which had held that while the words ‘Aaj’ and ‘Tak’ may individually be descriptive and dictionary words, their combination enjoys protection as a trademark when subject to long, prior and continuous use by a particular party, and that any prefix or suffix would be irrelevant in a passing off action.
On misrepresentation and likelihood of confusion, the Court observed that the respondent had incorporated the entirety of the appellant’s mark ‘Aaj Tak’ and merely prefixed a geographical identifier. The prefix ‘Saurashtra’ did not negate the association but rather reinforced it by suggesting a regional arm of the same business. The Court examined the respondent’s newspaper and Advertisement Rate Card on record, noting that the words ‘Aaj Tak’ appeared in bold and in a larger font while ‘Saurashtra’ was in a smaller font, clearly indicating an attempt to pass off on the appellant’s goodwill.
On likelihood of damage, the Court held that actual damage need not be proved in a passing off action, a probability of damage is sufficient. The absence of an intention to deceive is not a defence to a passing off action. The Court rejected the respondent’s defence under Section 34 of the Trade Marks Act (prior user protection), holding that Section 34 applies only where the subsequent user’s use predates the use of the first-mentioned trademark. Since the appellant had been using ‘Aaj Tak’ since 2000 and the respondent commenced use only in 2002, Section 34 offered no protection to the respondent.
A proposal involving amendment of the memorandum of association and change in capital structure falls prima facie within that reserved matters regime and cannot be tabled before the Board without such prior consent
The Delhi High Court in the case of Resilient Innovations Private Limited (BharatPe) vs Unity Small Finance Bank Limited [O.M.P.(I) (COMM.) 293/2026] dated July 24, 2026, has held that where a shareholders’ agreement expressly provides that no “Reserved Matter” may even be taken up for discussion or approval without prior written consent of specified shareholders, a proposal involving amendment of the memorandum of association and change in capital structure falls prima facie within that reserved matters regime and cannot be tabled before the Board without such prior consent. This is especially so where the company’s own agenda note and prior correspondence expressly acknowledge that the matter is a reserved matter and seek consent accordingly.
The Court also laid down that where the warrant terms themselves state that the shareholders’ agreement will prevail in case of conflict, the company cannot rely on the warrant mechanics or regulatory backdrop to sidestep the consent requirement under the shareholders’ agreement at the interim stage. The Court treated the prior written consent requirement as mandatory, substantive and enforceable, not procedural or dispensable.
The Court made it clear at the outset that, since the matter was at the Section 9 interim stage, the issue was only whether BharatPe had established a prima facie case for urgent protection. The Court therefore focused on the language of the Shareholders’ Agreement, the warrant terms, and the impugned agenda note rather than undertaking a final determination on all disputed issues.
The Court found that the warrant terms did not help the respondents at this stage. Annexure A expressly stated that if there was any conflict between the warrant terms and the Shareholders’ Agreement, the Shareholders’ Agreement would prevail. The Court therefore held prima facie that the warrant framework remained subject to the consent architecture under the Shareholders’ Agreement, including in relation to transfer and exercise-related consequences where the action involved a reserved matter such as amendment of the memorandum or change in capital structure.
The Court then examined the impugned Agenda Item No. 18 and found that its own language undermined the respondents’ argument. The agenda itself recorded that the proposal was to increase authorised share capital, amend Clause V of the memorandum, and seek prior RBI approval. More importantly, the agenda note itself acknowledged that any amendment to the memorandum or change in capital structure was a reserved matter under the Shareholders’ Agreement, and that approval of both BharatPe and Centrum was being sought. The Court described it as “intriguing” that the respondents were now arguing before the Court that the matter was not a reserved matter, despite having themselves treated it as one in their own documents and prior correspondence.
The Court held that the real issue was not the downstream action after approval of the resolution, but the fact that amendment of the memorandum and change in capital structure were necessary preconditions for that action. Since those preconditions themselves fell within reserved matters, prior written consent of both shareholders was mandatory.
A difference between restaurant pricing and online platform pricing does not, by itself, establish abuse of dominance where the online model includes distinct additional services such as platform access and delivery, and where consumers voluntarily choose that convenience at disclosed additional cost
The Competition Commission of India (CCI) in the case of R. Suresh vs Eternal Limited (Formerly Zomato Limited) [Case No. 22 of 2026] dated July 23, 2026, has held that a difference between restaurant pricing and online platform pricing does not, by itself, establish abuse of dominance where the online model includes distinct additional services such as platform access and delivery, and where consumers voluntarily choose that convenience at disclosed additional cost. The Commission also held that complaints relating to platform fee, delivery fee and similar add-on charges are essentially issues of pricing under Section 4 of the Competition Act, but in the present case the material placed on record did not disclose any prima facie abusive conduct.
The Commission noted that the informant was essentially an end consumer aggrieved by higher pricing on the food delivery platform as compared to the restaurant, the charging of platform fee without identifiable service justification, drip pricing, and overlapping charges such as delivery fee and platform fee. It observed that although allegations were framed under both Sections 3 and 4 of the Act, the real substance of the grievance related to unfair prices and charges, which are matters that may be examined under Section 4, and therefore no further analysis under Section 3 was required.
On the issue of higher pricing on the platform compared to the restaurant, the Commission took a prima facie view that such difference may not amount to abuse because sale through an online platform includes additional services such as platform access and delivery services, unlike direct restaurant purchase. The Commission explained that online food delivery platforms are multi-sided platforms: they charge platform fee from consumers for online food services, delivery fee for transport of food, and commission from restaurant partners for facilitating sales through the platform. It further noted that since commissions are paid by restaurants, restaurants may pass on that burden to consumers by increasing menu prices on the platform, and taxes apply in both models.
The Commission also observed that a consumer unable or unwilling to visit the restaurant may choose the convenience of online food delivery by paying additional charges such as delivery fee and platform fee. It held that the business model of offline restaurant sale and online food delivery is different, and therefore the price of the same food product may legitimately vary across the two channels. The Commission additionally remarked that the informant had relied only on a single low-priced food item costing INR 100 to show an 88% difference, and if the food item were priced higher, the percentage difference would naturally reduce because delivery charge is generally a fixed charge and may also vary with distance.
As regards drip pricing, the Commission described it as a sales technique where only part of the total price is shown initially and additional mandatory fees such as platform fee, delivery fee, taxes or surcharges are disclosed progressively during the purchase process. However, it held that such additional charges were linked to additional services and that consumers retained the option to accept or reject the order until the final stage of placing it. On that reasoning, the Commission concluded that drip pricing, by itself, did not raise any competition issue in the facts of the case.
Where a bank, after commencement of CIRP, debits the corporate debtor’s own cash credit account to satisfy letters of credit that were already outstanding before the insolvency commencement date, and for which the bank had already lodged its claim in CIRP, such debit amounts to recovery of pre-CIRP dues during the moratorium
The Indore Bench of the National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT) in the case of Prawincharan Prafulcharan Dwary vs Bank of India [IA/42(MP) 2021] dated July 10, 2026, has clarified that where a bank, after commencement of CIRP, debits the corporate debtor’s own cash credit account to satisfy letters of credit that were already outstanding before the insolvency commencement date, and for which the bank had already lodged its claim in CIRP, such debit amounts to recovery of pre-CIRP dues during the moratorium and is impermissible under Section 14 of the IBC. The Tribunal further held that any approval or acquiescence by the IRP/RP cannot cure or legitimise such a prohibited recovery.
The Tribunal confined itself only to the narrowed claim concerning the five pre-CIRP LCs. On the bank’s defence based on judgments concerning performance bank guarantees and margin money for letters of credit, the Tribunal found that the present case involved direct debit from the corporate debtor’s own cash credit account.
The Tribunal noted that when a creditor bank applies credits received in the corporate debtor’s own account, after the insolvency commencement date, towards discharge of its own pre-CIRP dues, it amounts in substance to recovery of pre-CIRP debt during the moratorium period. The bench relied on the reasoning adopted in earlier insolvency rulings where similar recoveries from the corporate debtor’s account during CIRP were treated as impermissible preferential recovery and ordered to be reversed. It also drew a distinction between pre-CIRP LCs and LCs opened during CIRP, and accepted that this distinction was legally significant.
A key observation of the Tribunal was that even if the erstwhile IRP had authorised or acquiesced in these debit entries to maintain business continuity, such approval could not validate a recovery that Section 14 itself prohibits. The Tribunal made it clear that neither the IRP nor the RP can legally permit one creditor to recover its own pre-CIRP dues from the assets of the corporate debtor during moratorium in a manner that gives it preference over similarly placed creditors.
The Tribunal also rejected the bank’s objections on maintainability, non-joinder and limitation. It held that seeking reversal of wrongly appropriated amounts was part of the liquidator’s duty to protect and preserve the assets of the corporate debtor under Section 35(1)(d), and no prior approval of the Stakeholders’ Consultation Committee was shown to be mandatory for filing such proceedings. It further held that impleading the erstwhile IRP or LC beneficiaries was unnecessary because the relief sought was only against the bank in relation to entries in the corporate debtor’s own account.
Registered money lender under the Gujarat Money Lenders Act, 2011, who arranges financing for the purpose of enabling a corporate debtor to repay an existing bank loan, does not qualify as a “financial creditor” and the amount advanced does not qualify as “financial debt”
The Ahmedabad Bench of the National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT) in the case of Mangaldas Finance vs Milano Papers Private Limited [C.P.(IB)/38(AHM)2026] dated July 15, 2026, has held that a registered money lender under the Gujarat Money Lenders Act, 2011, who arranges financing for the purpose of enabling a corporate debtor to repay an existing bank loan, does not qualify as a “financial creditor” and the amount advanced does not qualify as “financial debt” within the meaning of Section 5(7) and Section 5(8) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016. The Tribunal emphasised that transfer of funds from the applicant’s own loan account with a cooperative bank to the corporate debtor’s Yes Bank account cannot be construed as a loan disbursement to the corporate debtor.
A money lender regulated under a state enactment, subject to the prohibitions on mode of recovery under Section 39 of the Gujarat Money Lenders Act, 2011, is ineligible to maintain a petition under Section 7 of the IBC. The petition, appearing collusive in nature, with no properly ascertainable date of default and no compliance with the terms of the money lender’s licence, is liable to be dismissed with costs, added the Tribunal.
The Tribunal observed that the petitioner was a money lender registered under the Gujarat Money Lenders Act, 2011, which is a state-regulated statute. The licence/registration in Form 3 was submitted for the period from Feb 20, 2024 to Feb 19, 2029. However, the applicant had not submitted any income tax filing, and had only submitted the PAN card of an individual named Asit Surendrabhai Shah. The stated loan was sanctioned to repay the corporate debtor’s outstanding loan to Yes Bank. The Tribunal held that a repayment arrangement made to enable the corporate debtor to repay its existing bank loan cannot be construed as the activity of a money lender, and the loan so granted by the applicant did not qualify as financial debt under Section 5(7) and Section 5(8) of the IBC, 2016.
The Tribunal further observed that the applicant could not be assigned the status of a financial creditor under the provisions of the IBC, 2016, even if it had arranged the facility. The stated amount was transferred from the Social Cooperative Bank (the applicant’s loan account) to the Yes Bank account, which the Tribunal held could not be construed as a loan disbursement to the respondent corporate debtor.
The Tribunal noted that Section 39 of the Gujarat Money Lenders Act regulates the money lender’s activity and imposes certain prohibitions regarding the mode of recovery, as also reflected in a Government of Gujarat Notification. The Tribunal concluded that the applicant was ineligible to file an application under Section 7 of the IBC, 2016, as the provisions of the IBC are for CIRP as defined in Chapter II, Section 6 and Section 7 of the IBC, and the applicant did not comply with the requirements for recovery of amount.
Where an auction purchaser of assets of a company in liquidation applies for a fresh electricity connection after the earlier connection has already been dismantled, the electricity distribution licensee cannot insist on payment of the previous consumer’s arrears as a condition for giving supply
The Kerala High Court in the case of G. Nagendran vs Kerala State Electricity Board [W.A.NO.1718 OF 2022] dated July 28, 2026, has held that where an auction purchaser of assets of a company in liquidation applies for a fresh electricity connection after the earlier connection has already been dismantled, the electricity distribution licensee cannot insist on payment of the previous consumer’s arrears as a condition for giving supply, because the governing statutory framework requires those dues to be recovered from the earlier owner or occupier and not from the purchaser.
The Court also laid down that a general clause creating a first charge on a consumer’s assets under Regulation 19 of the KSEB Terms and Conditions of Supply, 2005 cannot be used against a subsequent purchaser unless there exists a legally enforceable charge referable to the applicable service connection agreement. Where the old arrears arose under a pre-2005 arrangement, and the sale deed itself conveyed the assets free from encumbrances and statutory liabilities, the Board cannot recover those dues from the auction purchaser.
The Court further clarified that once the electricity board has submitted its claim in the liquidation proceedings, it must await recovery in accordance with company liquidation law along with other creditors, and cannot sidestep that process by refusing a fresh connection to the auction purchaser until old arrears are paid.
The Court observed that the appellant had applied for a new electricity connection, not for restoration or transfer of the old one, because the previous connection had already been dismantled. For such a case, Section 43 of the Electricity Act, Regulation 12 of the Kerala Electricity Supply Code, 2005, and Regulation 7 of the KSEB Terms and Conditions of Supply, 2005 clearly provided that arrears of the previous owner or occupier had to be recovered from that previous consumer and not from the purchaser.
The Court further observed that the charge contemplated under Regulation 19 of the 2005 Terms and Conditions could operate only in respect of assets covered by a service connection agreement executed after those terms came into force. In the present case, the arrears related to the earlier owner whose service connection agreement had been entered into before 2005. Therefore, this was not a case where an enforceable charge existed over the assets purchased by the appellant.
The Court also found, contrary to the view taken by the Single Judge, that KSEB had in fact participated in the liquidation proceedings and had lodged its claim before the Official Liquidator for the same arrears. Once KSEB had come into the winding up process as a creditor, it could not bypass that process and indirectly convert its unsecured claim into a preferential recovery against the auction purchaser, to the prejudice of other secured creditors entitled to claim against the sale proceeds.
The Court gave importance to the wording of the sale deed as well. It noted that the assets were expressly conveyed to the appellant without encumbrance and without statutory liability of the vendor company. In that situation, KSEB was estopped from demanding the previous consumer’s dues from the appellant merely because he had purchased the company’s assets in auction.
Since Open AI stores the literary works for training purposes, in a closed space without access to the public, and that data is accessible only to the LLM models themselves and is not publicly available to any human entity either for access or for download, such act does not amount to infringement under Section 51 of Copyright Act
The Delhi High Court in the case of ANI Media vs Open AI Opco LLC [I.A. 45300/2024] dated July 24, 2026, has addressed whether the training of Large Language Models (LLMs) like ChatGPT on copyrighted news data constitutes infringement or protected “fair dealing”. The Court has held that the storage of original literary works for the sole purpose of training an LLM qualifies as fair dealing, provided the use is transformative and does not substitute the original work’s market.
Since ANI’s alleged injury was quantifiable (as ANI itself had offered Open AI a license to all its digital media video, imagery, photographic and/or news content owned or within the control of ANI for a fee of USD 7.5 million in terms of ANI’s letter dated 3rd October 2024), the High Court held that it did not meet the threshold of “irreparable loss” required for an injunction. Further, the Court clarified that public interest serves as a vital factor, and granting an injunction would harm millions of users who benefit from AI in education, healthcare, and research.
On the “reproduction claim”, the Court found that ANI failed to prove “substantial similarity” between its news articles and ChatGPT’s responses. It noted that ANI used “adversarial prompts”, highly specific and repeated instructions, to try and force the AI to produce verbatim extracts, yet still failed to show substantial reproduction. The Court observed that ChatGPT uses Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) to pull from multiple external sources, making its output a transformative summary rather than a literal copy.
As far as AI Training & Fair Dealing is concerned, the Court examined whether storing data for AI training is “fair dealing” under Section 52(1)(a) of the Copyright Act. It observed that such use is highly transformative and does not result in “market substitution” because ChatGPT and ANI perform fundamentally different functions. The Court highlighted that requiring licenses from every source for AI training would be economically unviable and would stifle technological progress.
As far as “Higher Threshold” for News Articles is concerned, the Court explicitly distinguished between news articles and more creative works such as songs, noting that the “creativity involved in writing lyrics of a song would ordinarily not be present to the same extent in a news article”. Since the fundamental purpose of a news article is to report events that have actually occurred, the Court held that the threshold for establishing substantial similarity in expression is higher for news. Referring to the US Supreme Court in Feist Publications v. Rural Telephone Service [499 U.S. 340 (1991)], the High Court noted that copyright in factual compilations or news is “thin”. This means that while the specific arrangement might be protected, the underlying facts remain free for anyone to use and restate.
To determine infringement, the Court looked at whether a reader would get an ‘unmistakable impression’ that the second work is a copy. For news, the Court looked for ‘transparent rephrasing’ or literal imitation of the “form, manner, arrangement, and expression” rather than just the shared facts. In cases of creative works like songs, identical reproduction from non-adversarial prompts was seen as evidence of ‘infringement’. In contrast, the Court found that ANI used adversarial prompts, highly specific, repeated instructions designed to ‘force’ the AI to produce verbatim extracts, and yet the AI still failed to produce a response that was ‘substantially similar’ to ANI’s original expression.
As far as ‘Adversarial prompts’ are concerned, the Court used this expression to describe a prompt that is deliberately framed to make the model produce a specific or exact output, instead of asking a neutral question in an ordinary user manner. The Court describes such prompts as “carefully designed inputs that manipulate model outputs.” The Court treated this as important because ANI was not merely showing what ChatGPT ordinarily generated in the normal course, rather it was trying to extract a near-verbatim response through specially engineered instructions.
In simple terms, the Court viewed adversarial prompts as stress-test prompts, not normal-use prompts. Because ANI had to push the model with commands like “tell me exactly what she said,” and because the relevant articles were not even part of the model’s training data timeline, the Court was not willing to infer that ChatGPT had memorised ANI’s articles. Instead, the Court treated ANI’s examples as insufficient to prove memorisation or regurgitation at the interim injunction stage.
Where offence u/s 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act had already been completed before commencement of insolvency proceedings under the IBC, later initiation of CIRP, declaration of moratorium under Section 14, or even liquidation of the company does not bar criminal prosecution against the directors or persons in charge under Sections 138 and 141 of the NI Act
The Punjab & Haryana High Court in the case of Ajay Gupta vs Can Bank Factors Limited [CRM-M-45498-2019 (O&M)] dated July 20, 2026, has held that where the offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act had already been completed before commencement of insolvency proceedings under the IBC, the later initiation of CIRP, declaration of moratorium under Section 14, or even liquidation of the company does not extinguish or bar criminal prosecution against the directors or persons in charge under Sections 138 and 141 of the NI Act. The moratorium protects the corporate debtor in respect of insolvency proceedings, but it does not grant immunity to natural persons from criminal liability already incurred on account of cheque dishonour.
The Court rejected the core submission of the petitioners that the later insolvency proceedings had rendered the complaint under Section 138 not maintainable. The Court noted that the cheques were issued and dishonoured in June 2015, the statutory notice had been served, and the complaint was filed on Sep 29, 2015. Therefore, the offence under Section 138 had already stood completed much before the corporate insolvency resolution process was initiated on Sep 29, 2017. In the Court’s view, once the criminal liability had crystallised, the subsequent commencement of insolvency proceedings could not erase or obliterate it.
Referring to the law laid down by the Supreme Court in P. Mohanraj v. Shah Brothers Ispat Pvt Ltd. [(2021) 6 SCC 258] and Ajay Kumar Radheshyam Goenka v. Tourism Finance Corporation of India Ltd. [(2023) 10 SCC 545], the Court reiterated the settled legal position that the moratorium under Section 14 of the IBC operates in favour of the corporate debtor, but the criminal liability of natural persons under Sections 138 and 141 of the NI Act continues unaffected. The Court specifically held that directors or persons in charge do not get absolved merely because insolvency resolution or liquidation proceedings have begun against the company.
On the argument that the petitioners had ceased to control the affairs of the company after appointment of the Interim Resolution Professional and later the Liquidator, the Court found no merit. It clarified that liability under Section 141 of the NI Act has to be examined with reference to the status of the accused when the offence was committed, namely when the cheques were issued and dishonoured. The later suspension or cessation of managerial powers by operation of the IBC does not wipe out criminal liability that had already attached at the time of the offence.
The High Court also rejected the argument that allowing the cheque dishonour prosecution to continue alongside IBC proceedings would amount to impermissible parallel proceedings. The Court observed that proceedings under Section 138 of the NI Act are predominantly criminal in nature, whereas the moratorium under the IBC is aimed at postponing civil debt enforcement. According to the Court, the moratorium is not meant to shield accused persons from criminal accountability arising from dishonour of cheques.
The Court further held that the petitioners were seeking quashing solely on the basis of subsequent insolvency proceedings, which was not legally sustainable. Questions such as whether the petitioners were actually in charge of and responsible for the conduct of the company’s business at the relevant time, and whether all ingredients of Sections 138 and 141 of the NI Act are made out, are matters for the trial Court to decide on evidence. At the quashing stage, the High Court found no illegality or perversity in either the complaint or the summoning order.
REGULATORY UPDATES
RBI Consolidates All Special Rupee Vostro Account Instructions into Single Circular, Says SRVA mechanism is now institutionalised channel for INR-denominated cross-border settlement
The Reserve Bank of India (RBI), vide its circular A.P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 19 dated July 17, 2026, has consolidated and rationalised the instructions previously issued across five separate circulars governing International Trade Settlement in Indian Rupees (INR). The earlier circulars so superseded are: A.P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 10 dated July 11, 2022; Circular No. 08 dated November 17, 2023; Circular No. 11 dated June 11, 2024; A.P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 08 dated August 05, 2025; and A.P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 14 dated October 03, 2025. The instructions contained in the circular have come into force with immediate effect. AD banks are directed to bring the contents of the circular to the notice of their constituents and customers concerned. The directions have been issued under Sections 10(4) and 11(1) of the Foreign Exchange Management Act (FEMA), 1999 (42 of 1999), and are without prejudice to any permissions or approvals required under any other law.
Key Takeaways
- Opening of Special Rupee Vostro Accounts: Authorised Dealer (AD) banks in India may open Special Rupee Vostro Accounts (SRVAs) of their own branches outside India or of a bank resident outside India, in terms of Regulation 7(1) of the Foreign Exchange Management (Deposit) Regulations, 2016. Notably, the opening of SRVA no longer requires a reference to the RBI for approval, as was previously the case under the earlier framework, this position was introduced vide the August 5, 2025 circular and has been carried forward into the present consolidated circular.
- Permissible Transactions Through SRVA: The settlement of cross-border trade transactions through the SRVA is stated to be an additional arrangement for invoicing, payment, and settlement of exports and imports in INR. Beyond trade transactions, all permissible capital and current account transactions under FEMA may also be settled through the SRVA. AD banks maintaining SRVA are further permitted to open an additional current account for exporters and importers, exclusively for the settlement of export/import transactions.
- Funding of SRVA: The SRVA may be funded by way of inward remittances or by transfer from other repatriable INR accounts, in terms of the Foreign Exchange Management (Deposit) Regulations, 2016. Additionally, proceeds accrued through permissible current and capital account transactions under FEMA can also be held in the SRVA.
- Investment in Debt Instruments: Investments in debt instruments out of the balances held in the SRVA shall be governed by the Master Direction — Reserve Bank of India (Non-resident Investment in Debt Instruments) Directions, 2025, as amended from time to time. This provision consolidates the earlier position introduced by the October 3, 2025 circular, which had specifically permitted investment of surplus balances in Non-Convertible Debentures (NCDs), bonds, and Commercial Papers.
- Documentation, Reporting, and FEDAI Directory: Documentation and reporting of cross-border transactions through the SRVA shall be done in terms of the extant guidelines under FEMA, 1999, issued from time to time. A new addition in the present circular is the requirement that the details of SRVA held by overseas correspondent banks with AD banks in India may be updated periodically in the “SRVA directory” published by FEDAI.
- Matters Not Carried Forward: Certain provisions from the earlier circulars have not been carried forward into the present consolidated circular. Specifically, the provisions relating to advance against exports, setting-off of export receivables, and bank guarantees, which were part of the original July 11, 2022 circular, are not part of the present circular. AD banks are directed to be guided by the extant instructions on these matters as amended from time to time. Additionally, the approval process for opening of SRVA, which was originally set out in the 2022 circular, was already superseded by the August 5, 2025 circular and accordingly does not find mention in the present circular.
Click here to read/ download the original notification
RBI Amends Payments Banks Governance Directions: Board Agenda Rationalised, Calendar of Reviews Overhauled
The Reserve Bank of India (RBI) has issued the Reserve Bank of India (Payments Banks – Governance) Amendment Directions, 2026, bearing reference number RBI/2026-27/179 and dated July 14, 2026, amending the earlier Reserve Bank of India (Payments Banks – Governance) Directions, 2025. The Amendment Directions shall come into force from October 01, 2026. The stated objective behind the Amendment Directions is to enable bank Boards to utilise their time effectively and to facilitate a more focused and qualitative engagement on strategy and risk governance.
Key Structural Changes to the Directions
The Amendment Directions introduce several modifications to the original Directions. Paragraph 23 of Chapter V has been deleted and reinserted, with slight modification, as a new paragraph 16A after paragraph 16. This new paragraph 16A provides that the Board shall exercise oversight on three specific matters: (i) risk management system, policy and strategy followed by the bank; (ii) exposures to related entities of the bank; and (iii) conformity with corporate governance standards, including the composition of various committees, their role and functions, periodicity of meetings, and compliance with coverage and review functions.
Paragraph 17 of Chapter IV and paragraphs 22, 24, 25, 26, and 27 of Chapter V have been deleted in their entirety. The title of Chapter V, which was previously “Calendar of Reviews and Board Meeting Procedures,” stands amended to “Matters to be placed before the Board.” This re-titling signals a shift from a procedural calendar-based approach to a more substantive matter-based framework for Board engagement.
New Paragraphs 27A and 27B: Categorisation of Board Matters:
After paragraph 27, two new paragraphs have been inserted into Chapter V. Paragraph 27A provides that, notwithstanding anything contained in extant RBI circulars or directions, the requirement for matters to be placed before the Board shall be as follows: (i) policies required to be placed before the Board for approval, and those in respect of which such approval can be delegated, shall be as specified in Appendix I, with review of policies specified for Board approval being delegable to Board Committees, with the Board approving only material amendments thereto; (ii) matters other than policies that are required to be placed before the Board for approval, review, or information shall be as specified in Appendix II A; and (iii) matters other than policies that may be delegated at the discretion of the Board shall be as specified in Appendix II B.
Paragraph 27B lays down key principles for determining the matters to be placed before the Board. The Board has ultimate responsibility for the bank’s business strategy and financial soundness, key personnel decisions, internal organisation and governance structure and practices, and risk management and compliance obligations, though it may delegate certain matters to Board Committees or Management Committees along with reporting requirements as may be necessary.
Appendix I: Policies Requiring Board Approval: Appendix I sets out a comprehensive list of 17 categories of policies that are required to be placed before the Board for approval. These include the Investment Policy, Risk Management Policy (covering market risk, operational risk, liquidity risk/ALM, cyber security, and fraud risk management), Outsourcing Policy, Policy on Digital Banking (covering digital payment products and prepaid payment instruments), IT Policy, Responsible Business Conduct Policy, Authorisation for Banking Outlets and Other Channels, Policy on Gold Deposits or Other Liability Products, Policy on Appointment and Remuneration of Auditors, Policy on Fit and Proper Assessment of Major Shareholders, Policy on Compensation of Directors/CEO/Material Risk Takers, CSR Policy, Compliance Policy, Policy on Protected Disclosure Scheme, Code of Conduct/Ethics Policy, KYC Policy, and Policy on Interest Rate on Deposits.
Appendix II A: Matters for Board Approval, Review, or Information: Appendix II A enumerates matters other than policies that are required to be placed before the Board. Matters requiring Board approval include acquisition of shares or voting rights, issuance of regulatory capital, reclassifications between investment categories, declaration of dividend, approval by Board of Directors in case of voluntary amalgamation, RTGS membership, appointment or reappointment of Managing Director and CEO, remuneration of Whole-Time Directors, appointment of the Chief Risk Officer, appointment of the Chief Compliance Officer, and undertaking business as Indian Agent under the Money Transfer Service Scheme.
Appendix II B: Matters Delegable at Board’s Discretion: Appendix II B lists matters that may be delegated at the discretion of the Board to specified Board Committees. Matters eligible for delegation for approval include risk assessment methodology for Risk-Based Internal Audit, annual audit plan, operational manual for constituent subsidiary general ledger accounts, allotment of special assignments other than statutory audit, annual banking outlet expansion plan, establishing new correspondent banking relationships, and authorisation and oversight of service providers owned or controlled by Directors or key managerial personnel.
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RBI’s Second Amendment to NBFC Stressed Assets Directions Mandates Prudential Norms for NBFCs Acquiring Immovable Assets from Defaulting Borrowers, Introduces Comprehensive Framework for Disclosure of Specified Non-Financial Assets (SNFAs)
The Reserve Bank of India (RBI), through its circular bearing reference number RBI/2026-27/189 dated July 16, 2026, has issued the Reserve Bank of India (Non-Banking Financial Companies – Resolution of Stressed Assets) Second Amendment Directions, 2026, amending the parent Directions issued in 2025 (hereinafter referred to as “the Directions”). The Amendment Directions have been issued in exercise of the powers conferred by Sections 45JA, 45L and 45M of the Reserve Bank of India Act, 1934; Sections 30A and 32 of the National Housing Bank Act, 1987; and Section 3 read with Section 31A and Section 6 of the Factoring Regulation Act, 2011, and all other laws enabling the RBI in this regard. The Amendment Directions shall come into force with effect from October 1, 2026.
The RBI has observed that an NBFC generally does not transact in immovable assets as part of its core business operations, other than in exceptional cases where it acquires such immovable assets in satisfaction of its claims on the borrower. In order to provide clarity on the prudential treatment of such specified non-financial assets including non-banking assets (NBAs), acquired by an NBFC through various mechanisms, the RBI has decided to issue prudential norms applicable in such cases. The Amendment Directions have been finalised after examination of the feedback received on the draft Directions issued on May 5, 2026.
Key Definitions and Policy Framework
New definition at Paragraph 10(15A) of the Directions, defining “specified non-financial asset” (SNFA) as an immovable asset acquired by an NBFC in satisfaction or part satisfaction of its claims on the borrower. A new Paragraph 16A has also been inserted, mandating that every NBFC’s policy shall incorporate suitable clauses for acquisition of an SNFA and disposal thereof. Such policy provisions shall specify, inter alia, the limit on SNFAs as a share of total assets, eligibility criteria, delegation matrix, recovery efforts to be explored before acquisition, and a maximum period for disposal not exceeding seven years.
Prudential Norms on Specified Non-Financial Assets: A new Chapter VII-A has been inserted into the Directions, containing Paragraphs 138A through 138O, which comprehensively govern the acquisition, valuation, disposal, and disclosure of SNFAs.
Applicability and Transitional Compliance: Paragraph 138A provides that the provisions of this Chapter shall cover all SNFAs, including those acquired through bilateral acquisitions or through the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest (SARFAESI) Act, 2002. Paragraph 138B mandates that in respect of any SNFA outstanding in the books of an NBFC as on September 30, 2026 (termed “Legacy SNFAs”), compliance with these Directions shall be achieved latest by September 30, 2027.
Conditions for Acquisition: Paragraph 138C clarifies that an SNFA shall be deemed to have been acquired only if the title of the asset is transferred in the name of the NBFC, and the NBFC is in a clear position to deal with the asset on its own. Paragraph 138D stipulates that an SNFA shall be acquired only in cases where an NBFC’s exposure to a borrower is classified as non-performing. Paragraph 138E permits an SNFA to be acquired from the borrower against full or partial extinguishment of the NBFC’s exposure on a non-recourse basis. Paragraph 138F further provides that partial extinguishment of exposure shall be treated as restructuring, and the residual exposure to the borrower shall attract the prudential treatment applicable to restructuring as contained in the Directions.
Valuation Norms: Paragraph 138G provides that upon acquisition, an SNFA shall be recorded in the balance sheet at the lower of the net book value (NBV) of the extinguished exposure or the distress sale value (DSV) of the SNFA arrived at by at least two independent external valuers. Paragraph 138H deals with the methodology for partial extinguishment, providing that the NBV of the extinguished exposure shall be calculated on a proportionate basis, i.e., as a proportion of the share of extinguished debt. An illustrative example has been provided: if the loan outstanding as of March 31, 2026 is ₹2 lakhs with 10% specific provisions (NBV of ₹1.8 lakhs), and ₹1.5 lakhs (75%) is sought to be extinguished by acquisition of an SNFA with a DSV of ₹1.4 lakhs, then upon acquisition, the residual value of the loan on the books of the NBFC shall be reduced to ₹0.5 lakhs with associated specific provision of ₹0.05 lakhs, and the SNFA shall be valued at the lower of (DSV, NBV), where NBV shall be calculated on a proportionate basis.
Paragraph 138I provides that at each subsequent reporting date, the SNFA shall be carried on the balance sheet at the revised NBV, which shall be the value of the extinguished exposure, net of the notional provisions applicable, had the exposure continued on the books of the NBFC. In case of partial extinguishment, the revised NBV of the SNFA shall be the extinguished fraction of the NBV of the original exposure.
Disposal of SNFAs: Paragraph 138J mandates that an NBFC shall dispose of the SNFA within the maximum period of disposal as envisaged in the NBFC’s policy, subject to an outer maximum period of seven years. Paragraph 138K requires that an NBFC shall make all efforts to dispose of the SNFA at the earliest through a public auction, and for this purpose, the NBFC shall adhere to the principles of auction enshrined in the SARFAESI Act, 2002. Paragraph 138L prohibits the sale of an SNFA back to the borrower or its related parties, with “related parties” having the same meaning as defined in the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016. This restriction on sale back to the borrower or its related parties shall continue to be adhered to even in cases where the SNFA has ceased to be an SNFA in terms of Paragraph 138M. Paragraph 138M provides that an SNFA put to the NBFC’s own use shall cease to be classified as an SNFA from the date of being put to use and shall be recorded under the accounting head “Fixed assets” or under any other relevant accounting head.
Disclosure and Reporting Requirements: Paragraph 138N provides that SNFAs shall not be included in the total stock of residual exposure, Gross NPA, Net NPA, Stressed exposures, or Provisioning Coverage Ratio. The same shall be disclosed under the relevant accounting head in the balance sheet of the NBFC as “Specified Non-Financial Assets”, in accordance with the applicable regulations and accounting standards. Paragraph 138O mandates that an NBFC shall report the details of the SNFAs as per the formats provided in Annex-2, on the CIMS portal. In case of NBFC-HFCs, the details may be furnished to the National Housing Bank (NHB).
Reporting Formats: Annex-2 prescribes two reporting tables. Table 1, titled “Stock Position of SNFAs”, requires disclosure of the total value and number of SNFAs as on the balance sheet date, broken down by age buckets of 0–3 years, 3–5 years, and 5–7 years. Table 2, titled “Movement of SNFAs”, requires disclosure of the total SNFAs at the beginning of the year, SNFAs acquired during the year, SNFAs disposed of during the year, SNFAs put to own use during the year, and the total SNFAs at the end of the year (computed as beginning balance plus acquisitions minus disposals minus assets put to own use).
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RBI Overhauls Credit Derivatives Regime: CDS, TRS, and Credit Index Futures Brought Under Unified 2026 Master Direction
The Reserve Bank of India (RBI), through its Financial Markets Regulation Department, issued the Master Direction – Reserve Bank of India (Credit Derivatives) Directions, 2026, vide Notification No. FMRD.DIRD.03/14.03.004/2026-27 dated June 25, 2026. These Directions were issued in exercise of the powers conferred under Section 45W of the Reserve Bank of India Act, 1934, read with Section 45U of the Act, and in supersession of the earlier directions issued vide FMRD.DIRD.11/14.03.004/2021-22 dated February 10, 2022 and A.P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 23 dated February 10, 2022. The genesis of these Directions lies in Paragraph 13 of the Statement on Developmental and Regulatory Policies announced as part of the Bi-monthly Monetary Policy Statement for 2025-26 dated February 06, 2026, which flagged the introduction of derivatives on credit indices and total return swaps on corporate bonds. Draft directions were released for public comments on February 06, 2026, and based on the feedback received, the final Directions have been issued. These Directions come into force with immediate effect from June 25, 2026.
The Directions are titled the Master Direction – Reserve Bank of India (Credit Derivatives) Directions, 2026, and they apply to credit derivatives transactions undertaken in both Over-the-Counter (OTC) markets and on recognised stock exchanges in India. The Directions came into force on June 25, 2026. A reference is also made to the Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999, the Foreign Exchange Management (Debt Instruments) Regulations, 2019, and the Master Direction – Reserve Bank of India (Non-resident Investment in Debt Instruments) Directions, 2025, dated January 7, 2025, as amended from time to time, indicating that cross-border investment considerations are woven into the regulatory framework.
Key Definitions
A “Credit Default Swap (CDS)” is defined as a credit derivative contract in which one counterparty (the protection seller) commits to pay the other counterparty (the protection buyer) in the case of a credit event with respect to a reference entity, and in return, the protection buyer makes periodic payments (premium) to the protection seller until the maturity of the contract or the credit event, whichever is earlier. A “Total Return Swap (TRS)” is defined as a credit derivative contract under which one counterparty (the total return payer) commits to transfer the entire economic performance of a reference asset to the other counterparty (the total return receiver), and in return, receives a pre-determined fixed or floating rate linked to a benchmark. A “credit derivative” is broadly defined as a derivative contract whose value is derived from the credit risk of an underlying debt instrument or from an index of underlying debt instruments.
A “credit event” means a pre-defined event in a credit derivative contract which triggers a settlement under the contract. “Corporate bonds and debentures” are defined as non-convertible debt instruments which create or acknowledge indebtedness, including debentures, bonds and other securities issued by a body corporate, a trust, or a statutory body, whether constituting a charge on the assets of the issuer or not, but excluding money market debt instruments, security receipts, securitised debt instruments, and bonds issued by the Central Government or a State Government. A “Future on credit indices” is defined as a standardised derivative contract, traded on a recognised stock exchange, to buy or sell an index of underlying debt instruments at a specified future date at a price determined at the time of the contract. “Hedging” is defined as the activity of undertaking a credit derivative transaction to reduce credit risk of a particular debt instrument or a portfolio of debt instruments.
“Cash settlement” of CDS means a settlement process in which the protection seller pays the protection buyer the notional amount of the CDS contract less the expected recovery value of the reference obligation. “Physical settlement” of CDS means a settlement process in which the protection buyer delivers any of the eligible deliverable obligations to the protection seller against the receipt of the notional amount of the CDS contract. “Auction settlement” of CDS means a settlement process in which the price of the reference/deliverable obligation at which the settlement will happen is determined through an auction mechanism.
Eligible Participants: The Directions state that the following persons shall be eligible to participate in the credit derivatives market: (a) residents; and (b) persons resident outside India, to the extent specified in the Directions. This framework thus opens the market to both domestic and foreign participants, subject to the specific conditions laid down for each category.
Market-Makers: The Directions prescribe that the following entities shall be eligible to act as market-makers in credit derivatives: (a) Scheduled Commercial Banks, except Small Finance Banks, Payment Banks, Local Area Banks and Regional Rural Banks; (b) Standalone Primary Dealers; (c) NBFCs – Upper Layer and NBFCs – Middle Layer (including Housing Finance Companies); and (d) Export Import Bank of India, National Bank of Agriculture and Rural Development, National Housing Bank, Small Industries Development Bank of India, and National Bank for Financing Infrastructure and Development. In case an NBFC fails to meet the eligibility criteria for acting as a market-maker, it shall cease to act as a market-maker, but shall continue to meet all its obligations under existing contracts till the maturity or termination of such contracts. Critically, at least one of the parties to a credit derivative transaction shall be a market-maker or a central counterparty authorised by the Reserve Bank for the purpose.
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RBI Amends FEMA Deposit Regulations, 2026: Expands SNRR Account Operations to IFSC, Permits NRO-to-NRE/SNRR Transfers, and Deletes Five Schedule 4 Paragraphs in Sweeping Overhaul
The Reserve Bank of India (RBI), through its Foreign Exchange Department, Central Office, Mumbai, has issued the Foreign Exchange Management (Deposit) (Sixth Amendment) Regulations, 2026, bearing Notification No. FEMA 5(R)(6)/2026-RB dated June 18, 2026. The amendment has been made in exercise of the powers conferred by sub-section (2) of section 6 and sub-section (2) of section 47 of the Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999 (42 of 1999), and it amends the Foreign Exchange Management (Deposit) Regulations, 2016 (Notification No. FEMA 5(R)/2016-RB dated April 01, 2016), referred to as the principal regulations. These regulations shall come into force from the date of their publication in the Official Gazette.
A key structural change introduced by the amendment is the insertion of a new definition clause in regulation 2 of the principal regulations. After clause (v), a new clause (v-a) has been inserted, which defines “International Financial Services Centre” or “IFSC” as having the same meaning as assigned to it in clause (g) of section 3 of the International Financial Services Centres Authority Act, 2019 (50 of 2019). This definitional insertion paves the way for IFSC-based operations to be brought within the scope of the deposit regulations.
The amendment significantly expands the operational scope of Special Non-Resident Rupee Accounts (SNRR accounts). Sub-regulation (4) of regulation 5 of the principal regulations has been substituted to provide that any person resident outside India may open, hold, and maintain an SNRR account with an authorised dealer in India or its branch outside India, expressly including a branch located in an IFSC in India. The account is specified in Schedule 4 of the regulations. This substitution effectively brings IFSC branches of authorised dealers within the permitted framework for opening and maintaining SNRR accounts.
The amendment also introduces new transfer pathways for Non-Resident Ordinary (NRO) accounts. In Schedule 1, paragraph 3, a new clause (k) has been inserted after clause (j), permitting transfer from an NRO account within the limit specified in Regulation 4 of the Foreign Exchange Management (Remittance of Assets) Regulations, 2016. Similarly, in Schedule 3, sub-paragraph (B) of paragraph 3, a new clause (v) has been inserted after clause (iv), permitting transfer to an NRE or SNRR account within the limit specified in Regulation 4 of the Foreign Exchange Management (Remittance of Assets) Regulations, 2016. These insertions create a regulatory pathway for moving funds from NRO accounts to NRE or SNRR accounts, subject to the remittance limits already prescribed under the Remittance of Assets Regulations.
Schedule 4 of the principal regulations has undergone substantial restructuring. The existing paragraph 1 has been substituted with a new provision stating that a person resident outside India may open an SNRR account with an authorised dealer in India or its branch outside India, including in an IFSC in India, for the purpose of putting through permissible current and capital account transactions with a person resident in India in accordance with the rules and regulations framed under the Act, and for putting through any bona fide transaction with a person resident outside India. Additionally, the existing paragraphs 2, 5, 6, 7, and 8 of Schedule 4 have been deleted in their entirety.
The existing paragraph 10 of Schedule 4 has been substituted to provide that transfer from an NRO account to an SNRR account shall be in accordance with Schedule 3 of the regulations. A new paragraph 16 has been inserted after paragraph 15 of Schedule 4, which provides that transactions between persons resident outside India involving SNRR accounts, which may not be subject to compliance under the Act or the Rules and Regulations framed thereunder, are to be effected by the AD bank based on instructions or mandate from the account holder that shall indicate the underlying purpose of the transfer. This provision effectively allows inter-account transactions between non-residents through SNRR accounts without requiring specific FEMA compliance, provided the AD bank receives a mandate from the account holder indicating the underlying purpose.
The notification has been issued by N Senthil Kumar, Chief General Manager of the Reserve Bank of India. The principal regulations were originally published in the Official Gazette of Government of India – Extraordinary – Part-II, Section 3, Sub-Section (i) vide G.S.R. No. 389(E) dated April 1, 2016, and have been subsequently amended through five prior notifications, the most recent being Notification No. FEMA 5(R)(5)/2025-RB dated January 14, 2025.
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Legal Updates (July 20 – July 25, 2026)
Legal Updates (July 20 – July 25, 2026)
CASE UPDATES
RBI prudential norms stopping banks from recognising interest income on NPA accounts do not wipe out the borrower’s obligation to accrue and recognise interest expense in its own financial statements. Under Ind AS 109, a borrower cannot stop recognising interest merely because the account has turned NPA or because a one-time settlement is under discussion
The New Delhi Bench of the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT) in the case of CA Som Prakash Aggarwal vs NFRA [Comp. App. (AT) No. 200 of 2022] dated July 13, 2026, has clarified that RBI prudential norms stopping banks from recognising interest income on NPA accounts do not wipe out the borrower’s obligation to accrue and recognise interest expense in its own financial statements. Under Ind AS 109, a borrower cannot stop recognising interest merely because the account has turned NPA or because a one-time settlement is under discussion. Interest liability continues until the liability is legally extinguished, modified, discharged, cancelled, or expires.
The Tribunal also laid down that Standards on Auditing are mandatory and not mere guiding principles. An auditor of a listed entity must maintain proper documentation, obtain sufficient appropriate audit evidence, apply professional scepticism, and issue a modified opinion where the financial statements are materially misstated. Failure to do so can amount to professional misconduct under the Chartered Accountants Act and attract action under Section 132(4) of the Companies Act.
The Tribunal further held that an audit firm has independent and primary liability for quality control failures under SQC 1, separate from the engagement partner’s personal liability. The firm cannot escape liability by arguing that only the engagement partner was responsible for audit execution. Proceedings against both the firm and the individual auditor on the same audit are legally maintainable and do not amount to double jeopardy.
The Tribunal found that RBI’s IRACP norms apply to banks as regulated entities and only govern when banks can recognise interest income on NPA accounts. Those norms do not extinguish the borrower’s contractual obligation to account for interest expense in its own books. The Tribunal emphasised that the RBI circular itself required banks to keep a memorandum record of accrued interest on NPA accounts, which showed that the underlying borrower liability continued to exist.
On Ind AS 109, the Tribunal held that borrowings remain financial liabilities measured at amortised cost using the Effective Interest Method unless the liability is legally extinguished, discharged, cancelled, or expires. A mere expectation of one-time settlement or future waiver cannot justify non-recognition of accrued interest. The Tribunal said expected OTS cash flows cannot be substituted for contractual cash flows unless there is a legally concluded modification or extinguishment of the liability.
On audit standards, the Tribunal found serious failures in audit documentation, risk assessment, audit evidence, and professional scepticism. It noted that the audit file lacked documentation of the NPA interest issue, challenge to management’s accounting treatment, bank confirmations, revised loan documents, or records of discussions on the alleged OTS.
The Tribunal held that audit documentation is not a mere formality and that without documentation there is no verifiable basis for the audit opinion.
The Tribunal also found that the management representation letter relied on by the auditor was unreliable because it was not on letterhead, did not identify the signing authority, and contained an impossible reference to inventory records as on a later date. It said reliance on such a defective document as the basis for accepting a material accounting treatment and still issuing an unmodified opinion reflected a fundamental failure of professional duty. As to the audit report, the Tribunal held that an unmodified opinion was plainly unsustainable because the alleged misstatement affected finance costs, current liabilities, profit before tax, profit after tax, retained earnings, and net worth. In such circumstances, the auditor ought to have at least considered a modified opinion, whether qualified or adverse, instead of certifying that the financial statements gave a true and fair view.
On the audit firm’s liability, the Tribunal rejected the argument that only the engagement partner could be proceeded against. It held that the firm, as the appointed statutory auditor, had independent and primary responsibility under SQC 1 to establish and ensure implementation of quality control systems. Merely having a policy document was not enough; the firm had to ensure that its personnel complied with professional standards and that audit reports issued by the firm or its engagement partner were appropriate.
In assessing passing off, the Court will have to examine the actual marketplace use of the impugned mark, including stylization, commercial impression, colour scheme and overall presentation, and not merely the mark as registered
The Delhi High Court in the case of Havells India vs Havai Home Products [CS(COMM) 778/2024] dated July 13, 2026, has held that registration of a defendant’s trademark does not bar a passing off action where the plaintiff establishes prior goodwill, misrepresentation and likely damage. In assessing passing off, the Court will examine the actual marketplace use of the impugned mark, including stylization, commercial impression, colour scheme and overall presentation, and not merely the mark as registered. If the defendant’s manner of use is designed to create an association with a well-known mark and is likely to cause initial interest confusion in relation to identical goods, interim injunctive relief can be granted notwithstanding the defendant’s registration.
The Court first noted that Havells is the registered proprietor of the HAVELLS trademark and its formative marks, that it has used the mark prominently and continuously for decades, and that its reputation, sales, advertising, exports, and market presence strongly establish its goodwill. The Court also recorded that HAVELLS has been recognized as a well-known mark and that Havells had earlier secured favourable injunctions against infringing marks, including marks designed to be misread in a manner similar to the present dispute.
The Court rejected the broad defence that registration of the defendants’ mark was sufficient to defeat the action. Relying on Supreme Court precedent, it observed that even if both parties are registered proprietors, a passing off action remains maintainable because passing off is a common law remedy protected under Section 27(2) of the Trade Marks Act, and rights of prior user and goodwill are superior to mere registration. The Court reiterated that the three ingredients of passing off are goodwill, misrepresentation and damage.
The Court further observed that the defendants had gone beyond the word mark and had also copied the get-up and colour combinations of the plaintiffs’ device marks. Since both sides were dealing in identical or overlapping electrical goods such as air coolers, fans and immersion rods, and since the purchasing public included ordinary consumers with average intelligence and imperfect recollection, the likelihood of confusion was high. The Court held that the “initial interest confusion” test clearly applied, because a customer could be misled at the first point of contact into believing that the defendants’ goods came from, or were associated with, Havells.
The High Court concluded that this was a classic case of passing off. It found, prima facie, that Havells had established goodwill in HAVELLS, that the defendants’ adoption and market presentation of the impugned marks amounted to misrepresentation, and that such conduct was likely to damage and dilute the plaintiffs’ goodwill and reputation. The Court therefore held that Havells had made out a strong prima facie case, that the balance of convenience was in its favour, and that irreparable harm would follow if injunction were denied.
A lease of immovable property for a term exceeding one year must be compulsorily registered under Section 107 of the Transfer of Property Act and Section 17(1)(d) of the Registration Act, and if such a lease deed is unregistered, it cannot be relied upon to establish substantive leasehold rights
The Indore Bench of the National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT) in the case of Kuldeep Tank vs Vatsal Acharya [IA/111(MP)2026] dated July 07, 2026, has held that a lease of immovable property for a term exceeding one year must be compulsorily registered under Section 107 of the Transfer of Property Act and Section 17(1)(d) of the Registration Act, and if such a lease deed is unregistered, it cannot be relied upon to establish substantive leasehold rights, duration of tenancy, or a continuing right to remain in possession when those very issues are in dispute. At best, only a limited collateral use may be permissible, but not where the main lis concerns the nature and validity of possession itself.
The Tribunal further held that where occupation of the corporate debtor’s premises directly affects the RP’s ability to take custody, preserve assets, conduct valuation, and facilitate CIRP, the NCLT has jurisdiction under Section 60(5)(c) read with Section 238 of the Code to examine the validity of such possession and direct delivery of possession. Such a dispute is sufficiently connected with insolvency resolution and is not excluded merely because the occupant raises contractual or civil law objections or has filed a parallel civil suit.
The Tribunal emphasised that the lease deed was for a term of 60 months and therefore fell squarely within Section 107 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 and Section 17(1)(d) of the Registration Act, 1908, both of which required compulsory registration of such a lease. The deed produced before the Tribunal bore only notarial attestation and had no endorsement of registration by the Sub-Registrar. The Tribunal therefore found it to be an unregistered instrument which the law required to be registered.
The Tribunal then examined the legal consequence of non-registration by referring to Section 49 of the Registration Act and held that an unregistered lease deed which is compulsorily registrable cannot be used to prove the substantive leasehold rights asserted by a party when the very nature, duration and purpose of possession are themselves in issue. In this case, the respondent was relying on the deed to establish a fixed 60-month lease and his continuing right to remain in possession. The Tribunal held that such substantive terms could not be relied upon from an unregistered instrument.
The Tribunal further held that at best, the conduct of parties might have created only a periodic tenancy under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. But even that argument failed on facts. The burden to show that the premises had been let for manufacturing purposes and that a different kind of tenancy existed was on the respondent, and that burden had not been discharged. The Tribunal noted that the RP had verified all three bank accounts of the corporate debtor and found no lease rent payments in them. The respondent had only produced cash-book extracts, but there was no independent proof showing that the corporate debtor or any authorised representative had actually received such rent. The Tribunal also relied on the Panchnama which showed there was no electricity, no water and no use of the factory, which was inconsistent with any actual manufacturing use.
On the question of jurisdiction, the Tribunal held that Section 60(5)(c) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code gives the Adjudicating Authority wide residuary jurisdiction to decide questions of law or fact arising out of or in relation to the insolvency resolution of the corporate debtor, and that Section 238 gives the Code overriding effect. This jurisdiction is not confined only to matters expressly covered by the moratorium under Section 14. Since the factory premises were assets of the corporate debtor and the RP was under statutory duty to take custody and control of them under Sections 18, 20 and 25, the dispute had a direct and clear nexus with the insolvency resolution process.
The Tribunal observed that Section 14(1)(d) protects the corporate debtor’s possession against recovery by an owner or lessor and cannot be used by an occupant like the respondent against the corporate debtor itself. In the present case, the corporate debtor was the owner and lessor, and the respondent was merely the occupant. Therefore, the moratorium did not support the respondent’s case; rather, it reinforced the RP’s duty to secure the asset. The Tribunal also held that the pendency of a civil suit filed by the respondent did not oust NCLT’s jurisdiction under Section 60(5), and that earlier access granted to the RP and deployment of security personnel could not amount to acceptance of the lease’s validity or revocation of the CoC’s termination decision.
Where the dispute between the parties arises out of a continuing loan and repayment relationship, and the substance of the grievance is only that the finance company wrongly adjusted payments or demanded excess money, the matter remains essentially civil in nature and does not by itself attract offences such as cheating, criminal breach of trust, forgery or criminal intimidation
The Calcutta High Court in the case of Managing Director of Bajaj Finserv vs State of West Bengal [CRR 2494 of 2025] dated July 21, 2026, has held that where the dispute between the parties arises out of a continuing loan and repayment relationship, and the substance of the grievance is only that the finance company wrongly adjusted payments or demanded excess money, the matter remains essentially civil in nature and does not by itself attract offences such as cheating, criminal breach of trust, forgery or criminal intimidation. The Court made it clear that penal provisions cannot be stretched by implication merely because one party alleges unfair financial conduct in a commercial transaction.
The Court also reaffirmed that forgery cannot be alleged in the absence of a specific accusation regarding creation of a false document, particularly where the complainant admits signing the concerned agreement. It further held that summoning an accused is a serious judicial act and the Magistrate must show due application of mind; criminal proceedings should not be allowed to become a pressure tactic for settlement of civil claims.
The Court noted that the complainant herself had admitted in the complaint that she had signed the later loan agreement relating to the converted loan account of Rs. 63,830, though she said she had signed it on good faith without being allowed to read its contents. The Court also recorded that it was undisputed that the loan transactions between the parties had continued over a considerable period. This background, according to the Court, showed an ongoing financial relationship rather than a one-time fraudulent inducement.
The High Court further held that the ingredients of forgery were completely absent. It observed that the complaint did not specify what exact document had been forged, how it had been forged, or what precise role the petitioners had played in creating any false document. Referring to Section 464 IPC, the Court emphasized that forgery requires making a false document, and here the complainant had admitted her own signature on the later loan agreement. The Court also found no material showing common intention or conspiracy in the manner alleged. In its view, the controversy was fundamentally over loan accounting and adjustment, and therefore remained in the realm of civil law.
The Court also observed that taking cognizance and issuing summons under Section 204 CrPC is not a mechanical exercise and that criminal law cannot be invoked routinely in business disputes. The Court found that the inquiry under Section 202 CrPC had not been properly carried out by a competent person in the right direction. It reiterated that a Magistrate must apply his mind to the complaint, supporting documents and preliminary material before summoning an accused, especially when the dispute on the face of the record appears to arise out of commercial dealings.
Where a bank’s own circular provides for automatic renewal of a term deposit on maturity in the absence of contrary instructions, the bank cannot deny interest for the interregnum period merely because it unilaterally shifted the money to a current account or wrongly placed it in an ineligible deposit scheme with retrospective effect
The Kerala High Court in the case of Narayan Bharathan vs State Bank of India [WP(C) No. 23659 of 2018] dated July 03, 2026, has held that where a bank’s own circular provides for automatic renewal of a term deposit on maturity in the absence of contrary instructions, the bank cannot deny interest for the interregnum period merely because it unilaterally shifted the money to a current account or wrongly placed it in an ineligible deposit scheme with retrospective effect. In such a case, when the material facts are admitted and no complex factual inquiry is required, a writ petition under Article 226 is maintainable even though the claim relates to payment of money arising from a banking transaction.
The Court examined the law on maintainability of writ petitions in contractual and banking matters and noted that there is no absolute bar on entertaining a writ petition merely because money is claimed or because a contract is involved. The Court observed that writ jurisdiction can still be exercised where the facts are admitted, complicated evidence is unnecessary, and the dispute can be resolved on the basis of documents already on record. The Court accepted the petitioner’s reliance on the bank’s own circular providing that, in the absence of specific instructions from the customer, a term deposit on maturity would be automatically renewed for the same period at the rate prevailing on the date of maturity.
The Court also found that the bank had no case that the transfer of the deposit amount to the current account had been made at the request of the petitioner or any other interested person. Similarly, the bank had no case that the petitioner or the firm had sought the deposit in the Army Group Insurance Fund with retrospective effect from July 18, 2012. The Court held that even if such a request had been made, the bank should not have created a retrospective deposit in an ineligible scheme. The Court therefore concluded that the deposit in the Army Group Insurance Fund with retrospective effect was a fault attributable to the bank alone, and the petitioner could not be blamed for that irregularity.
A sale certificate issued by a liquidator under the IBC in respect of property sold by public auction is not compulsorily registrable under Section 17 of the Registration Act, and when it is sent only for filing in Book No. 1 under Section 89(4), it does not attract stamp duty or registration fees
The Bombay High Court in the case of Rajaram Food Products India vs Joint District Registrar and Collector of Stamps [Writ Petition No. 3018 of 2026] dated July 14, 2026, has held that a sale certificate issued by a liquidator under the IBC in respect of property sold by public auction is not compulsorily registrable under Section 17 of the Registration Act, and when it is sent only for filing in Book No. 1 under Section 89(4), it does not attract stamp duty or registration fees. The Maharashtra amendment in Section 17(1)(g) does not apply because the IBC is not a recovery Act, and in any event the case is directly covered by the exemption in Section 17(2)(xii) relating to public auction sale certificates.
The Court noted that the impugned order itself relied only on Article 16 of Schedule I of the Stamp Act and did not refer to Section 17(1)(g) of the Registration Act at all. Therefore, the respondents were attempting to support the order by reasons not found in the order itself, which was impermissible. The Court nevertheless examined the State’s additional argument on merits as well.
The Court then examined the statutory scheme of Sections 17, 17(2)(xii), and 89(4) of the Registration Act. It emphasised that Section 17(2)(xii) specifically exempts from compulsory registration a certificate of sale granted to the purchaser of property sold by public auction by a Civil or Revenue Officer, and Section 89(4) requires only a copy of such certificate to be sent to the registering officer and filed in Book No. 1. The Court contrasted this with Section 17(1)(g), inserted by the Maharashtra amendment, which speaks of a sale certificate issued under a recovery Act, but does not specifically refer to a public auction sale certificate.
The High Court relied heavily on the Supreme Court ruling in State of Punjab v. Ferrous Alloy Forgings Pvt Ltd. [2024 SCC OnLine SC 3372], which held that a sale certificate issued after confirmation of an auction sale is merely evidence of title, and that title passes on confirmation of sale, not on issuance of the certificate. Therefore, so long as the certificate is only forwarded for filing under Section 89(4), it is not compulsorily registrable and does not attract stamp duty. Stamp duty arises only if the auction purchaser later seeks to use the original sale certificate for some other purpose.
The Court further held that the State could not successfully invoke Section 17(1)(g) because the IBC is not a recovery legislation. Referring to Supreme Court rulings including Glas Trust Company LLC vs. Byju Raveendran [(2025) 3 SCC 625], Tottempudi Salalith vs. State Bank of India [(2024) 1 SCC 24] and Hindustan Construction Company Limited and another vs. Union of India [(2020) 17 SCC 324], the Court reiterated that the IBC is a framework for revival and resolution/liquidation of a company in debt, and not a debt recovery mechanism. Accordingly, a sale certificate issued by a liquidator under the IBC could not be treated as one issued under a “recovery Act” for the purpose of Section 17(1)(g).
Holding that the IBC is not a recovery law, the Bombay High Court ruled that a sale certificate issued by a liquidator in a public auction need only be filed in Book No. 1 under Section 89(4) of the Registration Act and does not attract stamp duty or registration fees unless later used for another purpose.
Oppression under Sections 241 and 242 of the Companies Act, 2013, depends on the nature of control and conduct, not merely on numerical shareholding, and that even majority shareholders can be oppressed where a minority entrenched in management abuses its position to deny participation, records, and governance rights
The Chennai Bench of the National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT) in the case of S Ravindhra Reddy vs Silver Line Retreat Hotels [CP(CA)/3(CHE)/2023] dated July 08, 2026, has held that shareholder intent and corporate democracy cannot be frustrated by management through procedural classification of shareholder nominees as Additional Directors under Section 161 of the Companies Act, 2013, when the surrounding facts show that they were meant to represent the majority on the board. The Tribunal held that management cannot first dilute shareholder representation and then rely on automatic cessation to exclude majority nominees.
The NCLT also affirmed that oppression under Sections 241 and 242 of the Companies Act, 2013, depends on the nature of control and conduct, not merely on numerical shareholding, and that even majority shareholders can be oppressed where a minority entrenched in management abuses its position to deny participation, records, and governance rights. The Tribunal also clarified that extraordinary remedies such as forensic audit under Sections 241-242 or investigation under Section 213 cannot be granted on mere allegations or shareholder distrust. Such reliefs require concrete prima facie material of financial impropriety, fraud or falsification, and are not to be used as tools in ordinary management control disputes.
On the core issue of the directors’ status, the Tribunal found in favour of the majority shareholder group. It observed that the shareholders had clearly sought board representation through identified nominees, and that this intention could not be diluted by subsequently describing those nominees as Additional Directors under Section 161. The Tribunal said the substance of the transaction had to prevail over form, and the management could not use a procedural route to defeat shareholder intent and then take advantage of the automatic cessation principle under Section 161.
The Tribunal therefore rejected the case that the majority nominees had automatically vacated office on Sep 30, 2022. Building on that finding, it held that the Form DIR-12 dated Dec 21, 2022 recording cessation of those directors was not a bona fide statutory compliance but a calculated step to alter the board composition and exclude the majority shareholders’ representatives from management. It said corporate democracy could not be defeated by unilateral ROC filings and declared the DIR-12 illegal, invalid and liable to be set aside.
On the allegations of financial irregularities, however, the Tribunal refused to order a forensic audit. It held that such a direction is extraordinary and requires sufficient prima facie material showing serious financial misconduct, siphoning of funds, falsification of accounts or similar circumstances. Mere suspicion, loss of confidence, or dissatisfaction with accounts was held to be insufficient. Since the disputes were primarily about control and board composition, the Tribunal concluded that restoring proper corporate governance would adequately address the grievances.
A second loan advanced to a relative during the subsistence of an earlier unpaid liability does not, by itself, make the case improbable. Likewise, a cheque being typewritten is not illegal and cannot, by itself, discredit the prosecution. The cheque dishonour for the reason “Drawer’s signature differs” can still fall within Section 138 NI Act if there were insufficient funds in the drawer’s account and other legal requirements are met
The Kerala High Court in the case of Shiny S Nair vs State of Kerala [CRL.A No. 705 of 2015] dated July 16, 2026, has held that where the complainant proves the underlying transaction and the execution of the cheque, the statutory presumptions under Sections 118 and 139 of the NI Act must operate in her favour. A second loan advanced to a relative during the subsistence of an earlier unpaid liability does not, by itself, make the case improbable. Likewise, a cheque being typewritten is not illegal and cannot, by itself, discredit the prosecution. The Court also reaffirmed that cheque dishonour for the reason “Drawer’s signature differs” can still fall within Section 138 NI Act if there were insufficient funds in the drawer’s account and other legal requirements are met.
The Court found that the trial court had taken an unduly narrow view of the evidence. It held that merely because an earlier liability remained unpaid, that by itself was not enough to treat the later loan as unbelievable, especially when the parties were admittedly relatives and the gap between the two transactions was only around five months. The Court also observed that issuance of a typewritten cheque is not prohibited by law, and therefore the mere fact that the cheque was typewritten could not be a reason to reject the complainant’s case once the transaction and execution were otherwise proved.
The High Court further noted that dishonour on the ground “Drawer’s signature differs” can still attract Section 138 NI Act where there were insufficient funds in the account and the statutory requirements are otherwise satisfied. On facts, the bank statement produced through PW3 showed that the accused’s account had only Rs.554.55 at the relevant time, which supported the complainant’s case.
The Court also attached significance to the defence version itself: during cross-examination and the Section 313 statement, the accused admitted an earlier borrowing from the complainant and set up a case that a blank cheque from that earlier transaction had been misused. The Court found that these circumstances did not demolish the complainant’s case; rather, they supported the existence of financial dealings between the parties.
Mere issuance of a demand notice under Rule 7(1) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Rules, 2019 to a personal guarantor does not amount to initiation of insolvency resolution proceedings under Section 95 of the IBC
The Telangana High Court in the case of Union Bank of India vs Bandla Ganesh Babu [Writ Petition Nos.25486 and 35956 of 2025] dated July 03, 2026, has held that mere issuance of a demand notice under Rule 7(1) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Rules, 2019 to a personal guarantor does not amount to initiation of insolvency resolution proceedings under Section 95 of the IBC. Unless a Section 95 application is actually filed, the interim moratorium under Section 96 does not commence. Therefore, in the absence of any insolvency proceeding against the personal guarantors, a secured creditor is legally entitled to continue recovery and enforcement action against them under the SARFAESI Act, notwithstanding CIRP and Section 14 moratorium operating against the corporate debtor.
The Court also held that Section 60 of the IBC does not automatically oust SARFAESI proceedings against personal guarantors unless there are actual insolvency or bankruptcy proceedings pending against those guarantors. A pending CIRP only against the corporate debtor is not enough to invalidate SARFAESI measures against guarantors. The DRT therefore erred in treating the Bank’s SARFAESI action as void ab initio merely because the Bank had issued a Rule 7 notice and was a member of the committee of creditors in the corporate debtor’s CIRP.
The Court identified the core issue as whether SARFAESI recovery proceedings against personal guarantors could continue even after the Bank had issued a Rule 7(1) demand notice under the 2019 IBC Rules, and when CIRP against the corporate debtor was pending before the NCLT. The guarantors argued that once the Bank invoked the IBC route, the matter had to proceed only under the IBC before the NCLT, and that the IBC would override SARFAESI. The Bank and the auction purchaser argued that mere issuance of a Rule 7 notice did not amount to filing an application under Section 95 of the IBC and therefore no interim moratorium under Section 96 had commenced against the guarantors.
The Court accepted the Bank’s and auction purchaser’s position and held that the Bank had only issued a demand notice in Form B under Rule 7(1), but had not filed any application under Section 95 of the IBC against the personal guarantors. The Court said that filing of a Section 95 application is the necessary trigger for the interim moratorium under Section 96(1). Since no such application was filed, no interim moratorium ever came into effect for the guarantors.
The Court further observed that the moratorium under Section 14 of the IBC operating against the corporate debtor is different from the interim moratorium under Section 96 applicable to individuals and personal guarantors. According to the Court, a moratorium in the corporate debtor’s CIRP does not by itself bar a secured creditor from enforcing security against personal guarantors under the SARFAESI Act. The Court said the IBC consciously treats the corporate debtor and personal guarantors as separate categories, and proceedings against them do not merge automatically unless insolvency proceedings are actually initiated against both in the manner contemplated by the Code.
On Section 60 of the IBC, the High Court clarified that the provision centralises insolvency and bankruptcy proceedings concerning the corporate debtor and personal guarantors before the same NCLT only where proceedings against both actually exist. In this case, only the corporate debtor was in CIRP before the NCLT, and no Section 95 proceeding had ever been initiated against the guarantors. Therefore, there was no occasion to invoke Section 60 to say that SARFAESI action against the guarantors was barred or that all proceedings had to be transferred to the NCLT.
The Court also stressed the sanctity of a public auction conducted under Rules 8 and 9 of the Security Interest (Enforcement) Rules, 2002. It noted that these rules contain a strict statutory sequence and safeguards, including public notice, reserve price discipline, deposit requirements and issuance of a sale certificate only after compliance. Since the auction purchaser had paid the full consideration within time and held a sale certificate, the Court found that the DRT had interfered with a completed auction on an incorrect legal basis.
Once a secured creditor has a valid and prior registered security interest, the creditor’s dues enjoy statutory priority under Section 26E of the SARFAESI Act over State tax and revenue claims
The Bombay High Court in the case of Union Bank of India vs Deputy Commissioner of State Tax [Writ Petition (L) No. 15997 of 2024] dated July 13, 2026, has held that once a secured creditor has a valid and prior registered security interest, the creditor’s dues enjoy statutory priority under Section 26E of the SARFAESI Act over State tax and revenue claims, including those asserted under the MGST Act and amended Section 37 of the MVAT Act. The State cannot defeat this priority merely by using “first charge” language or a non- obstante clause in State legislation.
The Court also clarified that where the State relies on an attachment predating the SARFAESI amendment, it must prove not only attachment but also all further statutory steps such as proclamation in accordance with law. In the absence of such proof, the secured creditor’s statutory priority prevails. Further, an auction purchaser who buys a secured asset in a SARFAESI sale and receives a sale certificate cannot be deprived of the benefit of that purchase by continued State encumbrances in revenue records. The State cannot pursue the very same asset again after the secured creditor has enforced its security and sold the property.
The Court observed that the objections were already answered in the case of Jalgaon Janta Sahakari bank Ltd vs. Joint Commissioner of Sales Tax [2022 SCC OnLine Bom 1767], where the Full Bench had specifically considered Section 82 of the MGST Act and framed the issue whether a secured creditor has a prior right over the Government department to appropriate sale proceeds of a secured asset. The Full Bench had explained that there is “no magic” in the expression “first charge” and that the statutory “priority” created by Section 26E of the SARFAESI Act and Section 31B of the RDDB Act is enough to override competing State claims, including claims for taxes, cesses and other rates.
The Court specifically rejected the State’s submission that phrases like “notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any law” in State tax enactments could defeat the secured creditor’s priority. The Court further said the law is categorically settled that dues of the secured creditor shall have priority over all other dues, including revenues, taxes, cesses and rates payable to the Central Government, State Government or local authority.
As to auction purchasers, the Court rejected the argument that because the sale was on an “as is where is whatever is” basis, the purchaser could not challenge the State’s action. The Court held that once the auction purchaser pays the full consideration and receives a sale certificate, the purchaser is entitled to enjoy the property free from such State-created boja/encumbrance, and the State cannot continue to burden the asset in revenue records.
A hire purchase agreement does not create ownership in favour of the corporate debtor, but it can create valuable contractual possession and development rights. Such rights, if subsisting on the insolvency commencement date, are capable of constituting assets under Sections 18 and 25 of the IBC and may be considered in CIRP and a resolution plan
The New Delhi Bench of the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT) in the case of Uttar Pradesh Housing and Development Board vs K.S.N. Buildwell Pvt Ltd [Company Appeal (AT) (Ins) No. 1581 of 2023] dated July 14, 2026, has held that a hire purchase agreement does not create ownership in favour of the corporate debtor, but it can create valuable contractual possession and development rights. Such rights, if subsisting on the insolvency commencement date, are capable of constituting assets under Sections 18 and 25 of the IBC and may be considered in CIRP and a resolution plan. However, the RP and CoC cannot treat land owned by a statutory authority as if it belongs to the corporate debtor, and no resolution plan can compel transfer of ownership, compulsory regularisation of unauthorised construction, or grant of statutory approvals contrary to law.
The Tribunal further held that the NCLT was wrong to reject the resolution plan only on the narrow ground that ownership of land did not vest in the corporate debtor. The correct inquiry was whether any contractual or developmental rights survived in favour of the corporate debtor and how those rights, along with the interests of homebuyers and the statutory powers of UPAVP, had to be accommodated within the IBC framework. But since the plan as framed wrongly dealt with third-party land itself and assumed mandatory regularisation, the remand to the CoC was justified.
On the de-sealing issue, the Tribunal found that the NCLT had proceeded on an incorrect factual basis while directing de-sealing. The appellate tribunal noted that the sealing and confiscation of the property had happened much before commencement of CIRP and moratorium, and that these actions were taken because of unauthorised construction in violation of the approved plan, not because of non-payment of instalments. At the same time, NCLAT clarified that the real legal question was not confined to who owned the land. It held that even if ownership remained with UPAVP, the adjudicating authority still had to examine whether the corporate debtor had any contractual, possessory or development rights in the land that could form part of the insolvency estate and be reflected in the information memorandum and resolution plan.
After examining the hire purchase agreement, NCLAT held that the arrangement was not a simple lease, not a bare licence, and not an outright sale. It described the agreement as a composite hire-purchase development arrangement under which ownership remained with UPAVP, but the corporate debtor was granted valuable rights such as possession, construction, commercial exploitation, transfer of units subject to the contract, and eventual conveyance upon payment of dues. These rights were held to have clear economic value.
The tribunal held that such contractual and developmental rights are capable of constituting “assets” under Sections 18 and 25 of the IBC, even though the underlying land is owned by a third party. It relied on the broader understanding of “property” and “asset” under insolvency law and commercial jurisprudence, while also making clear that the RP cannot claim rights higher than those actually held by the corporate debtor.
The Tribunal placed heavy emphasis on the fact that third-party rights had already been created in favour of 144 flat buyers and 44 shop buyers. It said these allottees could not be ignored in the insolvency process, especially because allottees are recognised as financial creditors in a class. At the same time, it balanced this by holding that homebuyers cannot get a better title than the corporate debtor itself had.
REGULATORY UPDATES
SEBI has revised the certification requirements for entities engaged in the sale and distribution of Specialized Investment Funds
The Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) vide its Circular No.: HO/24/13/17(1)2026-IMD-POD-1/I/16895/2026, dated July 21, 2026, has revised the certification requirements for entities engaged in the sale and distribution of Specialized Investment Funds (SIFs). Under the revised framework, persons engaged in the sale and distribution of SIF products must hold a valid “NISM Series-V-D – Mutual Fund – Specialized Investment Fund Distributors Certification." The certification also authorises them to distribute both Mutual Fund and SIF products without requiring a separate "NISM Series V-A– Mutual Fund Distributors Certification.”
SEBI clarified that entities distributing only Mutual Fund products must continue to hold the existing NISM Series V-A certification. The regulator has also discontinued the requirement of holding the "NISM Series XIII – Common Derivatives Certification" for the sale and distribution of SIF products with effect from September 21, 2026.
As a transitional measure, SEBI has allowed SIF distributors holding a valid NISM Series XIII certification obtained on or before September 21, 2026, to continue distributing SIFs until their certification expires, without obtaining the new NISM Series V-D certification. They must, however, continue to hold a valid NISM Series V-A certification during this period. Further, SEBI has directed the Association of Mutual Funds in India and Asset Management Companies to ensure that distributors and agents comply with the revised certification requirements.
SEBI has introduced a standardised framework for the transmission of securities, bringing in a faster process for low-value claims and prescribing uniform procedures for processing transmission requests
The Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) vide its Circular No.: HO/38/13/11(14)2026-MIRSD-POD/I/17111/2026, dated July 23, 2026, has introduced a simplified and standardised framework for the transmission of securities, bringing in a faster process for low-value claims, easing documentation requirements and prescribing uniform procedures for processing transmission requests. The revised framework will apply to listed companies, Registrars and Transfer Agents (RTAs), depositories, depository participants and Asset Management Companies (AMCs). It is aimed at making the transmission process more efficient and investor-friendly.
Among the key changes is the introduction of a harmonized, standardised and risk-based framework for transmission of securities. SEBI has also created a new Quick Transmission Processing (QTP) category for low-value claims and revised the claim thresholds under the simplified documentation framework. Under the QTP category, the claim threshold has been fixed at ₹10,000 for securities held in physical mode and ₹30,000 for securities held in dematerialised mode.
For claims processed under the simplified documentation framework, the thresholds have been fixed at ₹10 lakh for physical securities and ₹30 lakh for dematerialised securities. Listed entities may enhance the ₹10 lakh threshold for physical securities at their discretion. SEBI has also standardised the documentation and procedure for transmission. The framework removes the mandatory requirement of probate of a Will, replaces separate affidavit and No Objection Certificate (NOC) with a combined affidavit-cum-NOC, recognises death certificates carrying QR codes as valid documents for verification, and allows additional modes for verifying death certificates issued in foreign jurisdictions.
The framework also prescribes uniform procedures for submitting claims, acknowledging documents, processing transmission requests and determining the documentation required in different transmission scenarios. It provides that transmission requests should ordinarily be processed within 21 calendar days of receipt of all required documents. The revised framework will come into force 30 days from the date of the circular. SEBI has, however, asked processing entities to endeavour to extend the benefit of the simplified framework even to transmission requests received before its commencement and not seek re- submission of documents that investors have already furnished.
SEBI directs Trading Members to adopt a policy governing unpaid securities, including invocation or release of pledges and liquidation of such securities
The Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) vide its Circular No.: HO/38/11/(9)2026-MIRSD-POD/I/15382/2026, dated July 03, 2026, has amended the framework governing the handling of clients’ unpaid securities by Trading Members, citing regulatory developments and operational challenges under the existing regime. SEBI said regulatory changes, including the mandatory pay-out of securities to clients’ demat accounts, and evolving market practices necessitated a revision of the framework. It also took into account stakeholder representations highlighting implementation challenges.
Under the revised framework, for trades outside the margin trading facility, unpaid securities must be credited directly to the client’s demat account, following which an auto-pledge will be created in favour of a separate account titled “Client Unpaid Securities Pledgee Account (CUSPA)”. Trading Members must also inform clients of their payment obligations and of their right to sell the securities in the event of default.
SEBI has also directed Trading Members to adopt a policy governing unpaid securities, including the invocation or release of pledges and liquidation of such securities. The policy must specify a payment timeline that cannot exceed five trading days from the pay-out date. If a client fails to make payment within the prescribed period, the Trading Member may invoke the pledge and sell the unpaid securities after giving reasonable notice. Any surplus remaining after recovery must be credited to the client’s ledger.
SEBI clarified that if the pledge is neither invoked nor released within five trading days, it will be automatically released on the sixth trading day, allowing the client unrestricted access to the securities. Significantly, SEBI has prohibited securities pledged to CUSPA from being re-pledged or transferred to banks or NBFCs for fund-raising. However, it has permitted the pledge period to be extended in exceptional circumstances, such as lower circuit conditions, suspension or trading halts, or other valid reasons recognised by Market Infrastructure Institutions.
SEBI allows mutual funds to avail intraday borrowings for investor payouts, investment-related pay-ins, mark-to-market and foreign exchange settlement obligations
The Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) vide its Circular No.: HO/(92)2026-IMD-POD-2/I/16006/2026, dated July 10, 2026, has issued a revised framework governing the intraday borrowing facility availed by mutual funds. The circular will come into effect from September 1, 2026, and it follows SEBI’s amendment to the SEBI (Mutual Funds) Regulations, 2026 permitting intraday borrowings by mutual funds. It supersedes the guidelines on borrowings of mutual funds contained in the SEBI Master Circular for Mutual Funds dated March 20, 2026 and the SEBI Circular dated March 25, 2026.
The revised framework allows mutual funds to avail intraday borrowings for investor payouts, investment-related pay-ins, mark-to-market and foreign exchange settlement obligations, and the repayment of existing borrowings. The regulator has capped intraday borrowings based on receivables expected by the mutual fund, including guaranteed inflows such as those from the RBI, Clearing Corporations and subscription proceeds, as well as other receivables expected by the end of the day. It has also allowed AMCs to avail additional intraday borrowings solely to meet redemption and other payouts to unitholders.
SEBI has directed AMCs to repay all intraday borrowings by the end of the day. Any borrowing that is converted into an overnight borrowing must remain within the limits prescribed under the SEBI (Mutual Funds) Regulations, 2026. It has also directed the boards of AMCs and trustees of mutual funds to approve an intraday borrowing policy, publish it on the AMC’s website, and put in place an approval and monitoring mechanism. AMCs have also been asked to maintain scheme-wise records of liquidity mismatches and the expected source of repayment. SEBI has clarified that AMCs will bear the cost of intraday borrowings, as well as any loss or additional cost arising from unforeseen events or delays in receiving funds from receivables.
SEBI has announced investor-friendly measures to simplify the process of transferring mutual fund investments to legal heirs or nominees after the death of a unit holder
The Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) vide its Press Release PR No.: 41/2026, dated July 17, 2026, has announced investor-friendly measures to simplify the process of transferring mutual fund investments to legal heirs or nominees after the death of a unit holder. In this press release, SEBI said it had advised the Association of Mutual Funds in India (AMFI) to further simplify the standards governing the procedure for claiming units or proceeds upon the death of a unit holder. Following SEBI’s advice, AMFI amended the standards.
According to SEBI, the revised standards are intended to make the transmission process easier while ensuring that industry practices remain aligned with the objective of protecting investors’ interests. One of the key changes relates to resolving address mismatches. SEBI said that where the address recorded in the mutual fund records differs from the latest address of the deceased unit holder, Asset Management Companies (AMCs) may rely on the latest available address. This will be subject to the submission of the required supporting documents.
The revised standards also introduce a harmonised framework for resolving name and signature mismatches. Under this framework, AMCs may adopt the guidelines prescribed for Registrars and Transfer Agents (RTAs) under SEBI’s Master Circular dated February 6, 2026. Under the guidelines, name mismatches may be resolved by submitting self-certified documents such as an Aadhaar card or passport. In cases involving signature mismatches, RTAs may follow the applicable procedure depending on the nature of the discrepancy.
SEBI has also advised AMFI to train all stakeholders involved in the transmission process. The regulator said this would help ensure that the revised standards are implemented uniformly across all AMCs.
Legal Updates (July 13 – July 18, 2026)
Legal Updates (July 13 – July 18, 2026)
CASE UPDATES
Section 452 of the Companies Act, 2013 has not been decriminalised by Amendment Act 29 of 2020, and the amendment only introduced a proviso protecting former employees from imprisonment in cases where the company has defaulted on statutory dues
The Kerala High Court in the case of Tata Coffee Limited vs Ramla [CRL.REV.PET No. 346 of 2026] dated July 01, 2026, has clarified that Section 452 of the Companies Act, 2013 has not been decriminalised by Amendment Act 29 of 2020. The amendment only introduced a proviso protecting former employees from imprisonment in cases where the company has defaulted on statutory dues. The Court held that the jurisdiction to try an offence under Section 452 vests exclusively with the competent Judicial Magistrate (not below the rank of Chief Judicial Magistrate), and not with the Adjudicating Officer under Section 454.
The Court emphasised that the Adjudicating Officer’s powers are confined to administrative penalties for statutory non-compliance and do not extend to criminal punishments. The express exclusion of Section 452 from the Special Courts under Section 435 further reinforces that criminal courts retain full cognizance over such offences.
The Court after examining Section 452 of the Companies Act, 2013, observed that the only change introduced by Amendment Act 29 of 2020 (effective 22.01.2021) was the insertion of a proviso to Sub-Section (2), which restricts the court from ordering imprisonment of a former employee in wrongful possession of a dwelling unit if the company has not paid dues such as provident fund, pension fund, gratuity, or workmen’s compensation to that employee. No other change was made to Section 452 by the 2020 amendment.
The Court drew a sharp and critical distinction between “penalties” and “punishments” under the Companies Act. It held that Section 454, which empowers the Adjudicating Officer, deals only with penalties for non-compliance of statutory requirements, which are administrative, civil, or contractual in nature, and has no bearing on penal offences under the Act. The Court further noted that Section 452 expressly provides for a fine of not less than Rs. 1 lakh and extending to Rs. 5 lakhs, and Sub-Section (2) additionally empowers the Court trying the offence to order delivery of property and, in default, imprisonment extending up to two years.
Crucially, the Court pointed to Sections 435 and 436 of the Companies Act, which establish Special Courts for speedy trial of offences under the Act, and noted that Section 452 is expressly excluded from the jurisdiction of those Special Courts. This express exclusion, the Court held, makes it abundantly clear that it is the competent Judicial Magistrate, and not any Adjudicating Officer or Special Court, who is empowered to try the offence under Section 452.
Where a cheque is allegedly issued in the name of a company after the company has already been struck off and dissolved, the cheque is not a legally enforceable instrument and prosecution under Section 138 of the NI Act is not maintainable against the former director
The Karnataka High Court in the case of Rakesh Ramakanth vs Somashekara Gowda R.G [Criminal Petition No.3024 of 2024] dated July 01, 2026, has held that where a cheque is allegedly issued in the name of a company after the company has already been struck off and dissolved, the cheque is not a legally enforceable instrument and prosecution under Section 138 of the NI Act is not maintainable against the former director. The Court clarified that this is different from a case where the cheque was validly issued while the company existed and only later, during the pendency of proceedings, the company goes into liquidation, winding up, or faces some other legal impediment. In such later-event cases, proceedings may continue against the persons covered by Section 141, but not where the very cheque itself post-dates the dissolution.
The Court found that the company on whose account the cheque was drawn had already been struck off and dissolved long before the cheque was allegedly issued. The Court observed that once a company is struck off and dissolved, it loses its juristic personality and cannot validly operate as a legal entity unless restored in accordance with law. A cheque allegedly issued in the name of such a dissolved company after its dissolution cannot become a legally enforceable instrument and would be void ab initio. Therefore, proceedings under Section 138 of the NI Act cannot be sustained on the basis of such a cheque.
The Court drew support from decisions dealing with moratorium, liquidation and winding up, and explained that where a person no longer has legal control over the company or its bank account, the statutory ingredients of Section 138 are not satisfied. It emphasized that Section 138 requires the cheque to be drawn on an account “maintained” by the drawer, and this presupposes legal authority and control over the account at the relevant time. In the present case, the company had ceased to exist in 2011 itself, so the former director could not be made criminally liable for a cheque allegedly issued in 2017 in the company’s name.
Dealership termination, even if commercially harsh, does not by itself become a competition law violation unless there is material showing an anti-competitive agreement causing appreciable adverse effect on competition under Section 3(4), or dominance and abuse under Section 4 of the Competition Act, 2002
The Competition Commission of India (CCI) in the case of Rajeev Bakshi vs Nissan Motor India [Case No. 09 of 2026] dated July 07, 2026, has held that a dealership termination, even if commercially harsh, does not by itself become a competition law violation unless there is material showing an anti-competitive agreement causing appreciable adverse effect on competition under Section 3(4), or dominance and abuse under Section 4 of the Competition Act, 2002. Where the dealer is free in practice to take another competing dealership, where the agreement permits discounting below Maximum Recommended Retail Price (MRRP), and where the manufacturer holds less than 1% market share in the relevant market for sale and distribution of passenger cars in India, no prima facie case arises under Sections 3(4) or 4 of the Competition Act.
The Commission noted that for Section 3(4) of the Competition Act, 2002 to apply, there must be an agreement, and here the relationship was governed by the dealership agreement. It examined the allegation that the agreement had imposed exclusivity, which restricted the dealer from dealing in other new motor vehicles or spare parts without Nissan’s written consent.
On facts, the Commission found that the informant had not produced evidence to show that Nissan actually prevented it from acquiring competing dealerships. On the contrary, material in the public domain showed that the informant had acquired another dealership with VinFast while the Nissan dealership was still subsisting. On that basis, the Commission held that the allegation of exclusive dealership or unlawful restriction under Section 3(4) lacked substance.
Since the dealership agreement expressly allowed the dealer to sell at a price lower than the MRRP, and there was no restriction on minimum resale price or discounting, the Commission held that the allegation of resale price maintenance was not made out. On refusal to deal, the Commission held that the dealership had been terminated under Clause 16 of the agreement, which allowed either party to terminate the agreement during its subsistence by giving 90 days’ notice, without assigning reasons. The Commission treated the cancellation of the dealership as a standard commercial dispute and observed that freedom of contract and selection of trading partners are normal business practices and not, by themselves, anti-competitive conduct.
A power of attorney holder can act only within the authority expressly or necessarily conferred by the instrument, and a power to sell, manage, deal with, or transact affairs does not include a power to execute a gift deed unless such authority is specifically granted
The Gujarat High Court in the case of Purshotam Ranchhodbhai Pankhania vs Harihar Ambalal Patel [R/First Appeal No. 259 of 2020] dated July 15, 2026, has held that a power of attorney holder can act only within the authority expressly or necessarily conferred by the instrument, and a power to sell, manage, deal with, or transact affairs does not include a power to execute a gift deed unless such authority is specifically granted. Further, where the principal dies, the agency stands terminated by operation of Section 201 of the Contract Act, and any act done thereafter on behalf of the deceased principal is without authority and legally invalid.
The Court also held that Section 208 of the Contract Act and Section 3 of the Powers-of-Attorney Act cannot save a transaction where the attorney had no authority in the first place to execute a gift deed, and where the act of presenting such deed after the principal’s death is itself void and lacking in bona fides. In such a situation, the transferee acquires no title.
The Court framed the core issue as whether an act done by a power of attorney holder, despite there being no such authority in the instrument, and particularly after the death of one of the principals, could be treated as legal and binding. The Court reiterated that a power of attorney creates a principal-agent relationship, and the holder can do only those acts which are specified and authorised by the executant.
The Court rejected the respondent’s attempt to take shelter under Section 208 of the Contract Act. It observed that termination by death operates automatically in law, and once the agency comes to an end, the agent has no authority to act further. The Court made it clear that a dead person cannot be represented in a contract through an agent after death, and therefore the plea of ignorance of death could not validate the execution or presentation of the gift deed for registration.
The Court also examined Section 3 of the Powers-of-Attorney Act, 1882, which protects acts done in good faith without knowledge of death. Even then, the Court held that the protection did not help the defendants. It observed that the very presentation of a conveyance deed for registration after the principal’s death, particularly when the attorney claimed to enjoy a family-like relationship with the principal, lacked bona fides. The Court said such conduct reflected a fraudulent act and could not convey title to immovable property.
On the construction of the powers of attorney, the Court held that such instruments must be strictly construed. General words cannot be used to enlarge specifically conferred powers. After extracting the clauses of both powers of attorney, the Court found that neither document contained any authority to make a gift of the property. At best, the powers related to management, sale, purchase, leasing, banking, litigation and general affairs, but not gifting. The Court expressly held that the documents did not authorise making of a gift and that any transfer contemplated under them had to be for consideration.
Under the SEBI (Mutual Funds) Regulations, 1996, a close-ended mutual fund scheme must be fully redeemed and wound up on its maturity date unless it is validly rolled over in the manner prescribed under Regulation 33(4), including necessary disclosures and written consent of unitholders
The Supreme Court in the case of Nilesh Shah vs SEBI [Civil Appeal No.6529 of 2026] dated July 13, 2026, has held that under the SEBI (Mutual Funds) Regulations, 1996, a close-ended mutual fund scheme must be fully redeemed and wound up on its maturity date unless it is validly rolled over in the manner prescribed under Regulation 33(4), including necessary disclosures and written consent of unitholders. An AMC/ Fund houses cannot, on grounds of commercial expediency or investor benefit, unilaterally extend the maturity of underlying securities and delay redemption of scheme proceeds. The Court held that securities regulation is compliance-driven and consequence-neutral, so absence of investor loss, presence of investor gain, bona fide intention, or absence of complaints does not excuse a proven regulatory breach.
The Court further held that where contravention of the SEBI Act and the mutual fund regulations is established, penalty follows and mens rea is irrelevant unless the statute expressly requires otherwise. It reaffirmed that due diligence obligations under Regulation 25(16) and the Fifth Schedule must be strictly observed, and that trustees and senior executives are equally accountable where they fail to ensure regulatory compliance and act in breach of their fiduciary and statutory responsibilities.
The Court made it clear at the outset that in an appeal under Section 15Z of the SEBI Act, its role is confined to substantial questions of law and not to judging the commercial wisdom of the decision taken by market participants. The Bench stressed that the statutory and regulatory framework under securities law is consequence-neutral: compliance is mandatory regardless of whether the impugned conduct ultimately caused gain or loss to investors. Once breach of the SEBI Act or the regulations is established, the only real defence is to show that no breach occurred at all or that the findings are manifestly perverse.
The Court held that the core violation lay in the extension of the maturity dates of the debentures beyond the maturity dates of the close-ended schemes and the resulting delayed redemption of scheme proceeds. Referring to Regulation 33(4) and Regulation 39 of the SEBI (Mutual Funds) Regulations, 1996, the Court said the legal position was plain: a close-ended scheme must be fully redeemed at the end of its maturity period and wound up on expiry of its duration, unless it is rolled over in accordance with the prescribed process and with written consent of unitholders. Since no rollover had been undertaken, the delayed and partial redemption was directly contrary to the regulations.
On disclosures, the Court held that SEBI and the unitholders had been kept in the dark. SEBI was informed of the course actually adopted only on 12 April 2019, after the first maturity dates had already passed and after SEBI itself sought information. The Court found this unacceptable, particularly because the action taken was not in consonance with the regulations and should have been disclosed to the regulator beforehand. It also observed that unitholders were not given any real choice, because the decision to extend the debenture maturity and withhold redemption amounts was imposed on them without the legally required rollover process.
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A leave and licence dispute concerning office premises, where possession was never handed over and where actual exclusive commercial use at the time of the agreement is not shown, does not qualify as a commercial dispute merely because the licensee is a business entity and intended to use the premises for business purposes
The Bombay High Court in the case of Jayshree Jagdish Thakker vs Pragati Infra Interiors [Writ Petition No. 8129 of 2026] dated July 07, 2026, has held that under Section 2(1)(c)(vii) of the Commercial Courts Act, a dispute relating to immovable property becomes a commercial dispute only when the property is actually and exclusively used in trade or commerce at the relevant time. Mere intended, proposed, or future business use is not enough. A leave and licence dispute concerning office premises, where possession was never handed over and where actual exclusive commercial use at the time of the agreement is not shown, does not qualify as a commercial dispute merely because the licensee is a business entity and intended to use the premises for business purposes.
The Court also clarified that where a Commercial Court lacks jurisdiction because the dispute is not a commercial dispute, the plaint should not be rejected outright on that ground. The proper course is to return the plaint under Order VII Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure for presentation before the proper ordinary civil court.
The Court explained the purpose of the Commercial Courts Act, and noted that the Act creates a special and speedier mechanism for resolution of commercial disputes, originally for high-value claims and later extended to lower-value claims as well. Because the Act provides a special procedure and stricter timelines, only disputes that clearly fall within the statutory definition of “commercial dispute” can be tried by Commercial Courts; ordinary civil disputes cannot be brought into that framework merely by broad interpretation.
The Court identified the central issue as whether this dispute arose out of an agreement relating to immovable property “used exclusively in trade or commerce” under Section 2(1)(c)(vii) of the Act. The Court reproduced the statutory language and emphasized that the real controversy was the meaning of the words “used exclusively in trade or commerce”.
The Court also held that the fact that the premises were described as “office premises” and were situated in a business park was not enough by itself to show that they were being used exclusively in trade or commerce. The agreement did not show that the defendants were themselves using the premises exclusively for trade or commerce when the agreement was entered into. The Court made it clear that use as an office does not automatically mean exclusive use in trade or commerce for the purpose of Section 2(1)(c)(vii).
Under Section 11(2) of Trade Marks Act, the issue is not confined to consumer confusion, rather, the focus is on protection of the reputation and distinctiveness of the earlier well-known mark against dilution, unfair advantage and detriment, even where the later mark is sought to be registered for dissimilar goods
The Delhi High Court in the case of Industria De Diseno Textil, S.A. vs Registrar of Trade Marks [C.A.(COMM.IPD-TM) 52/2024] dated July 06, 2026, has held that similarity between rival marks must be judged on an overall impression and not by dissecting the marks into separate syllables or components. Applying that test, “ZARA” and “ZORA” were held to be deceptively similar phonetically and visually. Additionally, the Court emphasised that under Section 11(2), the issue is not confined to consumer confusion in the classic Section 11(1) sense. The focus is on protection of the reputation and distinctiveness of the earlier well-known mark against dilution, unfair advantage and detriment, even where the later mark is sought to be registered for dissimilar goods.
The Court first examined Section 11 of the Trade Marks Act and made an important distinction between Section 11(1) and Section 11(2). It observed that Section 11(1) is concerned with likelihood of confusion in cases involving similar or identical goods/services, whereas Section 11(2) protects an earlier well-known mark even against dissimilar goods if use of the later mark would take unfair advantage of, or be detrimental to, the distinctive character or repute of the earlier mark.
On the issue whether a mark must be formally declared “well-known” before Section 11(2) can be invoked, the Court held that Section 11(2) does not require a prior formal declaration by a court or inclusion in the Registrar’s list of well-known marks. What is required is that the earlier mark should, on the evidence, be entitled to protection as a well-known mark in India under Section 2(1)(zg) read with Section 11(6) and Explanation (b) to Section 11.
Applying that principle, the Court found that the evidence on record clearly showed that “ZARA” had immense reputation, substantial Indian and international presence, extensive sales, advertising, diversified product lines, and prior judicial recognition as a well-known mark. The Court therefore held that “ZARA” was entitled to protection as a well-known mark under Section 11(2), regardless of whether there had been a separate formal declaration process.
The Court then held that the Registrar had applied the wrong legal test while comparing “ZARA” and “ZORA”. It said that rival marks must be compared as a whole and not by dissecting them into parts such as “ZA” and “ZO”. The Court found that both marks are four-letter word marks, begin with “Z”, end with “RA”, have the same consonant structure, and produce a similar overall phonetic impression. The difference of one vowel was held insufficient to avoid deceptive similarity, particularly from the perspective of a person of average intelligence and imperfect recollection.
The Court further observed that once Section 11(2) is attracted, the respondent’s argument on dissimilarity of goods loses much of its force, because a well-known mark is protected even against dissimilar goods. Even otherwise, the Court noted that both marks were in Class 24 and there was a connection in the course of trade, as ZARA’s brand presence extended beyond end-consumers to manufacturers, traders and suppliers dealing in textiles, bags and related products.
The High Court also held that the Registrar wrongly looked for proof of actual public confusion. It clarified that actual confusion is not the controlling test under Section 11(2). The proper enquiry under that provision is whether the later mark, used without due cause, would take unfair advantage of or harm the distinctive character or reputation of the earlier well-known mark. The Court found that use of “ZORA” would dilute and blur the distinctiveness of “ZARA” and would wrongly suggest a trade connection with the appellant’s brand.
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A minor admitted to the benefits of a partnership firm cannot be treated as a defaulter for the firm’s loan liabilities during his minority. Where the firm stood dissolved under Section 42 of the Indian Partnership Act before such person attained majority, there is no question of requiring him to make an election under Section 30(5) to become or not become a partner
The Kerala High Court in the case of Dhruv Hitesh Dattani vs Reserve Bank of India [WP(C) No. 35894 of 2025] dated July 07, 2026, has held that a person who was only a minor admitted to the benefits of a partnership firm cannot be treated as a defaulter for the firm’s loan liabilities during his minority. Where the firm stood dissolved under Section 42 of the Indian Partnership Act before such person attained majority, there is no question of requiring him to make an election under Section 30(5) to become or not become a partner. In such circumstances, the lending bank cannot validly report him to a credit information company as a defaulter or wilful defaulter, and any such adverse reporting is liable to be corrected.
The Court observed that although disputes involving civil rights are ordinarily left to civil proceedings, this case could be decided in writ jurisdiction because the relevant facts were admitted and clear from the record. The Court found that the petitioner became major only in 2008 and that, before he attained majority, two of the firm’s partners had died. In the absence of any clause in the partnership deed for continuation of the firm despite the death of partners, Section 42 of the Partnership Act operated and the firm stood dissolved.
On that basis, the Court rejected the bank’s reliance on Section 30(5). It observed that there was no need for the petitioner to elect whether to become a partner on attaining majority because the firm itself was no longer subsisting by then. Therefore, the bank’s stand that he automatically continued as a partner was not accepted.
The Court also attached significance to the bank’s conduct in the DRT proceedings. It noted that the bank had sought to implead the petitioner only as a legal heir of a deceased defendant, and not as a partner of the firm, and even that attempt was dropped. The Court further noted that the petitioner could not in fact be treated as the legal heir of the deceased defendant because he was only the grandson. Since the bank never pursued any case against him as a partner even after he became major, the Court held that he could not later be treated as a defaulter for the firm’s debt.
Where landowners participate in Section 5A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 proceedings over several dates, receive replies, and then fail to appear, file rejoinders, seek adjournment, or otherwise pursue their objections, they may be treated as having abandoned the right of personal hearing
The Supreme Court in the case of Alok Kothwala vs Jaipur Metro Rail Corporation [Civil Appeal No.8269 of 2026] dated July 13, 2026, has held that while Section 5A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 confers a mandatory and valuable right of objection and hearing, that right can be lost by the landowners’ own conduct where they fail to pursue the proceedings after participating on multiple dates; in such circumstances, substantial compliance with Section 5A is sufficient and the acquisition for the Jaipur Metro car depot could not be invalidated.
Section 5A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 creates a mandatory right to file objections, receive a hearing, and obtain fair consideration of those objections, but the Collector’s role remains administrative and not judicial. Therefore, a detailed speaking order is not required and substantial compliance is enough if objections are considered, brief reasons are indicated, and the State Government applies its mind before issuing a Section 6 declaration, added the Court.
The Court further held that where landowners participate in Section 5A proceedings over several dates, receive replies, and then fail to appear, file rejoinders, seek adjournment, or otherwise pursue their objections, they may be treated as having abandoned the right of personal hearing. In such circumstances, forwarding the recommendation without granting one more opportunity does not by itself amount to breach of Section 5A or invalidate the acquisition.
The Supreme Court then independently examined the substance of the landowners’ objections and found none of them sufficient to invalidate the acquisition. It held that there was no legal requirement that newspaper publication must precede the Section 4 notification, especially when the landowners admittedly had notice and filed objections in time. It further held that acquisition for a metro rail depot clearly served a public purpose, and evolving project planning or later DPR changes did not negate that public purpose.
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Legal Updates (July 06 – July 11, 2026)
Legal Updates (July 06 – July 11, 2026)
CASE UPDATES
Telecom Regulatory Authority of India (TRAI) can validly regulate advertisement duration on television channels under its ‘quality-of-service’ powers once broadcasting falls within its regulatory domain, and such regulation can include a 12-minute per clock hour cap to protect viewer interest
The Delhi High Court in the case of 9X Media vs TRAI [W.P.(C) 7982/2013] dated July 08, 2026, has held that Telecom Regulatory Authority of India (TRAI) can validly regulate advertisement duration on television channels under its ‘quality-of-service’ powers once broadcasting falls within its regulatory domain, and such regulation can include a 12-minute per clock hour cap to protect viewer interest. The Court also held that this is a constitutionally valid, neutral and proportionate regulation of a licensed activity involving public spectrum, does not infringe Articles 14 and 19, and is in any case supported by the constitutional principles in Articles 39(b) and 39(c) read with Article 31-C.
The Court observed that TRAI had the statutory competence to frame the impugned regulation under Sections 11(1)(b)(v) and 36 of the TRAI Act, 1997. It said that once broadcasting and cable services were included within the definition of telecommunication services, TRAI’s quality of service jurisdiction extended beyond purely technical matters and legitimately included viewer experience. The Court found that in television broadcasting, the frequency and duration of advertisement breaks directly affect consumer viewing quality, and therefore regulating advertisement time was a valid quality of service measure.
The Court strongly emphasized that airwaves and spectrum are scarce public resources held by the State in trust for the public. Since broadcasters use public spectrum under a statutory and licensed regime, they cannot claim an unfettered right to commercially exploit it. The Court said the State is fully entitled to regulate such use in public interest so that the benefit of spectrum accrues to the community at large and not merely to private commercial entities.
On the constitutional challenge, the Court held that the broadcasters’ real grievance was about loss of advertisement revenue and not direct suppression of editorial or programme content. It therefore viewed the challenge principally through Article 19(1)(g), not the core of Article 19(1)(a). The 12-minute cap was treated as a neutral, time-based regulation that did not ban any category of speech or content, but merely limited the quantity of advertisement time in the interest of viewers. The Court added that Article 19(1)(g) does not guarantee profitability or unlimited monetisation of a public resource.
The Court also held that the uniform cap across channels, genres and time slots was based on a rational regulatory objective, namely preventing over-commercialisation and protecting viewer experience. It found that the framework was not manifestly arbitrary because it was based on consultation, consumer complaints and comparative international practice. The Court further held that TRAI was not required to accept every objection raised by industry stakeholders so long as the regulatory process showed transparency, rationality and application of mind.
Disputes between users and a private cryptocurrency exchange concerning withdrawal restrictions, cyber incidents and fund mismanagement remain private law disputes. Taxation of Virtual Digital Assets under the Finance Act does not, by itself, make such private entities “State” under Article 12
The Delhi High Court in the case of Amit Ranjan vs Union of India [LPA 393/2026] dated July 02, 2026, has held that disputes between users and a private cryptocurrency exchange concerning withdrawal restrictions, alleged cyber incidents and alleged fund mismanagement remain private law disputes, even if many investors are affected. Such disputes do not automatically acquire a public law character, and taxation or statutory recognition of Virtual Digital Assets under the Finance Act does not, by itself, make such private entities “State” under Article 12 or subject them to writ scrutiny on that basis.
The Court further held that where reliefs such as release of funds and compensation require adjudication of disputed facts, evidence, proof of loss, culpability and quantification, those issues must be pursued before civil courts or other competent fora, and not through writ proceedings under Article 226. A direction for CBI or SIT investigation also cannot be granted in the absence of exceptional circumstances.
The Court agreed with the core view of the Single Judge, and observed that the dispute was essentially between individual customers and a private cryptocurrency exchange over a cyber incident, withdrawal restrictions and alleged fund mismanagement. The Court said that merely because a large number of investors were affected, the dispute did not become one involving enforceable public law rights. It also held that private cryptocurrency entities do not become “State” under Article 12 simply because VDAs are taxed under the Finance Act.
On the relief for release of funds, the Court observed that such a claim would require factual examination of the amount standing to the credit of each investor and whether the withdrawal restrictions were protective measures or amounted to mismanagement. On the compensation claim, the Court held that proof of loss, culpability and quantification would all require evidence and trial. For that reason, both claims were held to be unsuitable for summary adjudication under Article 226.
Where settlement terms in a Section 138 NI Act matter expressly provide that legal remedies are only temporarily suspended, subject to honouring of settlement cheques, then the original complaint does not automatically stand extinguished merely because a later settlement was executed
The Delhi High Court in the case of Anil Sayal vs Apace Transco Pvt Ltd [CRL.M.C. 1016/2020] dated July 01, 2026, has held that where settlement terms in a Section 138 NI Act matter expressly provide that legal remedies are only temporarily suspended, subject to the complaint already filed under Section 138, and further provide that withdrawal of complaints will happen only upon honouring of settlement cheques, the original complaint does not automatically stand compounded, extinguished, or subsumed merely because a later settlement was executed. In such a case, continuation of the original complaint is legally permissible, particularly where no payment has been made and the later settlement cheques were never encashed.
The Court clarified that the observation laid down by the Apex Court in the case of Gimpex Pvt. Ltd. v. Manoj Goel [2021 SCC OnLine SC 925] applies only where the settlement wholly replaces the original cause and gives rise to a fresh and separate Section 138 cause of action, leading to an impermissible parallel prosecution. It does not apply where the settlement itself preserves the pending complaint and only keeps it in abeyance pending performance. The Court also clarified that disputes over interpretation of such settlement terms are factual matters not fit for quashing under Section 482 CrPC unless the defence is based on unimpeachable material.
The Court reiterated the settled position that quashing of a complaint under Section 138 NI Act at a pre-trial stage is an exception, and can be done only where the accused produces unimpeachable material showing that no offence is made out. Referring to Rathish Babu Unnikrishnan v. State (NCT of Delhi) [2022 SCC OnLine SC 513], the Court said that where factual controversy exists and the statutory presumption under the NI Act operates, the High Court should be slow to scuttle criminal proceedings before trial.
On examining the consent terms, the Court found that both documents expressly stated that the parties’ legal rights and remedies were only “temporarily suspended” and that such suspension was “subject to the action already taken U/s 138”. The consent terms also stated that criminal complaints would be withdrawn only if the post-dated cheques issued under the settlement were honoured. Prima facie, therefore, the settlement documents did not automatically wipe out or extinguish the pending NI Act complaint; rather, they contemplated that the complaint would be kept on hold pending payment.
The Court found that the settlement terms themselves preserved the earlier Section 138 proceedings and only kept them in abeyance. Further, the security cheques issued under the later consent terms were never presented for encashment, so there were no second prosecution and no duplication of criminal proceedings. The Court also observed that the offence under Section 138 is complete once the cheque is dishonoured, and a later assignment or transfer of debt to a sister concern does not by itself invalidate the original liability, especially where the settlement itself preserves recourse against the original accused and no amount has actually been paid to the complainant.
A rights issue that does not comply with the mandatory timing and procedural requirements under company law, and which is structured in a way that reduces majority shareholders into a minority and transfers control, constitutes oppression under Sections 241 and 242 of the Companies Act, 2013
The Hyderabad Bench of the National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT) in the case of Ashok Kumar Mandhani vs MBG Commodities Pvt Ltd [IA(CA)/304/2025] dated June 16, 2026, has held that service of notice for a general meeting is a mandatory statutory requirement, and where an EGM is convened without proper proof of service on substantial shareholders, the meeting and resolutions passed thereat are liable to be set aside. Further, a rights issue that does not comply with the mandatory timing and procedural requirements under company law, and which is structured in a way that reduces majority shareholders into a minority and transfers control, constitutes oppression under Sections 241 and 242 of the Companies Act, 2013.
The Tribunal noted the legal threshold under Sections 242(1)(a) and 242(1)(b), namely that oppression or mismanagement must be proved and that circumstances should justify winding up on just and equitable grounds, though relief can be moulded to avoid winding up. It also held that the petitioners were entitled to maintain the petition as members satisfying the statutory requirement under Section 244 of the Companies Act.
The Tribunal also found procedural illegality in the rights issue itself. It recorded that the issue opened on June 19, 2025 and closed on June 27, 2025, remaining open for only eight days, contrary to the minimum period under Section 62(1)(a). It further noted that the letter of offer was dispatched on June 17, 2025 for an issue opening on June 19, 2025, which did not satisfy the regulatory requirement referred to by the Tribunal for dispatch at least three days before opening.
A major factual circumstance noted by the Tribunal was that on the very first day of the issue, Respondent No. 5 subscribed not only to her entitlement but also applied for the large unsubscribed balance which could have become available only after expiry of the offer period and non-subscription by others. The Tribunal treated this as showing that the allotment process was pre-arranged and contrived. It held that the cumulative effect of these facts showed contravention of mandatory requirements governing a rights issue.
Regulation 29 of the IBBI (Liquidation Process) Regulations, 2016 permits set-off only in case of mutual dealings between the same corporate debtor and the same other party. It does not permit cross-adjustment of claims involving separate group companies, even if they belong to the same industrial group or were handled by the same liquidator
The New Delhi National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT) in the case of Assam Power Distribution Company vs Meena Sureka [Company Appeal (AT) (Insolvency) No. 1205 of 2025] dated July 03, 2026, has held that Regulation 29 of the IBBI (Liquidation Process) Regulations, 2016 permits set-off only in case of mutual dealings between the same corporate debtor and the same other party. It does not permit cross-adjustment of claims involving separate group companies, even if they belong to the same industrial group or were handled by the same liquidator. Separate legal identity continues to apply throughout CIRP and liquidation, and recoveries/distributions must remain entity-specific under the IBC framework.
The Court also reinforced that the “group of companies” argument cannot be used to bypass the basic principle that each company in insolvency is treated as a separate legal person unless the Code itself provides otherwise. Administrative convenience, shared communication, common office address, or common insolvency professional do not erase this distinct legal identity. As a result, a creditor must pursue its admitted claims in each liquidation separately and can only receive distribution under Section 53 from the relevant liquidation estate.
On Regulation 29, the Tribunal made it clear that set-off is available only where there are mutual dealings between the corporate debtor and the same counterparty. It cannot be invoked to adjust sums allegedly owed by third-party group entities against money payable to the present corporate debtor. Since the appellant was seeking to club liabilities of different companies, and those companies had also undergone separate proceedings and dissolution, the plea of set-off was rejected.
The Tribunal also noted that the load security deposits of each entity were separately maintained, electricity bills were separately raised for each unit, and even the appellant’s own claim form before the IRP recorded “N/A” against the column dealing with mutual credits, mutual debts, or mutual dealings available for set-off. This materially weakened the later attempt to argue for a group-wide adjustment mechanism.
The NCLAT further accepted the liquidator’s justification for the calculation of the refundable amount and observed that the adjustment of the load security deposit was in consonance with the applicable electricity supply code. It also held that the appellant’s reliance on provisions of the Electricity Act could not override the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code because Section 238 of the IBC gives the Code overriding effect in case of inconsistency.
In a copyright action involving logos, mere visual resemblance and prior adoption are not enough to justify interim relief. The plaintiff must show a reasonable possibility of access and a prima facie causal link between its work and the defendant’s work
The Bombay High Court in the case of Atyati Technologies Private Limited vs Cognizant Technology Solutions [Interim Application (L) No. 7958 of 2024] dated July 07, 2026, has clarified that in a copyright action involving logos, mere visual resemblance and prior adoption are not enough to justify interim relief. The plaintiff must show a reasonable possibility of access and a prima facie causal link between its work and the defendant’s work; if the defendant produces persuasive material showing independent creation, the inference of copying is displaced. Here, although the logos resembled each other in adopting a hexagonal device, Cognizant’s evidence of a substantial and documented design process, coupled with the absence of material showing reasonable access to Atyati’s logo, defeated the copyright claim at the interim stage.
On passing off, the Court held that reverse passing off is maintainable in principle under Section 27(2) of the Trade Marks Act and ordinary passing off principles can cover a case where a junior but stronger market player overwhelms a senior user. However, the plaintiff must still establish the classic trinity of goodwill, misrepresentation, and damage. Since Atyati failed to show protectable goodwill in its standalone logo and the relevant consumers were sophisticated institutional buyers unlikely to be confused, no prima facie case of passing off or reverse passing off was made out.
On copyright ownership, the Court held that Atyati had prima facie established ownership of copyright in the ATYATI logo. Cognizant had tried to weaken this by referring to an allegedly similar Spanish logo from 2015, but the Court said that mere existence of a similar logo somewhere in the world was not enough. What mattered was copying. Since there was no pleading or material to show that Atyati had a reasonable opportunity to view and copy the Spanish logo, the Court was not willing to reject Atyati’s originality at this stage only on the basis of archived internet screenshots.
On similarity, the Court accepted that there was resemblance between the ATYATI logo and Cognizant’s logo because both used a similar hexagonal-shaped device. At the same time, it noted differences such as colour contrast, orientation, and presentation. The Court emphasised the settled principle that copyright protects the form and expression of an idea, not the idea itself, and that resemblance by itself is not enough unless it crosses into actionable copying.
The Court found that the underlying concept in both logos involved a geometrically structured expression connected to the alphabet “C”, but said that when a similar idea is expressed in a geometric hexagonal form, some similar reflections may naturally occur. It therefore treated the case as one where resemblance had to be examined alongside access and causal connection, not in isolation.
The Court also held that Atyati had failed to show that Cognizant had a reasonable opportunity to view Atyati’s logo. Mere public availability of the logo, Atyati’s prior adoption, Cognizant’s business presence in India, or the fact that many Cognizant employees were Indian nationals was not enough. The Court said access cannot be inferred from bare possibility or speculation; there must be a chain of circumstances showing exposure, availability, and opportunity. That chain was missing here. As a result, the Court held that Atyati’s copyright infringement case failed at the interim stage.
Where, upon amalgamation under Section 45 of the Banking Regulation Act, the original tenant ceases to exist and the tenancy rights and possession of the rented premises vest in another entity without the landlord’s written consent, Section 14(1)(b) of the Delhi Rent Control Act is attracted
The Supreme Court in the case of British Motor Car Company vs Hindustan Commercial Bank [Civil Appeal No. 5714 of 2012] dated July 09, 2026, has held that where, upon amalgamation under Section 45 of the Banking Regulation Act, the original tenant ceases to exist and the tenancy rights and possession of the rented premises vest in another entity without the landlord’s written consent, Section 14(1)(b) of the Delhi Rent Control Act is attracted. The Court clarified that the provision does not carve out any exception for involuntary or statutory transfers under an administrative scheme.
According to the Court, Section 14(1)(b) covers every mode by which tenancy rights or possession pass from the original tenant to another entity, including involuntary transfers. It reiterated that the law does not distinguish between voluntary and involuntary transfers, and that the reasons behind the transfer are irrelevant once the factual situation of assignment or parting with possession is established.
The Court found that once the amalgamation took effect on Dec 19, 1986, HCB ceased to exist and all its rights, liabilities, assets, and interests, including tenancy rights in the premises, stood vested in PNB. As a result, HCB had parted with possession and PNB had come to occupy the premises. Since this transfer admittedly took place without the landlord’s written consent, both ingredients of Section 14(1)(b) stood satisfied. The Court therefore rejected the respondents’ argument that a transfer under a banking amalgamation scheme should be treated differently merely because it was not voluntary.
The Court also rejected the argument that a scheme framed under Section 45 of the Banking Regulation Act should be treated as having overriding statutory force. Rather, it held that the scheme-making process under Section 45 is administrative in nature, not legislative. Therefore, such a scheme cannot be treated as a statutory enactment capable of overriding Section 14(1)(b) of the Delhi Rent Control Act.
What matters is the factual transfer of tenancy rights and possession to a different entity without written consent, not the reason or manner in which that transfer occurred. Accordingly, the Supreme Court restored the eviction decree passed by the Additional Rent Control Tribunal.
A one-time settlement does not extinguish the underlying financial debt in an absolute sense when the settlement is conditional. If the borrower breaches the OTS terms and the settlement stands withdrawn in accordance with its terms, the financial creditor is entitled to revive and claim the entire dues under the original loan arrangement
The New Delhi National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT) in the case of Gaurav Jaiswal vs Indian Renewable Energy Development Agency Limited [Company Appeal (AT) (Insolvency) No. 594 of 2025] dated June 30, 2026, has clarified that service of a Section 7 IBC petition on the corporate debtor’s registered email address available in MCA records constitutes valid and sufficient service, particularly when accompanied by attempts at service at the registered office and publication in accordance with the NCLT Rules. The NCLAT said that a corporate debtor cannot later challenge an ex parte admission order on grounds of non-service where it has failed to maintain or update its statutory contact details.
The Tribunal also laid down that for admission of a Section 7 application, the Adjudicating Authority is concerned only with the existence of financial debt and default above the statutory threshold. Even where the principal is said to have been paid, a default consisting of unpaid interest can sustain Section 7 proceedings if the amount exceeds the threshold limit under the Code.
Further, the NCLAT held that a one-time settlement does not extinguish the underlying financial debt in an absolute sense when the settlement is conditional. If the borrower breaches the OTS terms and the settlement stands withdrawn in accordance with its terms, the financial creditor is entitled to revive and claim the entire dues under the original loan arrangement.
The Tribunal rejected the argument that the Section 7 proceedings were vitiated for want of notice. It observed that service of the petition had been effected on the registered email address of the corporate debtor as reflected in MCA records, and that such service is valid and sufficient under the NCLT Rules, 2016. The Tribunal also noted that service had been attempted at the registered office and later through publication, and therefore the plea of violation of natural justice could not be accepted.
The Tribunal emphasized that under Section 12 of the Companies Act, 2013, the burden lies on the company to maintain a functional registered office capable of receiving notices and to update MCA records if its office changes. The corporate debtor could not take advantage of its own failure to keep its registered office and contact details operative.
The Tribunal also rejected the submission that IBC could not be invoked because the matter should have gone before the DRT or because only interest remained unpaid. It held that the Code is a self-sufficient legislation and there is no legal bar to initiating Section 7 proceedings for default in payment of interest, provided debt and default are established.
If promoters of a company in liquidation procure mutation of company-owned immovable property into their own names, without any transfer instrument, without disclosed or valid consideration, and in circumstances showing that the asset has been taken out of the company estate to the detriment of creditors, the transaction attracts Section 531(1) of the Companies Act, 1956 as a fraudulent preference and is void
The Bombay High Court in the case of Indage Vineyard Pvt Ltd vs Kotak Mahindra Bank [Official Liquidator Report No. 34 of 2025] dated June 25, 2026, has held that where promoters of a company in liquidation procure mutation of company-owned immovable property into their own names, without any transfer instrument, without disclosed or valid consideration, and in circumstances showing that the asset has been taken out of the company estate to the detriment of creditors, the transaction attracts Section 531(1) of the Companies Act, 1956 as a fraudulent preference and is void.
The Court made it clear that even if the promoters later contend that there was “no valid transfer at all,” that does not save the transaction. On the contrary, such a stance supports the conclusion that the mutation entries were illegal and required reversal. The Court treated the mutation-based transfer itself as sufficient interference with the company’s title and with creditors’ rights to justify nullification.
The Court observed that Section 531(1) creates a deeming fiction: a transfer made within six months before commencement of winding up can be treated as a fraudulent preference if it would have had that character in insolvency law. It emphasised that the purpose of the provision is to protect creditors, and that the assets of a company are not the assets of its shareholders or promoters.
The Court found several suspicious features in the transaction. There was no transfer deed, no disclosed consideration, no valuation of the property, and no disclosure of the amount allegedly owed by the company to the promoters. The promoters had claimed the property was transferred because they had lent money to the company, but the record did not reveal the quantum of debt or how it compared with the value of the land. The Court also noted that the shareholder resolution relied upon was itself questionable, including because Section 293(1)(a) would ordinarily apply to public companies and the resolution mentioned no value for the related party transfer.
The Court further observed that the promoters had effectively “helped themselves” to company property without stated consideration, thereby materially eroding the pool of assets available to creditors in liquidation. Their conduct in getting the land mutated in their names without any transfer instrument, and then attempting to sell it to third parties in 2023, showed that they had enjoyed and dealt with the property as their own, creating a real risk of putting the asset beyond the reach of creditors.
The Court held that the absence of consideration itself demonstrated absence of good faith, and that the only reasonable conclusion was that the promoters had sought to place the property beyond the reach of creditors. The Court also rejected the argument that, because there was no transfer instrument, there was no transfer to invalidate. It held that a transfer sought to be effected by mutation entries also falls within the mischief of Section 531(1), especially where those entries had the effect of securing title in favour of the promoters without lawful documentation.
Section 36AAA of the Banking Regulation Act does not require RBI to grant a personal hearing before superseding the Board of a co-operative bank, because the Legislature deliberately omitted such a requirement from that provision while expressly including it in Section 36AA
The Kerala High Court in the case of M.P Jackson vs Reserve Bank of India [WP(C) No. 3275 of 2026] dated July 03, 2026, has held that Section 36AAA of the Banking Regulation Act does not require RBI to grant a personal hearing before superseding the Board of a co-operative bank, because the Legislature deliberately omitted such a requirement from that provision while expressly including it in Section 36AA. Secondly, the proviso to Section 36AAA(1) makes consultation with the concerned State Government mandatory, and consultation only with the Registrar of Co-operative Societies is not sufficient compliance. Any order passed without such consultation is legally unsustainable.
The Court also affirmed that RBI is legally competent to supersede the managing committee of a co-operative bank under the Banking Regulation Act even if that committee is democratically elected under the State co-operative law. The Court observed that although orders causing civil consequences ordinarily attract the requirement of a hearing, the statutory scheme here was different. It noted that Section 36AA expressly provides a reasonable opportunity of representation before removal of managerial persons, whereas Section 36AAA, dealing with supersession of the Board of a co-operative bank, contains no such requirement. The omission was treated as deliberate, and the Court held that a hearing cannot be read into Section 36AAA.
On the consultation requirement, the Court drew a clear distinction between the “State Government” and the “Registrar of Co-operative Societies.” It held that while the Registrar may be a competent officer in matters concerning co-operative societies, consultation with the Registrar is not the same as consultation with the State Government when the statute specifically requires consultation with the State Government. The Court said that where a statute prescribes that an act must be done in a particular manner, it has to be done in that manner alone.
On RBI’s power to supersede an elected committee, the Court rejected the petitioner’s democratic-governance objection. It held that in the case of co-operative societies carrying on banking business, the Banking Regulation Act also applies, and RBI has independent authority under Section 36AAA to supersede the Board of Directors. The democratic structure under the Kerala Co-operative Societies Act does not immunise a co-operative bank from RBI action under the central banking law.
A personal guarantee expressly drafted as a continuing and irrevocable guarantee does not stand discharged merely because the guarantor resigns as director of the corporate debtor. Revocation of such guarantee under Section 130 of the Contract Act requires notice to the creditor and operates only prospectively
The New Delhi National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT) in the case of Nakul Gupta vs State Bank of India [Company Appeal (AT) (Insolvency) No. 494 of 2024] dated July 06, 2026, has held that a personal guarantee expressly drafted as a continuing and irrevocable guarantee does not stand discharged merely because the guarantor resigns as director of the corporate debtor. Revocation of such guarantee under Section 130 of the Contract Act requires notice to the creditor and operates only prospectively.
The Tribunal also reinforced that where the creditor’s claim and debt trace back to the original loan and guarantee documents, the guarantor cannot avoid insolvency proceedings by arguing that later renewals automatically extinguished the original guarantee, especially when the guarantee itself states that future variations do not affect liability.
The Tribunal examined the nature of the 2017 deed of guarantee and accepted SBI’s submission that the guarantee was continuing and irrevocable. The Tribunal noted that under the guarantee, the guarantor’s liability was payable on demand, the guarantor was deemed to be principal debtor for enforcement purposes, and the guarantee was expressly stated to continue notwithstanding disputes between the bank and borrower. The Tribunal further held that, renewal of the working capital facilities by SBI did not amount to novation or such variance as would discharge the guarantor under Sections 62 or 133 of the Contract Act. Even otherwise, Section 133 discharges the surety only as to transactions subsequent to the variance, while liability for earlier debt continues.
On the resignation point, NCLAT held that merely stepping down as director did not discharge Nakul Gupta from his obligations under the guarantee. The Tribunal emphasised that a continuing guarantee under Section 129 extends to a series of transactions and that revocation under Section 130 can operate only for future transactions and only upon notice to the creditor. It found that no such notice of revocation had been issued to SBI.
The Tribunal also agreed with the Adjudicating Authority’s view that even if there was an increase in sanction limits without the guarantor’s consent, the guarantor would still remain liable for the debt existing prior to such variance.
While discussing Section 133 of the Contract Act, NCLAT reiterated the legal principle that variance without the surety’s consent discharges the surety only for transactions subsequent to the variance, and not for transactions already covered. It added that the debt registered with the Information Utility flowed from the loan and guarantee documents of Oct 17, 2017, and the NeSL material did not show any fresh debt arising from a separate unguaranteed facility under the Jan 01, 2019 renewal.
Legal Updates (June 29 – July 04, 2026)
Legal Updates (June 29 – July 04, 2026)
CASE UPDATES
Later consent terms with a sister concern did not automatically extinguish the original cheque dishonour complaint, because the settlement documents themselves preserved the already-filed Section 138 NI Act proceedings and contemplated withdrawal only upon honouring of the settlement cheques
The Delhi High Court in the case of Anil Sayal vs Apace Transco Pvt Ltd [CRL.M.C. 1016/2020] dated July 01, 2026, has held that where settlement terms in a Section 138 NI Act matter expressly provide that legal remedies are only temporarily suspended, subject to the complaint already filed under Section 138, and further provide that withdrawal of complaints will happen only upon honouring of settlement cheques, the original complaint does not automatically stand compounded, extinguished, or subsumed merely because a later settlement was executed. In such a case, continuation of the original complaint is legally permissible, particularly where no payment has been made and the later settlement cheques were never encashed.
The Court clarified that the observation laid down by the Apex Court in the case of Gimpex Pvt. Ltd. v. Manoj Goel [2021 SCC OnLine SC 925] applies only where the settlement wholly replaces the original cause and gives rise to a fresh and separate Section 138 cause of action, leading to an impermissible parallel prosecution. It does not apply where the settlement itself preserves the pending complaint and only keeps it in abeyance pending performance. The Court also clarified that disputes over interpretation of such settlement terms are factual matters not fit for quashing under Section 482 CrPC unless the defence is based on unimpeachable material.
The Court first reiterated the settled position that quashing of a complaint under Section 138 NI Act at a pre-trial stage is an exception, and can be done only where the accused produces unimpeachable material showing that no offence is made out. Referring to Rathish Babu Unnikrishnan v. State (NCT of Delhi) [2022 SCC OnLine SC 513], the Court said that where factual controversy exists and the statutory presumption under the NI Act operates, the High Court should be slow to scuttle criminal proceedings before trial.
On examining the consent terms, the Court found that both documents expressly stated that the parties’ legal rights and remedies were only “temporarily suspended” and that such suspension was “subject to the action already taken U/s 138”. The consent terms also stated that criminal complaints would be withdrawn only if the post-dated cheques issued under the settlement were honoured. Prima facie, therefore, the settlement documents did not automatically wipe out or extinguish the pending NI Act complaint; rather, they contemplated that the complaint would be kept on hold pending payment. Further, the settlement terms themselves preserved the earlier Section 138 proceedings and only kept them in abeyance. Also, the security cheques issued under the later consent terms were never presented for encashment, so there were no second prosecution and no duplication of criminal proceedings.
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Where the supplier continues performance while consistently protesting the revised price condition, there is no novation and no acceptance by conduct. In such a case, an arbitral award holding unilateral price reduction to be unauthorized is a plausible view based on the contract, and cannot be interfered
The Delhi High Court in the case of BSNL vs BWL [O.M.P. (COMM) 43/2020] dated July 01, 2026, has held that, for novation under Section 62 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, there must be clear mutual agreement; and for acceptance by conduct under Section 8, the conduct must show unequivocal acceptance without reservation. The Court also clarified that where the supplier continues performance while consistently protesting the revised price condition, there is no novation and no acceptance by conduct. In such a case, an arbitral award holding unilateral price reduction to be unauthorized is a plausible view based on the contract and evidence, and cannot be interfered with under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.
The Court reiterated the settled scope of interference under Section 34: the Court cannot sit in appeal over an arbitral award, reappreciate evidence, or reinterpret contractual terms if the arbitrator’s view is a possible and plausible one. Interference is confined only to the limited grounds under Section 34(2) and Section 34(2A) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. The Court accepted the arbitrator’s finding that BWL had consistently resisted the proposed price reduction through its letters and had never unequivocally agreed to a unilateral amendment of the price term. Because the evidence showed continuous protest and reservation, continued supply of goods did not amount to unconditional acceptance by conduct under Section 8 of the Contract Act.
The Court also held that estoppel could not be used to create novation where consent was absent. It was further held that BSNL’s reliance on Section 9 of the Sale of Goods Act, 1930 was misplaced because the contracts had already fixed the price and did not leave the matter open for fresh negotiation.
Accordingly, the High Court upheld the arbitrator’s directions to BSNL refunding the amounts deducted towards price reduction to BWL along with pendente lite and post-award interest at 9% per annum on the principal amount, and left intact the costs awarded by the arbitrator. The Court also held that where a supply contract fixes a firm price and permits reduction only on account of reduction in statutory levies/taxes, the purchaser cannot unilaterally impose price reduction merely because deliveries are made during an extended period at lower prevailing market rates.
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Compliance with the phased Net Owned Funds (NOF) Requirements prescribed under the RBI Notification dated March 27, 2015 is mandatory, and failure to meet the NOF threshold by the cut-off date entitled the RBI to cancel the certificate of registration under Section 45-IA(6) of the Reserve Bank of India Act, 1934
The Bombay High Court in the case of Mane Finance Private Limited vs Reserve Bank of India [Writ Petition No.1091 of 2021] dated June 09, 2026, has held that compliance with the phased NOF requirements prescribed under the RBI Notification dated March 27, 2015 is mandatory, and failure to meet the NOF threshold by the cut-off date entitled the RBI to cancel the certificate of registration under Section 45-IA(6) of the Reserve Bank of India Act, 1934. The Court further held that a company cannot avoid cancellation by showing that its NOF improved only after the prescribed deadline, especially where its financial position had been in negative for the relevant years and the claim of subsequent compliance was supported only by unaudited accounts.
The Court noted that Section 45-IA(1)(b) of the Reserve Bank of India Act, 1934 makes it mandatory for an NBFC to maintain the prescribed net owned funds (NOF) in order to commence or carry on business, and that the RBI’s Notification dated March 27, 2015 had statutory force. The Court also noted that before the RBI, the company did not submit audited financial statements and relied only on an unaudited statement for March 31, 2018. It held that later improvement in NOF after the cut-off date could not be treated as compliance with the RBI’s directions. The Court emphasized that the RBI is an expert statutory body regulating NBFCs and that judicial review in such financial matters is limited, particularly where the regulator has found that allowing such a company to continue would not serve public interest.
Once a secured creditor has taken possession of a secured asset and transferred it by auction sale under the SARFAESI Act, 2002, the security interest in that asset stands exhausted, and another bank cannot later invoke Section 14 of the SARFAESI Act to again enforce against the same asset in the hands of the auction purchaser
The Bombay High Court in the case of Mariyam Rangwala vs State of Maharashtra [Writ Petition No. 11618 of 2025] dated June 30, 2026, has that once a secured creditor has taken possession of a secured asset and transferred it by auction sale under the SARFAESI Act, 2002, the security interest in that asset stands exhausted, and another bank cannot later invoke Section 14 of the SARFAESI Act to again enforce against the same asset in the hands of the auction purchaser. By operation of Section 13(6) of the SARFAESI Act, 2002, the auction purchaser acquires all rights in the secured asset as if the transfer had been made by the owner, and such purchaser cannot be made to suffer because of competing claims between secured creditors.
The Court also held that where two banks have competing claims over the same secured asset or over the recovery flowing from the borrower’s default, the dispute is to be resolved inter se under Section 11 of the SARFAESI Act through arbitration or conciliation, and not by physically dispossessing a bona fide auction purchaser.
The Court found that although both banks claimed rights over the same flat, SBI had moved forward with speed under the SARFAESI Act, obtained physical possession through Section 14, completed the auction, and transferred the flat to the petitioners through a registered sale certificate. In contrast, Saraswat Bank took symbolic possession in April 2013 and then “went into deep slumber” for about eleven years before seeking physical possession in 2024–2025. The Court held that Saraswat Bank failed to explain this delay and proceeded at its own peril because, in the meantime, SBI had already exhausted the security interest by enforcing and selling the secured asset.
The Court accepted the principle that once a secured asset is enforced and sold under the SARFAESI Act, that asset is no longer available for further enforcement by another creditor. Relying on Section 13(6), the Court noted that transfer of the secured asset vested in the petitioners all rights in relation to the flat as if the transfer had been made by the owner. Referring to Section 13(7), the Court observed that if Saraswat Bank claimed a superior charge or entitlement, its dispute was really against SBI and in relation to the sale proceeds held in trust, not against the petitioners who were bona fide auction purchasers holding a registered sale certificate.
The Court further observed that the real dispute was an inter se dispute between two banks over competing claims to the same secured asset and recovery of dues from the common borrower. Such a dispute, the Bench held, must be resolved under Section 11 of the SARFAESI Act by conciliation or arbitration. It also held that questions relating to title, or legality of the mortgage in favour of SBI, were not matters for the DRT and, if at all required, would lie before a competent civil court.
Section 11(2) of the EPF Act gives a first charge only on the “assets of the establishment”, and not automatically on the separate assets of the employer or a partner. While Section 8B permits recovery from the employer’s separate property, that provision only lays down a recovery mechanism and does not create a statutory first charge over such separate asset
The Karnataka High Court in the case of Regional Provident Fund Commissioner vs Devki Designs [Writ Petition No. 47483 of 2018 (L-PF)] dated June 16, 2026, has held that Section 11(2) of the Employees’ Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952 creates a first charge only over the assets of the establishment. That first charge can extend to the asset of the employer only where the asset of the establishment and the asset of the employer are the same. In the case of a partnership firm, a partner’s separate property can be subjected to such first charge only if it is shown that the property was brought into the stock of the firm. If the partner’s property remains separate, EPFO may proceed against it only in accordance with Section 8B, and such recovery will remain subject to any prior charge already created over that property.
The Court observed that Section 11(2) of the EPF Act gives a first charge only on the “assets of the establishment”, and not automatically on the separate assets of the employer or a partner. While Section 8B permits recovery from the employer’s separate property, that provision only lays down a recovery mechanism and does not create a statutory first charge over such separate assets.
The Court further noted that in a partnership, the firm’s assets and the partners’ personal assets may be distinct, unless the partners have brought their personal property into the stock of the firm. Merely because a partner mortgages his personal property as security for a loan taken by the firm does not make that property an asset of the firm. The Court also clarified that the first charge under Section 11(2) of the EPF Act prevails over a security interest under the SARFAESI Act, 2002, so far as the asset in question is an asset of the establishment.
Exclusion of provident fund, pension fund and gratuity fund dues from the liquidation estate under Section 36(4)(a)(iii) of the IBC is not contingent upon the existence of a separate or identifiable fund on the liquidation commencement date. Such dues do not form part of the liquidation estate and are not to be distributed through the waterfall mechanism under Section 53(1)(b)
The New Delhi National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT) in the case of State Bank of India vs Manoj Kumar Das [Company Appeal (AT) (Insolvency) No. 419 & 420 of 2026] dated June 30, 2026, has held that exclusion of provident fund, pension fund and gratuity fund dues from the liquidation estate under Section 36(4)(a)(iii) of the Insolvency & Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (IBC) is not contingent upon the existence of a separate or identifiable fund on the liquidation commencement date. Such dues do not form part of the liquidation estate and are not to be distributed through the waterfall mechanism under Section 53(1)(b).
The Tribunal observed that Section 36(4)(a)(iii) of the Insolvency & Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (IBC) is clear in excluding “all sums due to any workman or employee from the provident fund, the pension fund and the gratuity fund” from the liquidation estate, and that this exclusion is due-centric, not asset-centric. It rejected the contention that such exclusion depends on the existence of a segregated fund on the liquidation commencement date, observing that accepting that argument would defeat the statutory right of workmen and employees to receive provident fund, pension fund and gratuity, and would negate the legislative scheme under the Code. The Tribunal also reaffirmed that absence of a separate fund does not extinguish the entitlement of workmen and employees.
On the issue of the 24-month period under Section 53(1)(b) of the Insolvency & Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (IBC), the Tribunal observed that the workmen were not seeking alteration of the liquidation commencement date under Section 5(17), but only exclusion of 1,656 days lost in litigation for the limited purpose of computing the look-back period. It held that if such exclusion were not granted, the workmen’s dues for the 24 months preceding liquidation would become nil merely because the CIRP remained pending for years in litigation, which would defeat the object of Section 53(1)(b).
The Tribunal further held that, for determining workmen’s dues for the 24 months preceding the liquidation commencement date, 1,656 days spent in litigation beyond the permissible 330-day CIRP period must be excluded, and therefore workmen’s dues for that 24-month period cannot be treated as nil. However, salary dues covered by the recovery certificate for January to March 2019 were held to remain within the liquidation framework and were not entitled to be kept outside the liquidation estate.
The NCLAT therefore dismissed SBI’s appeals and upheld the NCLT’s direction that the liquidator must pay provident fund and gratuity dues to workmen and employees in terms of the Employees’ Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952 and the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972, and that such dues shall not form part of the liquidation estate. The Tribunal partly allowed the workmen’s appeal by granting exclusion of 1,656 days spent in litigation for computing the 24-month period under Section 53(1)(b), and directed the liquidator to recompute the workmen’s dues accordingly and take consequential action.
Moratorium under Section 14, IBC, and the restriction under Section 33(5), IBC, do not override attachment proceedings relating to proceeds of crime under the PMLA, because such proceedings operate in a different field and concern public law consequences rather than civil debt enforcement
The New Delhi National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT) in the case of Value Wise Consultancy Private Limited vs Directorate of Enforcement [Company Appeal (AT) (Ins) No. 1226 and 1227 of 2022] dated June 30, 2026, has held that the PMLA in its working neither differentiates nor discriminates the companies that are drawn into a CIRP and those which are considered financially safe by its creditors. It emphasised that Parliament did not legislate IBC with an intent to create a holy Ganges out of the IBC to wash the corporate debtor of its sin of criminality under the PMLA, or as a mechanism for legitimizing any ill-gotten wealth of the Corporate Debtor (CD). The NCLAT emphasised that IBC could not unwittingly become a camouflage or a shield to save the ill-gotten wealth of the corporate debtor and create a classification within the non-discriminatory character of the PMLA
The NCLAT explained that there is nothing in the IBC, that enables accommodating the wealth which is sourced by and out of a crime, in the resolution or liquidation process of a corporate debtor. The legislative intent behind the scheme of IBC only aims to deal with the issue of corporate insolvency, either in a CIRP or in a liquidation process, and to pay off the creditors of the corporate debtor through the sale proceeds of the legitimate assets of the corporate debtor either as a going concern or as liquidated assets, as the case may be, and not out of the ill-gotten wealth of the CD.
The Tribunal clarified that whether to attach or not to attach the properties of a corporate debtor is for the Enforcement Directorate to decide under the PMLA, and any challenge to such attachment, including notices issued under Section 50, PMLA, must be pursued only before the adjudicatory mechanism created under the PMLA and not before the NCLT or NCLAT under Section 60(5), IBC. The Tribunal held that moratorium under Section 14, IBC, and the restriction under Section 33(5), IBC, do not override attachment proceedings relating to proceeds of crime under the PMLA, because such proceedings operate in a different field and concern public law consequences rather than civil debt enforcement.
The Tribunal observed that IBC cannot be treated as a mechanism to cleanse tainted assets or legitimise ill-gotten wealth of the corporate debtor. According to the Tribunal, the protection under Section 14, IBC during CIRP, and Section 33(5), IBC during liquidation, revolves around the legitimately acquired assets of the corporate debtor, and not assets that fall within the shadow of crime under the PMLA. It further observed that proceedings arising from penal statutes of public law nature, which do not add to the debt-liability of the corporate debtor, cannot be held to be hit by moratorium merely because they reduce the asset pool available in CIRP or liquidation.
The Tribunal also held that the jurisdiction of the NCLT and NCLAT under the IBC is not all-pervasive. Referring to Embassy Property Developments Private Limited v. State of Karnataka and Others [(2020) 13 SCC 308], it observed that the jurisdiction of the Adjudicating Authority is confined to what is necessary for the working of the IBC, and does not extend to examining the validity of attachment proceedings or coercive measures taken by authorities under the PMLA. The NCLAT noted that even the IBBI Circular No. IBBI/CIRP/87/2025 dated Nov 04, 2025 advises insolvency professionals to seek restitution of attached assets before the Special Court under Sections 8(7) or 8(8), PMLA, thereby reinforcing that the remedy lies within the PMLA framework and not before the tribunals constituted under the IBC.
Where the Deed of Guarantee is a continuing guarantee, the claim can remain enforceable against the guarantor beyond three years from the date of default of the principal borrower
The Chennai Bench of the National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT) in the case of Aditya Birla Finance Limited vs G. Thiyagarajan [CP(IB)/43(CHE)/2024] dated June 09, 2026, has held that where the Deed of Guarantee is a continuing guarantee, the claim can remain enforceable against the guarantor beyond three years from the date of default of the principal borrower, and limitation against the guarantor would commence when the guarantor defaults in fulfilling his obligations under the guarantee deed after invocation.
The Tribunal further held that the liquidation of the corporate debtor and disbursal of part proceeds to the financial creditor pursuant to settlement among creditors did not discharge the personal guarantor, because the liability of the surety arises out of an independent contract and is not absolved by release or discharge of the principal borrower through an involuntary process such as liquidation or insolvency. It also held that resignation from the company does not absolve a guarantor from liability under the guarantee agreement unless he is discharged.
The Tribunal observed that the corporate debtor had availed the credit facilities on January 24, 2014; that the respondent had given a Declaration-cum-Undertaking and executed the Deed of Guarantee on the same date; and that the corporate debtor’s account became NPA on November 01, 2017. It further noted that while a Section 13(2) SARFAESI notice dated November 03, 2017 was issued to the corporate debtor and the other personal guarantor, no such notice was issued to the respondent at that stage, and the notice invoking the respondent’s guarantee was issued only on October 15, 2022.
The Tribunal also noted that insolvency proceedings against the corporate debtor had been initiated in 2018 within limitation, that the corporate debtor went into liquidation, and that the petitioner received Rs. 1.03 crores from sale proceeds pursuant to a settlement among creditors. The Tribunal observed that release or discharge of the principal borrower by operation of law, including liquidation or insolvency, does not absolve the personal guarantor of liability, which arises from an independent contract of guarantee. It further observed that resignation of the respondent from the corporate debtor would not absolve him from liability under the guarantee agreement unless he was discharged.
The Tribunal observed that the guarantee was a continuing guarantee and coextensive with the liability of the principal debtor. It held that, being a continuing guarantee, it could be invoked at any stage, and that the rights of the financial creditor against one guarantor remained in full force notwithstanding any arrangement with another guarantor.
While approval and implementation of a resolution plan under Section 31 of the IBC extinguish past claims and entitle the successful resolution applicant to a “clean slate”, such approval does not automatically authorize the Adjudicating Authority to direct deletion or removal of statutory charge entries maintained by the Registrar of Companies under the Companies Act, 2013
The Jaipur Bench of the National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT) in the case of Administrator of Specified Undertaking of Unit Trust of India vs Modern Syntex [IA No. 29/JPR/2026] dated June 22, 2026, has held that while approval and implementation of a resolution plan under Section 31 of the IBC extinguish past claims and entitle the successful resolution applicant to a “clean slate”, such approval does not automatically authorize the Adjudicating Authority to direct deletion or removal of statutory charge entries maintained by the Registrar of Companies under the Companies Act, 2013 without compliance with the statutory mechanism for satisfaction or modification of charges.
The correct legal position is that the IBC’s binding effect must be given full play, but implementation of the approved resolution plan must still proceed through the statutory process contemplated under Section 82 of the Companies Act and the applicable rules. Therefore, the Tribunal can require secured creditors and stakeholders to cooperate in effecting the plan, but cannot supplant the statutory framework by directly ordering deletion of MCA charge records.
The Tribunal recorded that there was no dispute on three core aspects: the resolution plan had been approved on March 12, 2024, payments under the approved plan had substantially been made, and pre-CIRP charge entries still continued in the MCA records. It accepted that the “clean slate” principle under Section 31 of the IBC means that claims not forming part of the approved resolution plan stand extinguished and the successful resolution applicant should take over the corporate debtor free from past liabilities.
At the same time, the Tribunal emphasized that statutory authorities operating under independent statutory frameworks continue to be governed by those enactments, and that the register of charges maintained under Sections 77 to 87 of the Companies Act, 2013 is a statutory register, with satisfaction or modification of charges governed by Section 82 and the applicable rules. For that reason, the Tribunal held that approval of a resolution plan does not by itself justify direct judicial deletion of charge entries without following the statutory process under the Companies Act.
The Tribunal, however, also made it clear that the matter could not be viewed only from the standpoint of Companies Act procedure while ignoring the binding effect of the approved resolution plan and the earlier approval order. Accordingly, the NCLT directed the concerned secured creditors to issue appropriate discharge, no-dues and satisfaction documents in terms of the approved resolution plan. The Tribunal expressly clarified that its order should not be read as directing the Registrar of Companies to act contrary to the Companies Act, 2013 or as dispensing with statutory compliances under that law.
Since bank had merely financed the suppliers of the corporate debtor, any recovery from the corporate debtor was in lieu of its operational dues payable to those suppliers
The Jaipur Bench of the National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT) in the case of Bank of Maharashtra vs Ashiana Ispat Limited [CP No. (IB) – 73/07/JPR/2025] dated June 22, 2026, has held that financial debt under Section 5(8) of the IBC requires disbursement against the consideration for time value of money. In the present case, there was no disbursement made to the corporate debtor, and there was no element of consideration for time value of money between the bank and the corporate debtor. Since the bank had merely financed the suppliers of the corporate debtor, any recovery from the corporate debtor was in lieu of its operational dues payable to those suppliers. Therefore, the debt remained an operational debt under Section 5(21), and the bank, as assignee of such receivables, could not maintain a petition as a financial creditor under Section 7 of the Code.
The Tribunal identified the core issue as whether the amount paid or disbursed towards reverse factoring could be treated as a financial debt. It examined the Master Buyer Agreement and noted that reverse factoring meant acquisition of receivables due and payable by the buyer to the seller by assignment or endorsement to the financier in consideration of funds advanced by the financier to the seller, with the process initiated by the buyer. The Tribunal also explained that, in such an arrangement, once the buyer approved the invoice on the TReDS platform, the financier paid the supplier immediately and thereafter became entitled to collect the invoice amount from the buyer on the due date.
The Tribunal further referred to the Master Agreement and observed that it placed the primary responsibility for payment on the buyer once an invoice had been financed, required the buyer to maintain sufficient funds for automatic debit, and made the financier’s recovery rights enforceable directly against the buyer on a non-recourse basis against the seller. It observed that the agreement created a direct and enforceable payment obligation of the buyer towards the financier, while insulating the seller from any later default by the buyer.
At the same time, the Tribunal held that the entire basis of the bank’s claim stemmed from trade payables owed by the corporate debtor to its suppliers. It observed that the bank had made payment to the suppliers after placing bids on the invoices, and the corporate debtor was only obliged to repay amounts which were originally due to those suppliers. On this reasoning, the Tribunal found that the debts discharged by the bank on behalf of the corporate debtor were squarely operational in nature, and that mere assignment of such operational debts to a third party did not convert their character into financial debt.
Legal Updates (June 22 – June 27, 2026)
Legal Updates (June 22 – June 27, 2026)
CASE UPDATES
If the bank has already rejected the OTS proposal, such rejection has been taken note of by the NCLAT, and the insolvency appeal is to proceed on its own merits, pendency of that appeal does not bar the bank from proceeding with transfer of loan exposure through the Swiss Challenge Method
The Madras High Court in the case of Reji Abraham vs Punjab National Bank [W.P. No.22088 of 2026] dated June 22, 2026, has held that where the bank has already rejected the OTS proposal, such rejection has been taken note of by the NCLAT, and the insolvency appeal is to proceed on its own merits, pendency of that appeal does not bar the bank from proceeding with transfer of loan exposure through the Swiss Challenge Method. The Court further held that a borrower or erstwhile management cannot insist on being permitted to match the highest bid in such a process, especially in view of the disqualification under Section 29A of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016.
The Court also reinforced that adoption of the Swiss Challenge Method by a bank for auction of secured asset is legally permissible and is not, by itself, violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. Interference under Article 226 is limited, and the High Court will not sit in appeal over commercial decisions of banks and financial institutions unless arbitrariness or illegality is clearly established. A vague allegation of non-compliance with internal or RBI policy, without a concrete challenge to the rejection decision itself, is insufficient to stop the transfer process.
The Court noted that the NCLAT had already taken cognizance of the bank’s rejection of the OTS proposal and specifically recorded that there was no possibility of settlement between the parties and that the controversy regarding acceptance or rejection of the proposal no longer survived. The Court also noted that the NCLAT had made it clear that the appeal could proceed on merits in relation to the order admitting CIRP. In that background, the Court held that pendency of the appeal before the NCLAT was not a bar on the bank proceeding with the impugned transfer process.
The Court further observed that the corporate debtor had ample opportunities to repay or submit a viable settlement proposal, but had merely prolonged the matter. It held that the submission that the corporate debtor should be permitted to match the highest bid could not be sustained, because Section 29A of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code specifically disqualifies certain persons, including erstwhile management, from participating in the resolution process. On the challenge to the Swiss Challenge Method itself, the Court reiterated that adoption of the Swiss Challenge Method is not violative of Article 14 and that writ courts do not interfere with commercial decisions of financial institutions unless they are arbitrary or illegal.
In real estate insolvencies, although the IBC is generally entity-centric, a project-oriented approach is warranted where the debt, security and loan documentation are confined to a specific project
The Mumbai Bench of the National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT) in the case of Union Bank of India vs Rashmi Realty Builders Pvt Ltd [IA (I.B.C) 514/MB/2026] dated June 19, 2026, has held that where entries in a duly signed balance sheet acknowledge borrowings within the subsisting period of limitation, a fresh period of limitation commences under Section 18 of the Limitation Act, 1963, and such acknowledgment, read with subsequent written communications and settlement proposals, can sustain a Section 7 petition within limitation. It further held that, at the stage of admission of a petition under Section 7 of the IBC, the enquiry is confined to the existence of financial debt and occurrence of default, and technical objections concerning strict evidentiary compliance do not defeat admission where certified bank records and an authenticated Information Utility record establish debt and default.
The NCLT clarified that, in real estate insolvencies, although the IBC is generally entity-centric, a project-oriented approach is warranted where the debt, security and loan documentation are confined to a specific project. Since the sanction letter and mortgage documentation unmistakably established that the financial facilities were intrinsically linked to the project “Rashmi Starcity Phase II & III” alone, the CIRP was required to remain confined to that project and could not extend to unrelated projects of the Corporate Debtor.
The Tribunal observed that the sanction letter, loan agreements, security documents, mortgage deeds, statements of account, Bankers’ Books Certificate and the Record of Default issued by NeSL collectively established that substantial financial facilities were extended by the Financial Creditor to the Corporate Debtor and that the liabilities remained unpaid. It observed that the principal defence of the Corporate Debtor was confined to technical objections.
The Tribunal also observed that proceedings under Section 7 of the IBC are summary in nature and that, at the admission stage, the Adjudicating Authority is confined to determining the existence of financial debt and the occurrence of default. It held that the certified statements of account, Bankers’ Books Certificate and the authenticated Record of Default issued by the Information Utility were sufficient, and that hyper-technical objections regarding evidentiary formalities did not detract from the material establishing debt and default.
Where the complainant fails to prove, through a witness with direct knowledge, the transaction that led to execution of the cheque and the passing of consideration, the initial burden necessary to invoke the presumptions under Sections 118 and 139 of the NI Act remains undischarged
The Kerala High Court in the case of Shijosh vs State of Kerala [CRL.A NO. 1403 of 2008] dated June 09, 2026, has held that where the complainant fails to prove, through a witness with direct knowledge, the transaction that led to execution of the cheque and the passing of consideration, the initial burden necessary to invoke the presumptions under Sections 118 and 139 of the NI Act remains undischarged. In such a situation, the complainant is disentitled to the benefit of those presumptions, and a finding that the offence under Section 138 has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt cannot be faulted.
The Court underscored that the statutory presumptions under Sections 118 and 139 of the NI Act do not operate in the abstract. The complainant must first lay a credible factual foundation regarding the underlying transaction and the execution of the cheque. Where the person who actually advanced the money and maintained contemporaneous records is not examined, and the complainant lacks direct knowledge of the transaction, the prosecution may fail at the threshold itself.
The Court observed that in a prosecution under Section 138 of the NI Act, the complainant may avail the twin presumptions under Sections 118 and 139, but only after proving the transaction and execution of the cheque in a convincing manner. The Court specifically noted that this would necessarily include proof of the passing of consideration covered by the cheque. The Court further held that such proof must come from a person having direct knowledge of the transaction and execution of the cheque, and that the evidence of a person without such direct knowledge would be insufficient for that purpose.
If third-party sellers exploit an e-commerce platform’s “latching on” feature to attach themselves to a brand owner’s existing listings and, through such listings, display the brand owner’s trade mark, copyrighted product photographs and listing content so as to present their own products under the same commercial presentation, a prima facie case of passing off is made out
The Delhi High Court in the case of Piyush Sapra vs Flipkart Internet Private Limited [CS(COMM) 643/2026] dated June 15, 2026, has held that where third-party sellers exploit an e-commerce platform’s “latching on” feature to attach themselves to a brand owner’s existing listings and, through such listings, display the brand owner’s trade mark, copyrighted product photographs and listing content so as to present their own products under the same commercial presentation, a prima facie case of passing off is made out. The Court accepted that such conduct is likely to deceive unwary consumers into believing that the defendants’ products originate from, are affiliated with, or are connected with the plaintiffs, and is therefore liable to be restrained at the ad-interim stage.
The Court observed that there existed a real likelihood that an unwary consumer of average intelligence and imperfect recollection may be led to believe that the Defendants’ products originate from, are affiliated with, or are otherwise connected with the Plaintiffs’ products. The acts of Defendant Nos. 2 to 13 were therefore held, prima facie, to be calculated to ride upon the goodwill associated with the Subject Marks and likely to cause confusion as to the origin of the products.
Accordingly, the Court restrained Defendant Nos. 2 to 13 and all persons acting on their behalf from using the Subject Marks ‘SHAPERMEN’ / ‘SHAPER MEN’ or any deceptively or confusingly similar mark, from using the Plaintiffs’ copyrighted product photographs and listing content, and from manufacturing, marketing, selling, distributing, offering for sale, advertising, exporting, importing or otherwise dealing in products bearing the Subject Marks or any deceptively similar mark, or from passing off the Defendants’ products as those of the Plaintiffs or as associated with the Plaintiffs.
In the absence of prima facie material disclosing fraud, misconduct, mala fides, violation of statutory duties or professional misconduct, no direction could be issued to the IBBI for initiation of enquiry or disciplinary proceedings against the Liquidator
The Kochi Bench of the National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT) in the case of Meenachil East Urban Co-operative Bank vs CA Mahalingam Suresh Kumar [IA(IBC)/1/KOB/2025] dated June 10, 2026, has held that the Explanation inserted to Section 53(1)(b) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 is clarificatory in nature and applies to pending proceedings, and that the statutory scheme contemplates distribution to a secured creditor who has relinquished its security interest under Section 52 with reference to the value of the security interest relinquished, and not merely on the basis of the quantum of debt admitted.
The Tribunal further held that in the absence of prima facie material disclosing fraud, misconduct, mala fides, violation of statutory duties or professional misconduct, no direction could be issued to the IBBI for initiation of enquiry or disciplinary proceedings against the Liquidator, and in the absence of cogent evidence demonstrating illegality, fraud, misappropriation or improper claim, no interference was warranted with liquidation expenses or liquidator’s fees.
The Tribunal identified the principal issue as the manner in which liquidation proceeds are to be distributed amongst secured creditors who had relinquished their security interests under Section 52 of the Code. The Applicant argued that once such relinquishment took place, the realised value ought to have been distributed amongst secured creditors on a pro rata basis having regard to their admitted claims under Section 53(1)(b), whereas the Liquidator and Respondent No. 2 defended the distribution on the basis of the value of the respective security interests relinquished.
The Tribunal examined Section 53 as amended in 2026 and noted that the Explanation inserted to Section 53(1)(b) clarifies that where the value of the security interest relinquished by the secured creditor is less than the total debt owed, such creditor shall be a secured creditor only to the extent of the value of such security interest, and for the remaining debt shall be treated as an unsecured creditor. The Tribunal further observed that though the liquidation sale had taken place on August 22, 2024 and the amendment came into force only on May 26, 2026, the amendment was clarificatory in nature and, following the reasoning on retrospective applicability of clarificatory amendments, would apply to pending proceedings.
Prepayment charges, commitment charges and processing fees constitute recoverable liabilities arising from the lending transaction and fall within the ambit of “debt” under Section 2(g) of the Recovery of Debts and Bankruptcy Act, 1993
The Calcutta High Court in the case of Maan Steel and Power Limited vs Indian Bank [WPO 2585 of 2022] dated June 10, 2026, has held that prepayment charges, commitment charges and processing fees constitute recoverable liabilities arising from the lending transaction and fall within the ambit of “debt” under Section 2(g) of the Recovery of Debts and Bankruptcy Act, 1993. Where such liabilities remain unpaid, the debt cannot be treated as fully discharged merely because the principal outstanding and accrued interest have been paid.
Consequently, where the sanction letter and facility agreement contemplate such charges and the FDR is pledged as security for repayment of the entire debt, the bank is entitled to retain the pledged FDRs and refuse release of securities and issuance of a “No Due Certificate” until the outstanding contractual liabilities are satisfied. Accordingly, such action cannot be characterized as arbitrary, illegal or unreasonable in writ jurisdiction.
The Court held that the expression “debt” under Section 2(g) of the Recovery of Debts and Bankruptcy Act, 1993 is of wide amplitude and includes prepayment charges, commitment charges and processing fees, these being contractual incidents of the lending arrangement itself. It also observed that omission to specifically quantify such charges in the closure computation did not extinguish the underlying contractual entitlement in the absence of waiver, accord and satisfaction, or novation.
The Court further observed that the FDRs had stood pledged as security for repayment of the “entire debt” and could not be said to become automatically releasable merely because the principal and interest components had been paid. It held that security follows the debt and continues until the secured obligations are fully discharged, and that mere communication of closure figures or acceptance of repayment of the principal exposure did not amount to abandonment of contractual claims expressly preserved under the governing documents.
In assessing deceptive similarity, rival marks must be compared as a whole on the basis of their overall structural, phonetic and visual impression, and in the case of pharmaceutical products a stricter standard applies because even a possibility of confusion must be avoided
The Bombay High Court in the case of Laboratoires Griffon Pvt Ltd vs Psychotropics India Limited [Interim Application No. 4006 of 2022] dated June 15, 2026, has held that deceptive similarity had to be assessed by comparing the rival marks as a whole and from the perspective of a person of average intelligence and imperfect recollection, considering the overall structural, phonetic and visual impression created by the marks. The Court further observed that in cases involving medicinal and pharmaceutical products, a stricter approach must be adopted since confusion between medicinal products may have serious or disastrous consequences.
The Court observed that even assuming “LINCTUS” was descriptive, deception and confusion were nevertheless likely to arise, and the Defendant, having itself sought registration of “PIL-LINCTUS”, could not now be permitted to contend that “LINCTUS” was merely descriptive or common to trade. It rejected the Defendant’s contention that the Plaintiffs were seeking to monopolise “LINCTUS”, holding that the Plaintiffs were protecting their registered composite mark as a whole. The Court also found that the Defendant’s conduct weighed against it at the interlocutory stage, noting its knowledge or deemed knowledge of the Plaintiffs’ mark, its abandoned applications for “PIL-LINCTUS” and “BRILINCTUS”, inconsistent pleas on user, and failure to produce material evidencing substantial use.
The Court clarified that in assessing deceptive similarity, rival marks must be compared as a whole on the basis of their overall structural, phonetic and visual impression, and in the case of pharmaceutical products a stricter standard applies because even a possibility of confusion must be avoided. On that standard, the Court held that “GRILINCTUS” and “PIL-LINCTUS” are deceptively similar, the hyphen does not remove the likelihood of confusion, and the fact that the common element may be descriptive does not, in the facts of this case, negate infringement or passing off where the overall impression remains confusingly similar. The Plaintiffs, having shown prior registration, long-standing use, goodwill, and absence of acquiescence, made out a strong prima facie case for interim relief.
In matters concerning medicinal and pharmaceutical products, stricter standards apply because even the slightest possibility of confusion is required to be restrained in public interest
The Bombay High Court in the case of Integrace Private Limited vs Mas Pharmachem [Commercial IP Suit No. 238 of 2015] dated June 15, 2026, has held that in matters concerning medicinal and pharmaceutical products, stricter standards apply because even the slightest possibility of confusion is required to be restrained in public interest. Where the Plaintiff proves subsisting proprietary rights in a registered mark, prior adoption and use, goodwill and reputation, and the impugned mark entirely subsumes the Plaintiff’s registered mark as its essential and leading feature in relation to identical medicinal and pharmaceutical goods, the Court may hold that the rival marks are deceptively similar and that the Defendants’ adoption is dishonest, mala fide, and likely to cause confusion, deception, and misrepresentation.
The Court observed that the Plaintiff had sufficiently proved its subsisting rights in the trade mark “BON K2” through the registration documents, legal proceedings certificates, the Deed of Assignment, and the evidence of the Plaintiff’s witness. It also found that the Plaintiff had established use of the mark since 2010, as well as goodwill and reputation, through annual turnover and publicity expenditure material. On comparison of the rival marks, the Court observed that they were “virtually identical” and that the Defendants’ impugned mark “BON K2 FORTE” had “entirely subsumed” the Plaintiff’s registered trade mark “BON-K2”. It further observed that the Defendants had used the exact same mark as the leading and essential feature of the impugned mark, and that the adoption was “plainly dishonest, malafide and with a clear intent to deceive.”
Since the rival goods were medicinal products, the Court noted that the Defendants’ use was more than likely to cause confusion, deception, and misrepresentation amongst consumers and members of the trade, and that a stricter approach applied because confusion in medicinal products may threaten public interest.
The liability of the guarantor is co-extensive with that of the Principal Borrower, and that an acknowledgment of liability by the Principal Borrower extends the limitation period for initiating proceedings against the Personal Guarantor as well
The Kolkata Special Bench of the National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT) in the case of Indian Bank vs Santosh Jhawar, Personal Guarantor of Burgundy Life Style Pvt Ltd [I.A. (IB) No. 1690/KB/2024] dated June 18, 2026, has held that where the guarantee is payable on demand, limitation against the personal guarantor begins to run when demand is made and the guarantor commits breach by not complying with the demand within the stipulated period. Further, where, before expiry of such limitation period, the Principal Borrower acknowledges the debt in writing, including through OTS proposals and audited balance sheets, a fresh period of limitation is computed under Section 18 of the Limitation Act, 1963, which also enures for proceedings against the Personal Guarantor because the guarantor’s liability is co-extensive with that of the Principal Borrower.
The Tribunal observed that the liability of the guarantor is co-extensive with that of the Principal Borrower, and that an acknowledgment of liability by the Principal Borrower extends the limitation period for initiating proceedings against the Personal Guarantor as well. It further held that, under the terms of the Deed of Guarantee, the demand notice dated May 04, 2016 issued under Section 13(2) of the SARFAESI Act served as invocation of the guarantee, and since the notice granted 60 days’ time, limitation commenced from July 04, 2016 upon expiry of that period without repayment.
The NCLT held that service of notice at the last known address is valid and effective service in law, and that a Financial Creditor may directly maintain proceedings under Section 95 of the IBC against the Personal Guarantor without first initiating or simultaneously pursuing CIRP against the Principal Borrower. The Tribunal also rejected the challenge to the demand notice on the ground of lack of authority for want of supporting material, held that service at the last known address constituted valid service in law, and held that maintainability of a Section 95 application is not conditioned upon prior or parallel CIRP against the Principal Borrower.
If the mark in the context of cosmetic and skincare products in Class 3, is descriptive of the nature, kind and intended purpose of the goods, is devoid of distinctive character, is not capable of distinguishing the goods of one person from those of another, and appears to be common to trade, it warrants rectification under Section 57(2) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999
The Delhi High Court in the case of Honasa Consumer Ltd vs Visage Beauty and Health Care Pvt Ltd [C.O. (COMM.IPD-TM) 215/2023] dated June 19, 2026, has held that the mark “D-TAN”, in the context of cosmetic and skincare products in Class 3, is descriptive of the nature, kind and intended purpose of the goods, is devoid of distinctive character, is not capable of distinguishing the goods of one person from those of another, and appears to be common to trade. Consequently, the mark could not have been validly registered and was wrongly remaining on the Register, warranting rectification under Section 57(2) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999.
The Court observed that the Trade Marks Registry had raised objections under Sections 9(1)(a) and 9(1)(b) of the Act on February 02, 2012, and that respondent no. 1’s reply dated September 30, 2014 did not satisfactorily answer the objection that the mark was devoid of distinctive character, nor did it provide any substantive explanation to overcome the objection that the mark consisted exclusively of indications designating kind, quality or intended purpose. The Court further observed that Section 12 operates as an exception permitting registration in cases of honest concurrent use or special circumstances, which itself implies the possibility of other users of identical or similar marks in respect of the same or similar goods or services.
The Court then examined the meanings of “de” and “tan” and held that, when combined in the context of skincare products in Class 3, “DETAN” or “D-TAN” clearly demonstrates removal or reversal of tanned skin and would undoubtedly imply a product which may bring about removal or reversal of tanning of the skin. On that basis, and also considering the screenshots of respondent no. 1’s own products and other manufacturers’ products, the Court held that “D-TAN” and “DETAN” are pure descriptors of the kind, quality and intended purpose of the products and fall strictly within Section 9(1)(b) of the Act.
The Court additionally found that the mark was not capable of distinguishing the goods of one person from those of another and appeared to be common to trade, and also observed that respondent no. 1 itself used “Professional O3+” prominently on its products and “D-TAN” in a small font, usually with prefixes such as “BLUEBERRY”, “CRANBERRY” and “OXY”, which impelled the Court to conclude that respondent no. 1 itself used “D-TAN” more in the nature of a description of the goods rather than as a trademark.
Where the requirements under Section 58 of the Indian Partnership Act, 1932 have been duly complied with, then the Registrar is under a statutory obligation under Section 59 to register the partnership firm, and cannot insist upon production and/or submission of a trade licence as an additional condition
The Calcutta High Court in the case of Dr. Arjun Chowdhury vs State of West Bengal [WPA/805/2026] dated June 18, 2026, has held that where the requirements under Section 58 of the Indian Partnership Act, 1932 have been duly complied with, then the Registrar is under a statutory obligation under Section 59 to register the partnership firm, and cannot insist upon production and/or submission of a trade licence as an additional condition, particularly in the case of a firm formed for carrying on the professional practice of law. The Court held that Section 58 does not require submission of a trade licence, and any guideline imposing such requirement cannot override or travel beyond the parent statute.
The Court identified the only issue for consideration as whether the Registrar was justified in refusing to register M/s Pinava Legal on the ground of non-production/non-submission of trade licence. Upon reproducing Section 58 of the Indian Partnership Act, 1932, the Court observed that the provision lays down the mode of making an application for registration of a partnership firm and requires a statement in the prescribed form, accompanied by the prescribed fee, containing the particulars set out in clauses (a) to (f).
The Court recorded that there was no dispute that the firm had complied with Section 58, and further observed that Section 58 does not provide for production/submission of a trade licence. It noted that Section 59 provides that where the Registrar is satisfied that Section 58 has been duly complied with, he shall record an entry in the Register of Firms and file the statement, thereby casting a duty upon the Registrar to register the firm. The Court also observed that no rule under the Bengal Partnership Rules, 1933 had been placed showing a mandatory requirement of submission of a trade licence for registration of a partnership firm formed for the purpose of carrying legal profession, and that even if guidelines provide for such a requirement, they must be in accord with the parent statute and cannot travel beyond it.
Under the insolvency process, only a security interest created over the assets of the Corporate Debtor can confer the status of secured financial debt
The Kochi Bench of the National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT) in the case of Dileep K.P vs YES Bank [IA(IBC)/138/KOB/2026] dated June 08, 2026, has held that under the insolvency process, only a security interest created over the assets of the Corporate Debtor can confer the status of secured financial debt. Where no such security interest exists in favour of the creditor over the assets of the Corporate Debtor, the debt cannot be treated as secured financial debt notwithstanding the existence of security over the personal assets of the promoters. Once it is evident that the Corporate Debtor never created a security interest in favour of the creditor, such creditor cannot claim to be a secured creditor qua the Corporate Debtor during CIRP.
The Tribunal observed that the documents relied upon by Yes Bank, namely the Memorandum of Deposit of Title Deeds, were not executed by the Corporate Debtor but by another entity, Phoenix Cars India Pvt Ltd., and certain individuals in their personal capacities. It noted that under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, secured financial debt refers to a financial debt backed by a valid security interest over the assets of the Corporate Debtor, created through mortgage, charge, hypothecation, pledge, or any other form of security interest executed by an agreement between the Corporate Debtor and the charge holder, whereas unsecured financial debt is not supported by such security interest.
The Tribunal further observed that although the distinction between secured and unsecured financial debt has limited relevance during CIRP for voting share in the CoC, as voting share depends on the quantum of admitted debt, the distinction becomes significant in insolvency and liquidation because secured creditors enjoy statutory privileges and options in relation to enforcement and distribution. Therefore, an erroneous classification as secured financial debt may adversely affect the rights and entitlements of other secured creditors.
The Tribunal also observed that Yes Bank claimed security only over the personal assets of the promoters of the Corporate Debtor and that no security interest had been created over the assets of the Corporate Debtor itself. It noted that a secured financial creditor is a financial creditor whose debt is secured by a charge on the assets of the corporate debtor, and that a charge is a security interest created by a company on its assets in favour of a lender to secure a debt. The Tribunal therefore held that financial institutions already holding security over the assets of the Corporate Debtor cannot be compelled to share their security interest and the benefits arising therefrom with Yes Bank merely because Yes Bank held security over promoters’ personal assets.
A registered proprietor of a trademark is entitled to enforce rights under Section 28 read with Section 29 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, notwithstanding alleged non-use, unless the mark is rectified or cancelled in accordance with law
The Delhi High Court in the case of Devans Modern Breweries vs Cartel Bros Pvt Ltd [CS(COMM) 346/2026] dated June 22, 2026, has held that a registered proprietor of a trademark is entitled to enforce rights under Section 28 read with Section 29 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, notwithstanding alleged non-use, unless the mark is rectified or cancelled in accordance with law. It further held that, on the facts of this case, beer and whisky are prima facie allied and cognate goods, and where the essential and prominent feature of the defendant’s composite mark is identical or deceptively similar to the plaintiff’s registered word mark, the anti-dissection rule does not preclude a finding of infringement. The Court therefore held, prima facie, that the defendants’ use of “GODFATHER” for whisky infringed the plaintiff’s rights and was also likely to affect the distinctive character or repute of the plaintiff’s trademark within the meaning of Section 29(4).
The Court observed that registration under Section 18 confers exclusive rights under Section 28 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, and that non-use of a registered trademark does not, by itself, disentitle the registered proprietor from suing for infringement. The Court held that, until the rectification petition filed by the defendant is allowed in accordance with law, the plaintiff’s registrations for “GODFATHER” in Classes 32 and 33 remain valid and enforceable, and mere filing of rectification does not create any presumption against validity.
On allied and cognate goods, the Court observed that beer and whisky are both alcoholic beverages, their trade channels and distribution outlets are common in India, and both are governed by the same excise regime. Although the Court acknowledged significant price variation, distinct shelves, and differences in consumer choice, it held prima facie that those aspects did not determine whether the goods were allied and cognate; rather, the decisive factors were the kind, nature and intended use of the goods. On that basis, the Court formed the prima facie opinion that beer and whisky are allied and cognate goods.
On the anti-dissection rule and deceptive similarity, the Court observed that even in the defendants’ revised composite mark, the word “GODFATHER’S” retained the essential characteristics of the plaintiff’s registered word mark “GODFATHER” and remained a prominent feature from the standpoint of a general consumer. The Court held that where the essential element, characteristics and feature of the plaintiff’s registered word mark are present in the composite mark, the anti-dissection rule would not assist the defendant. The Court also found that the defendant was aware of the plaintiff’s registrations, as reflected in the Trade Marks Registry objection and the defendant’s reply seeking to distinguish its mark by adding the prefix “THE”, which cast doubt on the bona fides of adoption.
The Court further observed that the plaintiff had established substantial goodwill and reputation in the mark “GODFATHER” through long use, substantial sales, promotional expenditure, and exclusive market association. It held that when a consumer with average intelligence and imperfect recollection encounters the defendants’ product, the consumer is likely to believe that the product is associated with or emanates from the plaintiff, and that the ingredients of Section 29(4) appeared to be met, including detriment to the distinctive character or repute of the plaintiff’s trademark and possible unfair advantage to the defendants.
Mere initiation or pendency of CIRP against a promoter, or a person claiming through the promoter, cannot be a ground for the Competent Authority to refuse to exercise jurisdiction under Section 11(3) and (4) of the Maharashtra Ownership Flats (Regulation of the Promotion of Construction, Sale, Management and Transfer) Act, 1963
The Bombay High Court in the case of Darshan Mandir Co-operative Housing Society vs District Deputy Registrar [Writ Petition No. 16318 of 2025] dated June 22, 2026, has held that mere initiation or pendency of CIRP against a promoter, or a person claiming through the promoter, cannot be a ground for the Competent Authority to refuse to exercise jurisdiction under Section 11(3) and (4) of the Maharashtra Ownership Flats (Regulation of the Promotion of Construction, Sale, Management and Transfer) Act, 1963 (MOFA). Grant of unilateral deemed conveyance is an exercise of statutory power to enforce performance of a statutory obligation in specie; it is not a suit, recovery proceeding, debt enforcement mechanism, or prohibited transfer of an asset of the corporate debtor under Section 14 IBC.
The Court also clarified that Section 238 IBC does not override Section 11 MOFA because there is no inconsistency between the two provisions in this context. Accordingly, the society need not approach NCLT under Section 60(5) IBC before seeking adjudication of its deemed conveyance application.
The Court observed that proceedings for deemed conveyance under Section 11(3) and (4) MOFA are not in the nature of debt recovery, claim enforcement, or transfer of a corporate debtor’s asset in the ordinary sense. The Competent Authority performs a statutory function to perfect title in favour of flat purchasers, and this statutory function cannot be stalled merely because CIRP is pending against the promoter or a subsequent purchaser. The Court reiterated that statutory rights of third parties and statutory duties of authorities continue despite insolvency or moratorium, and that Section 14 IBC does not bar discharge of such statutory functions.
The Court also emphasized the legislative object behind the 2008 amendment introducing deemed conveyance under Section 11(2) to (5) MOFA. It said the amendment was brought in because developers were routinely delaying conveyance in order to exploit future development potential, additional FSI and TDR. If Section 14 IBC were interpreted to suspend deemed conveyance proceedings, errant developers could misuse moratorium to indefinitely postpone transfer of title, frustrating the welfare object of MOFA and even jeopardising redevelopment of ageing buildings in cities like Mumbai.
Legal Updates (June 15 – June 20, 2026)
Legal Updates (June 15 – June 20, 2026)
CASE UPDATES
Where the complainant fails to prove, through a witness with direct knowledge, the transaction that led to execution of the cheque and the passing of consideration, the initial burden necessary to invoke the presumptions under Sections 118 and 139 of the NI Act remains undischarged
The Kerala High Court in the case of Shijosh vs State of Kerala [CRL.A NO. 1403 of 2008] dated June 09, 2026, has held that where the complainant fails to prove, through a witness with direct knowledge, the transaction that led to execution of the cheque and the passing of consideration, the initial burden necessary to invoke the presumptions under Sections 118 and 139 of the NI Act remains undischarged. In such a situation, the complainant is disentitled to the benefit of those presumptions, and a finding that the offence under Section 138 has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt cannot be faulted.
The Court underscored that the statutory presumptions under Sections 118 and 139 of the NI Act do not operate in the abstract. The complainant must first lay a credible factual foundation regarding the underlying transaction and the execution of the cheque. Where the person who actually advanced the money and maintained contemporaneous records is not examined, and the complainant lacks direct knowledge of the transaction, the prosecution may fail at the threshold itself.
The Court observed that in a prosecution under Section 138 of the NI Act, the complainant may avail the twin presumptions under Sections 118 and 139, but only after proving the transaction and execution of the cheque in a convincing manner. The Court specifically noted that this would necessarily include proof of the passing of consideration covered by the cheque.
The Court further held that such proof must come from a person having direct knowledge of the transaction and execution of the cheque, and that the evidence of a person without such direct knowledge would be insufficient for that purpose. On the complainant’s own showing, the money was paid by his father to the accused in five instalments, and the details were recorded by the father in a notebook which was not produced before the court.
On that basis, the Court found that the transaction and the passing of consideration were in fact between the complainant’s father and the accused, and that the complainant himself did not know the transaction or execution of the cheque, including the passing of consideration. The Bench therefore held that the competent person to depose on these aspects was the complainant’s father, who was not examined.
Mere fact that interest under a foreign judgment was awarded from a particular date does not by itself furnish a justifiable basis for treating that date as the date of default in the insolvency proceedings
The Bengaluru National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT) in the case of Reschtsanwalt Dr. Christian Bachmann vs Coffee Day Global Limited [IA(IBC)722/2025] dated June 01, 2026, has held that an amendment to the date of default in an insolvency petition may be permitted where the amendment is clarificatory, relevant to proper adjudication, and intended to align the pleading with the factual foundation already set out, provided it does not shift the cause of action, withdraw an admission, or cause irretrievable prejudice to the respondent.
The Tribunal further held that the mere fact that interest under a foreign judgment was awarded from a particular date does not by itself furnish a justifiable basis for treating that date as the date of default in the insolvency proceedings, and that questions concerning the substantive enforceability of the underlying Letter of Comfort, the foreign judgment, and authorization issues are not germane while deciding the amendment application and are to be addressed at the hearing of the main petition.
The Tribunal observed that the application may have been prompted by the objections raised by the respondent and could, in that sense, be regarded as belated, yet there was “absolutely no basis available” for treating Nov 27, 2020 as the date of default merely because the Vienna Commercial Court had awarded interest from that date.
The Tribunal further recorded the settled proposition of law on amendment of pleadings, namely that at the stage of considering an amendment application, the merits of the proposed amendment are not to be examined; rather, the inquiry is whether the amendment is relevant and aimed at placing facts necessary for real, effective and complete adjudication of the disputes, so long as it does not amount to withdrawal of admission or setting up an altogether new cause of action.
Applying that test, the Tribunal held that the proposed amendment appeared to align the date of default with the pleaded case and did not displace the respondent from its disclosed standpoint. The Tribunal expressly left issues regarding the efficacy of the Letter of Comfort, implementation of the foreign judgment, and authorization of the signatory to be considered at the stage of hearing of the main petition.
Where the arbitral award rejects the applicant’s substantive claim, directs return of the bank guarantee, and there exists a prior consent arrangement fixing the outer limit for continuation of that bank guarantee, the Court will not direct continuation of the security merely because a Section 34 challenge is pending
The Bombay High Court in the case of Oil and Natural Gas Corporation vs Swiber Offshore Construction PTE Limited [Comm Arbitration Petition No. 17832 of 2026] dated June 15, 2026, has held that although an unsuccessful party in arbitration may maintain a post-award petition under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, such relief can be granted only in rare and compelling cases satisfying a higher threshold than an ordinary interim application. Where the arbitral award rejects the applicant’s substantive claim, directs return of the bank guarantee, and there exists a prior consent arrangement fixing the outer limit for continuation of that bank guarantee, the Court will not direct continuation of the security merely because a Section 34 challenge is pending, even if the opposite party is in liquidation and the challenge raises arguable issues.
The Court observed that after an arbitral award has been rendered, a petition under Section 9 stands on a different footing, and the principles applicable to post-award relief require a higher threshold to be met. Thus, the Court held that an unsuccessful party is not barred from seeking relief under Section 9, but such relief cannot be granted in a routine manner. Apart from a prima facie case, balance of convenience, and irreparable injury, the applicant must show exceptional circumstances such that refusal of interim protection would result in a situation which cannot later be corrected even if the challenge succeeds.
The Court noted that ONGC had raised arguable grounds in its Section 34 challenge, including contentions relating to Clause 6.3.2, the Tribunal’s approach to proof of actual loss, and the findings on delay and categories of loss. However, the Court held that these were matters for examination in the Section 34 proceedings and that an arguable challenge by itself was insufficient for grant of post-award interim relief under Section 9. The Court was thus unable to conclude that ONGC had shown such an exceptionally strong prima facie case that the award could virtually be disregarded for the purpose of interim protection.
A significant factor weighed against ONGC was the existence of the Consent Terms governing continuation of the bank guarantee, which ONGC had not adequately disclosed in the present petition. The Court observed that these Consent Terms directly concerned the duration of the bank guarantee after the award and that fairness required disclosure of such an arrangement while seeking discretionary relief. The omission was held to be material, as ONGC was effectively seeking enlargement of its rights beyond the period consciously agreed by the parties, rather than mere preservation of an existing arrangement.
The Court further observed that the plea of urgency was weakened by ONGC’s conduct. Although ONGC was aware from the outset of the issue concerning continuation of the bank guarantee and had already sought such relief in its Section 36(3) application, it filed the present Section 9 petition only on 15 May 2026 and served it on 1 June 2026, shortly before expiry of the guarantee on 15 June 2026.
The Court also held that although Swiber’s liquidation and ONGC’s apprehension regarding recovery were relevant factors, the bank guarantee could not be treated as a general security for all claims of ONGC against Swiber. It was furnished specifically in connection with liquidated damages under Clauses 6.3.2 and 6.3.4, and liquidation by itself was insufficient to elevate the case to the category of a rare and compelling case contemplated in Home Care Retail Marts (P) Ltd. v. Haresh N. Sanghavi [2026 SCC OnLine SC 670].
Applying this principle, the Court held that ONGC had failed to establish exceptional and compelling circumstances justifying post-award interim protection under Section 9, and accordingly dismissed the petition seeking continuation, renewal, extension or substitution of the bank guarantee, while keeping all questions in the pending Section 34 and Section 36 proceedings expressly open.
If the plaintiff is the prior adopter, prior user, and prior registrant of an identical word mark and device mark, and the defendants subsequently adopt the same dominant mark without any apparent explanation, the plaintiff is entitled to interim protection against infringement and passing off
The Delhi High Court in the case of Motherson Through Its Partners vs Motherson Industries [CS(COMM) 623/2026] dated May 29, 2026, has held that where the plaintiff is the prior adopter, prior user, and prior registrant of an identical word mark and device mark, and the defendants subsequently adopt the same dominant mark without any apparent explanation, the plaintiff is entitled to interim protection against infringement and passing off. The Court applied the principle that prior adoption and registration entitle the trademark proprietor to injunction, and concluded that, because the plaintiff’s registered trademark included the word mark itself, Section 29(3) of the Trade Marks Act would justify a presumption of likelihood of confusion.
The Court observed, that upon visual examination of the rival marks, that the plaintiff’s word mark “MOTHERSON” and device mark appeared on the defendants’ impugned marks and were identical in their dominant and prominent feature. The Court noted that although the defendants’ marks contained additional elements such as abbreviations and the word “INDUSTRIES,” the dominant part remained “MOTHERSON,” and that this would be what struck the public at first instance.
The Court also observed that the plaintiff’s registrations dated back to 2005 and its use was claimed from 1975, whereas the defendants had only sought registration in 2024 and 2025 on a “proposed to be used basis.” On that basis, the Court held it safe to infer that the plaintiff was the prior adopter, prior user, and prior registrant of the mark “MOTHERSON” and its variants.
The Court further noted that even though the defendants’ goods fell in a different class, there was nothing on record to explain how or why the defendants had coined the word “MOTHERSON” as their trademark. It accepted that the plaintiff had demonstrated long and continuous use and that “MOTHERSON” functioned as a source identifier exclusive to the plaintiff. Since the plaintiff held registration not only for the device but also for the word mark, the Court observed that Section 29(3) would aid the plaintiff and that confusion on the part of the public would be presumed.
Thus, the Court restrained the defendants, their directors, wholesalers, distributors and others acting for them from using, manufacturing, selling, exporting, importing, offering for sale, or distributing any goods or products bearing the plaintiff’s registered trademark “MOTHERSON” and device mark in any manner whatsoever, including on their website or advertising material, insofar as such use may amount to infringement of the plaintiff’s trademark.
A trade mark proprietor cannot assume that a platform is under a continuing court-mandated obligation to proactively police all visible uses of its marks unless the operative part of the order expressly imposes such an obligation
The Delhi High Court in the case of DRS Logistics vs Google India Pvt Ltd [CS(COMM) 1/2017] dated June 15, 2026, has held that a trade mark proprietor cannot assume that a platform is under a continuing court-mandated obligation to proactively police all visible uses of its marks unless the operative part of the order expressly imposes such an obligation. The Court has drawn a clear distinction between: (i) judicial directions dealing with the use of trade marks as keywords in online advertising; and (ii) platform-policy enforcement concerning use of trade marks in visible fields such as Ad-Text, Ad-Title and URL.
The Court observed that the principal question was whether the earlier directions were confined to use of the subject marks as keywords, or whether they also extended to use of the subject marks in Ad-Text, Ad-Title or URL, and further whether defendant nos. 1 and 3 were under a proactive obligation to ensure that such use did not occur without any complaint from the plaintiffs. The Court held that the operative portions of the earlier judgments required defendant nos. 1 and 3 to investigate complaints made by the plaintiffs alleging use of the subject marks and their variations as keywords, to review the overall effect of the advertisement, and to remove or block such advertisements if infringement or passing off was found. It noted that, although the plaintiffs had sought broader reliefs, the directions ultimately granted were limited to complaints regarding use of the subject marks as keywords.
The Court further observed that the plaintiffs had, in the earlier proceedings, confined their submissions to the issue whether providing the proprietor’s trade mark as a keyword to a third party would amount to infringement, after the statement recorded on behalf of defendant nos. 1 and 3 that third parties were not permitted to put / publish / refer to the trade mark in Ad-Text / Ad-Title as per policy.
The Court nevertheless observed that defendant nos. 1 and 3 remained bound by the statement recorded in the judgment dated 30.10.2021 that the subject marks would not be permitted to be used in Ad-Text, Ad-Title or URL in terms of the policy, but that this did not translate into a judicial direction imposing a proactive monitoring obligation. Rather, grievances regarding such use were to be governed by the defendants’ policy, under which, upon receipt of a complaint, the complaint would be examined and appropriate action taken.
The Court also observed that contempt jurisdiction can be invoked only in relation to explicit or plainly self-evident directions, and where two interpretations are possible and the conduct is not wilful, contempt is not maintainable. Since the advertisements / URLs complained of had already been taken down pursuant to the plaintiffs’ notice and subsequent Court orders, and since the operative part of the judgments did not extend to proactive policing of Ad-Text, Ad-Title or URL, no wilful disobedience was made out.
The Court stated that the operative directions in the judgments dated Oct 30, 2021 and Aug 10, 2023 were confined to requiring defendant nos. 1 and 3 to investigate complaints made by the plaintiffs regarding use of the subject marks as keywords, to review the overall effect of the advertisement, and to restrain / remove / block advertisements if infringement or passing off was found; those judgments did not impose a proactive obligation on defendant nos. 1 and 3 to monitor and prevent use of the subject marks in Ad-Text, Ad-Title or URL of third-party advertisements without any complaint from the plaintiffs.
The Court further held that, while defendant nos. 1 and 3 remained bound by their recorded statement that use of the subject marks in Ad-Text, Ad-Title or URL would not be permitted in terms of their policy, any grievance in that regard was to be addressed under the policy framework upon notice by the plaintiffs, and not through contempt on the footing that the earlier judgments had expressly directed proactive enforcement. Therefore, no wilful disobedience of the earlier judgments was established and the contempt application was dismissed.
If multiple cheque dishonour prosecutions arise out of a single transaction, and continued custody for default in payment of fine becomes excessively disproportionate, the High Court may equalise the aggregate default sentence to the period already undergone, without extinguishing the complainant’s right to recover the fine
The Karnataka High Court in the case of Dinesh Malpani vs State of Karnataka [Criminal Petition No.5718 of 2026] dated June 04, 2026, has held that imprisonment in default of payment of fine under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act is coercive and not substantive in character. Therefore, where multiple cheque dishonour prosecutions arise out of a single transaction, and continued custody for default in payment of fine becomes excessively harsh and disproportionate, the High Court may, in exercise of its jurisdiction, moderate and equalise the aggregate default sentence to the period already undergone, without extinguishing the monetary liability or the complainant’s right to recover the fine in accordance with law.
The Court observed that Section 65 IPC, now mirrored in Section 8(3) BNS, embodies a restraint on sentencing power by providing that imprisonment in default of payment of fine cannot exceed one-fourth of the maximum term prescribed for the offence. The Court emphasized that the legislative intent behind the provision is that imprisonment in default is a coercive mechanism to secure payment and not a disproportionately oppressive penalty.
The Court further noted that Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act prescribes a maximum punishment of two years’ imprisonment, or fine extending to twice the cheque amount, or both. Consequently, when read with Section 65 IPC and Section 8(3) BNS, the outer limit of imprisonment in default of payment of fine would be six months in each case. While examining the legal position, the Court reiterated that default imprisonment is not an additional punishment for cheque dishonour but a coercive and procedural consequence of non-payment. It also recognised the caution in these decisions against converting default imprisonment into a debtors’ prison model and against using it as a disguised method of enhancing substantive punishment.
Applying those principles, the Court held that the petitioner had demonstrated financial incapacity to satisfy the fine amounts and that his prolonged incarceration had caused hardship to his family. In these circumstances, continued detention in default of payment of fine was found to be disproportionate. At the same time, the Court clarified that the complainant’s and the State’s right to pursue recovery proceedings remained unaffected, and proceedings under Section 421(1) CrPC could continue independently.
Accordingly, the Court directed that the aggregate default sentence of imprisonment imposed upon the petitioner be proportionately staggered, moderated and equalised to the period of imprisonment already undergone by him in default of payment of fine.
Salary or employment-related claims can qualify as “operational debt” under Section 5(21) of IBC, but admissibility under Section 9 will still fail if the claimed default includes amounts arising during the Section 10A suspension period, if the creditor seeks to artificially cross the Section 4 threshold by adding unsupported interest
The New Delhi National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT) in the case of Devesh Bbyan vs Spicejet Ltd [C.P. (IB)-148/ND/2025] dated June 12, 2026, has held that employment dues do fall within the definition of “operational debt” under Section 5(21) of the IBC, and therefore, in principle, a petition under Section 9 may be filed on that basis. However, the Tribunal held that the petitioner’s claim included Rs. 47.52 lakhs for the period April 2020 to March 2021, which fell within the period protected by Section 10A, and such amount could not be considered for the purpose of the threshold for filing a petition under the IBC.
The NCLT reaffirmed that salary or employment-related claims can qualify as “operational debt” under Section 5(21), but admissibility under Section 9 will still fail if the claimed default includes amounts arising during the Section 10A suspension period, if the creditor seeks to artificially cross the Section 4 threshold by adding unsupported interest, or if the record discloses a plausible pre-existing dispute regarding liability or quantum.
The Tribunal observed that employment dues fall within the definition of “operational debt” under Section 5(21) of the IBC, since the provision expressly includes a claim in respect of employment, and therefore a petition under Section 9 can, in principle, be maintained for employment dues. The Tribunal then examined the petitioner’s own calculation sheet and noted that a sum of Rs. 47.52 lakhs was claimed for the period April 2020 to March 2021. Referring to Section 10A, the Tribunal observed that no application shall ever be filed for initiation of CIRP for defaults occurring during the protected period commencing March 25, 2020, and accordingly this amount could not be counted towards the threshold of Rs. 1 crore.
On the claim for interest, the Tribunal observed that the Operational Creditor had claimed Rs. 56.78 lakhs as interest at 24% per annum, but no agreement or other record establishing entitlement to such interest was produced. It also held that, in the absence of any agreement for interest, the interest amount could not be added for the purpose of meeting the threshold under Section 4 of the IBC.
The Tribunal further observed that there existed a pre-existing dispute between the parties regarding the quantum of employment dues. In the reply to the Section 8 notice, the Corporate Debtor had asserted novation of the contract, acceptance of revised terms, and that only Rs. 3.95 lakhs were payable as full and final settlement. The petitioner had not refuted these contentions in the petition, and the e-mail exchanges on record also indicated disagreement as to the amount payable. Thus, the Tribunal observed that for Section 9 purposes it is sufficient if there exists a plausible pre-existing dispute which is not spurious, hypothetical or illusory, and that such disputes on employment dues cannot be adjudicated in IBC proceedings.
On these findings, the Tribunal held that the alleged default was below Rs. 1 crore and that the dispute pre-dated the demand notice, and therefore dismissed the Section 9 petition as not admissible.
Legal Updates (June 08 – June 13, 2026)
Legal Updates (June 08 – June 13, 2026)
CASE UPDATES
Strict compliance with Rule 9 of the Security Interest (Enforcement) Rules, 2002 is a statutory sine qua non for a valid auction sale of secured immovable property under the SARFAESI Act
The Supreme Court in the case of M.R. Vasumathi vs The Authorized Officer [Civil Appeal No. 1606 of 2026] dated June 09, 2026, has clarified that compliance with Rule 9 of the Security Interest (Enforcement) Rules, 2002 is a statutory sine qua non for a valid auction sale of secured immovable property under the SARFAESI Act. Where the balance 75% of the purchase price is paid beyond the fifteen-day period prescribed in Rule 9(4), and there is no written agreement extending such time as required by the Rule, the sale stands vitiated. A sale suffering from such statutory non-compliance cannot be validated on the basis of equities, the borrower’s earlier inaction, or the fact that the sale had been confirmed. The Court therefore set aside the auction sale on the ground of material irregularity going to the root of the matter, while expressly leaving the limitation issue open.
The Court observed that the validity of an auction under the SARFAESI framework must be tested strictly against the statute and rules, and not on equitable considerations alone. It emphasised that Rule 9(3), 9(4) and 9(5), as they stood at the relevant time, are mandatory in character. The purchaser was required to deposit 25% of the sale price immediately on the date of sale, and the balance amount within fifteen days of confirmation of sale unless an extended period had been agreed upon in writing between the parties.
The Court noted that, on the record, the balance 75% of the bid amount was admittedly paid only on 31.03.2010, whereas the outer limit of fifteen days had expired on March 26, 2010. The Bench found no material showing that the auction purchaser had sought extension before that date, or that any written agreement extending time had been entered into between the relevant parties. It held that broader considerations such as the borrower’s conduct, delay in challenging proceedings, or hardship to the auction purchaser could not cure a sale process vitiated by statutory non-compliance. The Court also observed that the appellant and other legal heirs had taken steps before the DRT seeking permission to redeem the property, which sufficiently indicated willingness to redeem.
Accordingly, the Apex Court set aside the High Court, DRAT and DRT orders, and quashed the auction sale of the secured asset. It directed that the auction purchaser be refunded the entire amount deposited by him together with interest at 7% per annum from the respective dates of deposit until payment, such refund to be made by the secured creditor within six weeks. The appellant was granted an opportunity to redeem the mortgage by approaching the secured creditor within two weeks to ascertain the amount due, and on payment within the time to be stipulated by the secured creditor, the secured asset was to be restored.
The Court further directed that restoration would be available upon payment of Rs. 95.42 lakhs together with interest at 5% per annum from the date of the Section 13(2) notice until payment. If the appellant failed to avail this one-time opportunity, the secured creditor could put the property to fresh auction after eight weeks, after obtaining a fresh valuation report from a government-empanelled valuer.
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Tenancy created by the borrower after receipt of notice under Section 13(2) of the SARFAESI Act, without prior written consent of the secured creditor, confers no enforceable right, title, or interest against the secured creditor or auction purchaser
The Calcutta High Court in the case of Boon Realtors vs Julien Educational Trust [F.M.A.T 493 of 2025] dated June 09, 2026, has that a tenancy created by the borrower after receipt of notice under Section 13(2) of the SARFAESI Act, without prior written consent of the secured creditor, is hit by Section 13(13), is a nullity, and confers no enforceable right, title, or interest against the secured creditor or auction purchaser. Further, where the reliefs in a civil suit are directed against sale certificate, sale deed, and other consequences of measures taken under Section 13(4), such dispute falls within the scope of Section 17 and the jurisdiction of the civil court is barred by Section 34 of the SARFAESI Act.
The Court observed that the tenancy agreement dated 4 January 2016 was executed long after the notice under Section 13(2) dated 13 May 2011 and therefore squarely offended Section 13(13) of the SARFAESI Act. Since no written consent of the secured creditor had been shown, the Court held that the tenancy was a nullity and conferred no title upon the plaintiff. The Court also rejected the plaintiff’s objection regarding service or knowledge of the notice, observing that the law did not require service of notice under Sections 13(2) or 13(4) upon anyone other than the borrowers, and that the plaintiff, claiming through the borrowers, had no locus to challenge the propriety of such notice after the process had culminated in a valid sale certificate and sale deed.
On possession, the Court found it significant that the plaintiff had neither sought a possessory injunction in the plaint nor in the temporary injunction application. It noted that the plaintiff’s own case, including its letter dated 6 November 2023, showed only beneficial use from September 2023 and not continuous possession. The Court held that such intermittent user by students and guardians during school hours could not amount to physical possession. Since the property was vacant land, the Court held that symbolic or deemed possession delivered under the sale certificate and sale deed was sufficient to clothe the appellant with possessory rights, especially when no continuous physical possession had been established by the plaintiff.
The Court also held that the plaintiff’s reliance on the expressions “tenanted,” “as is where is,” and related wording in the sale documents was misplaced. It found that the “tenants” referred to in the sale notice were other persons involved in prior litigation and not the present plaintiff. It further held that the sale deed had to be read as a whole and, when so read along with the sale certificate, it clearly showed that possession had been handed over to the appellant and the sale was free from encumbrances known to the secured creditor.
On maintainability, the Court compared the prayers in the suit with Sections 13, 17, and 34 of the SARFAESI Act and held that every relief sought by the plaintiff, declaration that the sale certificate and sale deed were illegal, cancellation of those documents, and injunction restraining the appellant from asserting rights under them, was in substance a challenge to measures taken under Section 13(4). Such grievances, the Bench held, lay before the Debts Recovery Tribunal under Section 17, and therefore the civil court’s jurisdiction was expressly barred by Section 34. It added that maintainability of the suit was an essential component of a prima facie case for injunction, and since the suit was prima facie barred, no injunction ought to have been granted. The Court further found that the trial judge had committed errors by overlooking the effect of Section 13(13), misconstruing the “as is where is” clauses, holding that Section 34 did not bar the suit, and granting protection regarding possession despite there being no such prayer in the injunction application.
Presence of a different house mark does not, by itself, defeat a passing off claim where the overall trade dress is deceptively similar, especially for low-cost, fast-moving consumer goods purchased on the basis of memory and visual impression
The Delhi High Court in the case of GRM FOODKRAFT vs KS AGRO IMPEX [CS(COMM) 637/2024] dated May 29, 2026, has confirmed the ex parte ad interim injunction granted on 1 August 2024 and held that, until disposal of the suit, the Defendants and all persons acting on their behalf are restrained from selling, offering for sale or advertising Golden Sella Basmati Rice in the impugned trade dress/packaging that is confusingly or deceptively similar to the Plaintiffs’ trade dress/packaging. At the same time, the Court clarified that Defendant No. 1 is not precluded from continuing its business in Golden Sella Basmati Rice if it uses packaging that is distinct and not deceptively similar to the Plaintiffs’ packaging.
The Court also clarified that in a passing off action based on packaging/trade dress, the Court must assess deceptive similarity on the basis of the overall visual impression of the competing trade dresses, focusing on similarities in the ensemble rather than dissecting individual differences. Even where individual elements such as colours, imagery or certain words may be generic or common to trade, protection may still be granted if their distinctive combination, arrangement and presentation has acquired goodwill and if the defendant has adopted a substantially similar overall get-up likely to cause confusion.
The Court essentially ruled that presence of a different house mark does not, by itself, defeat a passing off claim where the overall trade dress is deceptively similar, especially for low-cost, fast-moving consumer goods purchased on the basis of memory and visual impression. In the case of edible products such as rice, the threshold of deceptive similarity is lower and greater sensitivity is required because consumer confusion is more readily occasioned.
The High Court observed that the governing test in a passing off action concerning trade dress is one of overall impression and deceptive similarity, to be assessed from the standpoint of a consumer of average intelligence and imperfect recollection, with greater attention to similarities than dissimilarities. On comparing the rival packaging, the Court found striking similarities in the green and gold colour scheme, gold lettering styled to resemble Urdu/Arabic script, the use of the word “Zarda” in similar stylisation, hanging lanterns and stars, and imagery of a pulao dish with minarets, and concluded that Defendant No. 1 had copied the essential elements of the Plaintiffs’ trade dress and attempted to come as close as possible to it.
The Court rejected the defence that the presence of the house mark “DOUBLE CHABI” was sufficient to dispel confusion, observing that in the case of rice, a fast-moving edible commodity sold through common trade channels, purchasing decisions are predominantly influenced by visual recognition of packaging rather than careful textual scrutiny of brand distinctions. The Court also held that even if “Zarda” were assumed to be generic or descriptive, that did not materially weaken the Plaintiffs’ claim because the gravamen of the action lay in the deceptive imitation of the overall trade dress and visual presentation.
The Court further found that the Plaintiffs had prima facie established goodwill and distinctiveness in the relevant packaging by producing material showing cumulative sales of more than Rs. 86.16 crores under the 10X Zarda King packaging, GST invoices for printed laminated packaging, promotional material, endorsements, hoardings, online listings and a CA certificate. It observed that the sales figures and expenditure could not be treated as nominal for an FMCG product such as rice and were sufficient at the interim stage to support the Plaintiffs’ claim of strong market presence and goodwill in the impugned trade dress.
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If social media publications are prima facie false & disparaging that harms the goodwill and reputation attached to a well-known trademark, and where such content has rapid and unrestricted digital reach capable of causing continuing commercial and reputational injury, the Court may grant ex parte ad interim injunctive relief
The Delhi High Court in the case of Gujarat Cooperative Milk Marketing Federation vs RK Singh Rajput [CS(COMM) 636/2026] dated May 29, 2026, has emphasised that online publications are capable of causing continuing reputational and commercial injury to the user of a well-known trademark, and therefore, restrained Defendants and all persons acting on their behalf from uploading any videos or other publications disparaging the plaintiffs or the AMUL mark, and also directed Defendants to take down the URLs within 36 hours of receipt of the order and prohibited re-upload of identical content until further orders.
The Court held that where social media publications are prima facie false, disparaging and structured in a manner that harms the goodwill and reputation attached to a well-known trademark, and where such content has rapid and unrestricted digital reach capable of causing continuing commercial and reputational injury, the Court may grant ex parte ad interim injunctive relief. Accordingly, the Court treated the continuing publication and dissemination of such material as constituting imminent and irreparable harm, especially where reputational injury could not be adequately compensated in monetary terms.
The Court recorded that the impugned publications and posts on social media platforms were, prima facie, disparaging and appeared to demonstrate a deliberate attempt to sensitize public sentiments relating to cow meat in India. It noted that the content had far-reaching and global dissemination through social media and was causing harm to the formidable goodwill and reputation of the plaintiffs in respect of products sold under the well-known mark AMUL since 1958.
The Court also observed that, given the false, sensational, provocative and inflammatory nature of the content, there was a real likelihood of further amplification of the misinformation if the material remained accessible in the public domain. Further, the Court accepted the plaintiffs’ contention that continued accessibility and circulation of the impugned material posed an imminent and continuing threat to their goodwill, reputation and commercial interests, and observed that once reputation is lost, monetary compensation may not retrieve the damage. On that basis, the Court found that the plaintiffs had made out a prima facie case for grant of ex parte ad interim injunction, that the balance of convenience lay in their favour, and that irreparable harm would follow if interim protection were denied.
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An arbitral tribunal cannot excuse disclosure of a contract central to an alleged breach of exclusivity or non-compete obligations solely on the basis of an asserted contractual confidentiality obligation, particularly where a court has already directed disclosure
The Bombay High Court in the case of Oil Field Instrumentation India vs Xcalibur Multiphysics Group S.L. [Commercial Arbitration Petition (L) No. 16156 of 2026] dated June 08, 2026, has held that an arbitral tribunal cannot excuse disclosure of a contract central to an alleged breach of exclusivity or non-compete obligations solely on the basis of an asserted contractual confidentiality obligation, particularly where a court has already directed disclosure and where standard protective mechanisms such as redaction, confidentiality rings, and restricted access remain available. A private confidentiality clause in a commercial contract cannot override a legal obligation to disclose before a court or tribunal in order to adjudicate the dispute properly.
The Court further laid down that, in construing a negotiated exclusivity clause in a joint venture agreement, the word “offered” must be given its contractual meaning and cannot be judicially rewritten to mean “accepted and paid for” or “purchased”. Where the record shows that the relevant technology was offered to the joint venture and its deployment continued to be pursued, the tribunal cannot infer rejection merely from postponement of purchase. In such a joint venture context, the clause is to be viewed not as a simple restraint on trade but as a positive covenant to conduct the business through the exclusive joint venture vehicle in the defined territory.
The High Court observed that the arbitral tribunal had adopted an untenable approach in excusing production of the Bhutan contract merely because the investor invoked a confidentiality clause said to exist in that very contract. It also observed that commercial confidentiality clauses ordinarily yield to legal, regulatory, or court-directed disclosure obligations, subject to mechanisms such as consultation, redaction, confidentiality rings, and controlled access.
The Court found that the arbitral tribunal had not even called for the confidentiality clause itself, nor the full correspondence with Bhutan, and had relied only on two disjointed letters without the intermediate communication or any proper examination of whether limited or protected disclosure could be made. In the Court’s view, permitting a party to avoid scrutiny of an alleged non-compete breach by invoking an unseen confidentiality clause in the allegedly offending contract would render such obligations effectively immune from adjudication.
On interpretation of “offered”, the Court disagreed with the arbitral tribunal’s view that the word should be understood as meaning technology actually made available, accepted, and paid for. The Court held that such a reading rewrote the contract. At the prima facie stage, where commercially sophisticated parties had chosen the word “offered”, it was not permissible to substitute it with “purchased” or “deployed”. The material on record did not support any rejection of the technology by the joint venture; rather, it showed continuing pursuit of deployment in India.
The Court further observed that Clause 18.3 was not merely a restraint on trade, but a commitment to conduct trade in an exclusive collaborative relationship through the joint venture. Accordingly, the tribunal’s conflation of “offered” with “accepted and paid for” was found implausible and contrary to the contractual text.
The Court also clarified that it did not disturb the tribunal’s refusal to stay performance of the Bhutan contract itself, noting that injuncting the contract could cause grave and irreparable harm. However, the Court emphasized that even if the Bhutan contract was not to be halted, the subject matter of the arbitration agreement, namely the exclusivity of the joint venture as the chosen vehicle for doing business in the Territory, still required preservation. For that purpose, disclosure of the Bhutan contract and related material was necessary at least to assess the scale of injury and possible protective measures, including damages-related preservation of the petitioner’s claim.
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In a Section 34 challenge to an award arising from an international commercial arbitration seated in India, ground of patent illegality under Section 34(2A) is unavailable. Consequently, reappreciation of evidence, or alleged ignoring of vital evidence cannot by themselves justify setting aside the award, because those matters do not fall within the restricted scope of “public policy of India”
The Bombay High Court in the case of ONGC vs Sapura Fabrication SDN BHD [Commercial Arbitration Petition No. 720 of 2024] dated June 09, 2026, has dismissed ONGC’s Section 34 Arbitration Act petition challenging an arbitral award arising out of a contract for redevelopment of the Mumbai High South Field, under which the contractor had completed the works within time and later raised six claims for extra work or change orders, holding that in a Section 34 challenge to an award arising from an international commercial arbitration seated in India, the ground of patent illegality under Section 34(2A) is unavailable.
Consequently, perversity, reappreciation of evidence, or alleged ignoring of vital evidence cannot by themselves justify setting aside the award, because those matters fall within patent illegality and not within the restricted scope of “public policy of India.” Where the Arbitral Tribunal’s interpretation of the contract is a plausible one and no case is made out under Section 34(2), the Court will not interfere even if another view is possible, and even where the award on a particular claim may appear vulnerable on patent illegality grounds.
The Court observed that the arbitration was an international commercial arbitration because Sapura was a Malaysian company and the arbitration was seated in India. Accordingly, while Section 34 applied, the separate ground of “patent illegality” under Section 34(2A) was not available. The Court emphasised that perversity in findings is relatable to patent illegality and not to the narrower post-amendment meaning of “public policy of India.” Therefore, ONGC could not seek to set aside the award by rearguing perversity or reappreciation of evidence as though it were pursuing an appeal.
If the arbitral tribunal has adopted a plausible contractual interpretation, and provided a reasoned basis for its conclusions on risk purchase, delay, liquidated damages, and bank guarantee invocation, the award does not suffer from patent illegality
The Bombay High Court in the case of Paharpur Cooling Towers vs Siemens Limited [Commercial Arbitration Petition No. 996 of 2019] dated June 08, 2026, has held that a reasoned arbitral award will not be disturbed under Section 34 Arbitration Act merely because the losing party alleges erroneous quantification, imperfect apportionment, or a different plausible contractual interpretation. Where the arbitral tribunal has considered the parties’ submissions, relied on contemporaneous material, adopted a plausible contractual interpretation, and provided a reasoned basis for its conclusions on risk purchase, delay, liquidated damages, and bank guarantee invocation, the award does not suffer from patent illegality or perversity warranting setting aside.
On risk purchase, the High Court observed that the arbitral tribunal had not acted arbitrarily in allowing 50% of the disputed portion of Siemens’ claim, and had considered the parties’ respective cases, the evidence on record, Siemens’ notices relating to risk purchases, and the admitted absence of price negotiation as well as the higher rates paid for manpower. The Court observed that this was not a case of unreasoned “rough and ready” justice; rather, the tribunal had articulated a reasonable basis for discounting the disputed amount and arriving at a broad estimate, which could not be characterised as patent illegality or perversity under Section 34.
On delay and liquidated damages, the Court found that the tribunal had adequately dealt with the argument that part of the delay was attributable to Siemens and another contractor, Gammon India. The Court accepted Siemens’ submission that under Clause 2.1 of the GRA, the relevant question was whether delay of not less than 100 days was attributable to Paharpur, because once that threshold was crossed, liquidated damages capped at 20% of the contract price became payable. The tribunal’s reliance on contemporaneous minutes of meetings, correspondence, milestone dates, and findings on shortage of manpower and machinery was held to be evidence-based and rational. The Court therefore refused to interfere with the findings attributing delay to Paharpur and upholding liquidated damages of Rs. 23.59 crores.
On invocation of bank guarantees, the Court rejected Paharpur’s contention that the issue had remained unadjudicated or that the tribunal had ignored a Supreme Court direction. It held that the Supreme Court’s earlier order merely observed that the legality of invocation was a matter for arbitration and not criminal proceedings. The arbitral tribunal had in fact interpreted the contractual documents and reasonably concluded that the advance payment guarantee continued to operate as a performance guarantee as well, since it was required to remain valid until provisional acceptance and had not stood discharged even after adjustment of the advance. The tribunal had also returned a categorical finding that Siemens’ invocation was not mala fide, and the Court held that this interpretation and treatment of the guarantees were commercially logical and plausible, and therefore immune from interference under Section 34.
Accordingly, the High Court reaffirmed that Section 34 review does not permit a court to substitute its own view on contractual interpretation, quantification of claims, or appreciation of evidence where the arbitral tribunal has adopted a plausible and reasoned approach. It also dismissed a Section 34 challenge to a unanimous arbitral award and reiterated the limited scope of judicial interference with reasoned arbitral decisions.
If the very transaction forming the basis of a Section 7 IBC petition is seriously challenged as fraudulent, or lacking legal sanctity, and where the creditor’s own Administrator has questioned the same transaction in separate Section 66 proceedings, the NCLT cannot mechanically admit the petition merely on proof of disbursement and asserted default
The Guwahati Bench of the National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT) in the case of SREI Equipment Finance vs Kitply Industries [IA (IBC)/59/GB/2025] dated June 02, 2026, has rejected a Section 7 insolvency application filed by SREI Equipment Finance Limited against Kitply Industries Limited, holding that the matter did not disclose a clear and undisputed “financial debt” and “default” fit for summary determination under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016. The NCLT held that where the very transaction forming the basis of a Section 7 petition is seriously challenged as non-genuine, collusive, fraudulent, or lacking legal sanctity, and where the creditor’s own Administrator has questioned the same transaction in separate Section 66 proceedings, the Adjudicating Authority cannot mechanically admit the petition merely on proof of disbursement and asserted default.
The Tribunal relied on the principle that the Adjudicating Authority must examine the nature of the financial transactions and not proceed solely because a debt and default are alleged. On the facts, the Tribunal found that the existence of a legally enforceable and undisputed financial debt was seriously overshadowed by substantial and bona fide issues requiring detailed adjudication, and therefore the essential ingredients of “financial debt” and “default” under the Code could not be said to stand established for the purposes of summary admission under Section 7.
Further, the NCLT held that although pendency of arbitration or Section 66 proceedings does not by itself bar a Section 7 petition, the present case involved disputed and complicated questions concerning the legitimacy and enforceability of the underlying transactions which were not fit for determination in summary insolvency jurisdiction. At the same time, the Tribunal declined to impose penalty under Section 65, holding that the materials on record did not meet the higher threshold needed to conclusively establish fraudulent or malicious initiation of proceedings.
The Tribunal observed that the case did not disclose a routine case of financial debt and default, but a peculiar factual matrix involving Kitply’s prior CIRP, implementation of its earlier resolution plan, allegations of connected-party control, same-day routing of funds, pending Section 66 proceedings before another Bench, and arbitral adjudication directed by the Calcutta High Court. It noted that although disbursement of amounts and execution of security documents were demonstrated, mere disbursement was not conclusive where serious allegations existed as to the true nature and legitimacy of the transaction.
The Tribunal placed significance on the fact that SEFL’s own Administrator had, in parallel proceedings, sought a declaration that the very same transactions under the contracts were fraudulent and amounted to wrongful trading. The Tribunal also noted that the Calcutta High Court had observed that the question whether the money given to Kitply was in effect a loan or a sham transaction used for round-tripping required detailed adjudication before an arbitrator.
Jurisdiction under Sections 241-242 of the Companies Act is a special statutory jurisdiction that cannot be waived by prior invocation of arbitration, and where the cause of action is composite, includes non-arbitrable reliefs, and involves parties not bound by the arbitration agreement, bifurcation is impermissible
The Chandigarh Bench of the National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT) in the case of Utsav Soi vs USAR Commerce Technologies [CA No. 201 of 2025] dated April 29, 2026, has held that where a petition under Sections 241-242 of the Companies Act, 2013 raises grievances and seeks reliefs that concern corporate governance, directorial status, board and shareholder actions, dilution of shareholding, alteration of constitutional documents, and other matters affecting rights in rem and the ownership and governance structure of the company, such disputes are statutory in character and are not amenable to arbitration merely because the dispute may have been triggered by or may overlap with contractual arrangements containing arbitration clauses.
The Tribunal further held that the jurisdiction under Sections 241-242 is a special statutory jurisdiction that cannot be waived by prior invocation of arbitration, and where the cause of action is composite, includes non-arbitrable reliefs, and involves parties not bound by the arbitration agreement, bifurcation is impermissible. The Tribunal found that many of the disputes raised and reliefs sought were not amenable to arbitration under the Employment Agreement or the Shareholders’ Agreement, and that the acts complained of fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribunal under Sections 241-242 of the Companies Act, 2013. It accordingly directed that the interim order would continue in full force and effect.
The Tribunal framed the core issue as to whether the disputes and reliefs in the petition under Sections 241-242 of the Companies Act, 2013 were amenable to arbitration under the Employment Agreement and the Shareholders’ Agreement, or whether they were fully or partly non-arbitrable matters of oppression and mismanagement falling exclusively within the Tribunal’s jurisdiction. It observed that Respondent No. 1 was not merely an employee under the Employment Agreement, but also a co-founder, 35% promoter-shareholder, and founding director, and that these capacities existed independently of the employment relationship. The Tribunal therefore held that the fact that termination of employment was the starting point did not make the entire dispute purely contractual in nature.
The Tribunal rejected the applicant’s characterization of the petition as a dressed-up contractual dispute. It held that the termination was only the trigger, and that what followed went beyond enforcement of contractual rights. It specifically referred to the alleged vacation of directorship without proceedings under Section 169 of the Companies Act, 2013, the EGM convened with only one director present and without the mandatory 95% shareholder consent under Section 101, the appointment of Respondent No. 3, the filing of DIR-12, the amendments to the MOA and AOA, the issuance of CCPS resulting in dilution of shareholding, the invocation of a call option to acquire the stake at a nominal amount, and the incorporation of “Shoppin Commerce Inc.” in Delaware for diversion of intellectual property and goodwill.
According to the Tribunal, these acts were ex facie independent statutory violations and acts of oppression and mismanagement, and not merely contractual consequences of termination under Clause 9.3 of the Employment Agreement.
The Tribunal also rejected the estoppel argument founded on Respondent No. 1 having earlier invoked arbitration. Relying on the principle that estoppel cannot operate against a statute, it held that the special statutory jurisdiction of the Tribunal under Sections 241-242 of the Companies Act, 2013, cannot be waived or elected away by invoking a contractual arbitration clause. It also noted that both the company petition and the Section 11 petition were filed on the same date, ruling out any prior conscious election.
The Tribunal held that many of the reliefs claimed related to rights in rem affecting the corporate structure, governance, and ownership of the company as a whole, and therefore were not arbitrable. It reiterated that such matters are reserved for adjudication by public fora, and further held that Sections 241-242 read with Section 430 of the Companies Act reflect legislative intent that oppression and mismanagement disputes of this nature are to be adjudicated exclusively by the Tribunal.
The Tribunal also reiterated that composite causes involving in rem and in personam reliefs cannot be severed, especially where not all parties are bound by the arbitration agreement, including Respondent No. 3. It additionally found direct support in the NCLAT decision in Indus Motor for the proposition that reliefs under Section 242 of the Companies Act, 2013, are not amenable to arbitration and bifurcation would frustrate the process and risk conflicting judgments.
A declaration of ownership cannot be sustained where the plaintiff lacks valid title, and a decree for conveyance cannot be granted in the absence of specific pleadings and prayer seeking such relief in view of the proviso to Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963
The Bombay High Court in the case of Waman Narayan Bhave vs Dev Bappa Cooperative Housing Society [Second Appeal No. 425 of 2003] dated June 08, 2026, has reaffirmed that a court cannot grant relief of conveyance or specific performance where the suit is framed only as one for declaration of title and the plaintiff has omitted to seek further substantive relief. The Court held that such a course is barred by the proviso to Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, particularly where the plaintiff had the opportunity to seek conveyance but did not pursue it.
The High Court clarified that where a suit is framed solely for declaration of title, and the plaintiff is able to seek further relief such as conveyance or specific performance but omits to do so, the court cannot grant such omitted relief indirectly, particularly in view of the proviso to Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. A declaration of ownership cannot be sustained where the plaintiff lacks valid title, and a decree for conveyance cannot be granted in the absence of specific pleadings and prayer seeking such relief. Relief founded on Maharashtra Ownership Flats Act (MOFA) cannot be awarded beyond the pleadings merely because the facts may suggest a promoter’s obligation to convey.
The High Court observed that the plaint, on a plain reading, contained only a prayer for declaration of ownership and did not disclose pleadings or cause of action for seeking conveyance under MOFA. The society’s case as pleaded was that it already was the owner of the land and building, and therefore sought only declaratory relief. The Court noted that there was no dispute that the defendant was the owner of the land, while the members claimed rights in their respective flats only under unregistered documents. It therefore held that the trial court had misread one flat agreement as creating entitlement in the society to seek conveyance under MOFA.
The Court further observed that both courts had effectively granted a decree for specific performance or conveyance on the basis of MOFA, despite there being neither pleadings nor prayer for such relief. It stressed that the first appellate court’s reasoning was entirely founded on the society’s supposed entitlement to conveyance under MOFA, even though that relief had never been properly pursued in the suit. The Court also attached significance to the fact that the society had withdrawn its amendment seeking to add a prayer for conveyance, and therefore had abandoned that relief. In that situation, the courts below could not grant declaratory relief and, at the same time, direct conveyance of title.
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Legal Updates (June 01 – June 06, 2026)
Legal Updates (June 01 – June 06, 2026)
CASE UPDATES
The Competition Act, 2002, did not confer any power on the CCI to keep an approval under Section 31(1) in abeyance or compel a fresh Form II filing after approval, whether under Section 45(2), Regulation 5(5), or any condition in the approval order
The Supreme Court in the case of Amazon.com NV Investment Holdings LLC vs Competition Commission of India [Civil Appeal No.4974 of 2022] dated May 27, 2026, on a proper construction of Section 6(2) of the Competition Act, 2002 read with Regulations 9(4) and 9(5) of the Combination Regulations, has that the requirement is to place before the CCI, in a single notice, the inter-connected steps and agreements that explain the substance of the composite arrangement, and that requirement is satisfied where the relevant instruments and linkages are on the CCI’s record and are capable of assessment in the same review process. A later disagreement as to legal or economic characterisation of disclosed material does not convert such disclosure into non-notification so as to attract Section 43A.
Further, the Apex Court held that penal action under Sections 44 and 45 can be sustained only upon strict proof of the specific statutory ingredients, including material falsity or material omission and the requisite mental element; internal deliberative material cannot, by itself, substitute for that inquiry where the executed agreements and review record were already before the CCI. The proviso to Section 20(1) is a jurisdictional limitation which bars the CCI, after one year from the date the combination has taken effect, from taking steps which in substance reopen the combination for fresh merits review.
The Competition Act does not contemplate an extra-statutory power to keep an approval in abeyance or compel re-notification of the same approved transaction, and such power cannot be sourced in Section 45(2), Regulation 5(5), or an approval condition. In proceedings of this nature, fair notice must extend not only to the allegations but also to the nature of the adverse action proposed, added the Court.
The Court observed that merger control under the Competition Act is an ex-ante, disclosure-based regime, but the CCI, being a creature of statute, must act strictly within the limits of the Act and the Combination Regulations. On the contemporaneous record, the Court found that the Form I notice, annexed executed agreements, and responses furnished during review had placed before the CCI the FRL-linked aspects, the FRL shareholders’ agreement, and the business commercial arrangements as part of the same review process, and that the approval order itself showed that the CCI had in fact examined retail-market overlaps involving FRL.
The Court therefore held that this was not a case of absence of a composite notice in substance, but at most a later dispute over characterisation of disclosed arrangements. It further held that Section 43A, being a penal provision, could not be invoked where notice had in fact been filed, processed, and approved, and that Sections 44 and 45 required strict satisfaction of statutory ingredients including materiality and the prescribed mental element, which had not been established merely by relying on internal communications predating the final transaction documents.
The Court also held that the proviso to Section 20(1) imposed a jurisdictional bar against reopening combination review after one year from the date the combination took effect, and that the proceedings culminating in approval abeyance and a direction to file Form II were, in substance, an impermissible reopening of the combination review. It additionally held that the Act did not confer any power on the CCI to keep an approval under Section 31(1) in abeyance or compel a fresh Form II filing after approval, whether under Section 45(2), Regulation 5(5), or any condition in the approval order.
Accordingly, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the NCLAT’s and the CCI’s order in revoking the approval for the 2019 Amazon -Future Coupons investment, in entirety, and directed that if any amount had been deposited or recovered from Amazon pursuant to the impugned orders, the same be refunded within eight weeks together with simple interest at 6% per annum from the date of deposit/recovery until actual refund. The Court further directed that if the refund was not made within that eight-week period, the unpaid amount would thereafter carry simple interest at 9% per annum from the expiry of eight weeks until payment.
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If a duplicate SIM is issued without proper verification, such issuance constitutes negligence and deficiency in service, and if it enables OTP diversion and fraudulent withdrawals, it is the proximate cause of the resulting financial loss. The telecom service provider is vicariously liable for such wrongful acts of its officials
The Karnataka High Court in the case of Basaveshwara Pattana Sahakara Bank Niyamitha vs Canara Bank [WP No. 16104 of 2025] dated June 01, 2026, has held that a civil compensation claims against a telecom service provider for negligent issuance of a duplicate SIM card, resulting in diversion of OTPs and fraudulent banking transactions, is maintainable before a Permanent Lok Adalat as a dispute concerning deficiency in a public utility service, notwithstanding the existence of parallel criminal proceedings arising from the same facts.
The Court held that where a duplicate SIM is issued without proper verification, such issuance constitutes negligence and deficiency in service, and if it enables OTP diversion and fraudulent withdrawals, it is the proximate cause of the resulting financial loss. The telecom service provider is vicariously liable for such wrongful acts of its officials when committed in the course of their authorised functions. Direct recoveries of the defrauded amount reduce the net loss, but insurance proceeds received from an independent insurer do not reduce the wrongdoer’s liability.
The Court observed that the dispute was a civil compensation claim for deficiency in telephone service and therefore fell within the jurisdiction of the Permanent Lok Adalat under Sections 22A and 22C of the Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987. It rejected BSNL’s contention that the matter was excluded merely because the underlying facts also involved allegations of fraud and criminal conduct. The Court observed that a civil compensation claim does not become a “matter relating to an offence” only because the same facts may also give rise to criminal proceedings, and that civil and criminal remedies may proceed independently.
The Court further held that the unauthorised issuance of a duplicate SIM card without proper verification amounted to negligence and deficiency in service attributable to BSNL. It found that the duplicate SIM enabled diversion of OTPs and was the proximate cause of the fraudulent transactions. The Court emphasised that the OTP was the final and indispensable authentication step, and without the duplicate SIM the fraud could not have been completed. It also drew an adverse inference against BSNL for not producing its SIM issuance and verification records and held that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applied in the circumstances.
On liability, the Court held BSNL vicariously liable for the acts of its official involved in issuing the duplicate SIM, observing that SIM issuance was squarely within the functions entrusted to the official and that wrongful performance of an authorised function does not take the act outside the course of employment. At the same time, the Court affirmed that Canara Bank bore no liability, since its system employed a two-factor authentication model, the OTP channel was externally subverted through the BSNL-side SIM swap, and no independent negligence or deficiency on the part of Canara Bank was established.
The Court also held that while the reverse credit of Rs. 30 lakhs and the police recovery of Rs. 7.12 lakhs were direct recoveries that reduced the gross loss, the insurance proceeds received by the Co-operative Bank did not reduce BSNL’s liability. Applying the collateral source rule, it held that insurance proceeds arose from an independent contractual arrangement between the Bank and its insurer and could not be used by BSNL to avoid or reduce its own liability. It also recognised that the Co-operative Bank had suffered consequential harm including liquidity stress, operational disruption and reputational damage.
Repayment of dues or conclusion of a one-time settlement does not erase fraudulent conduct by the borrower that jeopardised the bank’s security. A bank’s decision to settle the debt does not prevent it from continuing proceedings under the RBI Master Circular dated 1 July 2016, if the settlement is silent on such proceedings
The Calcutta High Court in the case of Bhanu Properties vs Reserve Bank of India [APOT/299/2025] dated May 18, 2026, has held that, although principles of natural justice apply to proceedings for classifying a borrower’s account as fraudulent under the RBI Master Circular, such proceedings are not vitiated merely because one audit report was allegedly not supplied, unless the borrower demonstrates actual prejudice. Where the borrower had access to the underlying stock statements, had already received the majority of the forensic audit reports, and chose not to respond to the show-cause notice, the plea of breach of natural justice fails.
The Court therefore held that repayment of dues or conclusion of a one-time settlement does not eclipse or erase fraudulent conduct by the borrower that jeopardised the bank’s security. A bank’s decision to settle the debt does not prevent it from continuing proceedings under the RBI Master Circular dated 1 July 2016, particularly where the settlement is silent on such proceedings and the object of the circular is deterrence as well as protection of the banking system.
The Court observed at the outset that it was difficult to understand how a writ court could interfere with proceedings initiated by the bank under the SARFAESI Act, particularly when settled law requires a challenge to SARFAESI measures to be made in accordance with Section 17 of the Act. However, the Court proceeded on the basis of the factual record before it and focused on the fraud-classification challenge under the RBI Master Circular.
On natural justice, the Court accepted that the principles of natural justice apply to a quasi-judicial proceeding even where not expressly provided. However, it noted that the appellants were found to have submitted misleading stock audit reports from 2018 till 30 April 2022, and that the suppression and misrepresentation in those stock reports could have seriously exposed the bank to the risk of being left without security. It held that this itself constituted the fraudulent conduct alleged, even assuming that the last stock audit report dated 30 March 2023 had not been supplied.
The Court further observed that the stock statements analysed by the forensic auditors were, at all material times, in the appellants’ possession. It considered significant that the appellants neither challenged the initial show-cause on merits nor formally sought the forensic stock audit reports from the respondents, and indeed chose not to reply to the show-cause notice at all. In that backdrop, the Court held that the appellants could not demonstrate any real prejudice from the alleged non-supply of one forensic stock audit report, especially when they had already received most of the reports for the period from March 2018 to 30 April 2022.
On the effect of repayment and the OTS, the Court acknowledged that declaration as a fraudster under the RBI Master Circular has serious civil and commercial consequences, including debarment from availing loans from banks and financial institutions for five years. Even so, it held that repayment of the bank’s dues does not extinguish the borrower’s fraudulent conduct where the borrower had exposed the bank to financial risk by jeopardising its security. The Court emphasised that the OTS was silent regarding the fraud-classification proceedings and that settlement of dues cannot absolve the borrower from the consequences under the RBI Master Circular, whose purpose includes deterrence against borrowers misleading banks into lending or continuing to lend.
The pendency of a Section 34 challenge to an arbitral award does not defeat a Section 7 IBC application where the insolvency application is independently founded on an earlier payment default, and that the arbitral award, in any event, gives a fresh period of limitation for initiating CIRP if filed within three years thereof
The New Delhi Principal Bench of the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT) in the case of Bindu Kapoor vs Sapan Mohan Garg [Company Appeal (AT) (Insolvency) No. 2040 of 2025] dated May 29, 2026, has held that where a financial creditor establishes the existence of financial debt and a continuing default, a Section 7 application is maintainable even if the creditor has also obtained an arbitral award and pursued execution proceedings, because those remedies are not mutually exclusive. In the present case, the default was held to have arisen independently upon non-payment pursuant to the valid loan recall notices, and was not dependent solely on the arbitral award.
The Tribunal further held that a contractually defined “material adverse effect” clause can validly support recall of the loan where the lender forms the opinion that circumstances affecting the guarantors impair the obligors’ ability to perform their obligations, particularly where guarantors are expressly included within the definition of “Obligor(s).” Consequently, non-payment within the recall period constituted default for the purpose of Section 7.
It was also held that the pendency of a Section 34 challenge to an arbitral award does not defeat a Section 7 application where the insolvency application is independently founded on an earlier payment default, and that the arbitral award, in any event, gives a fresh period of limitation for initiating CIRP if filed within three years thereof.
The Tribunal observed that the loan recall notices were not infirm and were issued in accordance with the contractual framework. The Tribunal noted that the loan agreements defined “Material Adverse Effect” broadly and included within “Obligor(s)” not only the borrower but also guarantors and other security providers. Since Rana Kapoor was an admitted guarantor, and criminal investigation and arrest had occurred, the lender was entitled, under Clause 12.1.8 and the consequences of default provision in Clause 12.2, to form the opinion that a material adverse effect had arisen and to recall the loans.
The Tribunal further observed that the Section 7 application against Bliss Abode was not founded only on the arbitral award. It specifically relied on the default that first occurred upon failure to pay the recalled dues by March 14, 2020, and pleaded that such default continued thereafter. Therefore, the appellant’s reliance on Regulation 2A and the contention that a non-final arbitral award could not be the basis of the insolvency application did not assist the appellant, because the award was not the sole basis of the claimed default.
On the argument that Section 7 was being used as an execution mechanism, the Tribunal held that the facts did not disclose abuse of process. It observed that the inquiry under Section 7 is confined to the existence of financial debt and default, and once those are established, admission follows. It also reiterated that there is no general discretionary power to refuse admission once debt and default are proved.
The Tribunal also rejected the limitation objection, and held that in addition to the continuing default after the recall notice, the arbitral award gave a fresh cause of action, and since the Section 7 application had been filed within three years thereafter, it was within limitation. The Tribunal finally concluded that for more than six years no payment had been made by either corporate debtor despite the recalled outstanding debt, and that debt and default stood proved.
If the plaintiff is the prior adopter and user of a registered trademark which has acquired substantial reputation, and the defendant adopts a mark that retains the dominant and essential features of that registered mark with only a minor insertion, such alteration does not dispel deceptive similarity
The Delhi High Court in the case of Capital Foods Private Limited vs Kishan Rameshbhai Kaswala Trading [CS(COMM) 562/2026] dated May 22, 2026, has held that where the plaintiff is the prior adopter and user of a registered trademark which has acquired substantial reputation, and the defendant adopts a mark that retains the dominant and essential features of that registered mark with only a minor insertion such as the word “DIPPING”, such alteration does not dispel deceptive similarity. If the overall commercial impression remains such as to cause confusion to an unwary consumer of average intelligence and imperfect recollection, the use is not honest or bona fide, and a prima facie case for injunction in an infringement and passing off action is made out.
The Court observed that since the suit was founded on infringement and passing off of the plaintiff’s registered trademark, comparison of the rival marks was necessary. On such comparison, the Court found that the emphasis on the words “Schezwan” and “Chutney” on a white background in the defendant’s products appeared similar to that of the plaintiff, and that merely using the word “dipping” between those words did not create such a distinction as would enable an unwary consumer of average intelligence and imperfect recollection to differentiate between the two products.
The Court observed that the defendant had been using the mark “Schezwan Chutney” openly on e-commerce platforms, and that such use was bound to create confusion in the minds of the public as to whether the defendant’s products were those of the plaintiff or were associated with it. It noted that the presence of brand names such as “K Masala”, “Green Piece” or “Fruvanta” at the top would not sufficiently alert the public that the products belonged to the defendant and not the plaintiff.
The Court also held that the defendant’s products shown on e-commerce websites were deceptively similar to the plaintiff’s products bearing the registered trademark “SCHEZWAN CHUTNEY”, and that adoption of the mark “SCHEZWAN CHUTNEY”, with or without the word “DIPPING” in between, did not appear honest or bona fide. The Court thus recorded that the plaintiff’s registered mark had garnered substantial reputation and goodwill over the years, as reflected from the sales figures and promotional expenditure, and that the defendant appeared to be riding on the coattails of the plaintiff’s immense reputation and goodwill, which was bound to dilute the plaintiff’s trademark.
Accordingly, the Court granted an ex parte ad interim injunction restraining the defendant, its agents, suppliers, distributors, directors, employees and all others acting on its behalf from directly or indirectly dealing in the impugned products “K3 MASALA SCHEZWAN DIPPING CHUTNEY”, “GREEN PIECE SCHEZWAN DIPPING CHUTNEY”, and “FRUVATA SCHEZWAN DIPPING CHUTNEY”, and/or any products or services bearing the mark “SCHEZWAN CHUTNEY” and/or “SCHEZWAN DIPPING CHUTNEY”, and/or from using any other mark deceptively similar to the plaintiff’s registered trademark “SCHEZWAN CHUTNEY”.
The Court further directed the defendant to place on record, in a sealed cover and within six weeks from the date of service, its books of account, invoices, sales memos and/or any other documents evidencing sale of the infringing products referred to in the injunction direction. Further, the matter was directed to be listed before the Joint Registrar (Judicial) on Aug 11, 2026 for completion of service and pleadings, and before the Court on Nov 17, 2026.
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If directors are vicariously liable under Section 141 of the NI Act and are themselves undergoing insolvency or bankruptcy under Part III of the IBC, they are entitled to the benefit of moratorium in respect of the compensatory liability, but not in respect of their personal criminal liability under Section 138 of the NI Act
The Supreme Court in the case of Dineshchand Surana vs UCO Bank [Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No. 12135 of 2024] dated May 27, 2026, has held that proceedings under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act are not in the nature of legal action for recovery of money simpliciter; they are quasi-criminal proceedings with a tilt towards the criminal side, and their predominant object is to maintain the credibility and integrity of cheques in commercial transactions by attaching penal consequences to cheque dishonour. Accordingly, the moratorium provisions under Part III of the IBC do not apply to the criminal aspect of Section 138 proceedings, namely the prosecution and punishment for the offence, but do apply to the compensatory aspect, namely the recovery of compensation ordered in such proceedings.
The Court further held that where directors are vicariously liable under Section 141 of the NI Act and are themselves undergoing insolvency or bankruptcy under Part III of the IBC, they are entitled to the benefit of moratorium in respect of the compensatory liability, but not in respect of their personal criminal liability under Section 138 of the NI Act.
The Court undertook an extensive examination of the nature of proceedings under Section 138 of the NI Act and held that though such proceedings arise from a civil transaction and have a compensatory element, the provision is predominantly criminal in nature because the dishonour of cheque is deemed to be an offence and is punishable with imprisonment or fine or both.
The Court observed that the offence is the act of cheque dishonour, while the non-payment of the debt is the injury caused by that offence. It further held that Section 138 proceedings cannot be treated merely as recovery proceedings, although the provision also contains a compensatory aspect through orders of compensation under Section 395 of the BNSS.
Therefore, the Court bifurcated Section 138 proceedings into two tiers: the criminal aspect, which culminates in punishment, and the compensatory aspect, which is civil in nature and concerns recovery of compensation. On the moratorium provisions under Part III of the IBC, the Court observed that they cannot apply to the criminal aspect of Section 138 proceedings, particularly because liability to pay fine is an “excluded debt” under Section 79(15) of the IBC; however, the moratorium would apply to the compensatory aspect of Section 138 proceedings, including recovery of compensation ordered by the criminal court.
The Court also observed that directors made vicariously liable under Section 141 of the NI Act may obtain the benefit of moratorium in respect of the compensatory liability, even where such liability originally arose from the company’s debt, because Sections 96 and 101 of the IBC use the expression “any debt.”
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The object of attachment, seizure or freezing under the PMLA is preservative in nature, and where the property is market-linked, preservation cannot be understood merely as retention of legal title or custody, but must extend to preservation of economic value as well
The High Court of Chhattisgarh in the case of Dream Achiever Consultancy Services vs Union of India [WPC No. 2073 of 2025] dated April 27, 2026, has held that where frozen or attached property under the PMLA consists of market-linked securities such as listed shares, preservation of the property necessarily includes preservation of its economic value, and not merely retention of the asset in its original frozen form. In the absence of any express statutory mechanism under the PMLA or the Prevention of Money-laundering (Taking Possession of Attached or Frozen Properties Confirmed by the Adjudicating Authority) Rules, 2013, for protecting the value of such volatile financial assets, the High Court may, in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, issue limited protective directions to permit consideration of liquidation and reinvestment of the assets into regulated, low-risk instruments under the exclusive supervision and control of the ED, provided the corpus remains fully secured, identifiable, traceable, and beyond the petitioners’ control, and without affecting the merits of pending PMLA proceedings.
The Court observed that the limited issue before it was not the legality of the freezing order or the confirmation order, since those were already under challenge before the Appellate Tribunal, but whether a mechanism could be devised to preserve the value of frozen market-linked securities pending culmination of proceedings under the PMLA. It noted that the assets were not static assets such as land or fixed deposits, but listed equity shares whose value remained subject to constant market fluctuation. The Court held that the object of attachment, seizure or freezing under the PMLA is preservative in nature, and where the property is market-linked, preservation cannot be understood merely as retention of legal title or custody, but must extend to preservation of economic value as well.
The Court further found substance in the submission that neither the PMLA nor the 2013 Rules provided a specific mechanism for management or preservation of the value of market-linked securities after freezing. While Rule 4(4) contemplates transfer of shares, debentures, mutual fund units or instruments in favour of the Director of Enforcement, the Rules are silent on protection against adverse market movements. The Court considered that this statutory silence could not be treated as a prohibition against adopting reasonable measures for preservation of value, particularly when the statutory objective itself is preservation of property pending adjudication.
The Court also observed that the apprehension of the ED regarding dissipation of assets could be addressed by safeguards, because the petitioners were not seeking control over the sale proceeds and had stated that the proceeds could remain under the exclusive control of the ED. It reasoned that if the corpus remained identifiable, traceable, fully secured and beyond the control of the petitioners, conversion from market-traded equities into regulated and low-risk financial instruments would not prejudice the ED or frustrate proceedings under the PMLA.
Accordingly, the Court directed the petitioners to submit to the ED a detailed proposal identifying the securities sought to be liquidated, the mode of liquidation, and the SEBI-regulated instruments in which the proceeds were proposed to be invested. Upon receipt, the ED was permitted to obtain the opinion of an independent SEBI-registered investment adviser, portfolio manager or other financial expert. If satisfied that liquidation of any part or whole of the frozen securities was necessary or desirable for preservation of value, the ED could permit such liquidation strictly under its supervision and through a SEBI-registered intermediary. The sale proceeds were not to be released to the petitioners and were to remain subject to the freezing order and PMLA proceedings.
The Court further directed that the sale proceeds be transferred into a separate escrow or custodial account or another designated account identified by the ED, with no operational control of the petitioners. The realized amount could then be invested only in low-risk and regulated financial instruments, including government-backed securities, treasury-linked instruments, debt-oriented mutual funds, liquid funds, money-market instruments, or other SEBI-regulated products approved by the ED upon expert advice, keeping in view preservation of capital and liquidity. Any income, dividend, interest, appreciation, redemption amount or other accretion was also to remain subject to the PMLA and abide by the final outcome of proceedings.
The petitioners were specifically restrained from claiming any right of possession, withdrawal, transfer, encumbrance, pledge, lien, beneficial enjoyment or management in respect of either the original securities or the sale proceeds and accretions during the pendency of proceedings. If the ED formed the view that liquidation would prejudice pending proceedings or would not serve preservation of value, it was required to pass a reasoned order within eight weeks from submission of the proposal. The Court clarified that it had not adjudicated upon whether the assets constituted proceeds of crime, or upon the validity of the freezing order, retention order or prosecution complaint, and left all such issues open for decision by the Appellate Tribunal, the Special Court and other competent forums.
An agreement of sale and an amendment agreement, even if executed prior to commencement of CIRP, do not by themselves confer any right, title or interest in immovable property of the corporate debtor in favour of the applicant, since title passes only through a duly executed and registered conveyance deed
The National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT), Bengaluru Bench in the case of Fortuna Integral Projects Private Limited vs Shivadutt Bannanje [I.A. No. 596 of 2024] dated May 26, 2026, has held that an agreement of sale and an amendment agreement, even if executed prior to commencement of CIRP, do not by themselves confer any right, title or interest in immovable property of the corporate debtor in favour of the applicant, since title passes only through a duly executed and registered conveyance deed.
Accordingly, where the applicant seeks enforcement of such pre-CIRP agreements in respect of a corporate debtor’s asset, and the transaction is already under challenge in avoidance proceedings as preferential, undervalued or fraudulent, the applicant cannot claim conveyance as of right merely on the basis of those agreements, particularly when payments were made during moratorium and no cogent proof of possession is produced.
The Tribunal identified as undisputed that the agreement of sale and amendment agreement had been executed before commencement of CIRP, that TGMC Bank was the secured creditor in respect of the schedule property, that CIRP commenced, that the applicant made payment to TGMC Bank during moratorium, that application seeking avoidance of the impugned sale transactions was pending, and that the applicant was seeking enforcement of the sale transaction by execution of the sale deed in its favour.
The Tribunal observed that the applicant had not filed any document showing physical possession of the schedule property except the recital in the amendment agreement, and further held that since payment was made by the applicant during CIRP, possession could not have been delivered earlier. It also observed that the agreement of sale and amendment agreement by themselves did not confer title or convey interest in favour of the applicant in the schedule property. The Tribunal also reiterated that an agreement to sell is only a promise of future transfer and does not itself create any interest in or charge upon immovable property; transfer of right, title and interest occurs only upon execution and registration of the sale deed.
The Tribunal further took note of the memo filed by the successful resolution applicant enclosing the discharge deed executed by TGMC Bank, under which the bank acknowledged satisfaction of its claims and discharged the equitable mortgage over the schedule property after payments under the approved resolution plan. On that basis, the Tribunal recorded that this reflected a possible dubious role of TGMC Bank in receiving money from the applicant while keeping the CoC in the dark, and again receiving amounts under the approved resolution plan, thereby warranting explanation from the bank regarding the entire scenario and its conduct as a public institution. The Tribunal also observed that the application, which sought enforcement in 2024 of agreements of 2019–20 without cogent explanation for the delay, was barred by limitation.
The Tribunal thus dismissed the application seeking enforcement of the 2019–20 agreements and execution of the sale deed in favour of the applicant. In addition, while noting the discharge deed issued by TGMC Bank after implementation of the resolution plan, the Tribunal stated that TGMC Bank needed to be summoned to explain the entire scenario and its conduct in receiving money both from the applicant and again under the approved resolution plan.
For purposes of Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, vicarious liability cannot be fastened merely on account of office or designation, and the complaint must disclose sufficient foundational facts showing the role of each accused in the conduct of the business of the company
The Supreme Court in the case of Mansi Finance (Chennai) Ltd vs M. Lalitha [Criminal Appeal No. 2849 of 2026] dated May 26, 2026, has asserted that, for purposes of Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, vicarious liability cannot be fastened merely on account of office or designation; the complaint must disclose sufficient foundational facts showing the role of each accused in the conduct of the business of the company or society at the relevant time.
However, it is clarified that while testing the complaint at the quashing stage, the Court must read it as a whole along with the documents forming part of it, and if such material prima facie reveals participation in the underlying transaction giving rise to the legally enforceable debt, continuation of prosecution is justified. Accordingly, quashing is warranted where the complaint contains only general assertions unsupported by transaction-specific material, but not where documentary material prima facie links the accused to the antecedent financial arrangements forming the substratum of the dishonoured cheque.
The Court reiterated that Section 141 of the NI Act creates vicarious criminal liability and therefore requires the complaint to disclose that the person sought to be prosecuted was in-charge of, and responsible to, the company or society for the conduct of its business at the relevant time.
Mere designation as an office bearer is insufficient, and a bald reproduction of statutory language without factual foundation cannot sustain prosecution. At the same time, the complaint must be read as a whole, and the Court is not required to insist on mechanical reproduction of the exact phraseology of Section 141 if the substance of the allegations and accompanying material disclose the factual basis for liability.
Applying this principle, the Court held that respondent nos. 1, 2 and 4 stood on a different footing because the complaint and accompanying documents prima facie connected them with the underlying transaction: the MoU bore the signature of respondent no. 1, the dishonoured cheque bore the signature of respondent no. 2, and the promissory notes and allied documents showed participation of respondent nos. 1, 2 and 4.
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If a franchisee has expressly acknowledged that it has no proprietary right in the franchisor’s trademark, and the franchise arrangement has been terminated, then any continued use of the mark thereafter is prima facie unauthorised
The Delhi High Court in the case of Moti Mahal Delux Management Services vs Zikra Hotels and Restaurants LLP [CS(COMM) 502/2026] dated May 14, 2026, has held that where a franchisee has expressly acknowledged that it has no proprietary right in the franchisor’s trademark, and the franchise arrangement has been terminated, any continued use of the mark thereafter is prima facie unauthorised and not bona fide. In such circumstances, as the plaintiff has shown subsisting trademark registrations, long-standing goodwill, deceptive similarity, and likelihood of consumer confusion, the High Court granted an ex parte ad interim injunction restraining Zikra Hotels and Restaurants LLP (defendant no.1) and all persons acting for or through it from running, advertising, selling, marketing or promoting any restaurant or catering business under the impugned marks of the Moti Mahal Delux.
The Court noted at the outset that, since the suit contemplated urgent interim relief, exemption from the requirement of pre-institution mediation under Section 12A of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 was justified. On the merits of the interim injunction application, the Court observed that under the Franchise Agreement the defendant had only a limited contractual authority to use the mark “MOTI MAHAL DELUX TANDOORI TRAIL” for the agreed period, and the defendant had clearly acknowledged that it had no right in that name.
The Court further observed that, once the Franchise Agreement stood terminated, defendant no.1 could not have continued using the mark for any reason whatsoever. It found that the plaintiffs’ investigation prima facie suggested continued unlawful use of the mark by defendant no.1 after termination, and that the contractual clauses appeared to prohibit such use. It therefore observed that the defendant’s continued use was not bona fide and appeared to be unauthorised.
The Court also recorded that a visual comparison of the rival marks demonstrated deceptive similarity likely to cause confusion and deception in the minds of unwary consumers. It further accepted that the plaintiffs’ trademark registrations, long use, sales figures, advertisement expenses, and prior enforcement history sufficiently established goodwill and reputation in the marks.
Based on these factors, the Court held that the plaintiffs had made out a prima facie strong case, that the balance of convenience was in their favour, and that irreparable loss and injury would be caused if interim protection was denied. Accordingly, the Court granted an ex parte ad interim injunction restraining defendant no.1 and persons acting on its behalf from using the impugned marks and directed removal of such marks from the restaurant premises, menus, advertising material, e-commerce websites, and social media platforms.
The Court also directed the defendant to remove all references to those marks from restaurant boards, hoardings, menus, cutlery, brochures, advertising material, e-commerce websites, and social media platforms within two weeks of receipt of the order.
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Once the notice fails to mention the specific amount due, the possibility of the drawer repaying the specific amount becomes impossible, and in the absence of specific mentioning of the amount in the demand notice, there is no demand for payment of the specific amount covered by the dishonoured cheque
The Kerala High Court in the case of Rajesh. K vs Asokan P.K. [CRL.A NO. 212 OF 2013] dated May 26, 2026, has held that a demand notice under proviso (b) to Section 138 of the NI Act must specifically state the actual amount covered by the dishonoured cheque. In the absence of such specific mention of the amount in the demand notice, the notice is incomplete and does not constitute a valid legal notice in the eye of law. Consequently, the recipient of such a notice cannot be said to have had the opportunity to pay the amount to avoid penal consequences, and therefore no offence under Section 138 of the NI Act would be completed, particularly the “deemed offence”. The High Court therefore confirmed the finding of the Magistrate and held that the verdict of acquittal did not require any interference.
The Court observed that the offence under Section 138 of the NI Act is a deemed offence, and its completion requires the fulfilment of five stages: (1) issuance of a cheque for a legally enforceable debt or liability; (2) presentation of the cheque within its time limit of three months; (3) dishonour of the cheque; (4) issuance of a demand notice under proviso (b) to Section 138 within thirty days from the date of receipt of information regarding dishonour; and (5) failure of the drawer to make payment of the amount demanded within fifteen days, followed by filing of the complaint within thirty days after expiry of the notice period.
The Court further observed that proviso (b) to Section 138 specifically employs the phraseology “makes a demand for the payment of the said amount of money,” which necessarily indicates that the notice must specifically state the amount to be paid consequent upon dishonour of the cheque. Only when the notice is specific about the amount is it possible for the recipient to pay the amount demanded and thereby avoid penal consequences.
The Court rejected the argument of the appellant/complainant that where there is only one transaction between the parties, the amount demanded may be inferred from the notice even without its specific mention. It held that such an argument cannot be countenanced on a meticulous reading of provisos (b) and (c) to Section 138 of the NI Act, as the statute specifically mandates demand of the “said amount of money,” which must be expressly stated in the notice.
The Court further observed that once the notice fails to mention the actual/specific amount due, the possibility of the drawer repaying the actual/specific amount becomes impossible, and in the absence of specific mentioning of the amount in the demand notice, there is no demand for payment of the actual/specific amount covered by the cheque in the eye of law.
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If the successful resolution applicant fails to furnish the performance guarantee or otherwise fails to comply with the plan process, forfeiture of the earnest money deposit in terms of the RFRP is valid, particularly where the non-compliance does not arise from non-receipt of the LoI or imposition of additional terms outside the resolution plan process
The Supreme Court in the case of Sanjay Dave vs Andhra Bank [Civil Appeal Nos.12264-12266 of 2024] dated May 26, 2026, has held that once a resolution plan has been approved by the CoC, the successful resolution applicant is bound by it and cannot seek to evade implementation by raising objections to LoI stipulations that are either inherent in the process, already known to it, or expressly accepted by it. The Court reaffirmed that after CoC approval, there is no scope under the IBC for the successful resolution applicant to negotiate further, modify the plan, or withdraw from it at its own instance; the only surviving statutory contingency is adjudicatory approval under Section 31, subject to the limits of Section 30(2).
The Court further held that where the successful resolution applicant fails to furnish the performance guarantee or otherwise fails to comply with the plan process, forfeiture of the earnest money deposit in terms of the RFRP is valid, particularly where the non-compliance does not arise from non-receipt of the LoI or imposition of additional terms outside the resolution plan process. The Court also affirmed that under Section 33(2), read with its Explanation, the CoC is entitled, at any time before confirmation of the resolution plan, to resolve to liquidate the corporate debtor, and such commercial decision is not amenable to judicial review except within the narrow statutory framework.
In short, the Court reinforced the binding and irrevocable character of a CoC-approved resolution plan as between the CoC and the successful resolution applicant, the permissibility of EMD forfeiture for non-compliance, and the primacy of CoC commercial wisdom in opting for liquidation when the applicant defaults. It clarified that all interim orders would stand vacated upon dismissal of the appeals, and further directed respondent No. 3, the Liquidator, to proceed with the remaining part of the liquidation in accordance with the Code.
The Court observed that the appellant’s contention that the Letter of Intent (LoI) were “conditional” was without merit. The stipulation that the LoI would remain subject to the final decision in pending judicial proceedings involving prospective resolution applicants did not convert it into a conditional LoI in any legally objectionable sense, because any adjudicatory order would in any event govern the process.
The Court also found, from the minutes of the CoC meetings, that the appellant was fully aware of the pending litigation and the relevant stipulations before insisting on issuance of the LoI, and therefore his later objection was an afterthought. As regards litigation risk relating to workers and employees, the Court noted that the appellant had expressly agreed in the CoC discussions that such risk and cost would be borne by the resolution applicant, and therefore could not subsequently disown that position.
On the issue of timeline for performance guarantee, the Court accepted that though 45 days had been relaxed during the pandemic in an earlier meeting, the appellant had later agreed to submit the performance guarantee within seven days as prescribed in the RFRP, and thus could not rely on the earlier relaxation. The Court repeatedly characterised the appellant’s conduct as an impermissible attempt to approbate and reprobate, or to blow hot and cold, and held that the appellant had acquiesced in the stipulations and could not indirectly withdraw from a CoC-approved plan by calling the LoI conditional.
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For maintaining an application under Section 95 of the IBC against a Personal Guarantor, the Financial Creditor must establish not only the existence of a guarantee but also valid invocation of that guarantee by a specific contractual demand and a subsisting legally enforceable default against the guarantor
The Guwahati Bench of the National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT) in the case of UCO Bank vs Mallika Barooah [CP(IB)/13/GB/2025] dated June 01, 2026, has that, for maintaining an application under Section 95 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code against a Personal Guarantor, the Financial Creditor must establish not only the existence of a guarantee but also valid invocation of that guarantee by a specific contractual demand and a subsisting legally enforceable default against the guarantor. A demand notice in Form B under Rule 7(1) of the Personal Guarantor Rules is only a procedural requirement prior to filing and does not amount to invocation of the guarantee.
The Tribunal observed that it had jurisdiction under Section 60(2) of the Code because insolvency proceedings of the Corporate Debtor were pending before the same Adjudicating Authority. It identified the principal issue as whether the Respondent could be proceeded against as a Personal Guarantor within the meaning of Section 95 and whether a legally enforceable debt and default had been established against her. The Tribunal also recorded that the demand notice under Rule 7(1), though initially returned unserved by post, was thereafter published in English and Assamese newspapers, and sufficient proof of service was produced before it.
On merits, the Tribunal found that the Respondent had admittedly executed the Letter of Guarantee dated May 20, 2008 for the original cash credit facility of Rs. 145 lakhs. However, the Applicant failed to produce cogent material showing that she continued to execute guarantee documents or expressly reaffirm liability after her resignation on March 31, 2009. The Tribunal further noted that the compromise approval dated Feb 14, 2018, extension of repayment dated June 25, 2020, and proposal for revival of OTS dated Nov 07, 2022 neither contained her signature nor attributed liability to her, and instead referred to other guarantors while excluding her.
The Tribunal attached significance to the SARFAESI demand notice dated Nov 12, 2011, observing that it was not addressed to the Respondent and that it specifically named only four other personal guarantors as liable towards the facilities. The omission of the Respondent from that statutory notice weighed against the Applicant’s present case that she continued to remain liable as Personal Guarantor.
The Tribunal also accepted the contention that the guarantee had never been validly invoked. It held that liability against a personal guarantor crystallises only upon issuance of a specific contractual demand invoking the guarantee, and that the Form B notice under Rule 7(1) is merely a procedural prerequisite for filing under Section 95. Since no prior invocation of the guarantee deed dated May 20, 2008 had been shown, no default within the meaning of Section 3(12) of the Code could be said to have arisen against the Respondent.
Further, where the material relied on to extend liability or limitation is not executed by, addressed to, or attributable to the respondent guarantor, such material cannot be used either to continue guarantor liability for enhanced facilities or to extend limitation under Section 18 of the Limitation Act, added the Tribunal.
The NCLT also clarified that although the Respondent’s status as guarantor in respect of the original 2008 facility could not be completely disputed, that by itself was insufficient for admission of the Section 95 application in the absence of proof of invocation, enforceable default, continuity of liability for subsequent facilities, and filing within the prescribed limitation period. Accordingly, the Tribunal broadly concurred with the Resolution Professional’s recommendation to reject the application, and held that the requirements of Section 95 of the Code had not been fulfilled, that no default could be said to have arisen qua the Personal Guarantor, and that the application was not maintainable.
Legal Updates (May 25 – May 30, 2026)
Legal Updates (May 25 – May 30, 2026)
CASE UPDATES
A resolution applicant whose plan has scored higher under the evaluation matrix does not acquire any vested right to have that plan approved, since the evaluation matrix is only a facilitative tool and the ultimate decision of the Committee of Creditors rests in its commercial wisdom
The Kochi Bench of the National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT) in the case of Ayyappan Nair Raghavan Pillai vs Committee of Creditors [IA(IBC)/379/KOB/2025] dated May 20, 2026, has held that a resolution applicant whose plan has scored higher under the evaluation matrix does not acquire any vested right to have that plan approved, since the evaluation matrix is only a facilitative tool and the ultimate decision of the Committee of Creditors rests in its commercial wisdom.
The NCLT held that judicial interference with the CoC’s decision is limited to cases of statutory non-compliance, jurisdictional infirmity, material irregularity, illegality or arbitrariness, and the Adjudicating Authority cannot substitute its own assessment for the commercial decision of the CoC merely because another plan secured a higher score or offered a different value proposition. Where the record shows that the CoC considered the competing plans, deliberated upon feasibility, viability, sustainability and implementation factors, and no material procedural unfairness or statutory breach is established, no interference is warranted under Section 60(5) of the IBC.
The Tribunal observed that the principal question was whether the approval of the successful resolution plan suffered from material irregularity, illegality, arbitrariness or violation of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 and the CIRP Regulations so as to warrant interference under Section 60(5). It noted that the evaluation matrix is only a guiding tool for comparative assessment and does not confer any vested or enforceable right upon the highest-scoring resolution applicant to demand approval of its plan.
The Tribunal recorded that the CoC is entitled to consider several commercial factors beyond the scoring matrix, including feasibility, viability, implementation capability, financial strength, long-term sustainability, operational continuity and overall effectiveness of the resolution.
The Tribunal further clarified that issues relating to the merits, feasibility, viability, implementability and legal compliance of the approved resolution plan would arise at the stage of adjudication of the plan approval application under Section 31, and not in the proceedings confined to the challenge to the decision-making process under Section 60(5).
A search engine operator that actively sells trademarked terms as keywords to trademark proprietor’s direct competitors, without the proprietor’s consent and for commercial gain, amounts to infringement under Section 29(8) of the Trade Marks Act
The Delhi High Court in the case of Hindware vs Grohe India [CS(COMM) 591/2017] dated May 22, 2026, has held that use of a registered, coined, and well-known trademark as a keyword under a paid search advertising programme, even where the keyword is invisible
to the consumer, constitutes “use” of the trademark within the meaning of Sections 2(2)(c)(i) and 29(6)(d) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999. A search engine operator that actively suggests, auctions, and sells trademarked terms as keywords to the trademark proprietor’s direct competitors, without the proprietor’s consent and for commercial gain, is not a passive intermediary but an active participant in such use. Such conduct amounts to infringement under Section 29(8) of the Trade Marks Act as it takes unfair advantage of the trademark’s reputation and goodwill, and is contrary to honest practices in industrial and commercial matters, regardless of whether likelihood of confusion is established.
The Court further laid down that the safe harbour under Section 79 of the Information Technology Act is unavailable to such a search engine operator because it selects the receiver of the transmission, fails to observe due diligence under the Intermediary Guidelines, and actively aids or induces the infringing use. The advertising function of a trademark, its ability to attract consumers to the proprietor’s goods and services, is a protectable commercial asset, and a search engine cannot be permitted to auction or monetise that asset without the proprietor’s authorisation.
The Court categorically held that use of the trademark as a keyword amounts to use by Google and not merely by the advertiser. Google does not operate as a neutral or passive platform. It actively suggests trademarked terms to advertisers through its Keyword Planner Tool, conducts real-time auctions for the use of trademarks as keywords, and determines which advertisements are ultimately displayed on the SERP through its proprietary algorithms. The final decision on which ad is displayed is Google’s, not the advertisers. Google monetises this process by earning CPC revenue at the precise moment a user clicks on the advertisement and is diverted to a rival’s website.
No prior consent or approval was taken from the plaintiff for offering, suggesting, or selling its registered trademark to third parties. Therefore, there is no permitted use within the meaning of Section 2(1)(r)(ii) of the Trade Marks Act, added the Court.
The Court held that Google’s conduct constitutes trademark infringement under Section 29(8) of the Trade Marks Act, which provides that a registered trademark is infringed by “any advertising” of that trademark if such advertising (a) takes unfair advantage of and is contrary to honest practices in industrial or commercial matters; (b) is detrimental to its distinctive character; or (c) is against the reputation of the trademark. Importantly, proof of likelihood of confusion is not required for infringement under Section 29(8).
On unfair advantage, the Court held that the term “unfair advantage” means a benefit or profit earned by free-riding on the goodwill of another’s mark. ‘HINDWARE’ is a coined word, a consumer types that term in the search bar only because the plaintiff has built a reputation for it through years of investment. Google exploits this consumer recognition by auctioning the mark to the plaintiff’s direct competitors, without the plaintiff’s consent and without sharing revenue with the plaintiff. Google generates higher revenue from third-party bidding on ‘HINDWARE’ than the plaintiff itself would generate by bidding on its own mark. This constitutes unfair advantage and free-riding on the plaintiff’s commercial asset.
On honest practices, the Court held that a practice is “honest” if it is fair with respect to the legitimate interests of the trademark proprietor, and is regarded as honest by a substantial and responsible section of the industry. Google’s conduct of selling a trademark it does not own to the proprietor’s direct competitors, without consent and without sharing profits, violates commercial morality. It amounts to misappropriating the advertising value of the plaintiff’s trademark and does not constitute honest practice in industrial or commercial matters.
The High Court therefore granted permanent injunction restraining Google LLC and Google India from using the mark ‘HINDWARE’, or ‘HINDWARE SANITARYWARE’, ‘HINDWARE SANITARY’, ‘HINDWARE SANITARYWARE INDIA’, or any combination thereof, as advertising keywords or AdWords, or in any manner amounting to infringement. The Court also awarded nominal damages of Rs. 15 lakhs in each suit, totalling Rs. 30 lakhs, payable jointly and severally by Google LLC and Google India within eight weeks. Actual costs of litigation were held payable jointly and severally by the defendant.
Once real estate project was undertaken under a collaboration arrangement with substantial construction and allotments were made to allottees, and neither HARERA nor the arbitral tribunal has accepted that collaboration agreement stood validly terminated, then unsold inventory cannot be excluded from valuation of the corporate debtor
The New Delhi Principal Bench of the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT) in the case of Ishan Singh vs Narender Kumar Sharma [Company Appeal (AT) (Insolvency) No. 1107 of 2025] dated May 11, 2026, has held that where a real estate project has been undertaken under a collaboration arrangement, substantial construction has been carried out, allotments have been made to allottees, and neither HARERA nor the arbitral tribunal has accepted that the underlying Collaboration Agreement stood validly terminated, the unsold inventory and the subject project property cannot be excluded from the valuation of the corporate debtor or from the Information Memorandum in CIRP.
The NCLAT asserted that merely because the arbitral tribunal found that the Collaboration Agreement could not be specifically enforced and described it as inoperable for that purpose, it did not follow that the project assets ceased to form part of the corporate debtor’s estate for insolvency purposes, particularly when the landowner’s specific prayer for declaration of lawful termination and for transfer of the project back to him had been refused, and the rights of allottees remained statutorily protected.
The Tribunal observed that the HARERA order dated Feb 09, 2022 had treated both the corporate debtor and the landowner as promoters of the project and had directed both of them to commence and complete the construction/development, while also recording that the inter se disputes between the landowner and the developer could not prejudice the statutory rights of innocent allottees.
The Tribunal further noted that the arbitral award dated Sep 14, 2022 did not grant the landowner’s prayer for a declaration that the Collaboration Agreement and subsequent addenda stood lawfully terminated; rather, the arbitral tribunal only held that the agreements were inoperable for purposes of specific enforcement and restrained the corporate debtor from acting upon the powers of attorney.
The Tribunal also emphasized that the arbitral tribunal had specifically rejected the appellant’s prayer for transfer of the project land and project-related documents in his favour. On that basis, it held that this was not a case where termination of the Collaboration Agreement had been accepted by a competent forum. The NCLAT also pointed out that the present matter involved a project where development had been undertaken, construction had been raised, allotments had been made to 147 allottees, and the rights of such allottees had acquired statutory protection. Accordingly, the NCLAT upheld the rejection of the appellant’s application seeking exclusion of the unsold inventory and subject property from the CIRP process.
If cheque is presented after company has gone into liquidation and the official liquidator has taken over, the company cannot be said to have committed an offence under Section 138, and the directors, who have ceased to control the affairs of the company, cannot be fastened with liability under Section 141 of the NI Act
The Delhi High Court in the case of Raj Kumar Jain vs Shree Balaji Enterprises [CRL.M.C. 1665/2023] dated May 04, 2026, has held that where, prior to the dishonour of the cheque and prior to issuance of the statutory demand notice, a Provisional Liquidator has already been appointed in respect of the company and the directors have been divested of authority over the company’s assets and bank accounts, the directors become functus officio and cannot be said to be maintaining the account within the meaning of Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881. In such a case, the legal and practical impossibility of operating the account or complying with the demand notice means that the essential ingredients of the offence under Section 138 are not met, and the complaint against such director is not maintainable.
The Court examined Sections 450, 456 and 457 of the Companies Act, 1956 and observed that appointment of a Provisional Liquidator does not dissolve the company, but it suspends the authority of the Board of Directors and renders them functus officio. The company continues to exist corporately, but its business operations, asset management and contractual dealings thereafter stand under the supervision and formal authority of the Provisional Liquidator, who becomes custodian of the corporate estate.
The Court noted that once an Official Liquidator is appointed as Provisional Liquidator, the Board of Directors becomes functus officio and the contention that erstwhile directors continue to perform their functions in the company is untenable in law. The Bench specifically noted that it is only the Provisional Liquidator who is empowered under Section 457(2)(iii) of the Companies Act, 1956 to draw, accept, make and endorse negotiable instruments in the name and on behalf of the company.
The Court reiterated that where a cheque is presented after the company has gone into liquidation and the official liquidator has taken over, the company cannot be said to have committed an offence under Section 138 because payment is legally barred and beyond its control. In such circumstances, the directors, who have ceased to control the affairs of the company, cannot be fastened with liability under Section 141 of the NI Act.
On the language of Section 138 of the NI Act, the Court emphasized the expression “an account maintained by him” and held that one of the prerequisite ingredients of the offence is that the accused must have control over the account at the relevant time. The Court observed that “maintained” cannot be understood merely as ownership of an account; it implies an account that is alive and operative, with the account holder being capable of issuing effective instructions to the banker and keeping the account functional for honour of cheques.
Accordingly, the Court concluded that, since the appointment of the Provisional Liquidator preceded the dishonour of the cheques and issuance of the demand notice, the petitioner was no longer in charge of the affairs of the company and did not maintain the account within the meaning of Section 138 of the NI Act. Therefore, the essential ingredients of the offence were not satisfied, the complaint was legally non-maintainable against the petitioner, and the pending complaint and all proceedings emanating therefrom qua the petitioner were quashed.
The right of a secured creditor to realise its security interest outside liquidation under Section 52 is a qualified statutory right and can be exercised only upon strict compliance with the Code and the Liquidation Regulations. Mere assertion of an intention not to relinquish security is insufficient
The New Delhi Principal Bench of the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT) in the case of STCI Finance Limited vs IMP Powers Limited [Company Appeal (AT) (Ins.) No. 1019 OF 2024] dated April 27, 2026, has held that the right of a secured creditor to realise its security interest outside liquidation under Section 52 is a qualified statutory right and can be exercised only upon strict compliance with the Code and the Liquidation Regulations. Mere assertion of an intention not to relinquish security is insufficient.
The NCLAT clarified that if the secured creditor fails to comply with Regulation 21A(2), including payment of the required dues within the prescribed period, and fails to take the necessary steps for realisation of security, Regulation 21A(3) operates automatically and the secured asset becomes part of the liquidation estate.
The Tribunal also held that where the alleged pari passu charge is conditional and the foundational contractual conditions for its creation are not fulfilled, such charge does not become legally enforceable merely because charge documentation exists or charge registration has been made. Further, in a consortium lending structure involving joint security, Section 13(9) of the SARFAESI Act applies as the applicable law under Section 52(4), with the consequence that a decision of secured creditors holding the requisite statutory majority binds the dissenting creditor.
The Tribunal examined, first, whether STCI could validly insist on standing outside liquidation under Section 52, and second, whether the issue of distribution of sale proceeds should be decided at the appellate stage. On the security issue, the Tribunal observed that STCI’s alleged first pari passu charge never became operative in law because the underlying NOCs from existing consortium lenders were conditional, and the essential conditions, particularly execution of an inter se agreement and reciprocal ceding of pari passu charge by STCI, were never fulfilled.
The Tribunal further observed that even assuming STCI was a secured creditor, it did not comply with the mandatory requirements of Regulation 21A(2), since it did not pay CIRP/liquidation-related dues within 90 days, did not intimate any proposed realization value, and did not take concrete steps to enforce security. It also noticed that the majority of secured creditors, first above 69% and later above 85% in value, had relinquished their security interest, and that in a consortium lending structure Section 13(9) of the SARFAESI Act would apply as the “applicable law” for purposes of Section 52(4).
The Tribunal therefore held that the secured assets became part of the liquidation estate by operation of law and the liquidator was justified in proceeding with the e-auction sale of the corporate debtor as a going concern.
If material on record shows a continuous commercial trading relationship supported by purchase and sales invoices, and there is no written loan agreement and no interest clause, to show that the transaction was a loan at inception, the debt cannot subsequently be recharacterized as financial debt merely by later communications or unilateral assertions
The Chennai Bench of the National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT) in the case of Supreme Plascare India vs Shiroo Polymers [CP/IBC/76/CHE/2025] dated May 05, 2026, has held that, for admission of a Section 7 application, the applicant must establish that the claimed debt is a “financial debt” within the meaning of Section 5(8), namely a debt disbursed against consideration for the time value of money. Where the material on record shows a continuous commercial trading relationship supported by purchase and sales invoices, and there is no written loan agreement, no interest clause, and no contemporaneous evidence that the transaction was a loan at inception, the debt cannot subsequently be recharacterized as financial debt merely by later communications or unilateral assertions. Further, interest cannot be added without contractual basis to artificially cross the statutory threshold for maintainability under Section 7 of the IBC.
The Tribunal observed that the principal issue was whether the debt claimed by the applicant qualified as a “financial debt” under Section 5(8) of the Code. On examining the invoices on record, it found that the parties were engaged in a continuous business-to-business relationship and that the documents showed purchase and sales invoices indicative of an operational rather than a financial arrangement. It reiterated that, to qualify as a financial debt, the debt must be disbursed against consideration for the time value of money, and that the burden lay on the applicant to prove that the transaction was not merely a commercial payment but a loan carrying an inherent element of time value of money.
The Tribunal also found the material relied upon by the applicant insufficient. It observed that the NeSL report was not duly authenticated and that the ledger account produced was only the applicant’s own ledger statement. As regards the WhatsApp message stating, “Sir, please consider as loan, we will adjust within a month later,” the Tribunal held that the phrase “please consider as loan” implied that the amount was not a loan at its inception, but rather reflected an attempt to recharacterize a pre-existing commercial liability.
The Tribunal stated that the nature of a debt is sacrosanct and that the legal character of a transaction is determined at the time of its inception and cannot be shifted at the whims of the parties to suit the jurisdiction of the Adjudicating Authority. It further noted that no written loan agreement, interest clause, or board resolution had been produced to support conversion of commercial dues into financial debt.
The Tribunal additionally accepted the respondent’s challenge on the statutory threshold. While the applicant claimed Rs. 1.13 Crores, the respondent’s case was that only Rs. 99.13 lakhs had actually been transferred as principal, with the rest added as interest without any underlying agreement. The Tribunal held that, in the absence of any financial contract or provision for interest, inclusion of such interest to cross the Rs. 1 crore threshold was legally untenable. On that basis, it concluded that the applicant had failed to establish that the amount due and payable was a financial debt, and Section 7 application was dismissed.
REGULATORY UPDATES
SEBI has simplified investor onboarding and the nomination process, by allowing nominations to be submitted either online or offline
The Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) vide its Circular No: SEBI/HO/OIAE/OIAE_IAD-3/P/CIR/2026/12676, dated May 29, 2026, has modified the nomination norms for demat accounts and mutual fund folios. The changes are aimed at simplifying investor onboarding and the nomination process. Under the revised norms, investors opening new single-holder demat accounts or mutual fund folios will have to either nominate a beneficiary or formally opt out of nomination. For jointly held accounts and folios, nomination will be optional.
SEBI has also permitted investors to nominate up to three persons. In case of multiple nominees, the nominees may either continue in the same account or folio. Alternatively, they may open separate accounts or folios for their respective holdings after the investor’s demise. The circular allows nominations to be submitted either online or offline. For online nominations, validation may be carried out through a Digital Signature Certificate, Aadhaar-based e-sign, any other e-sign facility recognised under the Information Technology Act, 2000, or two-factor authentication.
For physical nominations, witness signatures will not be required where the account or folio holder signs the form. However, where the holder affixes a thumb impression, the nomination must be witnessed by two persons. The names and addresses of the witnesses must also be captured in the nomination form. The circular will come into effect from September 1, 2026.
IBBI requires resolution professional to appoint set of registered valuers within three days of appointment in cases of pre-packaged insolvency
The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India (IBBI) has amended its pre-packaged insolvency rules to require resolution professionals to appoint registered valuers within three days of taking charge, while allowing the consultation committee to require two sets of valuers if reasons are recorded in writing. The changes have been introduced through the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India (Pre-Packaged Insolvency Resolution Process) (Second Amendment) Regulations, 2026, notified on May 19.
The amended rules require the resolution professional to appoint a set of registered valuers within three days of appointment to determine the corporate debtor’s fair value and liquidation value. However, the consultation committee may decide, for reasons recorded in writing, that two sets of registered valuers should be appointed. The amendments also introduce eligibility restrictions for registered valuers. A related party of the corporate debtor cannot be appointed as a registered valuer. The disqualification also applies to any person who served as an auditor of the corporate debtor at any time during the five years preceding the commencement of the pre-packaged insolvency resolution process.
Further, a partner or director of an insolvency professional entity of which the resolution professional is a partner or director is barred from appointment. The same restriction extends to relatives of the resolution professional and relatives of such partners or directors.
The IBBI has also revised the valuation methodology under Regulation 39. Where one set of valuers is appointed, the fair value submitted by the coordinating valuer will be treated as the fair value of the corporate debtor. Where two sets are appointed, the average of the two fair value estimates submitted by the coordinating valuers will be taken as the fair value.
For liquidation value, where one set of valuers is appointed, the aggregate of liquidation value estimates submitted by registered valuers for each asset class will be treated as the liquidation value. Where two sets are appointed, the aggregate of the averages of the two estimates for each asset class will be considered the liquidation value. The amended regulations came into force on May 19, 2026, the date of publication in the Official Gazette.
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