Legal Updates (May 18 – May 23, 2026)
Legal Updates ( May 18 – May 23, 2026 )
CASE UPDATES
Amount received by a claimant under a Mediclaim/medical insurance policy is not deductible from compensation awarded under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, even where compensation under the head of medical expenses is also claimed before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal
The Supreme Court in the case of New India Assurance Company vs Dolly Satish Gandhi [Special Leave Petition (Civil) Nos.18267 of 2025] dated May 15, 2026, has held that amount received by a claimant under a Mediclaim/medical insurance policy is not deductible from compensation awarded under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, even where compensation under the head of medical expenses is also claimed before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal.
The Court held that the two receipts stand on different footings: compensation under the Motor Vehicles Act is a statutory and beneficial entitlement arising out of the accident, whereas Mediclaim reimbursement is a contractual benefit flowing from premiums paid earlier by the claimant. Since the Mediclaim amount is an independent contractual entitlement and not a substitute payment by the wrongdoer or under the same legal regime, its receipt cannot be used to reduce MACT compensation.
The Court observed that the governing principle against “double benefit” in motor accident claims is that there should be no duplication for the same head of loss, since compensation under the Motor Vehicles Act is meant to be “just compensation” that fairly makes good the loss suffered and not to create a windfall. However, the Court clarified that the real inquiry is into the source and nature of the benefit: if the additional payment is a substitute for the same loss, it may be deductible; if it is independent or an accrued entitlement, it is not. Employment-related benefits such as provident fund, gratuity and pension were cited as illustrations of non-deductible benefits because they arise from independent rights and not as compensation for the accident.
The Court drew a clear distinction between statutory benefits and contractual benefits. It explained that a statutory benefit flows from legislation and becomes available upon fulfilment of statutory conditions, whereas a contractual benefit flows from a private agreement and is enforceable because the parties have consented to its terms. On this basis, the Court treated Mediclaim as a contractual entitlement purchased by a person through payment of premiums to prepare for medical contingencies and not as a benefit arising solely because of the motor accident.
The Court reiterated that amounts lacking correlation with the accidental death or injury, or amounts receivable independently of the accident, cannot be deducted from compensation under the Motor Vehicles Act. It further observed that if Mediclaim reimbursement were to be deducted from MACT compensation, it would denude the claimant of the benefit of premiums paid from his or her own resources, confer an undue advantage upon the Mediclaim insurer who collected premiums, and equally grant an unjust benefit to the insurer of the offending vehicle by reducing its liability because of the claimant’s prudence in obtaining insurance.
The Court also emphasized that the two regimes operate on different yardsticks: Mediclaim is limited by the policy amount, whereas compensation under the Motor Vehicles Act is guided by the beneficial principle of just and fair compensation without such strict monetary limits.
Click here to read/ download the original judgment
Once complainant enters witness box and give substantive evidence regarding transaction and the mode of execution of cheque, and that version was not shaken in cross-examination, then complainant has discharged his initial burden and presumptions under Sections 118 and 139 of the NI Act become available to the complainant
The Kerala High Court in the case of Wilfred Jose vs Jayapal [CRL.A No. 1964 of 2008] dated May 18, 2026, has held that in a prosecution under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, the complainant discharges the initial burden when he enters the witness box and gives substantive evidence regarding the transaction and the execution of the cheque, including that the accused brought, wrote, signed and executed the cheque, and such evidence remains unshaken in cross-examination. Once that initial burden is discharged, the presumptions under Sections 118 and 139 of the NI Act become available to the complainant, and the court cannot reject the complainant’s version on conjecture.
If the court has accepted that the accused himself wrote and signed the cheque, it cannot, in the absence of supporting material, hold that the transaction was otherwise than as spoken to by the complainant. The burden then shifts to the accused to rebut the presumptions either from the materials on record or by adducing independent evidence, added the Court.
The Court noted that once the complainant had entered the witness box and given substantive evidence regarding the transaction and the mode of execution of the cheque, and that version had not been shaken in cross-examination, the complainant had discharged his initial burden. The Court further noted that the accused had contended that cheque had reached the complainant through one Radhakrishnan, but the accused did not adduce any evidence in support of that case and did not examine Radhakrishnan.
The Court held that, after finding that the accused himself wrote and signed the cheque, the Magistrate could not, without supporting material, conclude that the underlying transaction was otherwise than as stated by the complainant.
Accordingly, the Court set aside the acquittal, convicted the accused under Section 138 of the NI Act, and sentenced him to simple imprisonment for one day till rising of the Court and payment of fine of Rs. 4.50 lakhs, of which Rs. 4.25 lakhs were directed to be paid to the complainant as compensation under Section 357(1)(b) CrPC, with default imprisonment of six months. The accused was directed to surrender before the Magistrate on May 29, 2026.
Click here to read/download the original judgment
Appeal filed without certified copy of the impugned order, and without even application for exemption from filing such certified copy, is not a merely defective appeal, but wholly incompetent appeal that does not satisfy the essential requirements under the Code and the NCLAT Rules
The Supreme Court in the case of Angelwoods Apartment Allottees Association vs M Lalitha [Civil Appeal Nos. 14439-14440 of 2025] dated May 12, 2026, has held that an appeal filed without a certified copy of the impugned order, and without even an application for exemption from filing such certified copy, is not a merely defective appeal capable of being cured, rather it is a wholly incompetent appeal that does not satisfy the essential requirements under the Code and the NCLAT Rules.
The Court reaffirmed, that Rule 22(2) of the NCLAT Rules mandatorily requires every appeal to be accompanied by a certified copy of the impugned order, and that parties cannot automatically dispense with this obligation. The Court emphasised that the act of applying for a certified copy before the expiry of the limitation period is not merely a technical requirement but is an indicator of the diligence of the party in pursuing litigation in a timely manner.
The Court further held that the NCLAT, while considering applications for condonation of delay, was obligated to first ascertain whether the appeal had been instituted in accordance with the prescribed norms before extending any indulgence to the appellant. Having failed to undertake this exercise, the NCLAT’s order condoning the delay was set aside. The filing and refiling of the appeal were held to be incurably tainted, and the appeal ought to have been rejected at the threshold.
Click here to read/ download the original judgment
If proprietor proves extensive and continuous use of mark over a long period, substantial sales and promotional expenditure, wide geographical presence, and broad public recognition in the relevant trade and consumer segment, such may be declared a well-known trademark within the meaning of Section 2(1)(zg) of the Act
The Delhi High Court in the case of Glaxosmithkline Pharmaceuticals vs Walter Healthcare [CS(COMM) 403/2025] dated May 15, 2026, has held that where the proprietor of a trademark proves, by cogent documentary material, extensive and continuous use of the mark over a long period, substantial sales and promotional expenditure, wide geographical presence, valid and subsisting registrations, broad public recognition in the relevant trade and consumer segment, and a consistent record of successful enforcement, the mark satisfies the criteria under Sections 11(6) and 11(7) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 and may be declared a well-known trademark within the meaning of Section 2(1)(zg) of the Act. Accordingly, the Court declared “CALPOL” to be a well-known trademark for medicinal and pharmaceutical products under Section 2(1)(zg) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999.
The Court noted that the plaintiff had placed material showing continuous, uninterrupted and extensive use of the CALPOL mark since 1991 in relation to tablets, syrups and oral drops containing paracetamol and related ingredients, supported by invoices and documentary evidence of use. The Court also took note of the plaintiff’s evidence that CALPOL products had been continuously and extensively marketed through advertisements, promotional campaigns, print and online coverage, and that search engine results generated numerous hits only for the plaintiff’s mark.
The Court observed that the plaintiff had demonstrated the duration, extent and geographical area of use of the mark in India, including sales through distributors, stockists and online pharmacies across the country, with invoices spanning the period from 1991 to April 2024. The Court also considered the plaintiff’s evidence of extensive promotion of the mark throughout India and found that the materials on record reflected increasing popularity and growth of the CALPOL brand.
The Court further observed that the plaintiff had valid and subsisting trademark registrations in Class 05, with the oldest registration dating back to July 13, 1965, and that these registrations reflected the use and recognition of the mark. It also took into account the plaintiff’s record of successful enforcement, including multiple ex parte injunctions and consent decrees against infringing parties in prior proceedings.
Upon examining the material on record, the Court formed the view that the trademark CALPOL had acquired extensive recognition and association within the relevant section of the public in the pharmaceutical and medicinal products industry over a long journey of more than 35 years commencing from 1991. It specifically noted the exponential increase in sales, with sales exceeding Rs. 300 crores in 2024 alone and pack units sold exceeding 20 crores, along with substantial investment in marketing and advertising, extensive coverage in popular publications, and visibility of the mark across pharmacies throughout India and on e-commerce platforms.
The Court finally observed that the plaintiff’s long-standing reputation and extensive, continuous and uninterrupted use of the mark CALPOL across India reflected its significant commercial presence and recognition and was testament to its distinctiveness in the field of medicinal and pharmaceutical products for adults and children. On that basis, the Court held that CALPOL satisfied the criteria and parameters under Sections 11(6) and 11(7) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 for declaration as a well-known trademark.
Click here to read/ download the original judgment
Where term loans are repayable through continuing instalment schedules, limitation for Section 7 proceedings is not exhausted merely because some earliest instalments may have become time-barred, and each subsequent unpaid instalment constitutes a default under Section 3(12) of the IBC
The Mumbai Bench of the National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT) in the case of Authum Investment & Infrastructure Limited vs RNA Lifestyle Pvt Ltd [RCP (IB)/31/MB/2024] dated May 15, 2026, has held that for admission of a petition under Section 7 of the IBC, the Adjudicating Authority is required only to ascertain the existence of a financial debt and the occurrence of default, and once these are established, technical objections as to Form 1 particulars, insufficiency of stamping, absence of Information Utility record, or pendency of parallel proceedings against related obligors do not defeat maintainability.
The Tribunal further held that where term loans are repayable through continuing instalment schedules, limitation for Section 7 proceedings is not exhausted merely because some earliest instalments may have become time-barred; and each subsequent unpaid instalment constitutes a default under Section 3(12), and defaults occurring within three years prior to filing are sufficient to sustain the petition.
It was also held that multiple loan facilities granted by the same creditor to the same corporate debtor as part of a common financing relationship may be pursued in one consolidated Section 7 application, and simultaneous proceedings against co-borrowers, guarantors, or sister concerns do not bar such petition until the underlying debt is fully satisfied.
The Tribunal observed that the scope of inquiry under Section 7 is limited to examining whether there exists a financial debt and whether default has occurred. It further observed that at the admission stage the Adjudicating Authority is not required to examine broader disputes, the commercial viability of the Corporate Debtor, or its alleged solvency; nor can technical objections be permitted to defeat the statutory remedy once debt and default are established.
On limitation, the Tribunal rejected the Corporate Debtor’s argument that limitation began almost immediately after disbursement. It observed that the facilities were structured term loans with defined repayment tenures and periodic instalment obligations extending well beyond the dates of disbursement. Since the petition was filed on May 29, 2019 and the repayment schedules continued till November 2019, July 2022, and March 2023 respectively, the debt was intended to be serviced during the contractual tenure.
The Tribunal also rejected the objection that the petition was incomplete for failure to state the date of default. It found that the petition and annexures clearly disclosed the dates of default for each loan facility and held that the requirement under Form 1 is to disclose sufficient particulars to establish default. It therefore treated the alleged defect, at best, as a minor procedural irregularity that could not frustrate insolvency proceedings once debt and default were otherwise shown.
On the issue of clubbing multiple loans in one petition, the Tribunal held that all three facilities arose out of a common financial relationship between the same parties and formed components of the same overall financing arrangement. Merely because there were separate sanction letters, separate loan agreements, or different dates of default did not require separate Section 7 proceedings. The Tribunal held that once a composite financial relationship and default are established, a consolidated petition is maintainable.
As regards parallel proceedings against sister concerns, the Tribunal held that such proceedings do not bar a Section 7 petition against the present Corporate Debtor so long as the debt remains unpaid. It observed that simultaneous recourse against different obligors in respect of the same debt is legally permissible, subject to the principle that the creditor cannot recover more than what is due.
The Tribunal further held that the objection relating to insufficient stamping of the loan agreements under the Maharashtra Stamp Act did not affect maintainability of a Section 7 petition. It observed that insolvency proceedings are summary in nature and that existence of debt and default could in any case be established from other material on record, including sanction letters, statements of account, loan documentation, and assignment agreements. Similarly, absence of an Information Utility record or Banker’s Book certificate was not fatal because proof of default is not confined to those forms alone.
A SARFAESI notice or a recovery certificate cannot, in the absence of a clear contractual stipulation or specific demand made upon the guarantor under the guarantee deed, be treated as invocation of the personal guarantee
The Jaipur Bench of the National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT) in the case of Bank of Baroda vs Amit Prakash Gupta [IA (IBC) No. 20/JPR/2026] dated May 18, 2026, has held that for initiation and admission of proceedings against a personal guarantor under Section 95 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, invocation of the guarantee in accordance with the contract of guarantee is a mandatory precondition under Rule 3(1)(e) of the relevant Rules, and such invocation must precede the Rule 7 demand notice as well as the filing of the Section 95 application.
The NCLT clarified that a Rule 7 of the Personal Guarantor Rules notice cannot itself amount to invocation, because it proceeds on the basis that default has already occurred. Similarly, a SARFAESI notice or a recovery certificate cannot, in the absence of a clear contractual stipulation or specific demand made upon the guarantor under the guarantee deed, be treated as invocation of the personal guarantee. Where no such prior invocation is pleaded and proved, no default arises qua the personal guarantor and the Section 95 application is not maintainable.
The Tribunal observed that the statutory framework under Part III of the Code makes invocation of guarantee a fundamental requirement because Rule 3(1)(e) requires that the guarantee must have been invoked and remain unpaid. Finding that the financial creditor had not disclosed in its pleadings any specific act of invocation, the Tribunal rejected the argument that the recovery certificate could amount to invocation, observing that a recovery certificate is the result of adjudication or consent before a recovery forum, whereas invocation is a contractual act by which the creditor calls upon the guarantor to perform his obligation under the contract of guarantee.
The Tribunal further noted that the Bank had shown no clause in the guarantee deed under which issuance of a recovery certificate would automatically operate as invocation, and had produced no specific communication addressed to the respondent after the recovery certificate demanding payment under the guarantee.
The Tribunal also held that the SARFAESI notice could not constitute invocation of the personal guarantee. It observed that the financial creditor had not pleaded in the Section 95 application that the guarantee was invoked through that notice; that a notice under Section 13(2) of the SARFAESI Act serves the purpose of enforcement of security interest against secured assets; and that invocation of a personal guarantee is conceptually and legally distinct from enforcement proceedings under SARFAESI.
The Tribunal further held that the Rule 7(1) demand notice could not be treated as invocation of guarantee because the scheme of the Code and the 2019 Rules treats invocation as a prior substantive contractual act and the Rule 7 notice as a later procedural step issued on the premise that default has already occurred. It explained that a valid invocation of a personal guarantee requires a clear and unambiguous demand upon the guarantor in terms of the guarantee deed, identifying the debt, calling upon him to pay the guaranteed amount or relevant portion, and indicating that upon failure the creditor would enforce the guarantee. On that reasoning, the Tribunal found that proceedings or instruments such as recovery certificates or SARFAESI notices may evidence liability or enforcement steps, but cannot substitute for invocation unless there is a clear contractual demand upon the guarantor.
On the RP’s report, the Tribunal accepted that delay in filing the report under Section 99 was not fatal, but held that the report still failed on the central issue because it confused existence of debt against the corporate debtor with default by the personal guarantor. The Tribunal recorded that the RP did not identify the precise document by which the guarantee was invoked and could not fill lacunae in the petition or construct a case of invocation on a basis different from what the financial creditor had pleaded.
Accordingly, the Tribunal concluded that the financial creditor had failed to establish invocation of the personal guarantee in accordance with law before initiation of the Section 95 proceedings. It therefore held that no default could be said to have arisen qua the personal guarantor, rejected the company petition under Section 100, took the RP’s report on record but declined to accept the recommendation for admission, and declared that the interim moratorium under Section 96 stood ceased.
REGULATORY UPDATES
SEBI discontinued the Investor Risk Reduction Access (IRRA) platform with immediate effect as it was not accessed by any stock broker
The Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) vide its Circular No. HO/38/44/12(3)2025-MIRSD-TPD1/I/10705/2026, dated May 07, 2026, has decided to discontinue the Investor Risk Reduction Access (IRRA) platform with immediate effect. Concurrently, Stock Exchanges have been directed to review the Contingency Pool Trading facility with a view to strengthening its framework. Stock Exchanges have also been advised to disseminate this circular to stock brokers. This circular expressly supersedes the earlier SEBI Circular no. SEBI/HO/MIRSD/MIRSD-PoD-1/P/CIR/2022/177 dated December 30, 2022, which had originally introduced the Investor Risk Reduction Access (IRRA) platform for stock brokers in India.
The platform was conceptualized as an alternative access point for trading, specifically designed to provide stock brokers with a fallback mechanism in the event of disruption of their primary trading services. The IRRA platform was operationalized with effect from October 01, 2023.
In the period following the introduction of the IRRA platform, SEBI introduced a series of technology-driven measures aimed at strengthening business continuity requirements for stock broker operations. These measures included the operationalization of Business Continuity Planning and Disaster Recovery (BCP-DR) requirements, an enhanced Cyber Security and Cyber Resilience framework, the implementation of a Security Operations Centre for the market (M-SoC), and a strengthened technical glitch framework. Concurrently, the trading operations of stock brokers witnessed significant technological advancements, which strengthened operational resilience by facilitating seamless transitions between primary and alternate sites during periods of disruption, as well as the emergence of independent cold sites for business continuity purposes.
In addition to the above measures, Stock Exchanges independently provide a Contingency Pool Trading facility for stock brokers. This facility is a mechanism that allows stock brokers to square off outstanding open positions for their clients during business disruptions. It operates via the exchange’s internal network within its physical premises, where broker-allocated dedicated terminals are seamlessly connected to the Stock Exchange trading platform. Notably, this facility has been utilized by brokers on several occasions over the past few years in instances of business disruptions, demonstrating its practical effectiveness as a contingency mechanism.
Given the above developments, Stock Exchanges informed SEBI that the IRRA platform had become structurally redundant. Critically, since its inception, the IRRA platform had not been accessed by any stock broker, a consequence of the robust regulatory measures, significant technological innovations in trading operations, and the ready availability of the Contingency Pool Trading facility. On this basis, Stock Exchanges unanimously recommended that the IRRA platform be discontinued.
Based on stakeholder feedback and the aforementioned factors, SEBI discontinued the Investor Risk Reduction Access (IRRA) platform. The circular has been issued in exercise of powers conferred under Section 11(1) of the Securities and Exchange Board of India Act, 1992, and Regulation 50 of the SEBI (Stock Brokers) Regulations, 2026, with the twin objectives of protecting the interests of investors in securities and promoting the development of and regulating the securities market.
Click here to read/ download the original circular
SEBI has decided to prescribe a uniform time lag of 30 days for both the sharing and usage of price data for educational purposes
The Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) vide its Circular No. HO/47/17/12(11)2025-MRD-POD3/I/11107/2026 dated May 08, 2026, has addressed to all Recognized Stock Exchanges, Clearing Corporations, Depositories, all Registered Intermediaries, and BSE Limited (in its capacity as Administration and Supervisory Body for Investment Advisers and Research Analysts), that it has consolidated and modified the regulatory framework governing the sharing and usage of market price data for educational purposes, building upon two prior circulars issued in 2024 and 2025.
The regulatory framework on this subject has evolved through three distinct stages. First, SEBI Circular dated May 24, 2024 (No. SEBI/HO/MRD/MRD-PoD-3/P/CIR/2024/56) prescribed norms for sharing of real-time price data by Market Infrastructure Institutions (MIIs) — comprising Stock Exchanges, Clearing Corporations, and Depositories — and registered market intermediaries. Under this circular, real-time price data could only be shared for orderly market functioning or regulatory compliance, and a time lag of one day was prescribed for sharing data for educational and awareness activities.
Subsequently, SEBI Circular dated January 29, 2025 (No. SEBI/HO/MIRSD/MIRSD-PoD-1/P/CIR/2025/11) further tightened the framework by stipulating that entities solely engaged in education could use price data only with a lag of three months. SEBI clarified that the two circulars operated at different levels — the May 2024 circular governed the sharing of data (with a one-day lag), while the January 2025 circular governed the usage of that data by purely educational entities (with a three-month lag).
Thus, the present circular was necessitated by stakeholder feedback and public consultation. Stakeholders flagged that the one-day lag for sharing was too short and created a risk of misuse, while the three-month lag for usage was considered excessively long for meaningful educational purposes. Balancing these competing concerns, SEBI has now decided to prescribe a uniform time lag of 30 days for both the sharing and usage of price data for educational purposes.
Recognising the unique role of the National Institute of Securities Markets (NISM) as SEBI’s own capacity-building initiative — responsible for SEBI-mandated training, certification programmes, and training of SEBI officers and market intermediaries, SEBI has carved out a special exception for NISM, whereby NISM is permitted to access market price data with a lag of only one day, but strictly for the purpose of usage in its simulation lab. This exception is limited in scope and does not extend to general educational or advisory activities.
The circular formally modifies Paragraphs 2(iii) and 2(iv) of the May 24, 2024 Circular to reflect the 30-day lag for sharing of market price data for investor education and awareness activities, along with the one-day exception for NISM’s simulation lab. Importantly, MIIs and market intermediaries are required to enter into appropriate legal agreements with entities or persons with whom data is shared. These agreements must contain provisions to prevent misuse and ensure maintenance of an audit trail for usage of such data.
The circular also modifies Question No. 8 of the FAQ at Annexure-A of the January 29, 2025 Circular, which distinguishes between “education” and “advice/recommendation.” Under the revised FAQ, a person engaged solely in education must not use market price data of the preceding thirty days to speak, display, or reference the name of any security (including by code name) in any talk, speech, video, ticker, or screen share that indicates future price, advice, or recommendation relating to any security. The one-day exception for NISM’s simulation lab is preserved in this FAQ as well.
The provisions of this circular are applicable with effect from July 01, 2026. All MIIs are directed to: (i) take necessary steps and put in place systems for implementation; (ii) make necessary amendments to their bye-laws, rules, and regulations; and (iii) bring the provisions to the notice of market participants, including investors, and disseminate the same on their websites.
The circular has been issued in exercise of powers conferred under Section 11(1) of the SEBI Act, 1992, read with Regulation 51 of the Securities Contracts (Regulation) (Stock Exchanges and Clearing Corporations) Regulations, 2018, Section 26(3) of the Depositories Act, 1996, and Regulation 97 of the SEBI (Depositories and Participants) Regulations, 2018, with the overarching objective of protecting investor interests and promoting the development and regulation of the securities market.
Click here to read/ download the original circular
Holding of an infrastructure project or termination of a concession agreement shall not affect SPV’s status
The Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) vide its Circular No. SEBI/HO/DDHS/DDHS-PoD-2/I/11698/2026, dated May 15, 2026, gives effect to an amendment made on April 17, 2026 to Regulation 2(1)(zy)(ii) of the Infrastructure Investment Trusts (InvIT) Regulations, which introduced a proviso clarifying that in respect of an SPV holding an infrastructure project, the conclusion or termination of a concession agreement, or any other agreement of a similar nature, shall not affect the SPV’s status as an SPV.
SEBI said that such an SPV shall continue to be classified as an SPV, subject to the fulfilment of conditions as may be specified by SEBI. This amendment provides regulatory certainty to InvITs holding SPVs whose underlying concession agreements have expired or been terminated, ensuring that such SPVs are not automatically disqualified from the InvIT structure.
The Circular imposes a time-bound obligation on the Investment Manager to either exit its investment in such an SPV (by way of sale, liquidation, winding-up, or merger) or acquire a new infrastructure project within that SPV, within one year from the latest of the following events: (i) completion or termination of the concession agreement or similar agreement; (ii) conclusion of all pending claims, litigations, tax assessments, and related appeals; or (iii) completion of the defect liability period. Importantly, any time taken to obtain relevant statutory or regulatory approvals for exiting the investment shall be excluded from the computation of the one-year timeline, providing a practical carve-out for regulatory delays.
Until the InvIT exits its investment in such an SPV, the circular mandates comprehensive disclosures in the InvIT’s annual report, operating at two levels. At the InvIT level, the Investment Manager must disclose a detailed breakup of the value of investments, on both a gross and net basis, in SPVs where the concession agreement or similar agreement has ended or been terminated. At the SPV level, additional disclosures are required for each such SPV, covering: (i) brief project details and the date of termination/conclusion of the agreement, along with the status of any vesting certificate or similar document issued by the concessioning authority upon handover; (ii) assets and liabilities of the SPV, including specific reserves, on a broad/grouped basis as per the annual audited financial statements; (iii) details of contingent liabilities as set out in the audited financial statements; and (iv) details of outstanding debt, if any, along with the repayment schedule.
Beyond financial disclosures, the circular also requires the Investment Manager to disclose whether the SPV has sufficient assets to meet its liabilities, including contingent liabilities, and if not, how such liabilities are planned to be met. Additionally, a clear exit strategy and timeline must be disclosed, detailing how and when the InvIT intends to exit its investment in the SPV or acquire a new infrastructure project, along with steps taken so far and the expected timeline for completion. Finally, any other material details relating to the SPV, including pending claims, litigations, assessments, statutory or contractual obligations, and the balance period of the defect liability period, must also be disclosed.
The circular has been addressed to all Infrastructure Investment Trusts (InvITs), all parties to InvITs, all Depositories, and all Recognized Stock Exchanges. The circular was issued in exercise of powers conferred under Section 11(1) of the Securities and Exchange Board of India Act, 1992, read with Regulation 33 and Regulation 2(1)(zy)(ii) of the SEBI (Infrastructure Investment Trusts) Regulations, 2014 (InvIT Regulations). The circular came into force with immediate effect upon issuance.
Click here to read/ download the original circular
RBI tightens NBFC recovery governance and proposes Amendment Directions, 2026 to shift primary accountability from Recovery-Agent Oversight to End-to-End NBFC
The Draft Reserve Bank of India (Non-Banking Financial Companies – Responsible Business Conduct) Amendment Directions, 2026 proposes a standalone and more comprehensive framework governing recovery of loan dues and engagement of recovery agencies by NBFCs. The amendment directions is stated to have been issued in exercise of the RBI’s powers under Sections 45JA, 45L and 45M of the Reserve Bank of India Act, 1934.
The central effect of the draft amendment is that recovery conduct is no longer treated merely as a third-party agent issue, but as an NBFC governance, outsourcing, customer protection, disclosure, monitoring and grievance redressal issue. The proposed framework places primary responsibility on the NBFC to design policy architecture, control outsourced conduct, regulate customer contact practices, preserve evidence of recovery interactions, structure lawful possession processes, and prevent abusive or coercive recovery behaviour, while also introducing a narrowly tailored but highly regulated regime for device-disablement tools in financed-device loans.
As a structural matter, the amendment inserts the definitions of “Recovery agency” and “Recovery agent” into paragraph 6 of the Reserve Bank of India (Non-Banking Financial Companies – Responsible Business Conduct) Directions, 2025. “Recovery agency” is defined broadly to mean any entity or individual, other than the NBFC’s own employees, engaged by an NBFC under an outsourcing arrangement to assist in recovery of loan dues from a borrower in default, including taking possession of security. Further, “Recovery agent” is defined as a representative of a recovery agency involved in recovery-related activities at the point of customer interface. The explanation makes clear that where an individual is directly engaged by an NBFC under an outsourcing arrangement for recovery or possession-related activities, the instructions applicable to both recovery agencies and recovery agents will apply to that individual.
In place of the earlier framework on “Responsibilities of Recovery Agents of the NBFC”, the amendment inserts a new Section J titled “Conduct of NBFCs in Recovery of Loan Dues and Engagement of Recovery Agencies”, and shifted the regulatory focus from only recovery agents to the broader conduct obligations of NBFCs themselves, their employees, and outsourced recovery agencies.
Under paragraph 100A, the new Section J applies to recovery of loan dues by an NBFC from borrowers in default, including taking possession of security. The proviso clarifies that wherever expressly specified, the provisions will also apply mutatis mutandis to collection of dues in the normal course from borrowers who are not in default. Paragraph 100B further states that these provisions operate without prejudice to any statutory rights available to an NBFC, and without prejudice to obligations relating to enforcement of security under any statute, as well as other Directions dealing with specific recovery actions such as one-time settlement. Paragraph 100C clarifies that for purposes of this section, “NBFC employees” includes employees deployed for recovery of loan dues, including taking possession of security.
The Directions require every NBFC to put in place a policy on collection and recovery of loan dues, including taking possession of security, whether carried out by its own employees or recovery agents. Under paragraph 100D, the policy is expected to cover trigger points for initiation of recovery, graded recovery actions through an escalation matrix, code of conduct for employees and recovery agents, and recovery of dues in cases involving death of a borrower. In relation to engagement of recovery agencies, the policy must also address eligibility and due diligence criteria, performance evaluation standards, inspection or audit mechanisms, controls for compliance with statutory and regulatory requirements, and procedures or penal actions in case of non-compliant agencies or agents. The policy must also incorporate provisions relating to compensation payable to borrowers or guarantors for loss arising from recovery-related actions of the NBFC or recovery agencies that are not consistent with the Directions.
In relation to outsourcing and onboarding of recovery agencies, paragraph 100E requires the NBFC’s due diligence process to conform to the RBI’s Reserve Bank of India (Non-Banking Financial Companies – Managing Risks in Outsourcing) Directions, 2025, as amended from time to time. The NBFC must also ensure that engaged recovery agencies verify the antecedents of their recovery agents at the pre-engagement stage and thereafter on an ongoing basis at a pre-defined periodicity specified in the NBFC’s policy. Paragraph 100F adds a mandatory training requirement by requiring NBFCs to ensure that only those recovery agents are engaged who have obtained certification from the Indian Institute of Banking and Finance after completing the prescribed training programme for Debt Recovery Agents, or from another institute having a tie-up arrangement with IIBF. Recovery agents already engaged but lacking such certificate must obtain it within one year from the issuance of the Directions.
Paragraph 100G obliges the NBFC to frame a code of conduct for both recovery agents and its own employees based on the instructions contained in the Directions. Where a recovery agency is engaged, the NBFC must obtain an undertaking from that agency confirming that its recovery agents agree to comply with the code of conduct. This makes the NBFC directly responsible not only for prescribing behavioural standards but also for obtaining contractual confirmation of compliance from outsourced agencies.
The disclosure obligations imposed on NBFCs are extensive. Under paragraph 100H, the NBFC must make available an up-to-date list of recovery agencies empanelled with or engaged by it across all prominent customer-facing channels, including branches, offices, websites and mobile applications, as applicable. The list must include key particulars such as the name of the agency, whether it is corporate or individual, correspondence address, period of engagement, purpose of engagement, and assigned geographical areas. The list must be updated within seven calendar days of any modification, but where the agency’s engagement is terminated, the update must be immediate. Paragraph 100I further requires that before a case is forwarded to a recovery agency for recovery through an in-person visit, the borrower or guarantor must be notified of the agency’s details at least one day before the first visit through message or email on the registered contact details, or, where such contact details are unavailable, by letter to the current address at least three days before the visit. Paragraphs 100J and 100K require immediate notification to the borrower or guarantor if the recovery agency is changed during an ongoing process or if the agreement with the agency is terminated.
The Directions also impose customer protection measures during the recovery process. Paragraph 100L requires the NBFC to ensure that disclosure of borrower or guarantor information to employees or recovery agencies is limited strictly to what is necessary for recovery duties, and to put in place safeguards, including penal provisions, to prevent misuse of customer information. Paragraph 100M states that if a grievance relating to loan dues or recovery has been lodged by a borrower, the NBFC must not forward the concerned recovery case to an employee or recovery agency until the grievance is finally disposed of. Paragraph 100N requires the NBFC to document the time and number of calls made by its employees or recovery agents to the borrower or guarantor and to maintain recordings of the content or text of such calls, as well as calls made by the borrower or guarantor to the number conveyed by the NBFC. These records must be preserved for six months from the date of the call, or until disposal where matters are sub judice. The NBFC must also take reasonable precautions, including informing the borrower or guarantor that the conversation is being recorded. Paragraph 100O further prohibits recovery targets or incentive structures in the recovery agency contract that may induce harsh recovery practices described in paragraph 100X.
For cases involving possession of security, paragraph 100P provides that where an NBFC incorporates a possession clause in the loan contract or agreement and relies on that clause to enforce its rights, it must ensure both that the clause is legally valid and that it is clearly brought to the borrower’s notice at the time of execution. The loan contract or agreement must accordingly include provisions on notice period before taking possession, circumstances in which the notice period can be waived, procedure for taking possession, final opportunity for repayment before sale or auction of the security, procedure for returning possession to the borrower, and procedure for sale or auction of the security. This effectively requires ex ante contractual clarity on the entire possession and enforcement process.
The Directions introduce a specific regime for technology-based recovery tools affecting financed mobile devices. Paragraph 100Q prohibits an NBFC from using any technology-based mechanism that restricts or disables the functions of a borrower’s mobile phone, tablet or similar device as a recovery tool, except where the loan financed acquisition of that device. Even in such cases, this mechanism may be used only if the loan contract expressly and unambiguously allows it and sets out the triggering events, notice process, graduated restriction approach, cure period and grievance redressal mechanism. In addition, a first notice can only be issued after the loan becomes 60 days past due, giving the borrower at least 21 days to cure the default, followed by a second notice after expiry of the first notice period giving at least another 7 days. The explanation makes clear that restriction or disablement cannot be deployed until the loan has become 90 days past due and the borrower has failed to cure the default despite both notices.
Paragraph 100R sets out detailed safeguards for any such device-restriction mechanism. The NBFC must adopt a graduated approach rather than disabling the device ab initio, and cannot disable essential functions such as internet access, incoming calls, emergency SOS features, or receipt of emergency government or public-safety notifications. Restrictions must be reversed expeditiously and in any case within one hour of cure of default. If there is wrongful restriction or delay in reversal after cure, the lender must compensate the borrower at the rate of ₹250 per hour until the wrongful action is remedied. The mechanism must be uninstalled soon after the loan is fully repaid, the borrower must retain the right to prepay the loan at any stage, and the NBFC must maintain a robust grievance redressal mechanism for issues relating to unlocking. Paragraph 100S separately imposes an absolute prohibition on the NBFC accessing, using, obtaining or retaining any data stored in the borrower’s mobile device for loan recovery or any other purpose.
On governance and oversight, paragraph 100T requires an NBFC to establish a management structure to monitor and control the activities of recovery agencies and to ensure that they do not engage in conduct that could damage the NBFC’s integrity and reputation. The NBFC must ensure that its agreement with each recovery agency contains necessary provisions to support this control framework. Paragraph 100U further requires a periodic review of the recovery mechanism so that lessons from experience are incorporated and improvements are made over time.
The operational conduct requirements applicable to NBFC employees and recovery agents are also set out in detail. Under paragraph 100V, during any visit for collection, recovery or taking possession of security, the employee or recovery agent must identify themselves through identity cards issued by the NBFC and the recovery agency respectively. The recovery agent must also carry an authorisation letter issued by the NBFC or recovery agency and a copy of the notice issued under paragraph 100I. The authorisation letter and notice must include, among other things, the telephone number of the recovery agency and the grievance redressal officer appointed by the NBFC under paragraph 100Y.
Paragraph 100W prescribes standards of conduct during borrower interaction. Recovery-related discussions may be held only with the borrower or guarantor, as applicable. The employee or recovery agent must behave in a civil manner and maintain decency and decorum during visits. Only authorised representatives may visit borrower or guarantor premises. Contact or visits may ordinarily take place only between 08:00 hours and 19:00 hours, unless the borrower or guarantor expressly requests or authorises otherwise, and requests to avoid contact at a particular time should ordinarily be respected. Contact should generally occur at the place chosen by the borrower or guarantor; only if no specific choice is made, or if the borrower or guarantor fails to appear at the chosen place on two or more successive occasions, may contact be made at residence or place of business or occupation. The Directions also require agents to avoid calls or visits on inappropriate occasions such as bereavement, calamitous events or marriage functions. For microfinance loans, collection or recovery must generally take place at a mutually decided designated or central designated place, though field staff may collect at residence or workplace if the borrower fails to appear at the designated place on two or more successive occasions. Any written communication must have prior approval of the NBFC and include the sender’s name and contact details, and proper acknowledgement or receipt must be promptly given for dues collected or recovered.
Paragraph 100X prohibits harsh recovery methods and gives an illustrative list of practices deemed harsh. These include use of minatory or abusive language; posting video, audio or personal details of the borrower or guarantor on social media; sending inappropriate mobile or social media messages; excessive calling or messaging, including outside prescribed hours; threatening or anonymous calls; intimidation or harassment of the borrower, guarantor, or their relatives, referees, friends or co-workers; use or threat of violence or other means to harm family, assets or reputation; and making false or misleading representations, particularly regarding the extent of debt or the consequences of non-payment. The provision is framed broadly so that the listed practices are deemed harsh without limiting the wider prohibition on harsh recovery methods generally.
For grievance handling, paragraph 100Y requires every NBFC to maintain a dedicated mechanism for redressal of recovery-related grievances. The details of this mechanism must be provided to the borrower both in the loan agreement and when the NBFC communicates the details of the recovery agency under paragraph 100I. In addition, all recovery-related communications issued by the NBFC must include the name, email address, telephone number and address of the relevant grievance redressal officer whom the borrower or guarantor may contact.
Finally, paragraph 100Z clarifies that compliance with this new recovery framework is in addition to compliance with other applicable RBI guidelines and guidelines issued by other authorities from time to time. The Directions specifically refer to the Telecom Regulatory Authority of India’s Telecom Commercial Communications Customer Preference Regulations, 2018, as amended, in relation to commercial communications aspects. This indicates that NBFCs must treat the new framework as supplemental and not exhaustive of all legal and regulatory obligations relevant to recovery conduct.
Click here to read/ download the original Amendment Direction
Legal Updates (May 11 – May 16, 2026)
Legal Updates ( May 11 – May 16, 2026 )
CASE UPDATES
Invocation of arbitration under Section 21 of Arbitration & Conciliation Act is not consent to appointment, and that subsequent participation in proceedings does not by itself constitute the express written waiver required under the proviso to Section 12(5)
The Bombay High Court in the case of D S Textiles vs IIFL Finance Limited [Arbitration Petition (L) No. 12097 of 2026] dated April 30, 2026, has held that a unilateral appointment of an arbitrator remains invalid even if the appointing party seeks to route that appointment through an “institution” or similar mechanism of its own choice, unless the parties had agreed to such institutional appointment. The Court said that the defect goes to the foundational requirement of independence, impartiality, equal treatment, and neutrality in constitution of the arbitral tribunal.
The Court explained that invocation of arbitration under Section 21 of Arbitration & Conciliation Act is not consent to appointment, and that subsequent participation in proceedings does not by itself constitute the express written waiver required under the proviso to Section 12(5).
Although the Court took note of the statement by IIFL Finance Limited (Respondent) that the arbitration proceedings were being dropped, it directed that the impugned order be quashed and set aside, and further directed that the judgment be placed before the Audit Committee of the Respondent’s Board of Directors by the Chief Compliance Officer so that the governance bodies were made aware of the practice being contrary to law and could frame appropriate policies.
The Court observed that the apparent modus operandi was to conduct arbitration in this manner and hope that most affected parties would not challenge the arbitration but would instead settle, thereby leading to recoveries; and that when a counterparty did challenge the unilateral appointment, the appointing party would simply volunteer to withdraw the arbitration proceedings.
The Court made it clear that appointment through an “institution” chosen unilaterally by one party is only a “veneer” or “fig-leaf” to claim independence, and that the arbitrator would still remain a unilaterally appointed arbitrator. It observed that orders under Section 17 attaching bank accounts were often passed rapidly in such arbitrations, and that such orders commonly contained no mention of the process of appointment of the arbitrator and were often also devoid of material particulars of compliant invocation of arbitration.
The Court stated that there are only two known methods in law to appoint an arbitrator: (i) by consent of the parties, and (ii) by appointment through a Section 11 court having jurisdiction; and that no third mode can be whitewashed as compliant. The Court therefore treated the attempt by finance companies and banks to present institution-based unilateral appointments as independent appointments as wholly untenable, completely illegal, and a colourable and manipulative device to circumvent Supreme Court law.
The Court also observed that a notice under Section 21 is only an expression to set the arbitration agreement in motion and does not by itself operate as consent to any future appointment. It clarified that participation in proceedings, filing a claim, or participating in Section 29A extension proceedings would still not amount to an express agreement in writing waiving objection to an ineligible arbitrator, and that such objection could still be raised at the Section 34 stage. The Court deprecated the practice and stated that it gives arbitration a bad name and inflicts long-term damage on alternative dispute resolution as a mechanism.
Click here to read/ download the original judgment
Where the suit’s substantive reliefs concern specific performance and enforcement of agreements, the plaint cannot be rejected at the threshold under Order VII Rule 11 merely because SARFAESI measures are also in the background, unless the matter sought to be adjudicated is one that the DRT is empowered to determine
The Bombay High Court in the case of IIFL Finance vs Paramvir Developers [Interim Application No. 4596 of 2025] dated May 04, 2026, has ruled that for the purposes of Section 12-A of the Commercial Courts Act, the determinative test is whether, on a wholesome reading of the plaint and supporting documents, urgent interim relief is genuinely contemplated from the plaintiff’s standpoint in light of the nature of the suit, subject matter, and cause of action. The Court clarified that it is not whether such interim relief is ultimately granted. If that test is satisfied, non-compliance with pre-institution mediation does not justify rejection of the plaint under Order VII Rule 11 CPC.
The Court further held that where the suit’s substantive reliefs concern specific performance and enforcement of agreements, the plaint cannot be rejected at the threshold under Order VII Rule 11 merely because SARFAESI measures are also in the background, unless the matter sought to be adjudicated is one that the DRT or Appellate Tribunal is empowered to determine under the SARFAESI Act. The Court held that no ground under Order VII Rule 11 CPC was made out and accordingly dismissed the interim applications seeking rejection of the plaint.
The Court observed, on the plaint as pleaded, that there was sufficient cause of action against all three defendants because the suit was founded on enforcement of the Framework Agreement against defendant nos. 1 and 2 and the profit-sharing agreement against defendant no. 3. As regards Section 34 of the SARFAESI Act, the Court observed that the substantive prayers in the suit were for performance of the Framework Agreement and the profit-sharing agreement, reliefs which could not be decided under the SARFAESI machinery. Hence, it opined that the plaint could not be rejected at the threshold on that ground.
The Court also rejected the submission that the plaint was barred under Section 41 of the Specific Relief Act at the threshold, holding that the pleadings warranted a trial and that merits of the cause of action and reliefs could not be dealt with under Order VII Rule 11 CPC at this preliminary stage.
On Section 12-A of the Commercial Courts Act, the Court treated the law as settled by the Supreme Court, especially in cases of Yamini Manohar vs. T.K.D. Keerthi [(2024) 5 SCC 815] and Dhanbad Fuels Private Limited vs. Union of India [2025 SCC Online SC 1129]. The correct test is not whether interim relief is ultimately granted, but whether, upon examination of the nature and subject matter of the suit and the cause of action, urgent interim relief could be said to be contemplated from the plaintiff’s standpoint.
The Court expressly noted that urgent interim relief must not be a disguise or camouflage to bypass mandatory pre-institution mediation, but equally, mere non-grant of ad interim relief or later rejection of interim relief on merits does not justify rejection of the plaint under Order VII Rule 11 CPC.
The Court further observed that post-filing stages of the suit are not relevant for deciding whether the plaint should be rejected under Order VII Rule 11(d) for non-compliance with Section 12-A. The Court found that the plaintiffs had pleaded precipitative action by the defendants, threatened enforcement of security, possession action, alleged breach of the Framework Agreement and profit-sharing arrangement, and apprehended loss of their protected interests. Seen from the plaintiffs’ standpoint, urgent interim relief was therefore contemplated.
Click here to read/ download the original judgment
Receipt by a person in India of Indian currency through a cheque drawn on an NRE account, even if that account had been funded by foreign currency deposits, does not by itself constitute a contravention of Section 8(1) of FERA
The Delhi High Court in the case of Prakash Chandra Yadav vs Directorate of Enforcement [Misc. Appeal (PMLA) 19/2024] dated April 30, 2026, has held that receipt by a person in India of Indian currency through a cheque drawn on an NRE account, even if that account had been funded by foreign currency deposits, does not by itself constitute a contravention of Section 8(1) of FERA, because the allegation is not of dealing in or acquiring “foreign exchange” within the meaning of the Act. Further, Section 8(2) of FERA is not attracted unless there is a transaction providing for conversion of Indian currency into foreign currency or foreign currency into Indian currency at rates other than those authorised by the RBI.
Thus, the Court held that, on the facts alleged, no violation of Section 8(1) or Section 8(2) of FERA was made out, set aside the Tribunal’s order dated 29.05.2024, directed refund of the penalty amount within four weeks, and allowed the appeal without costs.
The Court recorded that there was no dispute that the appellant received a cheque of Rs. 30 lakhs drawn on Akbar Veerji’s NRE account, that the account had been funded by deposits in US dollars, and that the cheque issued to the appellant was in Indian currency. On Section 2(h) of FERA, the Court observed that “foreign exchange” includes instruments, deposits, etc. payable in foreign currency, or payable in Indian currency or foreign currency at the option of the drawee or holder, the essential element being that it is payable in foreign currency at such option.
The Court observed that, in the present case, the cheque was paid and payable to the appellant only in Indian currency. On Section 8(1), the Court held that what is prohibited is dealing in foreign exchange by purchase, acquisition, borrowing, sale, transfer, lending or exchange, except through an authorised dealer. The Court expressly observed that the allegation against the appellant was not of dealing in foreign exchange or exchanging the same, but only of receiving an amount in Indian rupees from an NRE account, and that this could not amount to a violation of Section 8(1) of FERA.
The Court disagreed with the Tribunal’s reliance on the Explanation to Section 8(1), holding that the Explanation must be read strictly and according to its grammatical meaning, and that it did not support the Tribunal’s finding. It noted that there was no allegation that Akbar Veerji had opened any account with the appellant in foreign exchange or had lent money to the appellant in foreign exchange.
On Section 8(2), the Court held that the Tribunal’s view was also unsustainable because Section 8(2) applies to transactions providing for conversion of Indian currency into foreign currency or foreign currency into Indian currency at rates other than those authorised by the RBI. The Court observed that there was no allegation against the appellant either of exchange of foreign currency into Indian currency or vice versa, or of any exchange at a rate other than the rate authorised by the RBI; therefore Section 8(2) had no application on the facts.
On the suppression argument, the Court held that the earlier order dated 06.04.2009 only rejected a challenge to the order framing charge on a prima facie view and was therefore no longer relevant after the criminal proceedings ended in acquittal on 30.11.2017. The Court referred to the criminal court’s findings that the funds had come through banking channels into an NRE account, that transactions out of the NRE account were in Indian rupees and made in India by cheque, and that nothing showed that the accused had acquired any foreign exchange or that the remittances into the NRE account were impermissible.
Click here to read/ download the original judgment
A Look Out Circular, being a coercive executive measure that directly impairs the fundamental right to travel abroad under Article 21, cannot be sustained merely on the basis of executive fiat, routine commercial default, bank debt recovery, guarantor/director status, or vague assertions of economic interest or public interest
The Delhi High Court in the case of Ritu Singhal vs Bureau of Immigration [W.P.(C) 17646/2022] dated April 17, 2026, has held that a Look Out Circular (LOC), being a coercive executive measure that directly impairs the fundamental right to travel abroad under Article 21, can be issued and continued only strictly in accordance with law, and ordinarily only in cases involving a live cognizable offence, deliberate evasion of arrest or judicial process, and a real and proximate likelihood of absconding. It cannot be sustained merely on the basis of executive fiat, routine commercial default, bank debt recovery, guarantor/director status, or vague assertions of economic interest or public interest.
The Court stated that public sector banks, through their Chairman, Managing Director or Chief Executive Officer, lack lawful authority to seek issuance of LOCs, and LOCs issued solely at their behest are liable to be quashed. Further, the exceptional power under Clause 6(L) of the 2021 Office Memorandum must be narrowly construed and can be invoked only in rare and compelling cases involving a clear and grave threat to sovereignty, security, integrity, strategic interests, national/systemic economic interests, or larger public interest in the strict sense recognised by law.
The High Court emphasised that where a charge-sheet or complaint has already been filed and the criminal court is seized of the matter, the proper course is ordinarily for the affected person to approach that court or the originating authority for cancellation or modification of the LOC, since that court is best placed to assess necessity and proportionality on the basis of the investigative record. Accordingly, the Court quashed the impugned LOCs falling in the first two categories, subject to stated conditions regarding prior intimation, itinerary disclosure, and certain case-specific safeguards.
The Court observed that the right to travel abroad is an integral facet of the right to life and personal liberty under Article 21, and that any restriction on this right must be founded on law and on a just, fair and reasonable procedure. Executive instructions cannot substitute legislative mandate when a fundamental right is curtailed.
The Court observed that an LOC is not statutory in origin but arises from executive instructions of the Ministry of Home Affairs, and that the current regime is governed principally by the Office Memorandum dated Feb 22, 2021. That regime permits resort to LOCs in cognizable offences, and in non-cognizable matters generally only for intimation of travel movements, subject to a narrow exceptional category.
The Court accepted and applied the position that LOCs are coercive measures of last resort and cannot be used routinely for law enforcement or debt recovery. It reiterated that recourse to an LOC may be taken only where there is a cognizable offence and the accused is deliberately evading arrest or process, coupled with a real and proximate likelihood of absconding. It observed that the inclusion of Chairmen, Managing Directors and Chief Executive Officers of public sector banks as authorities empowered to seek LOCs had been held bad in law, and that public sector banks do not possess legal authority to seek opening of LOCs.
The Court further observed that mere inability to repay debt, absence of collateral, declaration of an account as NPA, or pendency of DRT or recovery proceedings cannot justify curtailment of the right to travel abroad in the absence of a criminal case and the legally required threshold. It also observed that expressions such as “economic interests of India” and “larger public interest” cannot be expanded to cover routine commercial defaults. The Court emphasised that the authority opening an LOC must independently apply its mind and pass a speaking order based on specific and credible material. A mechanical or pro forma exercise, or action taken merely because a bank or originating agency requests it, is insufficient.
The Court also observed that an LOC cannot be sustained merely because a person is a director, guarantor, shareholder or family member of a borrower or accused, unless there is specific material demonstrating direct and personal involvement. It expressly stated that guilt is personal and not vicarious in civil or criminal liability. The Court stressed that continuance of an LOC is not indefinite and must be periodically reviewed. Where the subject has cooperated, has not evaded process, and no further interrogation or presence is demonstrably required, continuation becomes an unreasonable restriction on personal liberty.
Click here to read/ download the original judgment
Disputes raised by the Corporate Debtor, including MSME-related objections, alleged irregularity in NPA classification, pending arbitration, or other inter se disputes, do not defeat admission once debt and default are established
The National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (NCLT) Mumbai Bench in the case of Buldana Urban Cooperative Credit Society vs Amar Seeds [C.P.(IB)/767(MB)2025] dated April 29, 2026, has held that for admission of a Section 7 IBC application, the Adjudicating Authority is required to determine whether there exists a financial debt and whether a default has occurred. The Court held that disputes raised by the Corporate Debtor, including MSME-related objections, alleged irregularity in NPA classification, pending arbitration, or other inter se disputes, do not defeat admission once debt and default are established.
The Tribunal also held that a dispute as to the precise date of default is not material where, even on the Corporate Debtor’s own case, the application remains within limitation. Further, a defect in the supporting affidavit of the application was treated as a curable defect, not fatal to maintainability once cured pursuant to the Tribunal’s direction.
The Tribunal explained that the debt owed by the Corporate Debtor fell within the definition of “financial debt” under Section 5(8), that the default exceeded the threshold under Section 4, and that the conditions necessary to trigger CIRP were fulfilled. Accordingly, the Section 7 application was admitted, moratorium under Section 14 was declared, and RSDS Advisory & Restructuring LLP was appointed as IRP.
The Tribunal observed that it was an admitted and undisputed position that the Applicant sanctioned Rs. 18 crores to the Corporate Debtor under the sanction letter dated 10.04.2023, that the loan agreement dated 29.04.2023 was executed, and that the account statement reflected disbursement of Rs. 18 crores on 29.04.2023. It also noted that the facility was secured by a mortgage deed dated 18.04.2023.
The Tribunal reproduced the repayment clauses of the loan agreement and noted that the loan, though approved as a demand loan, was permitted to be repaid in monthly instalments as a concession, and that if an amount equal to three instalments was not paid, the creditor could demand recovery of the entire outstanding amount with interest and expenses.
On default, the Tribunal observed that the moratorium expired on 29.04.2024 and that the Corporate Debtor failed to pay the first three instalments. In terms of the loan agreement, this entitled the Applicant to recall the entire loan. The Tribunal also recorded that demand notices dated 27.06.2024 and 19.09.2024 were issued and remained unpaid.
On the objection regarding the date of default, the Tribunal rejected the contention as inconsequential. It held that even if the Corporate Debtor’s interpretation were accepted and the instalments were treated as due on the 10th of the following month, the application would still be within the three-year limitation period. The Tribunal stated that the objection did not have the effect of rendering the application time-barred and was therefore rejected.
On the MSME defence, the Tribunal held that while MSME status was not disputed, the reliefs under the MSMED Act and related RBI frameworks cannot override the operation of the Code. The Tribunal expressly observed that for admission under Section 7, the relevant date is the date of default and not the date of NPA, and that even procedural non-compliance in NPA classification would not negate the right to approach the Adjudicating Authority once default is established.
On the argument that the petition was a counterblast and on disputes relating to pledged goods/arbitration, the Tribunal held that proceedings under Section 7 are summary in nature, and the Adjudicating Authority is only required to ascertain the existence of financial debt and default. Inter se disputes and pendency of arbitration were held to be irrelevant for admission of the application.
The Tribunal noted that the Applicant had placed on record the NeSL record of default in Form D, showing the status as “Deemed to be Authenticated”, total outstanding of Rs. 22.77 Crores, and date of default as 31.07.2024. It also found that the application filed on 30.07.2025 was within limitation. Accordingly, the Tribunal found that the proposed IRP did not have a valid AFA as on the date of the order.
For admission under Section 95 of IBC, pendency of proceedings under SARFAESI or before the DRT does not bar initiation of insolvency resolution against a personal guarantor, having regard to the independent nature of IBC proceedings and the overriding effect of Section 238
The National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT) Mumbai Bench in the case of Canara Bank vs Shweta Deepak Patel [IA(I.B.C)2976(MB)2025] dated April 06, 2026, has observed that a document styled and worded as a guarantee, which records that the signatory unconditionally and irrevocably guarantees repayment of the borrower’s dues, will be treated as a contract of guarantee and not as an indemnity merely because it also contains language that, as between the bank and guarantor, the guarantor is treated as principal debtor.
The Tribunal held that where the terms of the guarantee are on demand, a Section 13(2) SARFAESI notice addressed to the guarantor and containing a specific demand to pay within the stated period can amount to valid invocation of the personal guarantee. In such a case, the guarantor’s default arises upon failure to comply within that demand period, and the date of default for the guarantor may therefore be different from the borrower’s default/NPA date.
The Tribunal further held that for admission under Section 95/100 IBC, pendency of proceedings under SARFAESI or before the DRT does not bar initiation of insolvency resolution against a personal guarantor, having regard to the independent nature of IBC proceedings and the overriding effect of Section 238. Even if the guarantee deed is challenged on stamping, the application can still be admitted where debt and default are otherwise established from other transaction documents on record.
The Tribunal observed on perusal of the agreement, that it was a guarantee agreement. It noted that the respondent was expressly described as “Guarantor”, and the document specifically stated that the guarantor would “unconditionally and irrevocably guarantee the repayment of all amounts”. It therefore rejected the argument that the document was merely an indemnity.
The Tribunal held that, in the facts of the case, the Section 13(2) notice dated 06.07.2024 constituted a valid invocation of the personal guarantee because it was addressed to the borrower/guarantor/mortgagor/owner and specifically required the respondent to pay within 60 days. On that basis, the Tribunal accepted 04.09.2024 as the correct date of default for the personal guarantor.
The Tribunal expressly observed that it did not find any guarantee agreement for the GECL and GECL 1.0 facilities. However, it held that the default in respect of the OCC facility alone was above the statutory threshold of Rs. 1 crore, and therefore the Section 95 proceedings were maintainable on that basis.
Further, the Tribunal rejected the objection based on differing dates of default for the borrower and guarantor. It held that the guarantor’s obligation to pay arises after invocation of the guarantee following default by the principal borrower, and that, here, the guarantor’s default occurred on expiry of the 60-day period under the invocation notice, i.e. 04.09.2024.
At the same time, the Tribunal held that the insufficiency of stamping objection did not defeat the petition because the bank had otherwise established the debt and default through other transaction documents, including the acknowledgment of debt and renewed sanction letters accepted by the personal guarantor.
Lastly, the Tribunal held that prior or parallel proceedings under SARFAESI and before the DRT do not bar a Section 95 application. It relied on Section 238 of the IBC and noted that insolvency proceedings under the Code are independent and are not invalidated merely because other recovery proceedings are pending. The Tribunal accepted that the bank, through its rejoinder, had filed statements of account with the Bankers’ Books Evidence Act certificate, which reflected disbursement to the corporate debtor. It therefore rejected the respondent’s evidentiary objection.
Where a suspended director, while aware of ongoing CIRP, conceals true asset-related transactions of the corporate debtor, furnishes forged leave and license documents to the RP, and diverts rental income from properties owned by the corporate debtor into his personal account, such conduct constitutes intention to defraud creditors, warranting a contribution direction under Section 66(1) of the IBC
The Mumbai Bench of the National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT) in the case of Ganesh Venkata Siva Rama Krishna Remani vs Puneet P. Bhatia [IA 4016 of 2025] dated April 29, 2026, has observed that where a director/suspended management, while aware of impending or ongoing CIRP, conceals true asset-related transactions of the corporate debtor, furnishes forged leave and license documents to the RP, and diverts rental income from properties owned by the corporate debtor into his personal account or a connected account, such conduct constitutes carrying on the business of the corporate debtor for a fraudulent purpose with intent to defraud creditors, warranting a contribution direction under Section 66(1) of the IBC.
The Tribunal directed Respondent No. 1 to contribute the amounts already received from Respondent Nos. 3 and 4, as well as any further amounts received under the leave and license arrangements, to the assets of the corporate debtor within 30 days, together with interest at 12% per annum from the date of receipt until payment. The Tribunal further held that, given the concealment, diversion of funds, and obstruction in relation to the corporate debtor’s assets during CIRP, the matter merited referral to the IBBI for appropriate action under Sections 70, 72, 73 and 74 of the IBC.
The Tribunal observed that Respondent No. 1 was fully aware of his obligation to disclose details of all assets of the corporate debtor to the RP, but instead furnished forged documents, thereby concealing the genuine nature of the transactions and the rental income that should have accrued to the corporate debtor.
The Tribunal noted that Respondent Nos. 3 and 4 had paid Rs. 9.67 lakhs and Rs. 40.68 lakhs respectively until discovery of the fraud. It also noted that the ledger statement of M/s BNT Connections showed payments linked to Mr. Puneet Bhatia, and that the leave and license agreement dated 04.01.2024 with Respondent No. 3 was entered into by Respondent No. 1 in his personal name. On that basis, the Tribunal found that rentals in respect of properties owned by the corporate debtor were received by Respondent No. 1 personally or in the account of M/s BNT Connections.
The Tribunal expressly held that the amounts ought to have accrued to the corporate debtor but were siphoned away at the behest of Respondent No. 1 to the prejudice of creditors. It found that these facts clearly established fraudulent intent and demonstrated carrying on the business of the corporate debtor in relation to these properties for a fraudulent purpose with intent to defraud creditors. The Tribunal also considered it appropriate to refer the matter to the IBBI for action against Respondent No. 1, treating him as an officer of the corporate debtor for the purposes of Sections 70, 72, 73 and 74 of the IBC.
REGULATORY UPDATES
Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India (Model Bye-Laws and Governing Board of Insolvency Professional Agencies) (Amendment) Regulations, 2026
The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India (IBBI) vide it Official Gazette Notification F. No. IBBI/2026-27/GN/REG/140, dated May 13, 2026, has amended its regulations to provide for appointment of its nominee director on the governing board of an insolvency professional agency (IPA), with the nominee enjoying the same status, rights, duties, powers and responsibilities as other directors. The change has been introduced through amendments to the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India (Model Bye-Laws and Governing Board of Insolvency Professional Agencies) Regulations, 2016.
The Gazette Notification states that the Board shall nominate one individual as its nominee director on the Governing Board of an insolvency professional agency, and such nominee director shall have the same status, rights, duties, powers and responsibilities as other directors of the governing board. The amendment also clarifies that nominee directors will be excluded while calculating the minimum requirement of seven directors on the governing board of an IPA.
Further, new eligibility conditions have been introduced for independent directors, including that they should not be members of statutory regulators that have sponsored or promoted the IPA, or directly or indirectly hold shareholding in or exercise control over it, and should not simultaneously serve as independent directors of another insolvency professional agency.
The regulations also provide that a managing director’s second term will be subject to a satisfactory performance review by the governing board and prior approval of the IBBI. For obtaining prior approval for the appointment or renewal of a managing director, an IPA will have to send at least two names to the IBBI at least one month before the expiry of the incumbent’s tenure.
Insolvency Professional Agencies are entities recognised by the IBBI to enrol, monitor and regulate insolvency professionals under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code. The three recognised IPAs in India are the Indian Institute of Insolvency Professionals of ICAI, ICSI Institute of Insolvency Professionals and the Insolvency Professional Agency of the Institute of Cost Accountants of India.
Click here to read/ download the original gazette notification
SEBI permitted use of fresh borrowings for InvITs where Net Borrowings exceeds forty-nine percent of the value of InvIT assets
The Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) vide its Circular No: SEBI/HO/DDHS/DDHS-PoD-2/ I/11700/2026, dated May 15, 2026, has expanded the permissible use of borrowings by Infrastructure Investment Trusts (InvITs) where net borrowings exceed 49% of the value of InvIT assets. SEBI said Regulation 20(3)(b)(ii) of the SEBI (Infrastructure Investment Trusts) Regulations, 2014 was amended on April 17, 2026 to expand the permissible use of such borrowings. Under the circular, borrowings above the 49% limit may now be utilised for capital expenditure undertaken to enhance asset performance or augment capacity.
SEBI has also permitted the use of such borrowings for major maintenance expenses in respect of road projects. The circular clarifies that “major maintenance expense” means expenditure incurred on maintenance of a road project that is not routine maintenance and is in accordance with obligations and requirements specified in the concession agreement. Further, the circular permits refinancing of debt by the InvIT, special purpose vehicle (SPV) or holding company (Holdco), subject to conditions.
SEBI clarified that only debt originally raised for purposes permitted under the InvIT Regulations can be refinanced, and only the principal amount may be refinanced, excluding accumulated interest, charges or fees. The circular also defines “road project” as a project in the ‘Roads and bridges’ infrastructure sub-sector as specified in the Ministry of Finance notification dated September 19, 2025, including any amendments or additions. The circular comes into force with immediate effect.
Click here to read/ download the original circular
Removal of difficulties for on-boarding for FPIs – PAN allotment related issues
The Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) vide its Press Release PR No.30/2026, dated May 15, 2026, said the Central Board of Direct Taxes (CBDT) had issued clarifications to address difficulties faced by Foreign Portfolio Investors (FPIs) in obtaining Permanent Account Numbers (PAN) following changes introduced under the Income-tax Rules, 2026. SEBI noted that CBDT had notified the Income-tax Rules, 2026 and new forms for PAN applications on March 20, 2026, making certain previously optional fields mandatory.
The regulator said it engaged with CBDT after stakeholders flagged difficulties faced by FPIs in furnishing the required information for PAN allotment. CBDT clarified that for the RA/AR field, the name of the Authorised Signatory as captured in the Common Application Form would suffice and no supporting documents would be required. CBDT further clarified that where the address, mobile number/landline number or email ID of the RA/AR are unavailable, details of the FPI may be furnished instead.
SEBI also said that where PAN, Aadhaar or passport details of the Authorised Signatory are unavailable, the FPI registration number may be provided. CBDT also clarified that where TIN or its equivalent is not applicable in a jurisdiction, the TIN field may be filled with “0000000000”. Further, where the mobile number of the FPI is unavailable, a landline number may be provided instead.
Click here to read/ download the press release
Legal Updates (May 04 – May 09, 2026)
Legal Updates ( May 04 – May 09, 2026 )
CASE UPDATES
An unsolicited post-submission “addendum” that alters payout tranches or equity infusion is a modification of the resolution plan and the CoC’s reasoned decision not to consider such addendum is within its commercial wisdom and is not liable to judicial interference absent any violation of Section 30(2) or Section 61(3) of the IBC
The National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT) in the case of Vedanta Ltd vs Bhuvan Madan, Resolution Professional of Jaiprakash Associates [Company Appeal (AT) (Insolvency) Nos. 552 & 553 of 2026] dated May 04, 2026, has held that where the Request for Resolution Plan (RFRP) and Process Note treat the financial proposal at the close of the Challenge Process as final and prohibit subsequent modification, an unsolicited post-submission “addendum” that alters payout tranches or equity infusion is a modification of the resolution plan and not a mere clarification.
Accordingly, the NCLAT held that the CoC’s reasoned decision not to consider such addendum is within its commercial wisdom and is not liable to judicial interference absent any violation of Section 30(2) or Section 61(3) of the Insolvency & Bankruptcy Code, or any material irregularity in the process. Further, neither the highest Net Present Value (NPV) nor a higher gross plan value gives a resolution applicant any right to approval, since the CoC is entitled to evaluate plans as a whole in accordance with the Evaluation Matrix, feasibility, viability, and other process documents.
The Tribunal noted that Vedanta’s Addendum was not merely clarificatory, but it had the effect of modifying the financial proposal in two material respects: substantially increasing upfront payment and doubling equity infusion. The Tribunal noted that Vedanta itself had pleaded before the NCLT that, with the Addendum, its score under the Evaluation Matrix would have improved considerably and it would have emerged as the highest scorer.
On value maximisation, the Tribunal accepted that maximisation of asset value is an important objective of the IBC, but emphasized that it operates within a time-bound resolution framework and does not override the structure of the process or the CoC’s commercial wisdom. It also reiterated that the fundamental object of the IBC is resolution and revival, not mere recovery.
The Tribunal rejected Vedanta’s argument that highest NPV or higher gross plan value compelled approval of its plan. It noted that the Process Note expressly stated that the CoC was under no obligation to approve the plan with the highest NPV or the highest score under the Evaluation Matrix. The Tribunal also held that the CoC had in fact considered Vedanta’s plan in the 23rd CoC meeting. The submission that the CoC abdicated its jurisdiction in favour of BDO was rejected because BDO was an adviser engaged under the RFRP, the CoC discussed its report, raised queries, required a reconsideration of qualitative scoring, and thereafter proceeded to vote.
The Tribunal found no material irregularity by the RP, as the RP’s email stating that the Addendum “appears” to violate the Process Note was treated as only a tentative opinion while seeking CoC views, and not as conduct amounting to material irregularity under Section 61(3). Thus, the Tribunal reaffirmed the narrow scope of judicial review over CoC decisions.
Marks must be compared as a whole, with emphasis on their essential features and overall similarity, and Section 17 of the Trade Marks Act does not prevent protection of a prominent part of a composite mark where that part is distinctive
The Bombay High Court in the case of UltraTech Cement vs Shiv Cement [Commercial IP Suit No. 126 of 2016] dated April 28, 2026, has held that where the plaintiff proves valid and subsisting registration, long and extensive commercial use, distinctiveness, and reputation of its trade mark, and the defendant uses marks in respect of the same goods that contain the essential and leading feature of the plaintiff’s mark and are visually, structurally, and phonetically deceptively similar, such use constitutes infringement and passing off.
The Court reaffirmed that marks must be compared as a whole, with emphasis on their essential features and overall similarity, and that Section 17 of the Trade Marks Act does not prevent protection of a prominent part of a composite mark where that part is distinctive. In an undefended action, where the defendant does not contest the evidence, the Court is entitled to grant permanent injunction, delivery up, and substantial costs, and may award monetary relief on a reasonable basis having regard to the defendant’s dishonest conduct and the statutory mandate under Section 35 CPC in commercial suits.
The High Court observed that there was no dispute that the plaintiffs were the registered proprietors of the UltraTech trade-marks and that the plaintiffs had clearly proved open, continuous, and extensive use of those marks since 2003. It found that UltraTech had acquired distinctiveness, immense goodwill and reputation, and had become exclusively associated in the public mind and in the trade with the plaintiffs alone. The Court also noted that the mark UltraTech had been recognized as a well-known trade mark and had been included in the list of well-known trade-marks.
On comparison of the rival marks, the Court held that the impugned marks “ULTRA PLUS/ULTRAPLUS CEMENT”, “ULTRA HITOUCH/ULTRA HITOUCH CEMENT BEMISAL MAJBUTI”, and “ULTRA POWER” were visually, structurally, and phonetically virtually identical to, and in any event deceptively similar to, the plaintiffs’ registered and well-known UltraTech trade-marks. The Court emphasized that “ULTRA” was the leading and essential feature of the plaintiffs’ marks and that the defendant’s use of similar get-up, placement, colour scheme, and general idea on cement bags showed mala fide adoption. Since the rival goods were the same, namely cement, the Court held that confusion, deception, and misrepresentation were more than likely.
Thus, the Court treated the defendant’s conduct as dishonest and lacking in bona fides, noting not only the adoption and use of the impugned marks but also the defendant’s failure to appear, file a written statement, cross-examine the plaintiffs’ witness, or challenge the plaintiffs’ evidence. The Court therefore held that the plaintiffs’ case had gone uncontroverted and that the evidence remained unchallenged. Accordingly, High Court granted a permanent injunction restraining a rival cement maker from using marks deceptively similar to UltraTech, holding that the adoption was “entirely dishonest” and “actuated in bad faith.”
For purposes of Sections 11 and 57 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, a foreign proprietor may succeed in rectification by proving that, on the date of the impugned application, its mark had acquired actionable recognition and spill-over reputation in India within the relevant consumer segment, even without formal commercial launch or direct sales in India
The Delhi High Court in the case of Toyota Jidosha Kabushiki Kaisha vs Tech Square Engineering [LPA 176/2023] dated May 04, 2026, has held that, for purposes of Sections 11 and 57 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, a foreign proprietor may succeed in rectification by proving that, on the date of the impugned application, its mark had acquired actionable recognition and spill-over reputation in India within the relevant consumer segment, even without formal commercial launch or direct sales in India. In assessing such reputation, the Court may legitimately rely on third-party imports, niche market presence, public-domain references and other material demonstrating recognition of the mark in India, especially for luxury goods.
The Court observed that in a rectification action under Section 57(2), a mark can be removed if it is “wrongly remaining on the Register”, and that this enquiry may require examination of whether the mark ought not to have been registered under Sections 9 or 11.
The Court noted that Toyota was not relying on a prior Indian registration or prior Indian application. Therefore, to succeed under Sections 11(1) and 11(2), Toyota had to show that ALPHARD qualified as an “earlier trade mark” by being a well-known trade mark in India on the date of the respondent’s application. The Court emphasized that for determining whether a mark is well-known, the relevant test under Section 11(6) to (10) is recognition in the relevant section of the public, and not necessarily widespread recognition among the public at large.
The Court observed that, in the case of high-value luxury automobiles, reputation cannot be judged by standards applicable to mass-market goods. In such a niche market, imports, niche consumer visibility, and targeted recognition are of heightened evidentiary significance. The Court therefore accepted Toyota’s submission that unsolicited importation by private parties was not neutral evidence, but reflected conscious market demand and recognition of the ALPHARD mark in India. The Court treated this as strong evidence of goodwill and reputation in India.
The Court held that the Single Judge erred in discounting third-party imports and public-domain references merely because they did not emanate from Toyota. It observed that “use” is not confined to acts of the proprietor alone and may be inferred from third-party actions and public-domain material associating the mark with the goods or services.
On the respondent’s claim of use, the Court found the documentary record weak. It noted that invoices were in the name of Tekstar Global Private Limited and not the respondent, and no proof of any legal nexus such as common shareholding, management control or formal commercial arrangement was shown. The Court also found that several invoices reflected cash transactions without adequate purchaser details, limiting their evidentiary value. It therefore held that the respondent had failed to discharge the burden of proving prior user and bona fide proprietorship.
Lastly, the Court pointed out that adoption of the identical mark ALPHARD in the same field or allied/cognate goods, coupled with inconsistent explanations by the respondent regarding the origin of the mark, raised serious doubt about the respondent’s bona fides.
If borrower obtains a loan from a bank for purchase of machinery from a supplier chosen by the borrower, the borrower’s obligation to repay the loan to the bank arises from the borrower-lender contract and is not defeated by the supplier’s alleged failure to supply the machinery, unless the bank had undertaken responsibility for such supply
The Calcutta High Court in the case of Jayanti Karmakar vs General Manager [WPA 17153 of 2009] dated April 30, 2026, has held that where a borrower obtains a loan from a bank for purchase of machinery from a supplier chosen by the borrower, the borrower’s obligation to repay the loan to the bank arises from the borrower-lender contract and is not defeated by the supplier’s alleged failure to supply the machinery, unless the bank had undertaken responsibility for such supply or acted in breach of a statutory or contractual obligation.
The Court found that the loan of Rs. 4.39 lakhs had been sanctioned for setting up the rolling mill and that the machines were hypothecated to the Bank. It observed that the Bank was only a lender of the loan amount and had issued the cheque in favour of the supplier on the basis of the petitioner’s own request and quotation. The Court noted that the petitioner had written to several authorities regarding non-supply but had not informed the private respondent, while the delivery challan on record reflected her signature acknowledging receipt of the remaining machinery.
The Court held that the agreement was between borrower and lender, and that the Bank could not be made responsible for alleged non-supply of machinery by the supplier as per the quotation furnished by the petitioner. If the supplier had failed to deliver, the petitioner could take steps against the supplier in accordance with law, but could not avoid repayment of the loan and accrued interest on that basis.
The Court further observed that the real dispute was a commercial dispute between the petitioner and the private respondent supplier, and that the foundational issue whether the diesel oil engine had actually been supplied was a seriously disputed question of fact, especially because the respondents relied on a delivery challan allegedly signed by the petitioner while the petitioner alleged forgery.
The Court expressly found no arbitrariness or illegality in the Bank’s actions, since the Bank had merely sanctioned and disbursed the loan in terms of the quotation and request furnished by the petitioner. It therefore, rejected the petitioner’s contention that repayment liability should not arise because of the supplier’s alleged default, holding that liability to repay a loan arises from the contract between borrower and lender and is not contingent on performance by a third party unless specifically provided otherwise.
During the subsistence of moratorium under Section 14 of the IBC, a lessor cannot terminate a subsisting lease and recover possession of leased property occupied by the corporate debtor by invoking contractual breach clauses or by initiating or continuing eviction proceedings under the Gujarat Public Premises Act, 1972
The Gujarat High Court in the case of Gujarat Industrial Development Corporation vs Gujarat Hydrocarbons and Power SEZ Ltd [R/Letters Patent Appeal No. 55 of 2026] dated April 29, 2026, has held that during the subsistence of moratorium under Section 14 of the IBC, a lessor cannot terminate a subsisting lease and recover possession of leased property occupied by the corporate debtor by invoking contractual breach clauses or by initiating or continuing eviction proceedings under the Gujarat Public Premises Act, 1972.
The Court emphasised that Explanation to Section 14(1) is clarificatory and not an enabling exception permitting such termination or recovery on grounds other than insolvency. The expression “proceedings” in Section 14(1)(a) is broad, and the protection under Section 14(1)(d) extends to actual occupation or possession of property by the corporate debtor, so as to maintain status quo and preserve the corporate debtor as a going concern during CIRP.
The Court observed that Section 14(1)(d) of the IBC prohibits recovery of any property by an owner or lessor where such property is occupied by or in possession of the corporate debtor, and that this protection had to be read in light of the object of the moratorium, namely preservation of the assets and value of the corporate debtor as a going concern. It accepted that the leasehold interest of the corporate debtor in the demised premises was “property” within Section 3(27) of the IBC, and noted that the leased land was the only property held by the corporate debtor.
The Court further observed that the statutory freeze under Section 14 is intended to preserve the status quo from the insolvency commencement date until completion of CIRP or approval of the resolution plan. The Court held that Explanation to Section 14(1) is clarificatory and was inserted by way of abundant caution to make explicit the legislative intent that Government licences, permits, concessions and similar grants should not be suspended or terminated during moratorium merely on the ground of insolvency. The Court specifically held that the Explanation cannot be read as an exception enabling termination or recovery in situations otherwise barred by the main provision, because such an interpretation would render Section 14(1) nugatory.
The Court also observed that the moratorium protection was not confined to civil suits stricto sensu. It held that the expression “proceedings” in Section 14(1)(a) is of wide amplitude and is not limited to civil proceedings alone. Proceedings before statutory or quasi-judicial authorities are capable of falling within that expression where they operate against the corporate debtor and threaten depletion of its assets or interference with its protected status during CIRP. On that reasoning, eviction proceedings under the Public Premises Act, 1972 could not be treated as outside the moratorium merely because they arose before a statutory authority.
If the Competition Commission differs from the findings of the Director General on any issue adverse to the opposite party, it must give notice indicating such disagreement and afford an effective opportunity of hearing/rebuttal before recording an adverse finding or issuing directions based on that departure
The New Delhi Principal Bench of the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT) in the case of Grasim Industries vs CCI [Competition Appeal (AT) No. 13 of 2020] dated May 05, 2026, has held that where the Competition Commission differs from the findings of the Director General on any issue adverse to the opposite party, it must give notice indicating such disagreement and afford an effective opportunity of hearing/rebuttal before recording an adverse finding or issuing directions based on that departure. Failure to do so violates the principles of natural justice, particularly the rule of audi alteram partem.
The Tribunal stated that if the Commission proposes to differ from the DG’s findings, it must spell out the reasons for disagreement and give the affected party an opportunity to respond. The Tribunal held that CCI’s direction requiring Grasim to make its discount policy transparent and publicly accessible was contrary to the DG’s finding that non-disclosure of the pricing/discounting policy was not, in itself, a contravention.
The Tribunal also held that CCI’s direction that buyers of Viscose Staple Fibre (VSF) should be free to use it for spinning or trading or any other lawful purpose was in variance with the DG’s finding that Grasim had no obligation to keep traders in business and that refusal to sell to traders did not appear to fall within Section 4. Thus, the NCLAT rejected the respondents’ submission that the word “buyer” should be read only as “spinners”; it held that in common parlance, a buyer allowed to trade can be understood as a trader.
For the purpose of maintainability of petitions under Sections 397 and 398 of the Companies Act, 1956, against oppression and mismanagement, the expression “member” is not to be construed in an unduly restrictive or purely technical sense confined only to formal entry in the register of members under Section 41(2)
The Supreme Court in the case of Dr. Bais Surgical and Medical Institute vs Dhanajay Pande [Civil Appeal No. 8973 of 2010] dated May 04, 2026, has held that for the purpose of maintainability of petitions under Sections 397 and 398 of the Companies Act, 1956, against oppression and mismanagement, the expression “member” is not to be construed in an unduly restrictive or purely technical sense confined only to formal entry in the register of members under Section 41(2).
The Court held that in the context of the equitable jurisdiction under Sections 397 and 398, read with Section 399, a person may be treated as a member where the cumulative factual circumstances demonstrate a clear, recognized proprietary interest in the company and the person has, in substance, been treated by the company as having shareholder status, notwithstanding absence of formal entry in the register at the relevant time.
The Court observed that the statutory scheme draws a distinction between the inclusive definition of “member” under Section 2(27) and the provisions in Section 41 dealing with acquisition of membership. Section 41 prescribes recognized modes by which membership may arise, but the requirement of written agreement and entry in the register was not treated as the sole or exclusive mode in the context of proceedings under Sections 397 and 398.
The Court emphasized that jurisdiction under Sections 397 and 398 is equitable in character, and therefore maintainability must be examined with reference to Section 399 and the remedial purpose of the provisions, rather than by a purely mechanical application of Section 41(2). It rejected an unduly restrictive or technical construction of the term “member” that would defeat substantive rights.
The Court approved the approach that, for Sections 397 and 398, the word “member” cannot be construed in isolation or rigidly confined to the technical requirements of Section 41(2), and that the broader definitional framework in Section 2(27) assumes significance.
Click here to read/ download the original judgment
A computer-related invention which merely uses an algorithm to colour-code message recipients based on message address characteristics, in order to assist a sender in avoiding unintended recipients, does not become patentable unless it demonstrates a technical contribution that improves the system’s functionality
The Delhi High Court in the case of Blackberry Limited vs Controller of Patents and Designs [C.A.(COMM.IPD-PAT) 14/2022] dated April 30, 2026, has held that a computer-related invention which merely uses an algorithm to colour-code message recipients based on message address characteristics, in order to assist a sender in avoiding unintended recipients, does not become patentable unless it demonstrates a technical effect or technical contribution that improves the system’s functionality or provides a technical solution to a technical problem.
Where the alleged contribution is only a software-based, user-convenience or data-management measure, and the claimed advance is rendered obvious by the prior art, the application is liable to be refused under Sections 2(1)(j) and 3(k) of the Patents Act.
The Court observed that the invention pertains to handheld wireless communication devices and seeks to enable users to differentiate intended recipients in outgoing draft messages by colour-coding recipient names based on message address characteristics such as host name, domain name or organization. The stated objective was to help users on small-screen handheld devices quickly identify intended recipients and reduce the risk of sending messages to unintended persons. The specification also described the device architecture, including a display, keyboard, micro-processor and navigation tool such as a trackball.
On inventive step, the Court recorded that the Controller had relied principally on prior arts D1 and D2, and also discussed D3 in the appellate analysis. D1 disclosed application of identifying styles to messages based on message attributes for categorisation; D2 disclosed a pre-send alert showing addressees so the sender could verify or modify recipients; and D3 disclosed visually distinguishable message formats for different users. The Court accepted that in the subject application, colour coding was done through an algorithm using message address characteristics, whereas in D1 the algorithm used message attributes for categorisation.
On Section 3(k) of the Patent Act, the Court endorsed the Controller’s view that the claimed feature of differentiating between recipients and notifying the sender before sending was not of a technical nature. The Court noted that the problem addressed by the invention was not related to the performance of existing hardware, and that the proposed solution only involved colour coding on the basis of message characteristics, with the hardware executing the algorithm in the same way as any other algorithm. It further held that the subject matter lay in software-implemented non-technical processes such as associating colour, accepting and examining message addresses, and displaying message information, and therefore amounted to a computer program per se or algorithm within Section 3(k).
The Court significantly observed that a “technical problem” must be technical in nature and not person-dependent in the manner suggested by the subject application. It accepted the reasoning that an error in sending a message to the wrong recipient depends on the person sending the message and is therefore not, by itself, a technical problem. It also observed that even after implementation of the invention, user error could still persist, for example where multiple recipients have the same name and the user must remember different assigned colours.
Click here to read/ download the original judgment
While subsidiary companies are separate legal entities, the corporate veil may be lifted where associated companies are inextricably connected so as to form one concern
The Supreme Court in the case of Alpha Corp Development Pvt Ltd vs Greater Noida Industrial Development Authority [Civil Appeal No. 1526 of 2023] dated May 05, 2026, has held that while subsidiary companies are separate legal entities, the corporate veil may be lifted where associated companies are inextricably connected so as to form one concern. Since in the present case, Earth Infrastructures Limited (EIL) EIL was the main driving force behind the development of all three Greater Noida Industrial Development Authority (GNIDA)-linked projects, GNIDA was aware of that position, and the subsidiary/SPC entities were only a front, the Court held this to be an eminently fit case for lifting the corporate veil.
The Court explained that although GNIDA remained entitled to recover its principal dues, its failure to monitor the projects, delay in taking steps against defaults, and lack of diligence during the CIRP disentitled it from claiming penal interest, penal charges and time-extension penalties at this stage.
The Court found that GNIDA was informed of the CIRP and of the inclusion of development rights over the project lands in that process, but failed to act with diligence or within the timelines contemplated by the Code. It held that GNIDA had contributed greatly to the situation by persistent inaction and ineptitude, and had failed to monitor development, failed to take timely coercive steps despite defaults and complaints from buyers, and later sought to portray itself as an uninformed victim.
The Court also observed that GNIDA could not credibly claim ignorance of EIL’s role in the projects. GNIDA knew that EIL was undertaking development on all three leased lands, including through approvals, communications and the structure of the Earth Towne arrangement itself. The Court accepted the position that, ordinarily, holding and subsidiary companies are distinct legal entities, but held that this was a fit case for lifting the corporate veil because the associated entities were inextricably connected and EIL was the real driving force in development and in payment of GNIDA dues, while the subsidiary companies were only a front.
The Apex Court therefore held that the NCLAT erred in setting aside the approved plans, and hence, restored the resolution plans of Alpha and Roma, directed GNIDA to recalculate dues excluding penal components, and allowed payment of those recalculated dues over twenty-four months. The Court also emphasised that since Earth Copia was on freehold land in Gurugram and had nothing to do with GNIDA, the NCLAT was wrong in allowing the approval of Alpha’s plan for that project to be affected by GNIDA’s challenge.
Click here to read/ download the original judgment
Agreements for sale executed by partners in their individual capacity, without reference to the firm, are not binding on the firm; and a suit seeking declaration that such agreements are null and void is maintainable without seeking cancellation since an agreement for sale does not create an interest in property
The Bombay High Court in the case of Abdul Karim Noor Mohammed vs Hotel Sultan Plaza [Writ Petition No. 1411 of 2025 (F)] dated April 29, 2026, has held that where immovable property has been brought into the common stock of a partnership firm by a partner, such property becomes property of the firm, and an individual partner cannot unilaterally bind the firm or alienate that property unless the act is done in the firm’s name or in a manner expressing or implying an intention to bind the firm in terms of Section 22 of the Partnership Act.
The Court clarified that agreements for sale executed by partners in their individual capacity, without reference to the firm, are therefore not binding on the firm; and a suit seeking declaration that such agreements are null and void is maintainable without seeking cancellation, since an agreement for sale does not create an interest in property.
The High Court accepted the concurrent findings that the suit property had been brought into the common stock of the partnership firm through the partnership documents and the mutation in survey records. It expressly held that there was no requirement of a registered document for the firm to acquire ownership of property contributed by a partner.
The Court observed that the impugned agreements were executed by Respondents Nos. 12 and 13 in their individual capacity, not in the name of the partnership firm, and there was no reference in those instruments showing an intention to bind the firm as required by Section 22 of the Partnership Act. The Court further noted that the transactions purported also to transfer the goodwill of the business, which it treated as an asset exclusively belonging to the firm and not capable of unilateral transfer by an individual partner.
REGULATORY UPDATES
RBI has exempted the NBFCs with assets below Rs 1000 Crore without public funds or customer interface from registration and reserve fund provisions
The Reserve Bank of India (RBI) vide its Notification No. RBI/2026-27/43 dated April 29, 2026, has notified the Reserve Bank of India (Non-Banking Financial Companies – Registration, Exemptions and Framework for Scale Based Regulation) Amendment Directions, 2026 on April 29. The changes revise the framework issued on November 28, 2025, following a review of rules governing such NBFCs.
As per the Notification, NBFCs with assets of less than Rs. 1,000 crores, based on their latest audited balance sheet, and operating without public funds or any customer interface will be exempt from the registration and reserve fund provisions under the Reserve Bank of India Act, 1934 from July 1, 2026.
The amended directions set out a three-category structure. A Type I NBFC is one that does not use public funds, has no customer interface, and holds a certificate of registration. Any NBFC that has been granted registration but does not fall within this category will be treated as a Type II NBFC. An Unregistered Type I NBFC refers to an entity meeting the same conditions but exempted from the provisions of Sections 45IA and 45IC of the Reserve Bank of India Act, 1934.
The exemption applies to NBFCs operating without public funds and customer interface as part of a conscious and long-term business model whose asset size remains below Rs 1,000 crore. Existing NBFCs that meet the criteria, including those already holding a certificate of registration as Type I NBFCs, may apply for deregistration by December 31, 2026. Applications for deregistration are required to be submitted through the PRAVAAH portal along with audited financial statements for the last three financial years, a statutory auditor’s certificate confirming the absence of public funds and customer interface, and a board resolution stating that the entity does not have and does not intend to access public funds or have a customer interface in the future.
The directions state that such requests will be considered only if the Reserve Bank is satisfied that the NBFC is operating with a conscious and long-term business model without availing public funds and without having a customer interface. NBFCs that meet the same conditions but have an asset size of Rs 1,000 crore or more are required to apply for registration as Type I NBFCs, subject to fulfilment of prescribed conditions.
Where multiple Unregistered Type I NBFCs exist within a group, the asset size of all such entities will be aggregated. If the aggregate asset size reaches Rs 1,000 crore or more, all such entities will be required to be registered as Type I NBFCs. An Unregistered Type I NBFC intending to undertake overseas investment in the financial services sector is required to obtain registration and will be regulated in the same manner as a Type I NBFC. Such entities are not permitted to undertake overseas investment in the non-financial sector.
The amended framework also places reporting obligations on auditors. Statutory auditors are required to submit an exception report to the Reserve Bank in case of any violation of the conditions relating to public funds or customer interface. The amendment also replaces references to “NBFC not availing public funds and not having any customer interface” in specified provisions across multiple RBI directions with the expression “NBFC holding Certificate of Registration as Type I NBFC”.
Click here to read/ download the original notification
RBI reiterates caution against unauthorised and misleading campaigns promising Loan Waivers
The Reserve Bank of India (RBI) vide its Press Release dated May 04, 2026, had cautioned the public against misleading campaigns promising loan waivers, warning that such activities continue despite its earlier press release dated December 11, 2023. The Regulator said that such campaigns not only mislead the general public but also interfere with the orderly functioning of the credit system of the country. This press release was issued because certain individuals and entities are falsely claiming they can secure waivers of outstanding dues to banks and Non-Banking Financial Companies (NBFCs).
These persons are also issuing so-called “debt waiver certificates” or similar documents and collecting fees under various pretexts, including service or legal charges. The RBI clarified that such claims are “false and misleading” and warned that those involved could face legal action under applicable laws. It is also emphasised that such activities undermine the stability of financial institutions, affect the interest of depositors, and association or engagement with such individuals/entities can result in direct financial loss.
Advising caution, the central bank urged people to avoid dealing with such entities, approach their lending institutions directly for any loan-related concerns, and report such misleading campaigns to law enforcement agencies.
Click here to read/ download the original press release
SEBI has specified framework for recognition and operationalisation of Past Risk and Return Verification Agency (PaRRVA)
The Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) vide its Circular No. HO/38/14/(4)2026-MIRSD-POD/I/10557/2026, dated April 29, 2026, has operationalised the framework for the Past Risk and Return Verification Agency (PaRRVA). In its circular, SEBI has recognised Care Ratings Limited as the PaRRVA, while the National Stock Exchange has been designated as the PaRRVA Data Centre under the newly operationalised framework. Care Ratings will begin providing its services after completion of the pilot-phase with operations commencing from 4 May 2026.
Under the framework, a Credit Rating Agency may be recognised as a PaRRVA in terms of the SEBI (Credit Rating Agencies) Regulations, 1999 and the SEBI (Intermediaries) Regulations, 2008. SEBI has mandated that Investment Advisers (IAs) and Research Analysts (RAs) intending to communicate past performance data to clients must register with PaRRVA within three months from the date of operationalisation. Failing such registration, they will not be permitted to use or disclose such data after the expiry of the said period.
SEBI has further stipulated that after two years of PaRRVA becoming operational, IAs and RAs shall only communicate performance data that has been verified by PaRRVA. It has also provided that IAs and RAs seeking to communicate certified past performance data must enrol with PaRRVA by 3 August 2026, and they may communicate such data only up to 3 May 2028.
SEBI has additionally revised the composition of the oversight committee for PaRRVA and the PaRRVA Data Centre, providing for representation from relevant stakeholders along with independent members, with a majority comprising independent members.
Click here to read/ download the original circular
SEBI introduces a fast-track mechanism allowing Alternative Investment Funds, except Large Value Funds, to launch schemes and circulate placement memorandums 30 days after filing
The Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) vide Circular No. HO/19/19/11(2)2026-AFD-RAC2 I/10624/2026, dated April 30, 2026, has introduced a fast-track mechanism allowing Alternative Investment Funds (AIFs), except Large Value Funds, to launch schemes and circulate placement memorandums (PPMs) 30 days after filing with the regulator. The move is aimed at easing timelines for fund launches by shifting to a disclosure-based regime, while retaining regulatory oversight through post-filing review.
Under the circular, AIFs (other than Large Value Funds) can proceed with launching new schemes and circulating PPMs to investors after 30 days from the date of filing the application with SEBI. In the case of first schemes, AIFs may launch from the date of grant of registration or after 30 days from filing of the application with SEBI, whichever is later. SEBI has mandated that any comments issued during this 30-day period must be complied with by the Merchant Banker and the AIF prior to the launch of the scheme or circulation of the PPM.
The regulator has also stipulated that the first close of a scheme must be declared within 12 months from the date on which the AIF becomes eligible to launch the scheme. Responsibility for the accuracy and completeness of disclosures in the PPM, as well as the declarations submitted, will rest with the Merchant Banker and the AIF Manager.
Clarifying the regulatory position, SEBI said that submission of a PPM does not amount to approval by the regulator and that it does not assume responsibility for the accuracy or correctness of disclosures, facts, or claims made in the document. It added that any irregularity or lapse in the PPM would make the concerned entities liable for action. The circular will come into force with immediate effect and will also apply to all pending PPMs of non-Large Value Fund schemes.
Legal Updates (April 27 – May 02, 2026)
Legal Updates ( April 27 – May 02, 2026 )
CASE UPDATES
Corporate guarantees executed by a corporate debtor in respect of loans advanced to group entities constitute “financial debt” within the meaning of Section 5(8) of IBC, and the beneficiaries thereof are entitled to be treated as financial creditors
The Supreme Court in the case of State Bank of India vs Doha Bank [Civil Appeal No. 8527 of 2022] dated April 28, 2026, has held that corporate guarantees executed by a corporate debtor in respect of loans advanced to group entities constitute “financial debt” within the meaning of Section 5(8) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, and the beneficiaries thereof are entitled to be treated as financial creditors. Such claims cannot be rejected merely on the grounds of alleged non-disclosure in financial statements, non-filing of the guarantee documents along with Form C, or objections regarding improper stamping, since non-stamping or insufficient stamping is only a curable defect and does not invalidate the instrument.
The Court further held that where the corporate debtor itself admits execution of the guarantee, and the Resolution Professional has verified the instrument, the NCLT/ NCLAT cannot disregard the claim on speculative grounds relating to timing, disclosure, or procedural production of documents. If the findings of the NCLT and NCLAT ignore such material and reject the claim of a financial creditor, those findings are perverse and liable to be interfered with under Section 62 of the Code.
The Court observed that a liability arising from a corporate guarantee squarely falls within the ambit of “financial debt” under Section 5(8) of the IBC, and that the amount of any liability in respect of guarantees for money borrowed against payment of interest is a financial debt. It reiterated that a guarantor incurs a coextensive liability with that of the principal borrower and such liability is enforceable in law.
The Court found that the execution of the corporate guarantees was beyond doubt because the corporate debtor itself, through its counsel’s communication dated March 19, 2019, admitted the execution of the guarantees and stated that information regarding the guarantees had always been publicly available and adequately disclosed in financial statements and annual reports of the borrower group.
On the question of timing, the Court held that the guarantees were executed before declaration of the account of the corporate debtor as NPA. Referring to Clause 17.2.6 of the RBI Master Circular dated July 01, 2015, the Court noted that where a restructured asset is subjected to restructuring again, its asset classification is reckoned from the date when it first became NPA. Therefore, the retrospective NPA classification from August 26, 2016 could not be used to question the timing and manner of the guarantees executed on March 03, 2017.
The Court further observed that mere non-disclosure of the corporate guarantees in the financial statements for financial years 2016–17 and 2017–18 could not deprive the appellants of their claim based on those guarantees; and at best, such non-disclosure could be treated as a default committed by the corporate debtor. It also held that the guarantees had been verified by the Resolution Professional after inspecting them in the office of the Security Trustee in New Delhi, and therefore the NCLAT’s finding that there was no material regarding verification was perverse.
Click here to read/ download the original judgment
Admission of a claim by the IRP/RP is only an administrative or clerical act and is akin to a mere recital or reference to debt, which does not amount to acknowledgment under Section 18 of the Limitation Act, 1963
The Supreme Court in the case of Shankar Khandelwal vs Omkara Asset Reconstruction [Civil Appeal No (S). 13158-13159 of 2025] dated April 29, 2026, has held that an application under Section 7 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 is governed by Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963, and limitation commences from the date of default, i.e., the date of NPA classification. Exclusion of time under Section 60(6) of the Code and under the Covid-19 extension orders must be strictly computed, and if the petition is filed after the expiry of the remaining limitation period, it is barred.
The Court further held that admission of a claim by an IRP/RP during CIRP does not amount to an acknowledgment of liability under Section 18 of the Limitation Act, 1963, because such admission is only an administrative act of collation of claims and does not reflect a conscious and unequivocal admission of subsisting liability by the corporate debtor or its duly authorized representative. Such admission cannot extend limitation for filing a Section 7 petition.
The Court observed that limitation for filing an application under Section 7 of the Code is governed by Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963, and begins to run from the date of default, namely the date on which the account is classified as NPA, and not from any subsequent recovery proceeding. Since the accounts were declared NPA on December 06, 2016, the right to file the Section 7 petition accrued on that date itself.
On the issue of acknowledgment, the Court held that for Section 18 of the Limitation Act, 1963 to apply, the acknowledgment must be made by the party against whom the right is claimed, or by a person duly authorized on its behalf, before expiry of limitation, and it must indicate a conscious and unequivocal intention to admit a subsisting jural relationship and existing liability. It must evince a conscious and unequivocal intention to admit a subsisting jural relationship and an existing liability. A mere reference to a past transaction or a bald recital of a debt, without an intention to admit liability, would not suffice.
The Court observed that the RP/IRP has no adjudicatory power and merely performs an administrative function of collation and admission of claims under Section 18 of the Code. Therefore, admission of a claim by the IRP/RP is only an administrative or clerical act. Therefore, admission of claim by RP only means induction/entry of a claim and is akin to a mere recital or reference to debt, which does not amount to acknowledgment under Section 18 of the Limitation Act, 1963.
Click here to read/ download the original judgment
Auditor’s remark stating that the company has an internal audit system which “needs to be strengthened” does not amount to a “qualification” within the meaning of Section 217(3) of the Companies Act, 1956, and failure to furnish explanation on such remark does not attract penal liability under Section 217(5) of the Companies Act
The Bombay High Court in the case of Radha Satish Timblo vs Union of India [Criminal Writ Petition No. 6 of 2024] dated April 27, 2026, has held that an auditor’s remark stating that the company has an internal audit system which “needs to be strengthened” is merely generic and advisory in nature and does not amount to a “reservation”, “qualification” or “adverse remark” within the meaning of Section 217(3) of the Companies Act, 1956. Hence, the failure to furnish explanation on such remark does not attract penal liability under Section 217(5) of the Companies Act.
The Court further held that Section 217(3) contemplates explanations in the Board’s report for the benefit of shareholders and not a separate satisfaction of the Registrar of Companies, and prosecution cannot be sustained merely because the Registrar found the reply to the show cause notice unsatisfactory.
The Court observed on a plain reading of Section 217 of the Companies Act, that the obligation under Section 217(3) is to give the fullest information and explanations in the Board’s report, or addendum thereto, on every reservation, qualification or adverse remark contained in the auditor’s report, and that this requirement is directed toward the shareholders of the company and is to be complied with through the Board’s report placed before the annual general meeting. The provision does not envisage furnishing such explanations to the Registrar of Companies.
The Court further observed that the entire complaint was founded only on paragraph 7 of the annexure to the auditor’s report, namely that “The Company has an internal audit system which needs to be strengthened.” The Court found that the first part of the remark was a positive statement, and the second part was at best a general observation or recommendation for improvement of internal processes. Such a generic and advisory remark could not, by any stretch of interpretation, be construed as a “reservation”, “qualification” or “adverse remark” for the purposes of Section 217(3).
On limitation issue, the Court rejected the respondents’ case that prior sanction was a mandatory pre-condition for launching prosecution under Section 217 and that limitation should run from the date of receipt of such sanction. The Court held that there is no statutory requirement for obtaining sanction to launch prosecution under Section 217 of the Companies Act, 1956, and the circulars/notifications relied upon by the respondents could not be treated as sanction in law.
Click here to read/ download the original judgment
Procedural decisions of the arbitral tribunal fall within its power under Section 19 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act to regulate its own procedure, and such decisions do not amount to violation of party autonomy, natural justice, or public policy unless grave prejudice or patent illegality is shown
The Delhi High Court in the case of OSA Vendita vs Bausch and Lomb India [O.M.P. (COMM) 336/2022] dated April 23, 2026, has held that it will not interfere with a reasoned arbitral award merely because a party was denied permission to lead belated evidence, where the tribunal had granted sufficient opportunities earlier and the rejection was based on delay and lack of due justification. Procedural decisions of the arbitral tribunal fall within its power under Section 19 to regulate its own procedure, and such decisions do not amount to violation of party autonomy, natural justice, or public policy unless grave prejudice or patent illegality is shown.
The Court explained that findings of fact by the arbitral tribunal on absence of contractual assurance, absence of breach, and failure to prove loss through reliable evidence are not amenable to re-appreciation in Section 34 proceedings, and where the tribunal’s view is plausible and consistent with the contract, including clauses excluding any obligation to take back goods, the award must be sustained.
The Court observed that the arbitral tribunal had granted sufficient opportunities to the petitioner to file affidavits and supporting documents, and that the application to introduce CA certificates was filed only after closure of the petitioner’s evidence and after the respondent had filed its evidence. The arbitrator’s rejection of that application on the ground of inordinate delay and absence of cogent justification was held to be a plausible and reasonable view based on the procedural history of the case.
The Court further observed that an arbitral tribunal is empowered to regulate its own procedure and that procedural orders do not warrant interference under Section 34 unless they contravene public policy or result in grave injustice. It rejected the petitioner’s argument that no prejudice would have been caused to the respondent, holding that appreciation of evidence, including the absence of corroborative books of account and relevant witnesses, lies within the exclusive domain of the tribunal and cannot be recast as a violation of natural justice.
On the issue of party autonomy and procedure, the Court held that Section 19 of the Act clearly permits the arbitral tribunal, in the absence of an agreed procedure, to determine its own procedure and that ad hoc arbitration is not treated differently from institutional arbitration under the Act. The Court also noted that the procedural framework and timelines had been settled at the inception of the proceedings with the consent of both parties, and the petitioner had not objected to the procedure during the arbitral proceedings.
Click here to read/ download the original judgment
A dispute resolution clause stating that disputes “can be settled by arbitration” does not constitute a binding arbitration agreement under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, because it indicates only the possibility of arbitration and not a mandatory or enforceable obligation to refer disputes to arbitration
The Supreme Court in the case of Nagreeeka Indcon Products vs Cargocare Logistics (India) [2026 INSC 384] dated April 17, 2026, has held that a dispute resolution clause stating that disputes “can be settled by arbitration” does not constitute a binding arbitration agreement under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, because it indicates only the possibility of arbitration and not a mandatory or enforceable obligation to refer disputes to arbitration. Where the clause contemplates or necessitates further consent of the parties before reference, it is merely an agreement to enter into an arbitration agreement in future, and not an arbitration agreement in law.
The Court observed that arbitration is founded on party autonomy and mutual intention, and that parties must agree to arbitration as the chosen dispute resolution mechanism for an arbitral tribunal to derive jurisdiction. At the Section 11 stage, the court’s scrutiny is confined to a prima facie examination of the existence of an arbitration agreement, and not to a detailed adjudication on merits.
The Court examined the word “can” in its ordinary meaning and held that it denotes capacity, capability, or possibility, and not a mandate. It contrasted “can” with “shall”, observing that while “shall” ordinarily signals obligation, “can” indicates only a choice available to the parties. Applying settled principles of contractual interpretation, the Bench held that the words chosen by the parties are the most reliable manifestation of their intent and courts cannot impute an obligation not intended by the contracting parties.
The Court further observed that a valid arbitration agreement must disclose a determination and obligation to go to arbitration, and not merely a possibility of doing so. The clauses contemplating future consent or further agreement for arbitration do not amount to binding arbitration agreements. On the language of Clause 25, the Court found that it merely kept open the future possibility of arbitration and therefore required fresh consensus between the parties after disputes arose.
Click here to read/ download the original judgment
If a Non-Banking Financial Company repossesses a financed vehicle through coercive means, in violation of RBI recovery guidelines, such action is not merely a contractual dispute but assumes a public law character and such coercive repossession is illegal and violative of Articles 14, 19(1)(g), and 21 of the Constitution
The Uttarakhand High Court in the case of Mohan Lal vs RBI [Writ Petition Misc. Single No.2032 of 2023] dated April 02, 2026, has asserted that where a Non-Banking Financial Company (NBFC) repossesses or attempts to repossess a financed vehicle through coercive means, without adherence to due process of law and in violation of RBI recovery guidelines, the action is not merely a contractual dispute but assumes a public law character and is amenable to writ jurisdiction under Article 226. Such coercive repossession is arbitrary, illegal, and violative of Articles 14, 19(1)(g), and 21 of the Constitution, and the creditor, even if entitled to recover dues under the contract, must do so only through lawful procedures before competent forums and not by self-help methods.
The Court observed that the central issue was not merely the contractual relationship or the quantum of dues, but the legality, fairness, and procedural propriety of the manner in which the respondent financial institution proceeded to repossess or attempt to repossess the vehicles. It held that although contractual disputes ordinarily do not invite interference under Article 226, that rule is not absolute, and an exception applies where the impugned action is arbitrary, unfair, violative of statutory or regulatory norms, or infringes fundamental rights.
The Court further observed that the petitioners had made specific allegations of forcible repossession through recovery agents in violation of RBI guidelines, and that if such allegations were established, the matter could not be treated as a mere breach of contract but as arbitrary and high-handed action offending Article 14. Since the vehicles were the petitioners’ primary means of livelihood, the Court held that the action also directly affected their rights under Article 21 and Article 19(1)(g).
Reference was made to ICICI Bank Ltd. v. Prakash Kaur [(2007) 2 SCC 711] and Citicorp Maruti Finance Ltd. v. S. Vijayalaxmi [(2012) 1 SCC 1], to reiterate that employing recovery agents or musclemen for forcible repossession is wholly impermissible, and that even in cases of admitted default, repossession must be carried out strictly in accordance with law through legally sanctioned procedures.
The Court found that the respondents had not effectively rebutted the serious allegations of forcible repossession and had produced no material showing prior notice, opportunity of hearing, or lawful recovery proceedings before a competent forum. The Court also emphasized that a repossession clause in a loan agreement does not authorize the creditor to take law into its own hands, and that contractual terms cannot override constitutional guarantees or statutory protections.
The Court also observed that disputes regarding the outstanding dues were contested and required adjudication by a competent forum on evidence, and could not be resolved through unilateral and coercive action by the creditor. It noted the socio-economic reality that the petitioners were transporters and the vehicles were their primary source of sustenance, and held that arbitrary deprivation of such assets without due process results in serious civil consequences and infringes the right to livelihood under Article 21.
Allotment of flats in lieu of legal fees, without any disbursement by the claimant to the corporate debtor, does not amount to a financial debt under Section 5(8) of the IBC
The New Delhi Principal Bench of the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT) in the case of L & L Partners Litigation vs Jalesh Kumar Grover [Company Appeal (AT) (Insolvency) No. 1944 of 2025] dated April 23, 2026, has held that allotment of flats in lieu of legal fees, without any disbursement by the claimant to the corporate debtor, does not amount to a financial debt under Section 5(8) of the IBC. The essential requirement of disbursal against consideration for time value of money remains mandatory, and in its absence the claimant cannot be treated as a financial creditor
The tribunal further held that a belated claim filed by a commercial entity after approval of the resolution plan by the CoC need not be condoned, particularly where admitting such claim would reopen the CIRP contrary to the time-bound scheme of the IBC.
The Tribunal pointed out that the present appellant was not a homebuyer whose payments were reflected in the record of the corporate debtor. It observed that the appellant’s claim was not reflected in the corporate debtor’s records, and therefore the appellant could not rely upon the principle that the RP must collate claims of homebuyers even if such claims are not formally filed.
Agreement of hypothecation executed after sanction of a credit facility, which merely evidences the creation of security and under which possession of the movable asset remains with the borrower, is neither chargeable as a “pledge” under Article 6 nor as a “mortgage deed” under Article 37 of the Kerala Stamp Act, 1959
The Kerala High Court in the case of Kerala Gramin Bank vs Saifudheen M [OP(C) No. 2628 of 2023] dated April 08, 2026, has held that an agreement of hypothecation executed after sanction of a credit facility, which merely evidences the creation of security and under which possession of the movable asset remains with the borrower, is neither chargeable as a “pledge” under Article 6 nor as a “mortgage deed” under Article 37 of the Kerala Stamp Act, 1959. Such an instrument is properly chargeable under Article 5(g) as an “Agreement not otherwise provided for”.
The Court observed that deed of hypothecation was not the instrument on the basis of which the loan was granted; rather, it merely evidenced that a credit facility had already been sanctioned and that security was created in respect of the vehicle for repayment of the loan. The Court noted that the borrower had agreed under the deed of hypothecation that the vehicle stood hypothecated as security, but the deed itself was only evidentiary of sanction and security creation.
The Court further observed that the trial court failed to appreciate the basic difference between “pledge” and “hypothecation.” Though hypothecation is a species of pledge, the essential distinction is that in hypothecation possession remains with the loanee, whereas in the case of pledge possession is retained by the pledgee. Since the agreement in question clearly showed that possession of the vehicle remained with the borrower, the Court held that it could not qualify as an instrument of pledge for the purposes of Article 6 of the Kerala Stamp Act, 1959.
The Court also held that stamp duty under Article 37, being the charging provision for a mortgage deed, is attracted only where the loan is advanced and the terms and conditions of such advancement are found in the mortgage deed itself, meaning that the sanction of the loan should be by the mortgage deed. Where a credit facility is already sanctioned and an agreement of hypothecation is later executed merely to evidence creation of security, such instrument does not fall within Article 37.
Accordingly, the Court held that since the hypothecation deed bore an adhesive stamp of Rs. 100/-, it was properly stamped under Article 5(g) as it stood at the relevant time. Accordingly, the order impounding the document was set aside, and the Munsiff’s Court was directed to receive the agreement of hypothecation in evidence and proceed with trial in accordance with law.
Click here to read/ download the original judgment
The venue of hearings or the place where the award is rendered does not alter the seat and does not confer jurisdiction on courts of that place, unless the seat is expressly changed by agreement of the parties
The Supreme Court in the case of J&K Economic Reconstruction Agency vs Rash Builders India [2026 INSC 368] dated April 15, 2026, has held that once the seat of arbitration is expressly designated by agreement of the parties, that seat becomes the juridical home of arbitration and operates akin to an exclusive jurisdiction clause. Consequently, only the courts of the seat have supervisory jurisdiction over arbitral proceedings and challenges to the award. The venue of hearings or the place where the award is rendered does not alter the seat and does not confer jurisdiction on courts of that place, unless the seat is expressly changed by agreement of the parties.
The Court observed that the distinction between the seat and venue of arbitration is firmly embedded in arbitral jurisprudence, and that the core issue was whether conduct of proceedings and rendering of the award at New Delhi could confer jurisdiction on Delhi courts despite the express designation of Srinagar as the seat.
The Court reiterated that the seat of arbitration is the juridical home or legal place of arbitration; it determines the curial law governing the arbitral process and identifies the court exercising supervisory jurisdiction. Once the seat is designated by agreement of the parties, courts of that place alone have exclusive jurisdiction over all proceedings arising out of the arbitration, including challenge to the award.
The Court also observed that the venue is only a geographical location chosen for convenience for hearings, examination of witnesses, or meetings of the tribunal. It does not confer jurisdiction and does not by itself alter or determine the seat. Mere conduct of arbitral proceedings or rendering of the award at a place different from the designated seat does not confer jurisdiction on courts of that place.
Accordingly, the Court noted that the order dated March 26, 2016 expressly recorded, on agreement of the parties, that the seat of arbitration shall be Srinagar and the venue shall be New Delhi. The surrounding circumstances also reinforced Srinagar as the seat, since the contracts were executed in Jammu & Kashmir, the works were to be carried out there, the arbitration was initiated there, and the High Court at Srinagar had appointed the arbitrator.
Click here to read/ download the original judgment
If the corporate debtor is a solvent and functioning company and the quantum of debt is seriously disputed, then insolvency process invoked only to secure payment of individual dues, and the initiation and continuation of CIRP amounts to misuse of IBC as a recovery mechanism
The Supreme Court in the case of Anjani Technoplast vs Shubh Gautam [Civil Appeal No. 8247 of 2022] dated April 23, 2026, has held that a money decree in favour of a financial creditor may furnish a fresh cause of action for initiation of proceedings under Section 7 of the IBC, but that principle does not entitle a decree holder, as a matter of right, to invoke the insolvency process in substitution of execution proceedings. Where the corporate debtor is a solvent and functioning company, the creditor has an efficacious execution remedy, and the quantum of debt is seriously disputed, the insolvency process invoked only to secure payment of individual dues, and the initiation and continuation of CIRP amounts to misuse of the IBC as a recovery mechanism and abuse of process.
The Court observed that the central issue was not whether some money was due from the appellant, but whether the insolvency process under the IBC could be invoked as a substitute for execution of a civil court decree. The IBC is enacted for reorganisation and insolvency resolution of corporate persons in a time-bound manner and is not a debt recovery legislation.
Referring to the decision in the case of Swiss Ribbons (P) Ltd. vs. Union of India [(2019) 4 SCC 17], Pioneer Urban Land and Infrastructure Ltd. vs Union of India [(2019) 8 SCC 416], and GLAS Trust Co. LLC vs. BYJU Raveendran [(2025) 3 SCC 625], the Court observed that the IBC must not be used as a tool for coercion and debt recovery by individual creditors, and that using insolvency as a substitute for debt enforcement amounts to improper use of the Code. The Court further noted that Section 65 of the IBC itself reflects the legislative intent to prevent fraudulent or malicious initiation of insolvency proceedings for purposes other than insolvency resolution.
The Court found the respondent’s conduct significant: despite holding a final money decree, he did not initiate execution proceedings and instead invoked Section 7 of the IBC against a solvent and functioning company. The appellant had represented itself as a running company with substantial revenue and profits, had undertaken to pay the amount lawfully due, and had deposited substantial sums before the High Court and pursuant to orders of this Court. These circumstances did not indicate genuine insolvency.
The Court also considered the serious and unresolved dispute as to the quantum of debt. It noted that the computation of the decretal amount, including credit for prior payments, was already pending before the Delhi High Court, and that the respondent had taken materially inconsistent positions before different forums regarding the amount due. Such discrepancies, in the Court’s view, went to the root of the claim and made insolvency proceedings inappropriate.
The Court clarified that although Dena Bank states that a decree for money in favour of a financial creditor gives a fresh cause of action to initiate proceedings under Section 7 of the IBC, that proposition does not mean that every decree holder who is also a financial creditor can invoke the IBC as a matter of right in preference to execution. Whether resort to the IBC amounts to misuse of process must still be examined on the facts of each case.
Click here to read/ download the original judgment
Legal Updates (April 20 – April 25, 2026)
Legal Updates ( April 20 – April 25, 2026 )
CASE UPDATES
The liquidator cannot proceed to auction any property unless he has cogent evidences that MOU, Allotment Letter and Possession Letter are ingenuine and are subterfuge created to defeat the ownership entitlement of corporate debtor
The Mumbai Bench of the National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT) in the case of Bank of Baroda vs Sanghvi Land Developers [IVN. P. (I.B.C)/186/MB/2025] dated April 07, 2026, has held that the liquidator cannot proceed to auction any property unless he has cogent evidences that MOU, Allotment Letter and Possession Letter are ingenuine and are subterfuge created to defeat the ownership entitlement of corporate debtor. It clarified that the powers of the Insolvency Professional under Section 18 and Section 25 of the Code, and of the Liquidator under Section 35, extend only to assets owned by the Corporate Debtor. The Code does not empower the RP/Liquidator to take control of assets belonging to third parties or deal with the rights of third parties in assets even if existing in name of the corporate debtor.
The Tribunal observed that the Society’s maintenance claim and records in the name of the Corporate Debtor were not conclusive evidence that the property belonged to the Corporate Debtor. While the Society may levy dues from the recorded owner, mere recording in the Society’s records cannot conclusively determine ownership, especially where the Applicant’s rights flowed from the registered Development Agreement and were further supported by the MOU, Allotment Letter and Possession Letter, the authenticity of which had not been disputed by the Liquidator.
The Tribunal specifically observed that the Liquidator had made no inquiry from the signatory of the MOU, Allotment Letter and Possession Letter as to whether those documents were validly executed. It further noted that even in the SCC meeting dated October 06, 2025, the Liquidator had framed the issue by acknowledging the existence of an MOU under which SLDPL acknowledged financial liability to Manoj Jahagirdar and allotted Shop No. 004A in settlement thereof, though legal ownership had not yet been transferred.
At the same time, the Tribunal clarified that it was not inclined to conclusively declare the Applicant’s ownership over the premises. It considered that the ends of justice would be met by protecting the possession of the Applicant, subject to final adjudication by a competent forum, and therefore directed the Liquidator to refrain from auctioning Shop No. 004A as property of the Corporate Debtor at present, while granting liberty to challenge the Applicant’s claim if cogent evidence was found.
If plaintiff is the prior user and prior registered proprietor of an inherently distinctive mark, and defendant subsequently adopts a mark that is phonetically, structurally and visually similar for allied and cognate goods sold through identical trade channels, a prima facie case of deceptive similarity and likelihood of confusion is made out
The Delhi High Court in the case of Flipkart India vs Marc Enterprises [FAO-IPD 46/2021] dated April 10, 2026, has held that where Marc Enterprises (respondent) is the prior user and prior registered proprietor of an inherently distinctive mark, and Flipkart India (appellant) subsequently adopts a mark that is phonetically, structurally and visually similar for allied and cognate goods sold through identical trade channels, a prima facie case of deceptive similarity and likelihood of confusion is made out.
In such circumstances, the use of a house mark alongside the impugned mark does not by itself obviate infringement or passing off, and the appellate court will not interfere with an order granting interim injunction unless the Trial Court’s exercise of discretion is shown to be perverse or manifestly erroneous.
The Court observed that in an appeal against an interim injunction, the appellate court is confined to examining whether the discretion exercised by the Trial Court is perverse or legally indefensible, and cannot substitute its own view merely because another view is possible. Interference is permissible only where the decision is one that no reasonable person, applying the relevant facts and law, could have reached.
The Court observed that the respondent is the admitted prior user of the mark “MARC”, with user claim since 1981 and first registration in 1984, whereas the appellant adopted the impugned marks only in 2017 for large electronic items. The Court further observed that the respondent had established that “MARC” is a uniquely coined term, inherently distinctive, and that the goods in question are covered by the respondent’s registrations.
The Court found that “MARC” and “MARQ” are nearly identical and deceptively similar, and that an average consumer of average intelligence and imperfect recollection is likely to be confused between the competing marks. The marks were held to be phonetically, structurally and visually similar, and the fact that the appellant sold its goods exclusively through an e-commerce platform did not negate the relevance of phonetic similarity or the likelihood of confusion.
The Court further held that, applying the anti-dissection rule, the rival marks when compared as a whole are deceptively similar. Mere addition of the house mark “Flipkart” was held insufficient to eliminate the likelihood of confusion, particularly when the house mark appeared in a miniscule manner and in some instances was not used at all with the impugned mark. The Court also rejected the plea that “MARC”, “MARK” or “MAR” were common to trade, holding that common to register does not establish common to trade unless substantial usage by other persons is proved.
Lastly, the Court pointed out that the respondent’s products were offered on the appellant’s platform, while the appellant’s products were sold exclusively through the same platform, showing identical trade channels, overlapping customer base, and allied and cognate goods. It also held that later registration obtained by the appellant for “Flipkart MarQ” in Class 7 and “MarQ by Flipkart” in Class 42 after the impugned order did not affect the injunction in the present case, especially as no such registration existed when the impugned order was passed and the Class 42 registration did not pertain to the products in question.
A foreign judgment sought to be enforced under Section 44A read with Section 13 CPC is not conclusive or enforceable in India, if it is rendered by summary judgment without prior permission of the Central Government or RBI required as per Section 47(3) FERA
The Supreme Court in the case of MESSER GRIESHEIM GMBH vs GOYAL MG GASES PVT LTD [2026 INSC 401] dated April 21, 2026, has held that a foreign judgment sought to be enforced under Section 44A read with Section 13 CPC is not conclusive or enforceable in India where it is rendered by summary judgment despite the existence of bona fide triable issues supported by contemporaneous material, because such adjudication is not a judgment on merits within Section 13(b) and is opposed to natural justice within Section 13(d).
The Court observed that the core question under Section 13 CPC was whether the English Court’s summary judgment was a judgment on merits and whether the procedure adopted was consistent with natural justice. The Bench found that the respondent had raised triable issues based on three alleged oral agreements and had relied upon contemporaneous documents such as balance sheets and board minutes carrying statutory significance under the Companies Act, 1956. In such circumstances, the respondent ought not to have been foreclosed from a full opportunity to defend.
The Court further clarified that the English Court was a court of competent jurisdiction under the contractual clauses conferring English law and jurisdiction, and no case of fraud under Section 13(e) CPC was made out. However, the foreign judgment failed the tests under Section 13(b), (c), (d) and (f) CPC because it was rendered by summary judgment despite bona fide triable issues, failed to give due effect to statutory permissions and conditions under Indian foreign exchange law, denied leave to defend, and sustained a liability contrary to law in force in India.
The Court observed that even under the principles governing summary judgment, both in Indian law and under the UK CPR, summary disposal is inappropriate where triable issues exist and fuller investigation may affect the outcome. Since the respondent had produced contemporaneous documentary material and sought leave to defend, the English Court ought to have refrained from disposing of the matter summarily. The grant of summary judgment therefore resulted in premature adjudication of disputed questions of fact and denied a meaningful opportunity to establish the defence through oral evidence and cross-examination.
Accordingly, the Supreme Court upheld the dismissal of the execution of the English judgment, holding that the foreign judgment was unenforceable in India as it fell within the exceptions under Section 13 CPC, though the High Court’s broader view that the RBI condition created an absolute bar to enforcement was reversed as a matter of legal principle.
Embargo under paragraph 2.5(a) of the RBI Master Circular RBI/2014-15/73 dated July 1, 2015 cannot be mechanically continued for five years after removal of the borrower’s name from the list of wilful defaulters in a case where the account has been successfully settled by compromise and the compromise amount has been fully paid
The Bombay High Court in the case of Ravi Arya vs Reserve Bank of India [Writ Petition No. 2545 of 2021] dated March 25, 2026, has held that the embargo under paragraph 2.5(a) of the RBI Master Circular dated July 1, 2015 cannot be mechanically continued for five years after removal of the borrower’s name from the list of wilful defaulters in a case where the account has been successfully settled by compromise and the compromise amount has been fully paid, unless the case involves siphoning/diversion of funds, misrepresentation, falsification of accounts, or fraudulent transactions.
The Court noted that the purpose of the Master Circular was to disseminate credit information pertaining to wilful defaulters so as to caution banks and financial institutions and ensure that further bank finance is not made available to them. It extracted the definition of “wilful default” under clause 2.1.3 and emphasized that identification of wilful default must be made keeping in view the borrower’s track record, that it should not be decided on isolated incidents, and that the default categorised as wilful must be intentional, deliberate and calculated.
The Court examined clause 2.5(a) of the 2015 Master Circular, which provided that no additional facilities should be granted to listed wilful defaulters and that companies and their promoters, where siphoning/diversion of funds, misrepresentation, falsification of accounts and fraudulent transactions had been identified, should be debarred from institutional finance for floating new ventures for five years from removal of their names from the list of wilful defaulters. The Court observed that the controversy centred on whether this five-year embargo could continue even after compromise settlement and removal of the borrower’s name from the wilful defaulters list.
The Court placed weight on the subsequent RBI Directions of 2024 and 2025, which expressly dealt with treatment of compromise settlements. It noted that under the 2024 Directions, an account included in the List of Wilful Defaulters would be removed when the borrower had fully paid the compromise amount, and that the revised regime also distinguished between the bar on additional credit facility, which would operate for one year after removal of the name, and the bar on credit for floating new ventures, which would continue for five years.
The Court also referred to RBI’s FAQ on the June 8, 2023 framework for compromise settlements and technical write-offs, which clarified that compromise settlement with borrowers categorised as wilful defaulters was not a new regulatory instruction and that the penal measures applicable to wilful defaulters would continue to apply. At the same time, the Court noted that RBI itself had, in later policy, given due weightage to compromise settlement and permitted removal of the borrower’s name from the wilful defaulters list upon full payment of the compromise amount.
The Court found merit in the petitioners’ contention that a party which attempts compromise and settles the NPA account cannot be placed on the same footing as a party which continues in default without settlement. It observed that once the compromise amount is paid and the name is deleted from the list of wilful defaulters, continuation of the five-year penalty is unjustified unless it is established that the defaulter is guilty of fraud or has siphoned off funds.
RBI circular dated June 07, 2019 on “Prudential Framework for Resolution of Stressed Assets” to provide a framework for early recognition, reporting, and time-bound resolution of stressed assets, is economic policy decision, and cannot be interfered by writ court
The Bombay High Court in the case of S.E. Transstadia Pvt Ltd vs Reserve Bank of India [Writ Petition No. 3865 of 2022] dated March 17, 2026, has held that the impugned RBI circular dated June 07, 2019 on “Prudential Framework for Resolution of Stressed Assets” was a policy decision taken by an expert body in larger public interest and, in the absence of mala fides, arbitrariness, or manifest unreasonableness, the Court would not interfere with such economic and regulatory policy. The Court found no arbitrariness in the scheme merely because it repealed the earlier circulars, including those relating to flexible structuring for infrastructure projects, and accordingly upheld the circular.
The Court noted that the purpose of the impugned circular was to provide a framework for early recognition, reporting, and time-bound resolution of stressed assets. It emphasized early identification of stress through SMA classification and reporting to CRILC, and required lenders to undertake a prima facie review within thirty days of default, with liberty to decide the resolution strategy or initiate insolvency or recovery proceedings.
The Court noted that the framework required all lenders, in cases involving multiple lenders, to enter into an inter-creditor agreement during the review period, and that a decision approved by 75% by value and 60% by number would bind all lenders. The framework also contemplated resolution plans involving regularisation of overdue, sale of exposure, change in ownership, and restructuring, and defined restructuring to include modification of terms, alteration of payment period, rollover of facilities, and sanction of additional finance for curing default.
The Court accepted the RBI’s submission that the June 07, 2019 circular was intended to address stress before default and to avoid “evergreening” of loans, where fresh lending masks defaults instead of reporting them. The Court observed that the new framework involved restructuring with supervisory review and stringent supervisory/enforcement action, while also carving out exceptions for projects under implementation, MSME revival and rehabilitation, and natural calamities.
Although restructuring could result in classification consequences, the circular provided a mechanism for upgradation upon satisfactory performance during the monitoring period, and further provided for treatment of additional finance and interim finance as standard assets subject to the conditions set out in clauses 13 and 14. This showed that the framework itself contained safeguards for both lenders and borrowers, added the Court.
Where no shares are issued or allotted and no consideration is paid, internal accounting entries such as goodwill, share premium, reduction of share capital, and profit and loss adjustments cannot be treated as consideration or transaction value for the levy of stamp duty
The Bombay High Court in the case of Seco Tools India Pvt Ltd vs State of Maharashtra [Writ Petition No. 3704 of 2011] dated April 01, 2026, has held that although an order of amalgamation under Section 394 of the Companies Act, 1956 is a “conveyance” within the meaning of Section 2(g) of the Maharashtra Stamp Act, stamp duty on such order can be computed only in the manner prescribed under Article 25(da) of Schedule I to the Stamp Act, namely with reference to the value of shares issued or allotted and the consideration paid. Mere chargeability as a conveyance does not conclude the issue of computation of stamp duty, which must be determined strictly under Article 25(da).
The Court observed that Article 25(da) contemplates levy with reference to the market value of shares issued or allotted in exchange or otherwise, and the amount of consideration paid for the amalgamation. The Court held that where no shares are issued or allotted and no consideration is paid, internal accounting entries such as goodwill, share premium, reduction of share capital, and profit and loss adjustments cannot be treated as consideration or transaction value for the levy of stamp duty.
In the present case, since Drillco Seco Limited was a wholly owned subsidiary of the petitioner, no new shares were issued, no money was paid, and the shares already held by the petitioner merely stood cancelled upon amalgamation.
The Court rejected the State’s contention that the expression “or otherwise” enabled the authorities to rely on figures such as profit and loss, goodwill and share premium for stamp duty computation. It held that the words “or otherwise” are connected with the phrase “shares issued or allotted in exchange or otherwise” and cannot be read as conferring an unlimited power to treat accounting entries as the basis of levy.
The Court further observed that reduction of share capital, adjustment of losses, and creation of goodwill were internal accounting steps undertaken to balance the books after amalgamation. Such figures did not represent real payment, issuance of shares, or consideration received by shareholders, and therefore could not be treated as consideration for the purposes of Article 25(da).
SARFAESI Act cannot operate as an independent source of enforcement power once a resolution plan under IBC extinguishes the underlying debt. Thus, continuation of lien in absence of a subsisting enforceable debt is alleged to be without authority of law and violative of Article 300-A of the Constitution
The Orissa High Court in the case of Sree Metaliks Limited vs Zonal Manager, State Bank of India [W.P.(C) No.27912 of 2025] dated March 13, 2026, has held that Section 31 of the SARFAESI Act cannot operate as an independent source of enforcement power once a resolution plan under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code extinguishes the underlying debt. Section 31 excludes certain secured assets and transactions from the Act’s enforcement mechanism, meaning SARFAESI recovery powers do not apply to them. Thus, the bank could not appropriate the deposit after the debt stood satisfied.
The Court explained that Section 31 of the SARFAESI Act cannot be construed as a reservoir of enforcement power detached from the existence of a subsisting and legally recoverable debt. The scheme of the Act predicates enforcement of security interest upon the continued existence of a financial liability. Once the debt has been assigned and thereafter resolved and satisfied in accordance with an approved Resolution Plan under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, the very foundation for invocation of ancillary or derivative rights ceases to exist.
The Court observed that SBI lacked legal authority to retain or appropriate the fixed deposit after extinguishment of the debt and ruled that the action amounted to unlawful deprivation of property under Article 300A of the Constitution. The continuation of lien in absence of a subsisting enforceable debt is alleged to be without authority of law and violative of Article 300-A of the Constitution. The Court thus held that where the action impugned is demonstrably without legal foundation and results in unlawful deprivation of property, relegating the Petitioner to an alternative forum would amount to perpetuating further illegality. Accordingly, the High Court directed SBI to release the fixed deposit along with accrued interest to the petitioner.
Where a statutory authority, during the subsistence of a moratorium under Section 14 of the IBC, directs a bank to place lien on and freeze the bank accounts of the Corporate Debtor, and the bank acts on such direction, such action amounts to execution and enforcement of an order against the Corporate Debtor and is barred by Section 14(1)(a) of the IBC
The Ahmedabad Bench of the National Company Law Tribunal in the case of Wind World vs IDBI Bank [1A/1278(AHM)2023] dated April 01, 2026, has held that where a statutory authority, during the subsistence of a moratorium under Section 14 of the IBC, directs a bank to place lien on and freeze the bank accounts of the Corporate Debtor, and the bank acts on such direction, such action amounts to execution and enforcement of an order against the Corporate Debtor and is barred by Section 14(1)(a) of the IBC. Since such action directly affects the Corporate Debtor’s assets, going concern status, and the conduct of CIRP, the NCLT has jurisdiction under Section 60(5) of the IBC to intervene and grant relief.
The Tribunal held that the Statutory authorities may determine dues, but they cannot enforce recovery outside the mechanism of the IBC during CIRP, and Section 238 of the IBC gives overriding effect to the Code over inconsistent recovery powers under other statutes.
It held that such action directly impacted the functioning of the Corporate Debtor as a going concern and inhibited the Resolution Professional from taking control, custody, protection and preservation of the Corporate Debtor’s assets.
While considering the effect of moratorium, the Tribunal relied on the principle that once moratorium is imposed, a statutory freeze operates so that the insolvency resolution process may proceed unhindered. It also noted that, in view of Section 238 of the IBC, the Code overrides inconsistent provisions contained in other enactments, and statutory authorities, though entitled to determine dues, cannot enforce recovery during the moratorium.
On relief, the Tribunal observed that the Mining Department was required to follow the mechanism under the IBC by filing its claim before the Resolution Professional for dues quantified prior to commencement of CIRP. Regardless of whether the Department was aware of the CIRP, the instruction to create lien and freeze accounts was held to be in violation of the moratorium, and the Tribunal directed IDBI Bank to defreeze the accounts and allow use of the money lying therein for running the Corporate Debtor as a going concern. It also clarified that any lien or attachment created prior to commencement of CIRP would remain subject to the provisions of the Code and could not be enforced during the moratorium period.
REGULATORY UPDATES
Government has tightened grip on Social-Media & Digital News with proposed amendments to Information Technology (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Rules, 2021
The Government of India, through the Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology (MeitY), has proposed amendments to the Information Technology (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Rules, 2021, with the aim of strengthening intermediary accountability and enhancing oversight of digital media. Issued on 30 March 2026, the notice invites stakeholder feedback on changes designed to ensure a more open, safe, trusted, and accountable internet ecosystem.
Stakeholders have been invited to submit their feedback by 14 April 2026, with assurances that submissions will be treated confidentially to facilitate open and uninhibited participation. The government describes the proposed amendments as clarificatory and procedural, intended to improve legal certainty, ensure consistent enforcement, and streamline regulatory mechanisms without introducing an entirely new framework.
Changes in Part II – Intermediary Due Diligence
Part II of the IT Rules, 2021, lays down the due diligence obligations of intermediaries such as social media platforms and online service providers. It defines the conditions under which intermediaries can claim safe harbour protection under Section 79 of the IT Act.
Proposed Changes:
Clarification on Data Retention (Rules 3(1)(g) & 3(1)(h)): The amendments clarify that data retention obligations imposed on intermediaries will operate without prejudice to obligations under other applicable laws, ensuring there is no legal conflict or ambiguity.
Insertion of Rule 3(4) – Mandatory Compliance Requirement: A new provision mandates intermediaries to comply with all clarifications, advisories, directions, SOPs, codes of practice, and guidelines issued by the Ministry. This requirement is explicitly included within due diligence obligations, thereby strengthening enforceability and linking compliance directly to safe harbour protection.
Changes in Part III – Digital Media Ethics Code
Part III of the IT Rules, 2021, deals with the Code of Ethics and regulatory framework for digital media, including publishers of news and current affairs content and online curated content (OTT platforms).
Proposed Changes:
Clarification of Applicability (Rule 8): The amendments clarify that Part III applies not only to publishers but also to intermediaries hosting content and news and current affairs content posted by non-publisher users. This significantly broadens the scope of regulation.
Strengthening Rule 14 – Inter-Departmental Committee: The role of the Inter-Departmental Committee is expanded to consider matters beyond complaints and examine issues referred directly by the Ministry.
Key Amendments under Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (Amendment) Act, 2026
The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (Amendment) Act, 2026 receives Presidential assent on April 6, 2026, marking a significant overhaul of India’s insolvency framework. It shall come into force on such date as the Central Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, appoint provided that different dates may be appointed for different provisions of this Act and any reference in any such provision to the commencement of this Act shall be construed as a reference to the coming into force of that provision.
Key Amendments:
Expanded Definitions & Clarifications (Sections 3 & 5): The amendment introduces and clarifies several critical terms:
“Registered valuer” aligned with the Companies Act, 2013.
“Service provider” expanded to include insolvency professionals, agencies, information utilities, and other notified entities.
Clarification that security interest must arise from agreement, not merely by operation of law.
New definitions for “avoidance transactions” and “fraudulent or wrongful trading.”
Stricter Timelines for Admission of Insolvency Applications: Sections 7, 9, and 10 have been amended to mandate:
14-day timeline for admission or rejection of applications.
Mandatory recording of reasons for delay by Adjudicating Authority.
Clarification that records of default with information utility is sufficient proof for financial creditors.
Overhaul of Withdrawal of Insolvency Applications (Section 12A)
Withdrawal now barred before CoC constitution and after invitation of resolution plans.
Requires 90% CoC approval.
NCLT must decide within 30 days, failing which reasons must be recorded.
Strengthening Moratorium & Guarantor Protection (Section 14): Clarifies that moratorium applies even when sureties initiate proceedings against corporate debtor under guarantee contracts.
Enhanced Role & Powers of Resolution Professional:
Mandatory verification and valuation of claims by IRP (Section 18).
Broader obligation on all persons (not just personnel) to cooperate (Section 19).
RP now explicitly empowered to file applications for avoidance and wrongful trading (Section 25).
Creditors Empowered in Avoidance Actions (Section 47)
Creditors, members, or partners can directly approach NCLT if RP/liquidator fails to act.
Tribunal can also initiate disciplinary action against RP/liquidator for inaction.
Committee of Creditors (CoC) Gains Oversight in Liquidation
CoC to supervise liquidation process (Section 21).
Power to replace liquidator with 66% vote (new Section 34A).
CoC continues even in ongoing liquidation cases in certain situations.
New Framework for Resolution Plans (Sections 30 & 31)
Protection for dissenting financial creditors must receive minimum liquidation value or proportionate distribution.
Mandatory reasoned approval by CoC.
Resolution plans may be implemented first, distribution approved later (within 30 days).
Post-approval, all prior claims extinguished, no fresh proceedings allowed against corporate debtor, and government licences and approvals to continue post-resolution if conditions are met.
Major Changes in Liquidation Process
Introduction of restoration of CIRP before liquidation (Section 33):
CoC (66%) can seek revival within 120 days.
Mandatory 30-day timeline for liquidation orders.
Liquidator must be appointed on recommendation of the Board.
Secured creditors must declare intent within 14 days, failing which security is deemed relinquished.
Revised Waterfall & Government Dues (Section 53)
Clarifies treatment of secured vs unsecured portions of debt.
Government dues split between secured and unsecured categories depending on nature of security.
Time-Bound Dissolution Process (Section 54)
Liquidation to be completed within 180 days (extendable by 90 days).
NCLT to pass dissolution order within 30 days.
CoC empowered to decide handling of pending litigations and proceeds.
Introduction of Creditor-Initiated Insolvency Process (New Chapter IV-A): The amendment introduces a creditor-led insolvency mechanism:
Financial creditors (with 51% approval) can initiate process without NCLT admission stage.
Corporate debtor given 30 days to respond.
Process deemed to commence upon public announcement.
Completion timeline: 150 days (extendable by 45 days).
Allows conversion into CIRP or closure depending on outcomes.
Management remains with board, but RP has oversight powers.
Lower Thresholds in Pre-Pack Insolvency: Approval thresholds reduced from 66% to 51% for certain decisions in pre-pack processes.
SEBI Framework for net settlement of funds for transactions done by FPI in cash market
The Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) vide its Circular No. HO/(1)2026-AFD-POD2//10157/2026 dated April 24, 2026, has allowed net settlement of funds for transactions undertaken by Foreign Portfolio Investors in the cash market to improve operational efficiency and reduce funding costs. Under the existing system, FPIs are required to settle transactions on a gross basis. This results in separate fund flows for purchases and sales within the same settlement cycle, leading to higher liquidity requirements and additional costs, including those arising from forex movements.
SEBI has permitted net settlement of funds for “outright transactions,” defined as either a purchase or a sale transaction, but not both, in a security within a settlement cycle. Only such outright purchase or sale transactions will be eligible for netting. Transactions involving both buy and sell in the same security during the same settlement cycle will continue to be settled on a gross basis. The regulator clarified that settlement of securities will continue on a gross basis between the FPI and its custodian.
Statutory levies such as Securities Transaction Tax and stamp duty will continue to be charged on a delivery basis. Custodians, FPIs, and other stakeholders have been directed to make necessary system changes. The framework is to be implemented on or before December 31, 2026.
SEBI has revised framework for Not-for-Profit Organization
The Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) vide its Circular No. HO/49/14/(10)2026-CFD-POD1//9380/2026 dated April 15, 2026, has issued a circular revising the framework for Not-for-Profit Organisations (“NPO”) on the Social Stock Exchange (“SSE”), easing registration and fund-raising requirements. SEBI has extended the period of registration for NPOs on SSE from two years to three years without the requirement to raise funds.
The regulator has also reduced the minimum subscription requirement for the issuance of Zero Coupon Zero Principal instruments from 75% to 50%, subject to due diligence by the SSE. The circular further mandates disclosures in cases of under-subscription, including details on the manner of raising balance capital and the impact on achieving the social objectives, while providing that funds shall be refunded if the minimum subscription is not achieved.
SEBI introduces key changes to regulatory framework governing Infrastructure Investment Trusts
The Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) vide its Gazette Notification No. CG-MH-E-17042026-271878 dated April 16, 2026, has notified the Securities and Exchange Board of India (Infrastructure Investment Trusts) (Amendment) Regulations, 2026, introducing key changes to the regulatory framework governing Infrastructure Investment Trusts (InvITs).
A significant change has been made to the definition of “liquid assets”, with SEBI refining the eligibility criteria for investments in liquid mutual fund schemes. The amendment now permits investment in units of liquid mutual funds having a credit risk value of at least 10 and falling under Class A-I or Class B-I under the prescribed risk matrix, thereby aligning the framework with updated risk classification norms.
The regulations also introduce important clarifications regarding Special Purpose Vehicles (SPVs). In the context of Public-Private Partnership (PPP) projects, SEBI has provided that where acquisition or holding structures are restricted by government or concession agreements, the usual SPV requirements may not apply, subject to specified conditions.
Further, the amendments clarify that an SPV holding an infrastructure project will retain its SPV status even after termination or conclusion of the concession agreement, provided it continues to meet conditions specified by SEBI. This change is aimed at providing continuity and regulatory certainty in infrastructure investments.
In addition, SEBI has expanded the permissible investment avenues by allowing InvITs to invest in such SPVs and has aligned corresponding provisions under Regulation 18. The threshold for credit risk value in certain investment instruments has also been reduced from 12 to 10, along with inclusion of Class B-I instruments, thereby widening the investment universe for InvITs.
The amendments further provide flexibility in utilisation of funds by allowing deployment not only for development of infrastructure projects but also for other purposes as may be specified by SEBI.
SEBI signs MoU with Financial Intelligence Unit India
The Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) vide its Press Release No.26/2026 dated April 16, 2026, has signed a memorandum of understanding with the Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU-India) to step up action against fraud and money laundering in the securities market.
The agreement, inked on April 15, 2026, will enable regular sharing of data and intelligence between the regulator and FIU-India to strengthen enforcement under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 and the rules framed under it.
The two agencies will collaborate based on the Egmont principles of information exchange, as part of efforts to improve coordination in tackling financial crimes. The MoU was signed by FIU-India Director Amit Mohan Govil and SEBI Whole Time Member Sandip Pradhan.
Legal Updates ( April 13 – April 18, 2026)
Legal Updates ( April 13 – April 18, 2026 )
CASE UPDATES
Bar of pre-institution mediation under Section 12-A of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 does not operate in cases seeking urgent interim injunctive relief in a trademark infringement and passing off action
The Delhi High Court in the case of Daimler India Commercial Vehicles vs Getmohit Cab Pvt Ltd [CS(COMM) 379/2026] dated April 10, 2026, has held that where, in a commercial trademark suit, the plaintiff pleads and places material to show statutory rights in a registered trademark, goodwill and reputation in the mark, and prima facie demonstrates that the defendants are using an identical or deceptively similar mark/logo/trade dress in relation to identical or allied services in a manner likely to cause confusion, dilution, and passing off, the Court may grant ex parte ad interim injunction upon being satisfied that a prima facie case exists, the balance of convenience lies in favour of the plaintiff, and irreparable harm is likely to ensue if protection is denied.
The Court also pointed out that exemption from pre-institution mediation under Section 12-A of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 is liable to be granted where urgent relief is prayed for. In a case seeking urgent interim injunctive relief in a trademark infringement and passing off action, the bar of pre-institution mediation does not operate.
In doing so, the Bench expressly referred to the judgment of the Supreme Court in Yamini Manohar v. T.K.D. Keerthi [(2024) 5 SCC 815], as also the Division Bench judgment of the Delhi High Court in Chandra Kishore Chaurasia v. RA Perfumery Works Private Ltd. [2022 SCC OnLine Del 3529].
On the plaintiff’s substantive case, the Court noted the plaintiff’s historical lineage, the global footprint of Daimler, the establishment and Indian operations of the plaintiff, the adoption and use of the BHARATBENZ brand, the asserted relationship between BHARATBENZ and the BENZ mark, the status of BENZ as a well-known trademark, and the plaintiff’s registrations, commercial presence, sales and advertising expenditure. By recording these pleadings in detail, the Court indicated that the plaintiff had placed material to establish the pedigree of the mark, its subsistence on the register, its goodwill, reputation, and distinctiveness, all of which were relevant for assessing both infringement and passing off.
The Court also noticed the plaintiff’s specific allegation that the impugned buses bore the mark BHARATBENZ and the plaintiff’s logo on the front grille, even though the steering wheel bore the logos/emblems of another manufacturer, Leyland, and that the impugned vehicle, shown in a video on X, did not follow safety norms such as having an emergency exit and lacked air suspension and other amenities. The Court further noted the investigation that connected the impugned activity to Defendant No. 1’s websites, namely ‘www.getbookbus.com’ and ‘www.getbookcab.com’, where an image of a bus bearing the three-star logo associated with Mercedes-Benz appeared and “Bharat Benz” was mentioned as a bus type on the booking page, and that Defendants No. 1 and 2 were advertising bus booking services under the BHARATBENZ mark on online travel platforms. These facts were material because they demonstrated not only use of the impugned mark in the course of trade, but use in relation to bus booking and passenger transport services in a manner capable of misleading consumers.
The unauthorized use of a copyrighted software program, detected and proved through an inbuilt security mechanism that logs ‘Infringement Hits’ by cross-checking license keys and capturing MAC addresses, constitutes copyright infringement when the defendant fails to procure genuine licenses and maintains silence to legal notices
The Delhi High Court in the case of Dassault Systemes Solidworks Corporation vs Zoneonne Venture Private Limited [CS(COMM) 334/2021] dated April 08, 2026, has held that where any party from whom a written statement is required fails to present the same within the time permitted or fixed by the Court, the Court shall pronounce judgment against him under Order VIII Rule 10 of the CPC, and the averments in the plaint and the evidence are deemed to have been admitted requiring no further corroboration on any material aspect in terms of Rule 4 of the Delhi High Court (Original Side) Rules, 2018.
The Court ruled that the unauthorized use of a copyrighted software program, detected and proved through an inbuilt security mechanism (‘Phone Home’ technology) that logs ‘Infringement Hits’ by cross-checking license keys and capturing MAC addresses, constitutes copyright infringement when the defendant fails to procure genuine licenses and maintains silence to legal notices.
In such cases of infringement, the quantum of loss and damages can be reckoned on the basis of the loss that occurred to the plaintiff, represented by the total market costs or genuine purchase cost of the software programs for the exact number of computer systems on which the pirated/unauthorized software was used, added the Court.
The Court observed that the methodology and mechanism explained by the plaintiff appears to be a plausible manner in which it is able to focus and capture infringement of its copyrighted SOLIDWORKS software program. The plaintiff has been able to prove by cogent evidence that the defendants have infringed the copyrighted SOLIDWORKS software program of the plaintiff on 7 computers at infringement database (Exalead Portal). The deathly silence on the part of the defendant to the legal notice dated Dec 09, 2020 and continued acts of unauthorised use would constitute infringement of the copyright of the plaintiff in its SOLIDWORKS software program.
Further, the Court observed that despite having been served with the summons and having appeared, the defendant chose not to file its reply nor does any evidence impel the Court to construe that the defendants have any plausible defence. The averments in the plaint as also the depositions of the prosecution witnesses and the documents marked as exhibits by such witnesses are deemed to have been admitted requiring no further corroboration on any material aspect, in terms of Rule 4 of the Delhi High Court (Original Side) Rules, 2018.
For any expense to qualify as Insolvency Resolution Process Costs under Regulation 31 of the CIRP Regulations, the expense must ordinarily have been incurred by the Resolution Professional for the conduct of CIRP or for running the corporate debtor as a going concern, and it must also have been placed before and ratified or approved by the Committee of Creditors
The Chennai Bench of the National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT) in the case of DBS Bank India vs Orchid Pharma [A(IBC)/784/CHE/2020] dated April 02, 2026, has held that, although Section 60(5)(c) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 confers residuary jurisdiction upon the Adjudicating Authority to entertain or dispose of any question of law or fact arising out of or in relation to the insolvency resolution process of the corporate debtor, such jurisdiction cannot be exercised in a manner that defeats the finality attached to a resolution plan approved under Section 31 IBC; once a resolution plan is approved, it becomes binding on all stakeholders and claims not forming part of the resolution plan stand extinguished.
The Tribunal held that, for any expense to qualify as Insolvency Resolution Process Costs under Regulation 31 of the CIRP Regulations, the expense must ordinarily have been incurred by the Resolution Professional for the conduct of CIRP or for running the corporate debtor as a going concern, and it must also have been placed before and ratified or approved by the Committee of Creditors.
Where lease rental claims are based merely on continued occupation of premises during CIRP, but the material on record does not show that the Resolution Professional formally continued the lease arrangement as part of the CIRP process or that the Committee of Creditors approved or ratified such payments as CIRP costs, such claims cannot be treated as Insolvency Resolution Process Costs and cannot be recovered after approval of the resolution plan by invoking Section 60(5).
The Tribunal referred to Regulation 31 of the CIRP Regulations and observed that IRP Costs includes expenses incurred by the Interim Resolution Professional or the Resolution Professional for running the business of the corporate debtor as a going concern and for conducting the CIRP. From a conjoint reading of the provisions of the Code and the CIRP Regulations, the Tribunal held that, for any expense to qualify as IRPC, two conditions must ordinarily be satisfied: first, the expense must have been incurred by the Resolution Professional for the conduct of the CIRP or for running the corporate debtor as a going concern; and second, such expense must have been placed before and ratified or approved by the Committee of Creditors.
Applying the test, the Tribunal held that the applicant’s claim for lease rentals, premised on continued occupation of the premises during CIRP, ordinarily fell within the category of operational debt and had to be dealt with in accordance with the provisions of the Code during CIRP. The Tribunal noted that it was not in dispute that the applicant had filed its claim before the Interim Resolution Professional in Form-B as an operational creditor claiming lease rentals due from the corporate debtor. However, the material on record did not demonstrate that the Resolution Professional had formally continued the lease arrangement as part of the CIRP process, or that payment of such lease rentals was treated as an expense necessary for running the corporate debtor as a going concern.
The Tribunal additionally found that no material had been placed on record to show that the Committee of Creditors had approved or ratified payment of such lease rentals as part of the Insolvency Resolution Process Costs. In the absence of such approval or ratification by the Committee of Creditors, the Tribunal held that the claim could not be treated as IRP Costs within the meaning of Regulation 31. It further observed that permitting the applicant to recover the alleged lease rentals as IRP Costs at that stage would effectively amount to reopening claims after approval of the resolution plan, which was impermissible under the scheme of the Code.
A purchaser of shares in a court-monitored liquidation process steps into the shoes of the transferring shareholder and is bound by the rights, obligations, and liabilities of the predecessor, including non-compete clauses contained in a Joint Venture and Share Purchase Agreement
The National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT), Principal Bench, New Delhi in the case of GH Energy vs Flovel Hydro Technologies [Company Appeal (AT) No.87 of 2024] dated April 08, 2026, has held that a purchaser of shares in a court-monitored liquidation process steps into the shoes of the transferring shareholder and is bound by the rights, obligations, and liabilities of the predecessor, including non-compete clauses contained in a Joint Venture and Share Purchase Agreement. This is strictly applicable when the Articles of Association mandate that a transferee must agree to be bound by such obligations as a condition precedent to the transfer, and such shareholder agreements are binding even if not explicitly incorporated into the Articles, provided they are not repugnant to them.
The paramount consideration of the Tribunal under Sections 241 and 242 of the Companies Act is the interest of the company, which prevents a competitor-transferee from competing with the joint venture company in violation of the predecessor’s non-compete obligations.
The NCLAT observed that Article 22 of the Articles of Association restricts the transfer of shares to a third party unless such party agrees to be bound by the rights, obligations, and liabilities of the transferring party, “including” those defined in the Memorandum and Articles of Association. The NCLAT interpreted the word “including” to mean that the Board may look beyond the Articles and refuse to register the transfer unless the transferee adheres to obligations noted elsewhere, such as the JVSPA. The NCLAT held that shareholder agreements are binding even if they are not incorporated in the Articles, so long as they are not contrary to the Articles, and the non-compete clause is not contrary to the Articles. Flovel, having acquired the 47% shares, steps into the shoes of Mecamidi France and cannot take a stand contrary to the obligations of its predecessor, which was a party to the JVSPA.
A shareholder of the corporate debtor cannot assert an independent proprietary right in respect of project assets or leasehold rights outside the corporate entity, and upon insolvency resolution the extinguishment or dilution of shareholder interest, does not amount to unconstitutional deprivation of property under Article 300A requiring compensation
The Telangana High Court in the case of Maha Hotel Projects vs State of Telangana [Writ Appeal No.27 of 2026] dated April 09, 2026, has held that where a corporate debtor holding project rights through an Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) undergoes insolvency resolution under the IBC, and the approved resolution plan under Section 31 contemplates transfer of shareholding and control subject to governmental consent, the State’s grant of such consent in furtherance of the approved plan is not a fresh award of State largesse, but an act undertaken within and bound by the statutory framework of the IBC; by virtue of Sections 31 and 238 of the IBC, the resolution plan is binding on all stakeholders, including shareholders and the State, and any inconsistent claims founded on prior contractual arrangements or other laws must yield to the Code.
The Court held that a shareholder of the corporate debtor cannot assert an independent proprietary or contractual right in respect of project assets or leasehold rights outside the corporate entity, since such rights vest in the company as a distinct juristic person, and upon insolvency resolution the extinguishment or dilution of shareholder interest is merely a commercial consequence of the statutory resolution process, constituting procedure established by law, and does not amount to unconstitutional deprivation of property under Article 300A requiring compensation.
Further, a resolution applicant selected through the CIRP process cannot be equated with a recipient of State largesse requiring re-tendering, and issues concerning FDI compliance fall for examination by competent regulatory authorities rather than by the writ court in the absence of manifest illegality.
The High Court treated the overriding effect of the IBC and the binding nature of the approved resolution plan as the fulcrum of the dispute. It held that the appellant’s allegation that the State had transferred a public project to respondent No. 4 without public tender ignored the statutory scheme of the IBC. Referring to Section 238, the Court observed that the IBC is a comprehensive special legislation with an overriding non-obstante clause, and noted that the legal position on primacy of the IBC was no longer res integra.
The Court observed that once a resolution plan is approved under Section 31, it becomes binding on the corporate debtor and all stakeholders. Since the plan approved by the NCLT on February 07, 2020 specifically contemplated transfer of entire shareholding and control of GJHPL and made implementation conditional upon State consent, the State’s subsequent decision dated September 22, 2025 was held to be an act in furtherance of the approved resolution plan, and not an exercise of fresh power to distribute State largesse.
The Court specifically observed that the project was implemented through GJHPL, which alone entered into the Lease Deed and DMA with the State, and therefore the rights of consortium members, including the appellant, were mediated exclusively through their shareholding in that corporate entity. The Court held that the appellant, being merely a shareholder of the corporate debtor, could not assert any independent or superior right over the project outside the corporate entity.
On the plea under Article 300A, the Court observed that the appellant had no independent or direct right in the leasehold property or the project, and whatever rights it possessed were derivative, flowing solely from its shareholding in GJHPL. The extinguishment or dilution of its interest was held to be a direct consequence of the insolvency of the corporate debtor and implementation of the approved resolution plan, and not a deprivation of property dehors authority of law. The loss suffered by the appellant was characterized as a commercial consequence of insolvency proceedings rather than compulsory acquisition by the State, and therefore compensation under Article 300A was held not to arise.
The approved resolution plan is binding on all authorities, including Revenue and Stamp Authorities and the refusal to effect mutation can be considered as contrary to the statutory mandate
The Madhya Pradesh High Court in the case of Mahan Energen Limited vs State of Madhya Pradesh [WP No. 26143 of 2025] dated April 08, 2026, has held that the approved resolution plan is binding on all authorities, including Revenue and Stamp Authorities and the refusal to effect mutation can be considered as contrary to the statutory mandate. The High Court observed that the resolution plan given by the NCLT is binding on every authority, and the authorities have failed to carry out the mutation of the company’s name in the land/revenue records. The inaction is continuing, unexplained, and contrary to the settled principle governing mutation proceedings. The binding order passed by the NCLT on 01.11.2021 continues to operate in full force, remains unimpeached, and there is no stay, suspension, or setting aside of the said order by any forum. The ROC has given recognition to the resolution by effecting the change in legal identity in the record of the ROC, changing the name to “Mahan Energen Limited” from 25.03.2022, added the Court.
The Court emphasised that the State does not dispute the title of the subject land of the petitioner as successor-in-interest and is accepting the Bhu-bhatak (land revenue) from the petitioner in the name of Mahan Energen Ltd. while refusing to record the name in the revenue record. The mutation of the name on the basis of a judicial/quasi-judicial order passed by the competent authority is ministerial and is not discretionary at all.
Thus, the Court stated that the Revenue Authorities are bound to carry out such entry once foundational facts are undisputed; they cannot convert this administrative functioning into a quorum of adjudicating collateral issues. Considering the provisions of Section 31 of IBC which gives a statutory mandate, the approved resolution plan is binding on all authorities, including Revenue and Stamp Authorities, and the refusal to effect mutation can be considered as contrary to the statutory mandate. Accordingly, the Court directed the respondent authorities (State Government) to forthwith mutate the Petitioner’s name “Mahan Energen Limited” in all relevant land/revenue records pertaining to the subject lands, subject to final adjudication of the writ petition.
Scope of interference under Section 34 and Section 37 of the Arbitration Act is extremely limited, and the Court does not sit in appeal over the findings of the Arbitrator and cannot re-appreciate evidence or substitute its own interpretation merely because another view is possible
The High Court of Chhattisgarh in the case of South Eastern Coalfields Limited vs M.K. Chaterjee [ARBA No. 27 of 2018] dated April 07, 2026, has ruled that the Arbitrator is the final authority on facts as well as interpretation of contract, unless the view taken is wholly unreasonable or beyond the scope of the contract. Thus, the scope of interference under Section 34 and Section 37 of the Arbitration Act is extremely limited, and the Court does not sit in appeal over the findings of the Arbitrator and cannot re-appreciate evidence or substitute its own interpretation merely because another view is possible. Interference is permissible only when the award is vitiated by patent illegality, perversity, or is in conflict with the fundamental policy of Indian law or the most basic notions of justice or morality.
The Court found that the Sole Arbitrator minutely examined the entire material available on record, including oral and documentary evidence, and rendered a reasoned award. Further, the Court noted that the Arbitrator did not ignore the vital/substantial evidence led by the parties and minutely appreciated the oral and documentary evidence, deciding every claim as per the evidence and entitlement of the respondent company. There is nothing on record to demonstrate that the Arbitrator has ignored vital evidence, taken into account irrelevant material, or rendered findings which are so arbitrary or irrational that no reasonable person would arrive at such conclusions.
The award reflects a plausible and reasoned view based on the material before the Arbitrator, and no valid ground was raised by the appellants which provides under Sections 34 and 37 of the Arbitration Act, added the Court.
Thus, in light of the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in Associate Builders vs. Delhi Development Authority [(2015) 3 SCC 49], the Court said that the Court cannot interfere with an arbitral award merely on the ground that another interpretation is possible or that the evidence could have been appreciated differently. The Arbitrator is the final authority on facts as well as interpretation of contract, unless the view taken is wholly unreasonable or beyond the scope of the contract.
The Court explained that the Commercial Court has rightly recorded its finding that reasons mentioned by the Sole Arbitrator were genuine and the approach of the Arbitrator is neither arbitrary nor capricious. The award is well reasoned and is in great detail on the basis of material facts and the finding rendered by it are those which fall within the terms and conditions of the contract. The findings of the Sole Arbitrator do not suffer from any patent illegality.
The power to appoint an arbitrator in an International Commercial Arbitration lies exclusively with the Supreme Court under Section 11(6) read with Section 11(12)(a) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996
The Madhya Pradesh High Court in the case of State of Madhya Pradesh vs SMEC International [Arbitration Appeal No. 266 of 2023] dated April 08, 2026, has held that the power to appoint an arbitrator in an International Commercial Arbitration lies exclusively with the Supreme Court under Section 11(6) read with Section 11(12)(a) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. Hence, an order passed by the High Court appointing an arbitrator in an International Commercial Arbitration suffers from an inherent lack of jurisdiction, rendering the constituted Arbitral Tribunal a coram-non-judice and the resultant arbitral award a nullity in law. Such a defect of inherent jurisdiction strikes at the very authority of the tribunal and cannot be cured even by the consent or active participation of the parties.
The Court observed that the respondent (SMEC International) is a body corporate incorporated in Australia, making the arbitration an ‘International Commercial Arbitration’ within the meaning of Section 2(1)(f)(ii) of the Act of 1996. Part I of the Act applies to international commercial arbitrations seated in India, making the Section 34 application maintainable; however, the ground of ‘patent illegality’ under Section 34(2A) is not available for international commercial arbitrations.
On the validity of Arbitrator appointment by the High Court, the Court observed that a conjoint reading of Section 11(6) and Section 11(12)(a) of the Act makes it abundantly clear that the power to appoint an arbitrator in an ICA lies exclusively with the Supreme Court. The High Court has no jurisdiction to appoint an arbitrator in an international commercial arbitration, and such an order suffers from a complete lack of jurisdiction. This is an inherent lack of jurisdiction, not a mere procedural flaw, and it cannot be cured by the consent or participation of the parties.
A customer has zero liability in cases of unauthorized electronic banking transactions arising out of a third-party breach where the deficiency lies neither with the bank nor with the customer but elsewhere in the system, provided the customer notifies the bank within three working days of receiving communication regarding the unauthorized transaction
The Bombay High Court in the case of Subodh C. Korde vs Union of India [Writ Petition No. 11990 of 2023] dated April 06, 2026, has held that writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is maintainable against a private scheduled bank for the enforcement of the Reserve Bank of India’s circulars and guidelines issued in the public interest, as the bank discharges a public function when acting in a capacity that involves public interest and the protection of customers in electronic banking.
The High Court observed that while HDFC Bank may not be a ‘State’ or its instrumentality under Article 12 of the Constitution, a writ petition under Article 226 is maintainable against it because the Bank discharges a public function when it implements the guidelines formulated by the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) under Section 35A of the Banking Regulation Act for the protection of customers in electronic banking transactions.
The Court also clarified that under the RBI Circular dated 06/07/2017, a customer has zero liability in cases of unauthorized electronic banking transactions arising out of a third-party breach where the deficiency lies neither with the bank nor with the customer but elsewhere in the system, provided the customer notifies the bank within three working days of receiving communication regarding the unauthorized transaction.
The Court observed that the RBI Circular dated 06/07/2017 on ‘Customer Protection – Limiting Liability of Customers in Unauthorised Electronic Banking Transactions’ is independent of any criminal investigation to be conducted to establish any cyber-crime, as the RBI intended to protect the customer who has suffered financial loss on account of fraudulent or unauthorized electronic banking transactions. Further, the Court noted that the burden of proving the customer’s liability in case of unauthorized electronic banking transactions lies entirely on the bank. Since the Bank failed to establish that the Petitioner was careless or negligent, or that he had shared the password or OTP with anyone, the Court observed that the Petitioner was a victim of a SIM swapping fraud, which is a sophisticated form of identity theft where fraudsters take over a victim’s phone number, resulting in the OTPs and banking alerts being received on a cloned/duplicate SIM in the hands of the fraudster.
The Court noted that the Bank’s internal investigation report clearly admitted that the transactions were not alerted because the risk score was 691, and the alert was declined despite the IP location of the disputed transactions (Chennai) being different from the genuine transaction IP location of the customer (Pune).
Since the Bank did not produce a single original log of sending messages or e-mails and its receipt by the Petitioner, but merely placed excerpts from the Log Book of a private agency to urge that the Bank had sent OTPs and e-mails, the Court concluded that since the fault lies neither with the Bank nor with the customer, but elsewhere in the system (third-party breach), and the customer notified the bank promptly, the clause fixing ‘zero liability’ on the customer gets triggered, entitling the Petitioner to a full refund.
A minority shareholder, even if a public sector undertaking, does not have a special right for differential treatment or separate valuation outside the prescribed statutory rules of the Companies Act, 2013, unless such a special right is provided under the Articles of Association
The Chennai Bench of the National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT) in the case of Tamilnadu Industrial Investment Corporation Limited vs Dipak Raj Sood [CP(CAA)/34(CHE)/2024] dated April 02, 2026, has held that takeover offer under a scheme of arrangement to acquire remaining minority shares under Section 230(11) of the Companies Act, 2013, where shares of non-promoter shareholders are taken over by promoters based on fair valuation prescribed by the Act and applicable rules, cannot be termed as ‘disinvestment’ by a State Government Company.
The NCLT held that a minority shareholder, even if a public sector undertaking, does not have a special right for differential treatment or separate valuation outside the prescribed statutory rules of the Companies Act, 2013, unless such a special right is provided under the Articles of Association or through any other instrument.
An application under Section 230(12) of the Companies Act, 2013 for grievances with respect to a takeover offer must be made when the scheme is under consideration by the Tribunal; and an application for recall or modification under Section 230(12) and Section 231(1)(b) is not maintainable once the scheme has been fully implemented and the consideration has been distributed and accepted, added the Tribunal.
The Tribunal observed that Section 230(12) of the Companies Act provides an opportunity for an aggrieved person to apply to the tribunal in respect of a grievance, if any, in the takeover offer of the company, and this application should be made when the scheme is under consideration by the tribunal. In the present case, the application was filed much after the scheme was approved and implemented.
The Tribunal observed that Section 231(1)(b) gives power to the tribunal to give directions or modify the scheme for its proper implementation; however, the scheme has been fully implemented, consideration has been distributed to all shareholders other than dormant shareholders, and the Applicant has also received its share of consideration. The Scheme of takeover under Section 230(11) of the Companies Act 2013 was approved by the tribunal after following the due process on 31.07.2024, and the valuation of shares was made as provided under Rule 3(6)(a) of the Companies (Compromises, Arrangements and Amalgamations) Rules, 2016.
The Tribunal further observed that Section 230(11) of the Companies Act was notified on 03.02.2020, providing an opportunity for majority shareholders to squeeze out minority shareholders through a process of selective reduction. The framework set in place by the above provisions does not envisage any inherent right of minority shareholders to retain their shares in the face of fair consideration being offered to them, based on legal precedents such as the Bombay High Court judgment in Sandvik Asia Limited v. Bharat Kumar Padamsi and the Cadbury India Limited principles, which emphasize ensuring fair valuation by reference to the rate at which past offers were effected.
Moving ahead, the Tribunal observed that disinvestment is the process when the Government wants to take back the investment made by it, and the guidelines regarding getting the highest of the valuation from the five valuation methods will be applicable only then. In the present case, it is a scheme under which shares of non-promoter shareholders are being taken over by the promoters based on the fair valuation as prescribed by the Companies Act and applicable rules, so this process in no way can be termed as disinvestment.
Thus, under the Articles of Association or through any other instrument, the Applicant does not get a special right for differential treatment in case of a takeover of shares by promoters under Section 230(11) of the Companies Act 2013, added the Tribunal.
Where a decree-holder seeks attachment of a debt or bank account not in the possession of the judgment-debtor, Order XXI Rule 46 CPC empowers the executing court to attach such property by a written prohibitory order directed to the person in possession, and Order XXI Rule 46A CPC operates only after such attachment
The High Court of Telangana at Hyderabad Bench in the case of Union of India vs Krishnapatnam Railway Company Limited [Commercial Court Appeal No.7 of 2026] dated April 10, 2026, has held that where a decree-holder seeks attachment of a debt or bank account not in the possession of the judgment-debtor, Order XXI Rule 46 CPC empowers the executing court to attach such property by a written prohibitory order directed to the person in possession, and Order XXI Rule 46A CPC operates only after such attachment.
On the objection concerning Order XXI Rules 46 and 46A CPC, the Court carefully distinguished the two provisions and set out the statutory sequence. It held that Rule 46 empowers the executing court to attach a debt, share or other property not in the possession of the judgment-debtor by a written prohibitory order directed to the person in possession of the property, whereas Rule 46A applies after attachment under Rule 46 and enables the Court, on the application of the attaching creditor, to issue notice to the garnishee either to pay the debt to court or to appear and show cause.
The Court observed that, in the present case, once the garnishee bank filed a memo stating that it had complied with the attachment order and had withheld/stopped transactions in the account, proceedings under Order XXI Rule 46A became unnecessary and irrelevant. Since the garnishee in the present case did not dispute liability and confirmed compliance with the attachment order, the appellant’s challenge founded on non-compliance with Rule 46A was held to be without factual or statutory basis.
Thus, the Court said that the issuance of notice to the garnishee under Rule 46A is not mandatory and, in any event, becomes unnecessary where the garnishee has already complied with the attachment order and does not dispute liability.
Further, the High Court held that exemptions under the proviso to Section 60(1) CPC attach only to specified amounts falling within the exempted categories and not to the entirety of a bank account; the burden lies on the judgment-debtor claiming exemption to furnish specific particulars and cogent material identifying the nature, quantum, and extent of the exempt sums. In the absence of such particulars, the executing court is justified in rejecting the claim for exemption from attachment.
The High Court observed that the burden of proof lies squarely on the party seeking to avail the benefit of the exemptions under the proviso to Section 60(1) CPC, namely, the appellant/judgment-debtor, to establish that the property is not liable to attachment or sale. The Court found that the appellant had failed to furnish any particulars regarding the nature of the property, the specific exempt amounts, their quantum, or their proportion in the overall treasury account balance.
The Court observed that the proviso to Section 60(1) CPC carves out exceptions from attachment in respect of “the following particulars,” indicating that only certain specified amounts are immune from attachment, as opposed to the entire account itself. The appellant, however, sought to invoke the statutory exemption in respect of the entirety of the treasury account without segregating or identifying the protected sums.
Legal Updates ( April 6 – April 11, 2026)
Legal Updates ( April 6 – April 11, 2026 )
CASE UPDATES
A withdrawal slip drawn on a co-operative society partakes the character of a ‘cheque’ and the society falls within the definition of a ‘banker’, rendering the complaint under Section 138 of the N.I. Act maintainable in law
The Kerala High Court in the case of Clara Dominic vs Tomy Eapen [Criminal MC No. 1782 of 2026] dated March 26, 2026, has held that if the instrument operates as a mandate for payment drawn on an account maintained with an institution carrying on banking functions, it would fall within the ambit of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (N.I. Act). Hence, a withdrawal slip drawn on a co-operative society partakes the character of a ‘cheque’ and the society falls within the definition of a ‘banker’, rendering the complaint under Section 138 of the N.I. Act maintainable in law.
The High Court observed that the expression ‘banker’ under Section 3 of the N.I. Act is of wide amplitude, is inclusive in nature, and extends to any person or institution acting as a banker. Co-operative societies carrying on banking business, notwithstanding the absence of a profit motive or formal licensing under the Regulation Act, fall within the ambit of a ‘banker’ for the purposes of the N.I. Act. Hence, instruments drawn on such institutions, including withdrawal slips operating as payment mandates, cannot be excluded from the sweep of the NI Act merely on technical nomenclature.
The Court noted that the essence of ‘banking’ lies in the acceptance of deposits from the public repayable on demand or otherwise, coupled with the facility of withdrawal by instruments such as cheques, drafts, or orders. Thus, the mere absence of a licence under Section 22 of the Regulation Act does not detract from the character of the activity as banking business, nor can such absence be invoked as a defence to evade legal obligations arising therefrom. The Court clarified that the substance of the transaction, and not its form or nomenclature, is determinative.
Once the statutory period of filing the written statement has elapsed, any subsequent filing of an application under Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC shall not revive the statutory period in any manner whatsoever, and shall not extend the statutory period for filing the written statement
The Delhi High Court in the case of IDBI Trusteeship Services vs Manish Jain [CS(COMM) 800/2025] dated March 23, 2026, has ruled that once the statutory period of filing the written statement has elapsed, any subsequent filing of an application under Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC shall not revive the statutory period in any manner whatsoever, and shall not extend the statutory period for filing the written statement.
The High Court observed that the application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC for rejection of the plaint was filed by defendant no. 2 much after the statutory period of 120 days for filing of the written statement had expired. It noted that while a defendant is entitled to file an application for rejection of plaint under Order VII Rule 11 CPC before filing the written statement, the liberty to file such an application cannot be made as a ruse for retrieving the lost opportunity to file the written statement.
Referring to the Supreme Court judgment in R.K. Roja Versus U.S. Rayudu [(2016) 14 SCC 275], the Court observed that once the statutory period for filing the written statement has already lapsed, subsequent filing of an application for rejection of plaint will not revive such statutory period. Thus, the Court categorically rejected the plea of defendant no. 2 that its right for filing the written statement ought not to have been closed due to the subsequent filing of the Order VII Rule 11 CPC application.
The Court further observed that the contention of defendant no. 2 regarding the interim moratorium operating under Section 96 of the IBC, on account of which the suit against defendant no. 2 is allegedly not maintainable, is the subject matter of the pending application filed under Order VII Rule 11 CPC for rejection of the plaint. Accordingly, the Court held that this aspect shall be considered by the Court while adjudicating the said application filed on behalf of defendant no. 2.
When a part of the sum covered by the cheque is paid during the period between the date on which the cheque is drawn and its encashment upon maturity, then the legally enforceable debt on the date of maturity would not be the sum represented on the cheque
The Kerala High Court (Ernakulam Bench) in the case of Danikutti Philip vs Johnykutty J [Criminal Application No. 1965 of 2025] dated March 26, 2026, has ruled that when a part of the sum covered by the cheque is paid during the period between the date on which the cheque is drawn and its encashment upon maturity, then the legally enforceable debt on the date of maturity would not be the sum represented on the cheque.
The High Court clarified that when part payment is made and the indorsement mandated under Section 56 of the Negotiable Instruments Act (NI Act) failed to be recorded, presenting the cheque for the whole sum, of which a part payment has already been paid, does not represent the legally enforceable debt; thus no offence under the NI Act would lie in case of dishonour of such a cheque.
The Court observed that Sections 15 and 56 of the NI Act assume significance, noting that Section 56 provides that where an amount has been partly paid, a note to that effect may be indorsed on the instrument, which may then be negotiated for the balance. If the drawer of the cheque pays a part or whole of the sum between the period when the cheque is drawn and when it is encashed upon maturity, then the legally enforceable debt on the date of maturity would not be the sum represented on the cheque. It noted that the complainant launched prosecution claiming Rs. 10.90 lakhs as such, shown in the cheque itself, without disclosing the part payments in the complaint.
The Court therefore observed that the prosecution could not be held as one consequent to dishonour of a cheque which represent a legally enforceable debt coming to Rs. 10.90 lakhs, and when the prosecution is not for a legally enforceable debt in full on the date of presentation of the cheque, no offence under Section 138 of the NI Act gets attracted.
A document titled ‘Deed of Hypothecation’ that contains a covenant whereby the hypothecator undertakes to cause the borrower to pay or repay the borrower’s dues, constitutes a contract of guarantee, rendering the executing party a Corporate Guarantor under Section 5(5A) of the IBC, irrespective of the nomenclature of the document
The National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT), New Delhi Bench, in the case of J.C. Flowers Asset Reconstruction vs Imagine Habitat Private Limited [C.P.(IB) – 30/ND/2026] dated April 07, 2026, has held that a document titled ‘Deed of Hypothecation’ that contains a covenant whereby the hypothecator undertakes to cause the borrower to pay or repay the borrower’s dues, constitutes a contract of guarantee, rendering the executing party a Corporate Guarantor under Section 5(5A) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, irrespective of the nomenclature of the document.
The Tribunal explained that under Section 60(2) and 60(3) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, an application relating to the insolvency resolution of a Corporate Guarantor must be filed before the same National Company Law Tribunal Bench where the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process of the Principal Debtor is pending, overriding the general territorial jurisdiction rules based on the registered office of the Corporate Guarantor.
The Tribunal therefore held that consistent with the principles of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, the liability of the principal borrower and the surety is co-extensive, permitting separate or simultaneous insolvency proceedings to be initiated under Section 7 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 against both the Corporate Debtor and the Corporate Guarantor.
The Tribunal observed that the execution of the Deed of Hypothecation by the Corporate Debtors made them liable as Corporate Guarantors. Clause 1 of the Deed explicitly contained a covenant that the Hypothecators ‘shall cause the Borrower(s) to pay/repay the Borrower’s Dues’. Relying on the Supreme Court judgment in China Development Bank vs. Doha Bank Q.P.S.C. [(2025) 7 Supreme Court Cases 729], the Tribunal noted that the nomenclature of a document is not decisive; a contract becomes a guarantee when it is an undertaking to perform the promise or discharge the liability of a third person in case of default. Therefore, the Corporate Debtors stood as sureties for the repayment of the debt procured by the Principal Debtor.
Addressing the contention that no default had occurred and that the Arbitral Award was under challenge, the Tribunal observed that the default was crystallized in terms of Clauses 12.1 and 12.2 of the Loan Agreement, which allowed the lender to recall the loan upon a ‘Material Adverse Effect’. The Tribunal further observed that under Section 238 of the IBC, the provisions of the Code have an overriding effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent contained in any other law. It reiterated that a decree or final adjudication, such as an Arbitral Award, gives rise to a fresh period of limitation, and the pendency of a Section 34 challenge does not bar proceedings under Section 7 of the IBC.
Dues arising during the CIRP period cannot be classified as “insolvency resolution process costs” merely because they accrued during that period; and they must be directly related to the CIRP and expressly approved by the Committee of Creditors as mandated by Regulation 31(e) of the IBBI (Insolvency Resolution Process for Corporate Persons) Regulations, 2016
The Mumbai Bench of the National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT) in the case of Kohinoor City Office Towers Industrial Estate vs Santanu T [IA No. 4520/2025] dated April 02, 2026, has held that maintenance dues and property tax dues arising during the liquidation period, even in respect of assets that stood attached by the Enforcement Directorate (provided they have not been confiscated and continue to vest in the Corporate Debtor), directly serve the purpose of preservation and protection of the liquidation estate and bear the character of ‘liquidation costs’ within the meaning of Regulation 2(1)(ea) of the IBBI (Liquidation Process) Regulations, 2016.
Conversely, the Tribunal clarified that the dues arising during the CIRP period cannot be classified as “insolvency resolution process costs” merely because they accrued during that period; and they must be directly related to the CIRP and expressly approved by the Committee of Creditors as mandated by Regulation 31(e) of the IBBI (Insolvency Resolution Process for Corporate Persons) Regulations, 2016.
The Tribunal observed that under Section 5(13) of the IBC read with Regulation 31(e) of the IBBI (Insolvency Resolution Process for Corporate Persons) Regulations, 2016, a cost qualifies as a CIRP cost only if it is directly related to the CIRP and has been approved by the Committee of Creditors (CoC). In the present case, the CoC had not approved the maintenance dues to be treated as CIRP costs, and the mere fact that the dues arose during the CIRP period is not determinative for them to be classified as CIRP costs.
The Tribunal noted that ‘liquidation cost’ under Regulation 2(1)(ea) of the IBBI (Liquidation Process) Regulations, 2016 includes costs incurred by the Liquidator for preserving and protecting the assets of the Corporate Debtor. Maintenance charges payable to a cooperative housing society are indispensable to the continued functionality and marketability of the units, as non-payment entitles the Society to restrict access to common amenities, thereby rendering the units inaccessible and commercially unviable.
This deterioration would prejudice the interests of all stakeholders by diminishing the realizable value of the asset and impairing the Liquidator’s ability to present a clean and encumbrance-free asset for sale. Therefore, the payment of maintenance dues and property tax dues is a necessary incident of the preservation and protection of the assets, added the Tribunal.
On the effect of ED attachment under PMLA, the Tribunal observed that the subject properties had been exempted from confiscation under the PMLA. A provisional or confirmed attachment order under the PMLA freezes the property but does not extinguish the title of the owner or transfer it to the government; and only confiscation has the effect of vesting the property in the Union of India.
Since no confiscation took place, the properties retained their character as assets of the Corporate Debtor and became part of the liquidation estate under Section 36 of the IBC, and the Liquidator’s obligation to preserve and protect these assets is not extinguished or suspended merely by reason of a PMLA attachment, added the Tribunal.
Lastly, the Tribunal held that property tax dues accruing prior to the liquidation commencement date cannot be accorded priority treatment as CIRP costs because they were not approved by the CoC. However, property tax dues accruing after the liquidation commencement date are treated mutatis mutandis to maintenance dues and qualify as liquidation costs.
If the drawer does not dispute the issuance of the cheque or deny his signature, the statutory presumption as contemplated under Section 139 of the N.I. Act comes into play. Consequently, the burden shifts to the drawer to prove that the cheque was not issued for any legally enforceable debt or liability, an exercise that must be undertaken during the trial
The Supreme Court in the case of Renuka vs State of Maharashtra [2026 INSC 327] dated April 07, 2026, has held that at the stage of issuance of process, the statutory presumption under Section 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act (NI Act) cannot be dislodged in a summary manner merely by contending that the cheque issued was not for any legally enforceable debt or liability. Once the basic ingredients of Section 138 of the NI Act are duly satisfied by the complainant, the rebuttal of the statutory presumption by the drawer can only be made during the course of trial.
The Court observed that at the stage of issuance of process by the Metropolitan Magistrate, what is prima facie required to be seen is the issuance of the cheque by the drawer, its dishonour on presentation, issuance of the statutory notice, and filing of the complaint within the prescribed statutory period.
The Court clarified that if the drawer does not dispute the issuance of the cheque or deny his signature, the statutory presumption as contemplated under Section 139 of the N.I. Act comes into play. Consequently, the burden shifts to the drawer to prove that the cheque was not issued for any legally enforceable debt or liability, an exercise that must be undertaken during the trial.
The Court noted that the Sessions Court misdirected itself by giving more weightage to the fact that the agreement dated 12th January 2022 was not signed by the second respondent, thereby ignoring that the basic ingredients for attracting the provisions of Section 138 of the N.I. Act had been duly satisfied for the issuance of process. Concluding that the cheque was not issued for a legally enforceable debt at the pre-trial stage itself, without granting an opportunity to the complainant to substantiate her case by leading evidence, amounts to ignoring the statutory presumption. Such an approach results in the presumption under Section 139 of the N.I. Act getting washed away even prior to the commencement of the trial.
NCLT under the IBC does not possess the jurisdiction or power to direct the refund of TDS deducted on interest accruing on fixed deposits; and that the exercise of powers regarding the refund of TDS is the exclusive prerogative of the Income Tax Authorities under the prevailing income tax laws
The Chennai Bench of the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT) in the case of S. Dhanapal vs Income Tax Officer [Company Appeal (AT) (CH) (Ins) No. 644/2025] dated April 02, 2026, has held that the Adjudicating Authority (NCLT) under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 does not possess the jurisdiction or power to direct the refund of TDS deducted on interest accruing on fixed deposits; and that the exercise of powers regarding the refund of TDS is the exclusive prerogative of the Income Tax Authorities under the prevailing income tax laws.
The Tribunal clarified that the determination of whether a Liquidator is entitled to exemptions under Section 140 of the Income Tax Act regarding the verification and filing of income tax returns falls strictly within the decision-making domain of the Income Tax Authorities. Any challenge or appeal preferred before the NCLT or NCLAT prior to such determination by the Income Tax Authorities is premature and not maintainable.
The overriding effect of Section 238 of the IBC over the Income Tax Act cannot be invoked prematurely; it can only be subjected to judicial scrutiny after the Income Tax Authorities have made a definitive decision regarding the exemptions claimed, particularly because the IBC, 2016 is silent on the specific aspect of TDS refunds.
The Tribunal observed that the direction issued by the Adjudicating Authority (NCLT) was merely an enabling direction for the Liquidator to submit a simpliciter account showing the income and expenditure of the Corporate Debtor during the liquidation period, which was required before the Income Tax Authorities could consider the refund request. The Tribunal noted that the Appellant’s challenge was a ‘challenge in premonition’, attempting to forestall the process and nip the problem at its bud based on an apprehension that the Income Tax Authorities would demand regular returns.
The Tribunal observed that under the IBC, 2016, there is no provision conferring power on the Adjudicating Authority to issue directions for the refund of TDS already made on the interest accruing on the fixed deposit. The exercise of powers for the refund of TDS is the prerogative of the Income Tax Authorities under prevailing income tax laws.
The intricacies of Section 140 of the Income Tax Act, its judicial interpretation, and the conditions for TDS deduction are questions required to be considered by the competent income tax authority itself, as the refund must flow from the Income Tax Authorities and not from authorities constituted under the IBC, added the Tribunal.
Regarding the Appellant’s argument on the inconsistency of law and the overriding effect of Section 238 of the IBC over Section 140 of the Income Tax Act, the Tribunal observed that taxation laws operate within their own domain. The aspect of inconsistency would only come into play when the Income Tax Authorities actually take a decision pertaining to the extension or denial of the benefit under Section 140 of the Income Tax Act.
The Tribunal further noted that the IBC is silent on the aspect of refund of TDS, and inconsistency prevails only when both laws have equivalent, contradictory provisions on the subject matter. The actual cause of action to approach the competent authorities under the IBC would only arise after a decision is rendered by the Income Tax Authorities.
No proceedings under Section 9 of IBC could have been drawn by an entity, which did not have the juristic authority in the eyes of law, and vested authority to litigate as a juristic entity. Thus, company petition filed by non-existing entity at time of institution of Section 9 application of IBC, is not maintainable
The Chennai Bench of the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT) in the case of Samunnati Agri Value Chain Solutions vs Nekkanti Sea Foods [Company Appeal (AT) (CH) (Ins) No. 337 / 2025] dated April 02, 2026, has held that that no proceedings under Section 9 of IBC could have been drawn by an entity, which did not have the juristic authority in the eyes of law, and vested authority to litigate as a juristic entity. Mere order of condonation of delay application will not itself make the entity of M/s. Samunnati Agri Value Chain Solutions Private Limited, to be a Company being a juristic status. The Application under Section 9 of IBC, was showing the Applicant as M/s. Samunnati Agro Solutions Private Limited, which was a name in much distinction to Samunnati Agri Value Chain Solutions Private Limited.
The Tribunal observed that since the Company Petition itself was preferred on Sep 19, 2024, the entity which was alleged to be holding a juristic authority and juristic existence to file the Company Petition, in fact was rather a non-existing entity. M/s. Samunnati Agro Solutions Private Limited, was not legally in existence at that point of time and there was no reservation of right reserved, to sue or be sued.
The Tribunal explained that as on the date of institution of the proceedings under Section 9 of IBC, it was filed by M/s. Samunnati Agro Solutions Private Limited, which was a non-existing company as its existence did not persist in the eyes of law even much prior to the institution of the Application, having merged into the parent company as on Dec 23, 2022.
Thus, the Tribunal upheld the dismissal of the Company Petition, as the company was not into existence in the eyes of law at the time of the institution of Section 9 Application of Insolvency & Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (IBC). Owing to the said fact, since the proceedings was drawn by a non-existing entity, it was not maintainable and the same has been rightly dismissed by the NCLT.
Merely signing a Board Resolution does not establish that a director was in charge of and responsible for the day-to-day affairs of a company, and therefore cannot by itself justify prosecution under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act
The Supreme Court in the case of Saroj Pandey vs Govt of NCT of Delhi [2026 INSC 324] dated April 07, has held that merely signing a Board Resolution does not establish that a director was in charge of and responsible for the day-to-day affairs of a company, and therefore cannot by itself justify prosecution under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. The Court reiterated that liability of a director under Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act requires a specific averment that the person was in charge of and responsible for the conduct of the company’s business at the relevant time.
The Court observed that a Board Resolution is a document that is signed by the members of the Board of Directors for decisions taken or conclusions arrived at for matters placed before the Board for consideration and decision. This may be inter alia regarding hiring of personnel at management levels, acquisition or liquidation of assets affecting the overall position of the assets and liabilities of the Company or any other such major directional issue. This, however, does not in any manner mean that each and every member of the Board of Directors is aware of all decisions taken in the everyday transactions that are involved in running a business concern.
The Court emphasised that the statutory requirement is not satisfied merely by establishing the person’s designation as a director, and that deemed liability cannot be inferred without specific factual assertions. The Court also noted that there was no direct allegation in the complaint against the appellant that she was in charge of, and responsible for the conduct of business of the company. Thus, the Court quashed the criminal proceedings initiated against the director in a cheque dishonour case, observing that there was no specific allegation demonstrating her active role in the conduct of the company’s business.
Where the adjudication of a dispute between the parties is exclusively in the domain of the NCLT, such as a dispute regarding the premature recovery or default in repayment of a loan/deposit under Section 45 QA of the Reserve Bank of India Act, 1934, the civil court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit or grant any injunction in that matter
Referring to Section 430 of the Companies Act, 2013, the Allahabad High Court in the case of Shivam Traders And Hire Purchase Pvt Ltd vs Madhusudan Vehicles Pvt Ltd [2026:AHC:67074] dated March 31, 2026, has held that where the adjudication of a dispute between the parties is exclusively in the domain of the National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT), such as a dispute regarding the premature recovery or default in repayment of a loan/deposit under Section 45 QA of the Reserve Bank of India Act, 1934, the civil court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit or grant any injunction in that matter.
Further, a litigant who suppresses material facts, such as the prior institution of proceedings before the NCLT, does not approach the court with clean hands, is disentitled from obtaining the discretionary and equitable relief of injunction, added the Court.
A Single Judge Bench of Justice Sandeep Jain observed that the defendant had already filed a petition under Section 45 QA of the RBI Act read with Rule 73 of the NCLT Rules, 2016 before the NCLT on Sep 09, 2020, prior to the plaintiff filing the instant suit on Jan 01, 2021. This fact was in the knowledge of the plaintiff but was deliberately suppressed and concealed while filing the suit.
The Court noted that the plaintiff apprehended legal proceedings by the defendant and filed the suit to pre-empt such proceedings or any order that could have been passed against it, which is barred by Section 41(b) of the Specific Relief Act. It held that since the defendant had already initiated proceedings before the NCLT, the plaintiff had no cause of action to file the instant suit and had not approached the court with clean hands, thereby disentitling it from getting any equitable relief of injunction.
The Court examined Section 45-I(bb) of the RBI Act and observed that the definition of ‘deposit’ expressly includes any receipt of money by way of deposit or loan or in any other form. It held that the plaintiff’s contention that money advanced as a loan to an NBFC is not covered under Section 45 QA is fallacious and liable to be rejected. If an NBFC commits default in repayment of a loan, the entity that advanced the loan can make a complaint under Section 45 QA of the RBI Act to the NCLT for safeguarding its interests.
The Court further observed that under Section 45 QA of the RBI Act, the NCLT is the only judicial authority empowered to decide disputes regarding whether depositors are entitled to claim back their deposit/loan from the NBFC, whether any default was committed, and the manner of refund. It held that no civil court shall have jurisdiction to entertain any suit or proceeding in respect of any matter which the Tribunal is empowered to determine under the Act or any other law (which includes the RBI Act).
Consequently, the civil court had no jurisdiction to grant an injunction restraining the defendant from prematurely recovering the loan amount, as this dispute fell exclusively within the domain of the NCLT, added the Court.
The right to disclosure is not absolute if the disclosure of any part affects third-party interests. If some portion of the forensic audit report or other material is found to impinge upon third-party rights in the opinion of the bank, the bank can withhold disclosure of those parts of the report
The Supreme Court in the case of State Bank of India vs Amit Iron Pvt Ltd [Civil Appeal Nos. 4243-4244 of 2026] dated April 07, 2026, has held that the ruling in State Bank of India vs. Rajesh Agarwal [(2023) 6 SCC 1] did not recognize any right in the borrower to a personal hearing by the banks before classifying their account as a fraud account. The RBI in its Master Directions of July 15, 2024 correctly understood the scope of Rajesh Agarwal judgment and incorporated Clause 2.1.1.1, 2.1.1.2, 2.1.1.3, and 2.1.1.4 as the procedure to be followed before classifying an account as a fraud account.
The Apex Court pointed out that the procedure set out in Rajesh Agarwal, which has been incorporated in the RBI Master Directions of 2024, strikes a fair balance between promptitude and fairness and duly comports with the principles of natural justice. Wherever audit reports are available, including forensic audit reports, the same shall be furnished to the borrower and their representation on the report be elicited. Disclosure by furnishing copies of the audit report to the borrower is mandatory.
If the banks, for reasons to be recorded, establish that the disclosure of any part of the report would affect the privacy of third parties, in that exceptional situation banks would be justified to withhold those portions of the report. Thus, the judgments of the High Courts which have taken a contrary view stand overruled, added the Court.
The Court observed that the judgment in State Bank of India vs. Rajesh Agarwal did not recognize any right in the borrower to a personal hearing from the Banks before classifying their accounts as a fraud account. In the context of the entire judgment, what was contemplated was only a Show Cause Notice, a written representation in the form of a reply, and the mandate that the order passed thereon must be reasoned so as to comport with fairness and indicate due application of mind.
The Court stated that the ultimate objective of the principles of natural justice is to ensure fairness in action and prevent miscarriage of justice, and it is a flexible concept that depends on the facts, circumstances, and framework of the law. Granting a right of personal hearing to each and every borrower would be practically inexpedient considering the large volume of cases. It explained that oral hearing is bound to convert an administrative process intended to be swift into a protracted one, defeating the very purpose of the exercise. It would also provide an opportunity to recalcitrant borrowers to dissipate assets, destroy evidence, or abscond, causing enormous prejudice to public interest.
As far as disclosure of Forensic Audit Reports is concerned, the Court observed that the borrower has a right to be disclosed of the material relevant to the proceeding against him, including the disclosure of the audit report. The furnishing of findings and conclusions alone would not tantamount to compliance with the principles of natural justice, as a complete sense of the findings can only be made after reading the contents of the report.
Legal Updates ( March 30 – April 04, 2026)
Legal Updates ( March 30 – April 04, 2026 )
CASE UPDATES
A shareholder or director of a company does not possess ownership over the entirety of the company’s data or assets, as a company incorporated under the Companies Act acquires a distinct juristic personality, and its property, including digital assets such as data, code, and intellectual property, vests exclusively in the company alone
The Karnataka High Court (Bengaluru Bench) in the case of Aashay Harlalka vs State of Karnataka [Criminal Petition No.12927 of 2025] dated March 25, 2026, has ruled that a shareholder or director of a company does not possess ownership over the entirety of the company’s data or assets, as a company incorporated under the Companies Act acquires a distinct juristic personality, and its property, including digital assets such as data, code, and intellectual property, vests exclusively in the company alone.
The High Court observed that the principal defence advanced on behalf of the petitioner does not withstand legal scrutiny and is liable to be rejected at the threshold. Once a Company is incorporated under the Companies Act, it acquires a distinct juristic personality, separate and independent of its shareholders and directors. The property of the Company, whether tangible or intangible, vests in the Company alone, and the parity in shareholding does not translate into proprietary entitlement over the company’s assets.
The court noted that a shareholder acquires merely a right to participate in the profits of the Company and does not, by any shareholding, obtain proprietary interests in the assets of the Company. In the contemporary digital age, the assets of a Company are not confined to physical or movable property but extend, in significant measure, to data, code, and intellectual property, which are owned exclusively by the Company.
The Court further observed that the issue is not purely civil in nature; it has all the hues and forms of cyber-crime, involving allegations of downloading, copying, deletion of source code, proprietary data, and confidential digital assets, which require highly technical and complex investigations involving forensic reconstitution of data.
Properties which have no nexus to a criminal activity relating to a scheduled offence cannot be regarded as proceeds of crime, and attachment of property acquired prior to the commission of the crime would not fall within the definition of the proceeds of crime
The Gauhati High Court in the case of Kumar Sanjit Krishna vs Directorate of Enforcement [Criminal Appeal (PMLA)/1/2025] dated March 27, 2026, has held that properties which have no nexus to a criminal activity relating to a scheduled offence cannot be regarded as proceeds of crime, and attachment of property acquired prior to the commission of the crime would not fall within the definition of the proceeds of crime.
If there is a disputed question of fact with regard to when the property had been purchased and keeping in mind the fact that the property had allegedly being registered in the name of the appellant only during the period of commission of the crime, the said disputed question of fact would have to be proved by way of evidence.
The High Court observed that the attached property is required to have a connection with the crime in question. The enforcement authority has to be able to trace the attached property to the criminal act relating to the scheduled offense, in terms of Section 2(1)(u) of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 (PMLA). Only a property which is connected with the proceeds of the crime can be attached and the only exception to the above, is when the property derived out of criminal activity is taken out of India and held outside India.
The Court noted that the Appellate Tribunal (SAFEMA) had erroneously held that Section 2(1)(u) of the Act would include within its ambit the property of the appellant, even if it did not have any connection with the crime in question, and that even if the property was acquired prior to the crime, it was liable to be attached if the proceeds of crime had vanished and could not be traced.
The Court observed that the pre-condition for being proceeds of crime is that the property has been derived or obtained directly or indirectly, by any person, as a result of criminal activity relating to a scheduled offence. The attachment must be only in respect of property which appears to be proceeds of crime and not all the property belonging to the person concerned.
Hence, the Court concluded that only property which has been derived or obtained, directly or indirectly, as a result of criminal activity relating to a scheduled offence can be attached.
Acquiescence is a complete defence to an infringement action which contemplates the existence of two elements viz. honesty in the defendant’s adoption and use, and lack of some positive act on the part of the plaintiff
The Bombay High Court in the case of Minco India vs Minco India Flow Elements [Commercial Appeal (L) No. 1600 of 2006] dated March 18, 2026, has asserted that a person who does not come to the Court with clean hands is not entitled to be heard on the merits of his grievance, as every Court is not only entitled, but is duty bound to protect itself from unscrupulous litigants who try to pollute the stream of justice by resorting to falsehood or suppressed facts which have a bearing on the adjudication of the issues. The suppression of material facts disentitles a party to the discretionary relief of an interim injunction.
The Court held that acquiescence is a complete defence to an infringement action which contemplates the existence of two elements viz. honesty in the defendant’s adoption and use, and lack of some positive act on the part of the plaintiff. While a plaintiff’s trademark registration makes it entitled to exclusivity, it does not extend to the defendant company in peculiar circumstances where the business of both entities was intertwined flowing from the same origin, and where the plaintiff had expressly granted a no objection to the defendant’s adoption of the corporate name.
The High Court observed that the Appellate Court shall not interfere with the exercise of discretion of the Court of first instance, and substitute its own discretion, except where the same has been shown to be exercised arbitrarily or capriciously or perversely or where the Court had ignored the settled principles of law regulating grant or refusal of interlocutory injunctions.
The Court noted that the Plaintiff suppressed the material fact about their companies being promoted by the same family patriarch and about the inter se relationship between Amarendra and Raghavendra in the management of the Plaintiff and the Defendant company. The plaint completely lacked particulars about the relationship between the Plaintiff and the Defendant, or that Amarendra was a Director in the Defendant company till 2015, conveying a misleading impression that the Defendant is an un-associated third party.
The Court observed that the Plaintiff’s reliance on its registration for the mark ‘MINCO INDIA’ granted on 29/01/2024 does not entitle the Plaintiff to an injunction as a matter of course, as the Plaintiff contrived its alleged cause of action immediately after its registration. The Bench also found the Plaintiff’s inaction for over 13 years, while the Defendant continued its business under the trading name ‘MINCO’ building a formidable business with cumulative sales turnover, amounts to clear acquiescence on the part of the Plaintiff. The Court noted that the Plaintiff in fact approved the change of name of the Defendant company in the year 2012 itself, as both companies formed part of the family-promoted consortium known as ‘GICON’.
Further, the Court observed that the products do not have any mark per se, as the Plaintiff and Defendant are manufacturers of specialized industrial equipment supplied as per the specification of the client, and are not products casually available for sale in the market. Consequently, the likelihood of confusion is minimal, and the reliance by the Plaintiff on a solitary email of February 2024 is not sufficient to establish confusion or the likelihood of confusion. Thus, the court concluded that the balance of convenience is in favour of the Defendant, who has been openly and continuously using ‘MINCO’ as a part of its trade name since September 2012 and has earned reputation and goodwill.
When the landowner had divested its role in the project by vesting development and sale rights in the developer through a power of attorney, then in the absence of any contractual nexus with the homebuyer, no liability could be fastened upon it
The Tamil Nadu Real Estate Regulatory Authority in the case of Mugundhine v. Cybercity Mangadu Project Pvt Ltd. [CCP No. 62 of 2024] dated February 10, 2026, in a delayed possession dispute involving a housing project in Chennai, has held that the marketing entity is not a “promoter” and cannot be held liable, while also declining to fasten liability on the landowner and directing the developer to pay compensation. Dismissing the complaint against Anugraha Real Value Services (Chennai) Pvt Ltd. and Shriram Properties Ltd., the RERA held that neither entity had any privity of contract with the complainant.
The RERA held that the landowner had divested its role in the project by vesting development and sale rights in the developer through a power of attorney, and in the absence of any contractual nexus with the homebuyer, no liability could be fastened upon it. Adjudicating Officer however, held Cybercity Mangadu Project Pvt Ltd., the developer, liable for the delay and directed it to pay Rs 3,00,000 as compensation along with Rs 50,000 towards litigation costs.
Clarifying the scope of liability, the authority observed, “it does not come under the definition of promoter as per Section 2(zk). It did not construct or convert or sell any of the building or apartments. Similarly, it did not develop any land into a project for the purpose of selling to other persons. It had acted as a Marketing Person for the project of the 1st Respondent. Exhibits A1 & A2 do not expose this 3rd Respondent as a party to the agreements. There is no other privity of contract in between the complainant and the 3rd Respondent and so it is not liable to pay for any reliefs to the complainant.”
On the role of the landowner, the authority held that there is no other privity of contract in between this complainant and the 2nd Respondent. As it has relinquished its dealings with the 1st Respondent and as such no amount was deposited in the escrow account, the 2nd Respondent is not liable to pay any compensation or costs to the complainant.
Mere existence of unutilised or unregistered FAR in a real estate project does not, by itself, constitute a violation of Section 3 of the Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016, in the absence of any evidence of actual marketing, sale, or booking
The Haryana Real Estate Appellate Tribunal (HREAT) in the case of Tulip Infratech Private Limited v. Haryana Real Estate Regulatory Authority, Gurugram [Appeal No. 124 of 2024] dated March 27, 2026, has held that the mere existence of unutilised or unregistered FAR in a real estate project does not, by itself, constitute a violation of Section 3 of the Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016, in the absence of any evidence of actual marketing, sale, or booking. It further held that Clause 1(iv) of the Registration Certificate, which provided for levy of late fee in case of default, cannot override the statutory requirement of establishing an actual violation under Section 3 of the Act.
The Tribunal held that while the appellant could not be completely absolved of regulatory consequences, the law targets unregistered sale or marketing, and not mere existence of unregistered FAR. It further held that fastening full retrospective liability on the incoming promoter would be inequitable where the alleged breach itself has not been conclusively established.
The Tribunal observed that while the project reflected some regulatory non-compliance due to incomplete registration of the entire licensed area, the absence of any unlawful sale or marketing activity, coupled with overlapping registration fees already paid for certain phases, rendered the late fee imposed excessive and disproportionate, warranting only a limited and moderated liability.
Considering that there existed an element of delayed comprehensive registration of the project as a whole, and some regulatory levy is justified to uphold statutory discipline, the Tribunal stated that the circumstances warranted moderate penalty in view of the fact that the appellant voluntarily took over an abandoned project. In case, the project had not moved forward, it would have resulted in heavy loss to the allottees.
Knowledge of carrying on of the business with intent to defraud creditors of the company or any other persons or for any fraudulent purpose is sine qua non to bring these persons within the ambit of section 339 of the Companies Act, 2013
The Mumbai Bench of the National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT) in the case of Union of India vs Infrastructure Leasing and Financial Services Ltd [IA 1/2022 IA 2/2022 COMP.APPL/ 313(MB)2025] dated March 24, 2026, has clarified that the aspect whether third persons, including the auditors, participated in, facilitated or assisted fraudulent transactions by a company knowing that the company’s business is being carried on for any fraudulent purpose can only be considered when the evidence(s) on record in relation to their role in perpetration of such fraud are examined.
No general rule for their exclusion from scope of section 339 of the Companies Act, 2013 can be laid, as it would depend on the facts of each case. Accordingly, the contention of third persons, including auditors, against their liability is premature at this juncture, added the NCLT.
The NCLT observed that Section 339 of the Companies Act makes liable any person, who is or has been a director, manager, or officer of the company or any persons who were knowingly parties to the carrying on of the business if any business of the company has been carried on with intent to defraud creditors of the company or any other persons or for any fraudulent purpose.
The Tribunal observed that the definition of officer under Explanation (b) to section 339 has the effect of excluding the word ‘key managerial person’ from the ambit of section 339 of the Act, however, they may fall under the words “any person”.
Further, the Tribunal held that the words “any person” cannot be read ejusdem generis to the words ‘officer, manager or director’ so as to hold that any person would only include a person who is an insider to the company, instead this word is a catch all provision to bring within its ambit any third person i.e. outsider who participated or aided or assisted in the fraud perpetrated by the insiders i.e. ‘officer, manager or director’.
The knowledge of carrying on of the business with intent to defraud creditors of the company or any other persons or for any fraudulent purpose is sine qua non to bring these persons within the ambit of section 339 of the Companies Act, 2013, added the Tribunal.
Moving ahead, the Tribunal made it abundantly clear that the word ‘any persons’ would also include the persons outside the organisation of the company, in whose affairs the fraud has been committed, who participate in, facilitate or assist fraudulent transactions by a company when they know that the company’s business is being carried on for any fraudulent purpose. It also follows that the third persons cannot be automatically brought within the ambit of section 339 of Companies Act, 2013 merely because they were parties to any activity alleged to be fraudulent unless they have participated in facilitating or furthering the said fraudulent activity.
In relation to the liability of Auditors and their partner(s) under Section 339, the Tribunal noted that an Auditor in view of his professional obligations is equated to a watchdog but not a blood hound, however, a watchdog cannot claim immunity if it is found that watchdog deliberately or consciously failed to be vigilant to allow perpetration of fraud by the insiders of the company and such deliberate or conscious act on part of watchdog furthered or facilitated commission of fraud.
The auditors cannot claim any immunity if they are found guilty of active participation or collusion or abatement in the commission of fraud in the affairs of auditee company. Accordingly, the action u/s 339 against the auditors will not lie automatically, however, their culpability in commission of fraud remains subject matter of examination and depends on the evidences on record, concluded the Tribunal.
Non-banking financial companies as defined in clause (f) of section 45-I of the RBI Act, 1934, having assets worth rupees one hundred crore and above, shall be entitled for enforcement of security interest in secured debts and the presence or absence of their name in the notification dated August 05, 2016 is irrelevant in view of notification dated February 24, 2020
The Allahabad High Court in the case of Rakesh Kumar vs Union of India [WRIT – C No. – 5496 of 2026] dated March 24, 2026, has clarified that Save Financial Services Private Limited (Respondent no. 4) being a financial institution for the purposes of the SARFAESI Act, 2002, no writ is maintainable in view of the availability of an efficacious alternative statutory remedy. Hence, the Court dismissed the petition challenging symbolic possession of the secured asset, leaving it open for the petitioner to avail appropriate legal remedy before the appropriate forum in accordance with law including approaching the DRT to avail the statutory remedy available under Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act.
The High Court observed that the underlying purpose of the SARFAESI Act, 2002 is to empower financial institutions to take possession of securities and sell them, as translated into provisions falling under Chapter III of the Act. The Bench examined Section 2(1)(m)(iv) of the SARFAESI Act, which empowers the Central Government to notify institutions as “financial institutions”, and Section 45-I of the Reserve Bank of India Act, 1934.
The Court noted that the notification dated Feb 24, 2020 was notified in supersession of the notification dated August 05, 2016. Through the notification dated Feb 24, 2020, the Central Government specified that all non-banking financial companies as defined in clause (f) of section 45-I of the RBI Act, 1934, having assets worth rupees one hundred crore and above, shall be entitled for enforcement of security interest in secured debts of rupees fifty lakh and above, as financial institutions for the purposes of the said Act.
The Court observed that the presence or absence of the name of respondent no. 4 in the notification dated Aug 05, 2016 becomes irrelevant after the notification dated Feb 24, 2020. The Bench further observed that the notification dated Feb 12, 2021 amended the notification dated Feb 24, 2020, substituting the words “rupees fifty lakh and above” with “rupees twenty lakh and above”. Consequently, the Court found no reason to doubt that respondent no. 4 is a financial institution and can invoke provisions of the SARFAESI Act within its statutory framework.
Regarding maintainability, the Court observed that Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act provides a comprehensive and efficacious remedy to any person aggrieved by measures taken under Section 13(4) of the Act before the Debts Recovery Tribunal. It reiterated that where a statute provides for an efficacious alternative remedy, the High Court would ordinarily refrain from exercising its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, and a writ petition against a private financial institution involving disputed questions of fact is not maintainable when a complete statutory mechanism is provided.
REGULATORY UPDATES
Lok Sabha passes Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (Amendment) Bill, 2025; Introduces a Creditor-Initiated Insolvency Resolution Process (CIIRP) that allows for out-of-court commencement of insolvency proceedings
Seeking to address procedural delays and interpretational issues that the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, has faced, the Lok Sabha passes Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (Amendment) Bill, 2025 on March 30, 2026, removes the liquidator’s powers with respect to admitting/rejecting claims and determining their value. It also provides the committee of creditors (CoC) the power to appoint or remove the liquidator and supervise the liquidation process.
The Bill introduces a Creditor-Initiated Insolvency Resolution Process (CIIRP) that allows for out-of-court commencement of insolvency proceedings by select financial institutions. Further, the debtor remains in control of the company during CIIRP. The Bill empowers the central government to frame rules related to group insolvency and cross-border insolvency proceedings.
Key updates:
The Code states that NCLT may admit CIRP if the default is proven, the application is complete, and no disciplinary proceedings are pending against proposed RP. It requires NCLT to pass an order within 14 days of receiving the application. The Bill makes it mandatory to admit the application when these conditions are met. It specifies that: (i) no other grounds can be considered to reject an application, (ii) NCLT must record reasons in writing if no order is passed within 14 days, and (ii) records from information utility will be sufficient proof of default.
The Bill allows withdrawal of an insolvency application only after the CoC has been constituted and before the first invitation for resolution plans. Such withdrawal would require the approval of 90% of the CoC. Currently, withdrawals are permitted even before the constitution of CoC, and after first invitation of resolution plans. The Bill also allows withdrawal of voluntary liquidation by a special resolution of shareholders and, if required, a resolution of creditors of two-third in value.
The Bill empowers the CoC to supervise liquidation. Presently, a stakeholder consultation committee (SCC) is constituted with all creditors, employees and even shareholders/partners during liquidation. The liquidator is required to consult the SCC on key decisions. However, their advice is not binding on him. The Bill also provides that the RP will not be appointed as the liquidator automatically. The liquidator will be appointed on the proposal of the CoC. CoC may also replace the liquidator.
The Bill adds that NCLT must pass the order for liquidation within 30 days from the date of the application or intimation. It also specifies that liquidation proceedings must be completed in 180 days, extendable by up to 90 days. Further, voluntary liquidation proceedings must be completed within one year.
The Bill clarifies that ‘security interest’ excludes security interest created by virtue of provisions in law. Further, government dues do not have the status of ‘secured creditor’. A security interest is the legal right a creditor has over a debtor’s asset(s) that serve as collateral.
The Bill introduces an alternative process called Creditor-initiated Insolvency Resolution Process (CIIRP). CIIRP is different from CIRP in the following manner: (i) it may be initiated only by specified financial creditors, (ii) it is to be initiated out-of-court, with at least 51% (by value of debt) of the notified financial creditors agreeing to the initiation, and (iii) during CIIRP, management of the company will remain with the debtor, subject to oversight by the RP. CIIRP must be concluded within 150 days, extendable by up to 45 days. CoC may decide at any time to convert the CIIRP into CIRP and seek an order from the NCLT for that conversion.
The Bill contains an enabling provision empowering the central government to prescribe rules for administering and conducting cross-border insolvency proceedings.
The Bill empowers the central government to formulate rules for conducting group insolvency proceedings. The rules may provide for a common bench for such debtors, coordination between the proceedings, common insolvency professionals, and a committee of CoCs of the debtors.
The Bill enables a creditor, who holds a security interest over a guarantor’s asset and has taken possession of that asset under any law, to transfer that asset as part of the corporate debtor’s CIRP. This can only be done with the approval of the CoC. Where the guarantor is also undergoing insolvency or bankruptcy proceedings, approval from the guarantor’s creditors would also be required.
Click here to read/ download the original Bill
Legal Updates ( March 23 – March 28, 2026)
Legal Updates ( March 23 – March 28, 2026 )
CASE UPDATES:
As per Section 32A of the IBC, the liability of a corporate debtor for an offence committed under any law prior to the commencement of CIRP shall cease, and the corporate debtor will not be prosecuted for such an offence from the date the resolution plan is approved by the adjudicating authority
The Delhi High Court in the case of Jas Infrastructure and Power Ltd vs Central Bureau of Investigation [CRL.A. 1596/2025] dated March 17, 2026, has refused to suspend the sentence of Jas Infrastructure and Power Ltd (appellant) finding that the appellant does not meet out the necessary conditions as envisaged under Section 32A of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (IBC), specifically, the approval of a resolution plan resulting in a change of management, coupled with the gravity of the offence committed.
The High Court observed that as per Section 32A of the IBC, the liability of a corporate debtor for an offence committed under any law prior to the commencement of CIRP shall cease, and the corporate debtor will not be prosecuted for such an offence from the date the resolution plan is approved by the adjudicating authority.
However, the Court cautioned about the conditions attached to this benign provision, and stated that exemption under Section 32A can be availed only if the resolution plan results in the change in the management or control of the corporate debtor to a person who was not a promoter, or in the management or control of the corporate debtor or a related party of such person; or a person who abetted or conspired for the commission of the offence.
The Court observed that in the present case, it is admitted that the resolution plan was not approved by the adjudicating authority. It categorically stated that the immunity is premised on various conditions being fulfilled, the foremost being that there must be a resolution plan and it must be approved. The Court also observed that the aforementioned provision aims at the extinguishment of the liability of the corporate debtor to provide a clean slate to the ‘new management’ and not for the wrongdoers to get away with the liability.
Further, the Court observed that Section 32A of the IBC has no direct bearing on Section 14 of the IBC, which provides for a mandatory moratorium period to the corporate debtor from the insolvency commencement date. The Court detailed that Section 32A deals with the extinguishment of liability of the corporate debtor from the date the resolution plan has been approved by the Adjudicating Authority, so that the new management may make a clean break with the past and start on a clean slate.
In contrast, the Court observed that a moratorium provision does not extinguish any liability, civil or criminal, but only casts a shadow on proceedings already initiated and on proceedings to be initiated, which shadow is lifted when the moratorium period comes to an end. During the moratorium period, the institution of new suits or continuation of the pending suits against the corporate debtor are temporarily suspended until the completion of the CIRP. The Court also noted that the present criminal proceedings were instituted much prior in time from the date of insolvency.
Non-inclusion of a claim in the resolution plan results in its extinguishment, and any claim which is not expressly included in the resolution plan, and which is not expressly barred as per such plan, cannot be inferred to have been included therein
The Supreme Court in the case of Ujaas Energy Ltd vs West Bengal Power Development Corporation [2026 INSC 268] dated March 20, 2026, has clarified that non-inclusion of a claim in the resolution plan results in its extinguishment, and any claim which is not expressly included in the resolution plan, and which is not expressly barred as per such plan, cannot be inferred to have been included therein.
The Court held that the West Bengal Power Development Corporation (respondent), although not entitled to independently pursue its claim by way of counterclaim post-approval of the resolution plan, ought to be permitted to raise the plea of set-off at least by way of defence. Further, the respondent shall not derive any positive or affirmative relief on the basis of the said defence and may only defend itself against the claim raised by the appellant to the extent necessary to prevent the appellant from succeeding in the arbitration proceedings either entirely or in part.
In the event the amount claimed in the counterclaim of the respondent, or any part of it, is found to be due and payable to the respondent by the appellant and such amount exceeds the amount awarded to the appellant, the surplus amount shall not be recoverable by the respondent, added the Court.
Conversely, the Court clarified that if any amount remains payable to the appellant after adjustment of the respondent’s defence plea, the same shall be recoverable by the appellant and the Tribunal may order accordingly. If the arbitration proceedings initiated by the appellant are withdrawn, the counterclaim of the respondent shall also fail, as the same is permitted only for the limited purpose of defence.
The Court observed that Section 31(1) of the IBC provides that the terms of an approved resolution plan are binding and attach finality to the plan. The terms are to be read strictly, given the binding nature and extinguishment of claims not part of it, which aligns with the resolution objective of the IBC.
Relying on the precedent set in Ghanashyam Mishra & Sons (P) Ltd. v. Edelweiss Asset Reconstruction Co. Ltd. [(2021) 9 SCC 657], the Court observed that on the date of approval of the resolution plan by the adjudicating authority, all claims which are not a part of the resolution plan shall stand extinguished, and no person will be entitled to initiate or continue any proceedings in respect to a claim which is not part of the resolution plan. The Court added that the respondent cannot seek any affirmative relief from the Tribunal because the respondent’s claim, raised by way of counterclaim before the Tribunal, does not find a place in the resolution plan and hence stands extinguished.
On the Interpretation of the resolution plan and the plea of set-off, the Court noted three specific aspects: first, the respondent raised its counterclaim prior to the approval of the resolution plan; second, the Resolution Professional was aware of the counterclaim, yet it was not made part of the resolution plan; and third, the resolution plan bars all future “payments/settlements” in respect of claims which were not raised before it.
The Court emphasised that Paragraph 12.4.1 of the resolution plan explicitly states that no other payments or settlements will have to be made in respect of claims against the Company, and all such claims, including counterclaims under pending arbitration proceedings, stand irrevocably and unconditionally abated, discharged, settled, and extinguished in perpetuity. Thus, going by the exact words employed in Paragraph 12.4.1 of the plan, it does not appear to bar a plea of set-off being raised as a ‘defence’ in any pending arbitral proceedings, although claims for any “payment” or “settlement”, including a counterclaim, not included therein are specifically not recoverable.
There is no “deemed liability” concept for a ‘Director’ merely by virtue of their designation, and the presence of specific factual averments linking a director to the day-to-day management of a company is not a mere procedural formality but a jurisdictional prerequisite under Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act
The Calcutta High Court in the case of Masud Tarif vs State of West Bengal [CRR 2128 of 2025] dated March 20, 2026, has discarded “deemed liability” concept for a ‘Director’ merely by virtue of their designation, and held that the presence of specific factual averments linking a director to the day-to-day management of a company is not a mere procedural formality but a jurisdictional prerequisite under Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act (NI Act). The Court pointed out that ‘Silence’ in a complaint regarding an individual director’s specific role constitutes a substantive failure to establish a prima facie case.
Where an underlying debt is restructured through a Settlement Agreement, the Court explained that the ‘material time’ for assessing liability shifts to the execution and implementation of said settlement. In settlement-based transactions, vicarious liability must be examined strictly against those who negotiated and executed the restructured debt, and a director who is a documented stranger to such an agreement cannot be held vicariously liable for the dishonour of cheques issued pursuant thereto.
In the exercise of inherent powers under Section 528 of the BNSS, the High Court said that it must prioritize the prevention of an illegal prosecution over procedural technicalities. The Court asserted that procedural delay is intended as a shield to prevent the abuse of the legal system, not a sword to perpetuate an illegal prosecution where the complaint is ‘facially deficient’, and an inherent illegality in a summoning order cannot be cured by the mere passage of time.
A summoning order that fails to distinguish between “Managing Directors/Signatories” and “Non-Executive Directors”, particularly in the absolute absence of specific averments regarding the latter’s role, reflects a failure of judicial application of mind. To allow such a trial to proceed would be to weaponize criminal machinery for civil recovery, amounting to a manifest abuse of the process of law, added the Court.
The Court observed that while the law discourages the ‘mechanical parroting’ of statutory language, it absolutely mandates the presence of a factual nexus, noting that the Complainant specifically attributes the request, negotiations, and discussions to Accused Nos. 2 and 3 alone. The conspicuous omission of the Petitioner is not a mere failure of elective language, but a fundamental failure of jurisdictional fact.
The Court examined the ‘Initial Transaction’ versus the ‘Novation of Debt’, observing that the Settlement Agreement functioned as a ‘novation’, effectively replacing the original 2013 contract with a restructured obligation. The negotiations for this settlement and the subsequent issuance of Post-Dated Cheques were handled exclusively by Accused Nos. 2 and 3, making the Petitioner a stranger to this agreement.
Further, the Court noted that Paragraph 3 of the complaint makes a blanket statement that all directors were ‘carrying on business’, but fails to provide the specific disclosure of facts required to link the individual director to the default. The ‘total silence’ regarding the Petitioner’s overt acts breaks the chain of liability.
It is an essential requirement to specifically aver in a complaint under Section 141 of NI Act that the person accused was in charge of, and responsible for the conduct of business of the company. Further, in the case of a Director, the complaint should specifically spell out how and in what manner the Director was in charge of or was responsible to the accused company for the conduct of its business, pointed out the Court.
Further, the Court observed that while the Magistrate’s hands were tied from recalling the summoning order, the High Court’s inherent jurisdiction is not; if a complaint discloses no offence against a specific individual, the continuation of that proceeding becomes an exercise in futility and a manifest violation of the right to personal liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution of India.
Addressing the Complainant’s plea regarding the Petitioner’s ‘deep slumber’, the Court observed that while delay is a relevant factor in discretionary relief, it cannot sanitize a proceeding that is fundamentally void of jurisdictional competence. The Court therefore concluded that it is the duty of the High Court to intervene where continuation of criminal proceedings would amount to an abuse of process of law, and procedural delay cannot outweigh the substantive injustice of an untenable prosecution.
Disputes arising out of contractual obligations between parties, even if they involve issues of tax reimbursement or compliance, do not fall within the category of non-arbitrable disputes relating to sovereign functions, provided neither party is questioning the validity or legality of the levy of the tax itself
The Allahabad High Court in the case of Shri Pramhans Enterprises vs Varanasi Aurangabad NH-2 Tollway Pvt Ltd [Arbitration and Conciliation Application u/s 11(4) No. – 129 of 2025] dated March 17, 2026, has held that the disputes arising out of contractual obligations between parties, even if they involve issues of tax reimbursement or compliance, do not fall within the category of non-arbitrable disputes relating to sovereign functions, provided neither party is questioning the validity or legality of the levy of the tax itself.
Further, while exercising jurisdiction under Section 11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, the Court is not required to go into the merits of the dispute; and the scope is strictly limited to examining the existence of an arbitration agreement and whether the dispute is prima facie arbitrable, added the High Court.
The Court observed that sovereign functions of the State, including taxation, being inalienable and non-delegable, are non-arbitrable. However, it is evident that disputes arising out of contractual obligations between parties, even if they involve issues of tax reimbursement or compliance, do not fall within the category of non-arbitrable disputes.
Reference was made to the decision of the Delhi High Court in Spectrum Power Generation Limited vs. Gail (India) Limited [ARB.P. No. 746 of 2022], where it was held that where the issue does not relate to the taxing power of the State but rather whether GST/VAT liability could be passed on or reimbursed under an agreement, the dispute is arbitrable.
The Court noted that in the present case, neither party is questioning the validity or legality of the levy of GST. The dispute is essentially with regard to the payment of the contractual dues, which has been withheld by the respondents on the ground of alleged non-compliance of GST obligations by the applicant. The Court observed that such a dispute is contractual in nature and is, therefore, arbitrable. It is always open to the respondents to raise their defence or counterclaim before the arbitral tribunal with regard to GST compliance or any consequential liability.
Further, the Court observed that at this stage, while exercising jurisdiction under Section 11(4) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, it is not required to go into the merits of the dispute. Thus, referring to the case of Duro Felguera S.A. vs. Gangavaram Port Limited, the Court noted that the scope is limited to examining the existence of an arbitration agreement and whether the dispute is prima facie arbitrable, nothing more, nothing less.
Procedural requirements introduced by IBBI Circulars regarding approaching the Special Court under PMLA for restitution of attached assets) cannot be applied retrospectively to applications that were registered and reserved for orders prior to the issuance of such circulars
The Kolkata Bench of the National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT) in the case of Santanu T. Ray vs Axis Bank [I.A. (IBC) 1521(KB) of 2025] dated March 27, 2026, has held that statutory mandate under Section 25(2)(a) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (IBC), coupled with the overriding effect under Section 238, obligates the Resolution Professional to take immediate control and custody of the assets of the Corporate Debtor, invalidating any lien created by statutory authorities (such as the Income Tax Department and Enforcement Directorate) during the subsistence of the moratorium under Section 14 of the IBC.
The NCLT clarified that the financial institutions are statutorily obligated under Section 17(1)(d) to act on the instructions of the Resolution Professional and cannot refuse to remove a lien or handover custody of an asset based on attachments made in violation of the IBC.
Procedural requirements introduced by IBBI Circulars (specifically Circular No. IBBI/CIRP/87/2025 dated Nov 04, 2025 regarding approaching the Special Court under PMLA for restitution of attached assets) cannot be applied retrospectively to applications that were registered and reserved for orders prior to the issuance of such circulars, added the Tribunal.
The Tribunal observed that the term deposit in question constitutes an asset of the Corporate Debtor and that the lien created by statutory authorities during the CIRP period directly falls foul of the moratorium imposed under Section 14 of the Code. A conjoint reading of Section 25(2)(a) and Section 17(1)(d) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 makes it clear that the Resolution Professional is duty bound to take control and custody of all assets of the Corporate Debtor, and the banks are equally obligated to facilitate such control and act on the instructions of the Resolution Professional.
Further, the Tribunal noted that the Income Tax Department had already filed its claim before the Resolution Professional, which had been duly admitted. Therefore, any attempt to secure its dues by creating a lien over the assets of the Corporate Debtor dehors the IBC framework is not permissible.
Relying on the Supreme Court decision in Pr. Commissioner of Income Tax v. Monnet Ispat and Energy Ltd, the Tribunal observed that Section 238 of the Code has an overriding effect, and any action taken by any authority, including statutory authorities, which is inconsistent with the provisions of the Code, cannot be sustained.
The Tribunal took note of Circular No. IBBI/CIRP/87/2025 dated Nov 04, 2025 issued by the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India (IBBI), which advises that where assets are attached by the Enforcement Directorate under the PMLA, the Insolvency Professional may approach the Special Court under Section 8(7) or 8(8) of the PMLA for restitution.
However, the Tribunal observed that the present Interlocutory Application was registered on Sep 24, 2025 and was reserved for orders on Nov 03, 2025, prior to the issuance of the said Circular. Consequently, the procedural requirement as envisaged under the aforesaid Circular cannot be applied retrospectively so as to defeat or delay the relief sought in the present application, particularly when the issue pertains to custody and control of the assets of the Corporate Debtor during the subsistence of CIRP.
REGULATORY UPDATES
SEBI amends ICDR Regulations, and calls for submission of draft abridged prospectus
The Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) vide its Notification No. SEBI/LAD-NRO/GN/2026/299 dated 16 March, 2026, has amended the SEBI (Issue of Capital and Disclosure Requirements) Regulations, 2018, by notifying the SEBI (ICDR) (Amendment) Regulations, 2026, on 16 March.
Under the amended regulations, a draft abridged prospectus must be submitted along with the offer documents and filed with SEBI and the stock exchanges. The abridged prospectus is required to be made available on the websites of the issuer, SEBI, stock exchanges, and lead managers, and must include QR codes and links to access the red herring prospectus, the abridged prospectus, and the price band advertisement.
The amendments mandate that all disclosures in the abridged prospectus be in clear, simple, and easily understandable language. Annexure–1 of the regulations has been substituted to prescribe the format of disclosures, including summaries of business, industry, financial information, risk factors, and other relevant details. The disclosure framework has also been expanded to include summaries of contingent liabilities and related party transactions.
The regulations will come into force on the date of their publication in the Official Gazette.
SEBI postpones implementing Intraday Borrowing Norms for Mutual Funds
The Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) vide its Circular No. HO/(92)2026-IMD-POD-2/1/7885/2026 dated 25 March 2026, has deferred the implementation of guidelines on intraday borrowing by mutual funds to 15 July 2026, citing operational challenges faced by asset management companies.
The circular, issued as an addendum to SEBI’s earlier circular dated 13 March 2026 on borrowing by mutual funds, noted that intraday borrowing norms were specified under clause 5.9.1 of the Master Circular.
To address operational difficulties raised by AMCs, SEBI has postponed the applicability of these provisions. Therefore, the norms, initially scheduled to take effect from 1 April 2026, will now be effective from mid-July 2026.
Click here to read/ download the original circular
SEBI reduces Social Impact Fund Investment Threshold to Rs. 1000
The Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) vide its Press Release PR No.18/2026 dated 23 March, 2026, has approved multiple measures to enhance ease of doing business, strengthen regulatory frameworks, and improve governance. The Board approved proposals to amend the SEBI (Alternative Investment Funds) Regulations, 2012 to allow alternative investment funds (AIFs) to retain liquidation proceeds beyond the completion of their tenure.
SEBI permits tagging certain AIFs as ‘inoperative funds’ with reduced compliance requirements. Further, it reduced the minimum investment by individual investors in Social Impact Funds from Rs. 2 lakh to Rs. 1,000 to facilitate wider participation. The Board also allowed net settlement of funds for foreign portfolio investors (FPIs) in the cash market to reduce costs and improve operational efficiency. It introduced various ease-of-doing-business measures for Infrastructure Investment Trusts (InvITs) and Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs), including relaxations in investment conditions.
The Board amended the ‘fit and proper person’ criteria under the SEBI (Intermediaries) Regulations, 2008, covering disqualification, disclosures, and the opportunity to be heard. Additionally, it approved recommendations of the High-Level Committee on the conflict-of-interest framework for SEBI Board Members and officials, including enhanced disclosure requirements and restrictions on certain transactions.
Click here to read/ download the original press release
SEBI relaxes reporting norms for stock brokers
The Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) vide its Circular No. HO/38/11/(1)2026-MIRSD-POD//7656/2026 dated March 23, 2026, has introduced ease of doing business measures by relaxing reporting requirements for stock brokers, including doing away with the requirement for brokers to report their own demat accounts to stock exchanges.
The circular amends provisions relating to enhanced supervision of stock brokers and depository participants under para 15 of the Master Circular for Stock Brokers dated June 17, 2025. Under the existing framework, stock brokers were required to tag all demat accounts and report details of their existing and new bank and demat accounts to stock exchanges, including reporting the opening and closure of such accounts.
Under the revised framework, stock brokers will no longer be required to report demat accounts to stock exchanges. Instead, depositories will provide details of all demat accounts opened or closed by a stock broker to the concerned stock exchanges, with the periodicity and mechanism to be jointly decided by stock exchanges and depositories.
SEBI has also clarified that where a stock broker is also a bank or a primary dealer, it will be required to report only those bank accounts that are used for stock broking activities. Details of such bank accounts must be reported within seven working days of opening or closure. Further, the requirement of tagging of demat accounts will not apply to stockbrokers that are also primary dealers, for demat accounts used exclusively for activities other than stock broking.
The regulator has mandated uniform nomenclature for naming or tagging of bank and demat accounts and clarified that once the nomenclature for a demat account is assigned, it cannot be modified. SEBI added that any non-compliance relating to nomenclature or reporting of accounts will attract penal action as per the rules of stock exchanges or depositories. The circular states that the revised reporting framework will come into force with effect from April 17, 2026.
Legal Updates (March 16 – March 21, 2026)
Legal Updates (March 16 – March 21, 2026)
CASE UPDATES:
A bank has a strict duty to comply with the express mandate of its customer. It cannot unilaterally act contrary to clear instructions, and any concerns regarding regulatory compliance or underlying agreements do not justify remitting funds to an unauthorized party. A breach of this duty renders the bank liable for the resulting loss to its customer
The Supreme Court in the case of Canara Bank Overseas Branch vs Archean Industries [Civil Appeal No. 13861 of 2024] dated March 17, 2026, has clarified that a contract of guarantee is established by a clear and unequivocal undertaking to discharge the liability of a third person in case of default, and the court will look at the substance of the communications and the conduct of the parties to determine if such an undertaking exists, rather than just the title of a document. Also, a party is estopped by its conduct from relying on a contractual condition to evade liability if it has acted in a manner that indicates a waiver of that condition.
The plaintiff is the dominus litis and generally cannot be compelled to implead a party against whom no relief is sought. On the other hand, a defendant cannot use the non-impleadment of another potentially liable party as a defence, especially when a procedural remedy like a third-party notice is available to the defendant to claim contribution or indemnity, added the Court.
Hence, the Apex Court upheld the liability of Canara Bank (appellant) for erroneously remitting USD 100,000 to a third party and affirmed the Madras High Court ruling which directed the Canara Bank to indemnify Archean Industries Pvt Ltd (respondent) for the mistaken transfer. The Court ruled that a bank has a strict duty to comply with the express mandate of its customer. It cannot unilaterally act contrary to clear instructions, and any concerns regarding regulatory compliance or underlying agreements do not justify remitting funds to an unauthorized party. A breach of this duty renders the bank liable for the resulting loss to its customer.
The Court addressed whether the letter dated 25.04.1998 was a valid contract of guarantee under Section 126 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, or merely a freight payment arrangement. It observed that a conjoint reading of the letter dated 22.04.1998 and the Corporate Guarantee dated 25.04.1998 clearly established an independent guarantee. The documents contained an unequivocal undertaking by Defendant No. 1 to discharge the liability of the vessel owner.
The Court noted that Defendant No. 1’s subsequent conduct, such as issuing remittance instructions to its bank, reflected its intention to honour this undertaking. Further, Defendant No. 1’s own witness admitted during cross-examination that the document was a ‘conditional guarantee letter’, thereby acknowledging its nature as a guarantee. The Court, therefore, rejected the contention that it was merely a freight payment arrangement.
The Court considered the argument that the vessel owner was a necessary party to the suit. It held that the plaintiff, as dominus litis, has the right to choose the parties against whom relief is sought and cannot be compelled to sue a person unless their presence is indispensable for adjudication. In this case, the liability of Defendant No. 1 arose from an independent guarantee, making the vessel owner’s presence not necessary for the effective adjudication of the dispute against the guarantor.
Also, the Court pointed out that Defendant No. 1 had the procedural remedy under Order VIII-A of the CPC to issue a third-party notice to the vessel owner to claim contribution but failed to do so. Having failed to invoke this available remedy, Defendant No. 1 could not shift the burden onto the plaintiff.
Further, the Court examined the bank’s liability for the erroneous remittance. The bank contended that it could not have remitted the funds to the plaintiff without RBI approval and that it acted based on the underlying Charter Party Agreement. The Court found that the bank, not being a party to the Charter Party Agreement, could not rely on its terms to justify its actions. The bank’s primary duty was to act in accordance with the express instructions of its customer, Defendant No. 1, as the instructions in Exhibit P14 and Form A-2 clearly directed payment to the plaintiff.
If the bank had concerns about regulatory approval, it should have sought clarification from its customer or withheld the funds, not unilaterally remitted them to the vessel owner contrary to the mandate. This act constituted a breach of duty, making the bank liable to indemnify its customer, added the Court.
A scheme of amalgamation framed under Section 45 of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949, can validly create different classes of depositors and provide for differential treatment, including staggered repayment schedules and reduction of interest. Such classification is not violative of Article 14 of the Constitution, if it is based on an intelligible differentia
The Bombay High Court in the case of Bhalchandra Dinkar Gondekar vs Reserve Bank of India [Writ Petition No. 8534 of 2022] dated March 09, 2026, has ruled that the scope of judicial review in matters of economic and financial policy, particularly schemes of bank amalgamation formulated by the Reserve Bank of India under Section 45 of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949, is extremely limited. Courts will not interfere with the expert judgment of a specialized regulatory body like the RBI unless the decision is proven to be arbitrary, irrational, mala fide, or vitiated by procedural impropriety.
The Court explained that a scheme of amalgamation framed under Section 45 of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949, can validly create different classes of depositors (e.g., retail and institutional) and provide for differential treatment, including staggered repayment schedules and reduction of interest. Such classification is not violative of Article 14 of the Constitution, provided it is based on an intelligible differentia and has a rational nexus with the object of the scheme, which is to act in the public interest and the interest of depositors to save a failing bank.
Section 45 of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949, is a self-contained code for the amalgamation of banking companies in emergent situations. Its provisions, by virtue of the non-obstante clause in Section 45(14), have an overriding effect on any other law, agreement, or instrument. This includes the power to reduce interest and rights of depositors and creditors to the extent the RBI considers necessary in the public interest, which is a permissible restriction and not an unconstitutional deprivation of property, added the Court.
On the issue of discrimination and classification of depositors, the Court observed that the classification between retail depositors (individuals, proprietorships, HUFs) and institutional depositors (corporations, firms, societies) is based on their distinct characteristics and nature of deposits. The Court held that this classification is reasonable and has a rational nexus to the object of the scheme, which is to serve the public interest and protect the maximum number of depositors by prioritizing individuals over institutions.
The Court noted that while Article 14 forbids class legislation, it permits reasonable classification. Treating these two distinct classes differently does not amount to treating equals unequally. The Court also justified prioritizing smaller depositors, stating that it catered to approximately 84% of the total depositors, thereby preventing potential widespread unrest.
On the issue of staggered payments, denial of interest, and deprivation of property, the Court observed that Section 45(5)(f) of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949, explicitly permits a scheme of amalgamation to include provisions for the ‘reduction of the interest or rights’ of depositors and creditors. Given the precarious financial condition and negative net worth of PMC Bank, the RBI was empowered to take such measures to ensure the stability of the transferee bank and the eventual repayment of the principal amount to all depositors.
The Court reasoned that the alternative was liquidation, under which depositors would have likely received only up to the DICGC insured amount of Rs. 5 lakhs, and that too after a prolonged process. Therefore, the scheme, by ensuring 100% return of the principal amount, was a more favourable outcome for depositors.
On procedural impropriety and lack of consultation, the Court, relying on the RBI’s affidavit, noted that the draft scheme was placed in the public domain, suggestions were invited, and appropriate changes were made before finalization. The Court held that Section 45 provides for an adequate opportunity for representation through written objections and does not mandate an oral hearing for every depositor. It affirmed that in such emergent situations involving a large number of stakeholders, considering written representations is sufficient compliance with the principles of natural justice.
On the role and liability of DICGC, the Court observed that the liability of the DICGC is fixed by the DICGC Act, 1961, at the insured amount (Rs. 5 lakhs per depositor). The withdrawals allowed during the moratorium were to provide immediate relief to depositors facing hardship. The Court found no violation of the DICGC Act, stating that the scheme ensured the DICGC’s liability was met as per the statute and that the transferee bank was obligated to repay the DICGC over time, as permitted by law.
Under the Investor Education and Protection Fund Authority (Accounting, Audit, Transfer and Refund) Rules, 2016, if a claimant for securities, valued up to Rs. 5 Lakhs, provides one of the documents specified in Rule 2.2(a), such as a succession certificate, the authorities cannot compel the claimant to also furnish an indemnity bond as required under Rule 2.2(b)
The Gujarat High Court in the case of Daksha Nanavati vs Investor Education and Protection Fund Authority [R/Special Civil Application No. 12112 of 2023] dated March 09, 2026, has clarified that under the Investor Education and Protection Fund Authority (Accounting, Audit, Transfer and Refund) Rules, 2016, if a claimant for securities, valued up to Rs. 5 Lakhs, provides one of the documents specified in Rule 2.2(a), such as a succession certificate, the authorities cannot compel the claimant to also furnish an indemnity bond as required under Rule 2.2(b).
The Court ruled that the requirement to submit an indemnity bond under Rule 2.2(b) is an alternative, applicable only when the documents under Rule 2.2(a) are absent. The lawful property of a citizen cannot be denied based on an unwarranted and erroneous interpretation of statutory rules, and any such action by the authorities is arbitrary, unsustainable, and liable to be set aside.
The Court noted that the central issue was whether the respondent authorities were justified in insisting that the petitioner furnish an indemnity bond for the transmission of shares, despite her having already submitted a valid succession certificate, especially when the value of the securities was less than Rs. 5 Lakhs. The respondents contended that the requirement for an indemnity bond was a mandatory part of the procedure prescribed by the IEPF Rules for processing the claim.
The Respondent No. 2 clarified that while it had found the petitioner’s documents to be in order, the insistence on the indemnity bond was due to the procedural requirements of the IEPF Authority’s online portal and rules. However, Respondent No. 2 also stated it would have no objection to the transmission if the IEPF Authority (Respondent No. 1) waived this requirement.
The Court observed that the respondents’ insistence was based on a misinterpretation of Rule 2.2 of the Investor Education and Protection Fund Authority (Accounting, Audit, Transfer and Refund) Rules, 2016. The Court performed a plain reading of Rule 2.2, which stipulates the documentary requirements for claims involving securities valued up to Rs. 5 Lakhs. It noted that Rule 2.2(a) requires documents like a succession certificate, probate of will, or a court order. At the same time, Rule 2.2(b) requires an indemnity bond and a no-objection certificate from other legal heirs, but this clause is explicitly applicable only ‘in the absence of the documents as mentioned at (a) above’.
The Court found that since the petitioner had already furnished a succession certificate under Rule 2.2(a), there was ‘no justification whatsoever’ to demand compliance with Rule 2.2(b). The Court held that the respondents’ action was ‘wholly misconceived’, ‘arbitrary and unsustainable in law’, and that they could not impose additional conditions not contemplated in the rules once the prescribed requirements were met.
The Magistrate cannot mechanically close the proceedings when faced with obstruction and must take necessary steps to execute the warrant, as the objective of the SARFAESI Act is to facilitate the recovery of dues without forcing the secured creditor to initiate fresh proceedings repeatedly
The Supreme Court in the case of IIHFL vs Nageswara Rao Perikala [SLP (Civil) No. 26160 of 2025] dated March 16, 2026, has clarified that the time limits specified in Section 14 of the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (SARFAESI Act), are directory in nature. Thus, a Chief Judicial Magistrate (CJM) or District Magistrate has a statutory obligation to ensure the execution of a warrant of possession, including providing police protection, and is not rendered functus officio merely because the possession could not be taken within the initially prescribed period.
The Court cautioned that the Magistrate cannot mechanically close the proceedings when faced with obstruction and must take necessary steps to execute the warrant, as the objective of the SARFAESI Act is to facilitate the recovery of dues without forcing the secured creditor to initiate fresh proceedings repeatedly.
Accordingly, the Apex Court quashed the impugned orders passed by the CJM and the High Court respectively, and restored the proceedings under Section 14 of SARFAESI Act. The Court also directed the CJM to provide Police protection to the Advocate Commissioner and to ensure that the warrant of possession is executed expeditiously, preferably within a period of one month.
The Court observed that the CJM is under a statutory obligation under Section 14 of the Act to ensure that the warrant of possession is executed and the secured creditor is not made to ‘run from pillar to post’. The Court also noted that the CJM is empowered to take all necessary steps and use such force as may be necessary to take possession of the secured asset.
Further, the Court held that the CJM’s order which mechanically directed the return of the unexecuted warrant and closed the petition without considering the Advocate Commissioner’s memo for a time extension, suffered from non-application of mind. This was deemed an ‘abdication of the statutory duty’ cast upon the CJM under Section 14 of the Act.
While concluding, the Court observed that the High Court also failed to appreciate this failure of duty by the CJM, and instead, granted liberty to the appellant to file a fresh petition, which defeats the purpose of the Act. The Court therefore reiterated that the time limits prescribed under Section 14 are directory and not mandatory, and the inability to take possession within the prescribed time does not render the Magistrate functus officio.
The principle of finality attached to court-confirmed auction sales is not absolute and does not prevent judicial scrutiny, especially concerning the adequacy of property valuation
The Supreme Court in the case of Om Sakthi Sekar vs V. Sukumar [Civil Appeal No. 3362 of 2026] dated March 13, 2026, has held that the principle of finality attached to court-confirmed auction sales is not absolute and does not prevent judicial scrutiny, especially concerning the adequacy of property valuation. The objective of an auction in recovery proceedings is to secure the best possible price for the asset, and the court’s supervisory jurisdiction can be invoked to examine whether this objective was met.
The dispute arose out of recovery proceedings initiated by Indian Bank against a borrower and guarantors for outstanding dues arising from an “at par facility” agreement entered into in 1992. After the borrower defaulted, the bank approached the Debts Recovery Tribunal, Chennai, which in January 2010 held the borrowers and guarantors jointly and severally liable and issued a recovery certificate. Pursuant to the recovery certificate, the DRT attached the mortgaged properties and conducted a public auction on 29 October 2010. The appellant emerged as the highest bidder with a bid of ₹2,10,98,765. The sale was confirmed by the DRT on 31 January 2011, and a sale certificate was issued and registered in February 2011.
The guarantors challenged the recovery proceedings before the Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal (DRAT), which upheld the validity of the auction. When the matter reached the Madras High Court, the Court affirmed the legality of the mortgage, the bank’s right to recover its dues, and the validity of the auction sale. However, it directed the DRT to reconsider the valuation of the properties and examine whether the assets had been sold for a value lower than their actual worth.
The Apex Court observed that while the rights of a bona fide auction purchaser ordinarily deserve protection, such protection is not absolute. It emphasised that where credible concerns arise regarding the adequacy of valuation or fixation of reserve price, courts may exercise supervisory jurisdiction to ensure that the secured asset fetches the best possible value. The Court noted that while there can be no quarrel with the settled proposition that the rights of a bona fide auction purchaser deserve due protection and that confirmed court sales should not ordinarily be interfered with, it is equally well established that such protection is not absolute. Where credible issues are raised regarding the adequacy of valuation or the fairness of the process leading to the fixation of the reserve price, the supervisory jurisdiction of the Court may be invoked to ensure that the recovery proceedings have been conducted in a manner that secures the best possible value of the property.
The Court noted that the purpose of an auction is to secure the most remunerative price through competitive bidding and ensure transparency in the sale process. Further, the High Court had not set aside the auction sale or questioned the purchaser’s participation. Instead, it had issued a limited direction for reconsideration of valuation by the DRT. Such a remand, the Court said, does not disturb the recovery already effected nor render the auction void. The Court observed that a limited remand by a higher court to a tribunal for the specific purpose of reconsidering valuation, without setting aside the entire auction, is a balanced exercise of jurisdiction and is legally tenable. Therefore, the Supreme Court dismissed an appeal filed by an auction purchaser challenging a Madras High Court direction that remitted the issue of property valuation to the Debts Recovery Tribunal (DRT) in bank recovery proceedings, and held that the High Court did not err in remitting the matter to the DRT to re-examine the valuation of the properties.
Consumer complaints involving highly disputed questions of fact or allegations of a criminal or tortious nature, such as fraud and forgery, cannot be adjudicated in the summary proceedings under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986
The Supreme Court in the case of Sant Rohidas Leather Industries and Charmakar Development Corporation vs Vijaya Bank [Civil Appeal No. 4841 of 2023] dated March 19, 2026, has held that consumer complaints involving highly disputed questions of fact or allegations of a criminal or tortious nature, such as fraud and forgery, cannot be adjudicated in the summary proceedings under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986. Such matters are to be decided by a regular civil or criminal court which is equipped to handle complex factual determinations.
While the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission’s (NCDRC) reasoning for dismissing the complaint (that earning interest on a deposit automatically makes it a ‘commercial purpose’) was not entirely correct, the ultimate dismissal of the complaint was justified because the dispute centred on allegations of fraud that were outside the scope of the consumer forum’s summary jurisdiction. The Apex Court, however, clarified that this dismissal does not bar the appellant from seeking recourse in an appropriate court or forum.
The Court observed that to determine if a service is availed for a ‘commercial purpose’, one must look at the dominant object or purpose of the transaction. The identity of the person (whether an individual or a body corporate) is not the sole determining factor. The Court disagreed with the NCDRC’s view that merely because a fixed deposit earns interest, the banking service is availed for a commercial purpose. Rather, it reasoned that there could be various non-commercial reasons for depositing money in a bank, such as statutory requirements or safe-keeping of funds.
However, the Court distinguished this from situations where a deposit is made specifically to leverage credit facilities for augmenting business. Such a transaction would have a direct nexus with revenue generation and could be considered a commercial purpose. In this case, the transaction was between two business entities (company and bank). The Bank’s defence was that the FDR was pledged to avail a credit facility for business use. The Court noted that without first determining the truth behind the allegations of fraud and forgery concerning the pledge and loan, it was not possible to ascertain the true purpose of the deposit and, consequently, whether the services were availed for a commercial purpose.
Further, the Court observed that ‘deficiency in service’ under the 1986 Act must be distinguished from tortious or criminal acts like fraud or cheating. It reiterated that the burden of proving deficiency in service lies on the complainant. Since proceedings before the Consumer Commission are summary in nature, they are not meant to adjudicate complex factual issues, especially those involving criminality.
In the present case, the core of the dispute was the Bank’s claim of a subsequent contract of pledge, which the appellant alleged was fraudulent. The Bank contended that the FDR held by the appellant was forged and that the original was with the Bank as security for the overdraft facility. Thus, the Court concluded that these allegations of fraud and forgery could not be properly adjudicated in a summary proceeding under the 1986 Act and were more appropriate for a regular civil or criminal court. The complaint as framed was not maintainable before the Consumer Commission.
Since SEBI’s regulations are framed to protect the rights of multiple stakeholders in the securities market, a violation of these regulations is a matter of public law and cannot be condoned by a private resolution of shareholders
The Supreme Court in the case of SEBI vs Terrascope Ventures Limited [Civil Appeal Nos. 5209-5211 of 2022] dated March 17, 2026, has held that the diversion of funds raised through a preferential issue for purposes other than those disclosed in the explanatory statement to the shareholders is a fraudulent and unfair trade practice under Regulations 3 and 4 of the SEBI (Prohibition of Fraudulent and Unfair Trade Practices Relating to Securities Market) Regulations, 2003 (PFUTP Regulations). Such an act, being illegal and contrary to statutory regulations that are a matter of public policy, is void ab initio and cannot be subsequently legitimized or validated by a resolution of ratification passed by the shareholders.
Further, the Court clarified that initiation of separate proceedings by the SEBI’s Whole Time Member for remedial directions (like debarment from the market) and by the Adjudicating Officer for imposing monetary penalties on the same set of facts is permissible, as these authorities exercise distinct jurisdictions and powers under the SEBI Act.
The Court observed that the funds raised through the preferential issue were immediately diverted for purposes not disclosed in the notice of the Extraordinary General Meeting (EoGM). This act was held to be a clear breach of Regulations 3 and 4 of the PFUTP Regulations. The Court emphasized that the disclosure of objects for a preferential issue, as mandated by Regulation 73 of the SEBI (ICDR) Regulations, 2009, is of utmost significance as it influences the decisions of investors and stakeholders.
Also, the Court noted that the definition of ‘fraud’ under the PFUTP Regulations is broad and does not require deceit; it includes any act, omission, or concealment that induces another person to deal in securities. The immediate diversion of funds upon receipt indicated that the respondents had no intention of using the funds for the stated objects from the very inception, making the disclosure untrue and misleading. This also constituted a violation of Section 21 of the Securities Contracts (Regulation) Act, 1956 (SCRA) read with Clause 43 of the Listing Agreement, which mandates reporting of variations between projected and actual utilization of funds.
The Court also found the reliance on Section 27 of the Companies Act, 2013, to be misplaced as it applies to a ‘prospectus’ for a public offer, not a private placement, which was the nature of the preferential allotment in this case. The Court distinguished between private rights, which can be waived or ratified, and matters involving public interest and public policy, which cannot. Since SEBI’s regulations are framed to protect the rights of multiple stakeholders in the securities market, a violation of these regulations is a matter of public law and cannot be condoned by a private resolution of shareholders.
An act that is ultra vires the regulations is void and cannot be ratified, even with unanimous shareholder consent. The diversion was contrary to the PFUTP Regulations and disclosure norms, making it a plainly illegal act that could not be legitimized post-facto, added the Court.
On the validity of parallel proceedings by the WTM and the Adjudicating Officer, the Court found no fault in the parallel proceedings, noting that the two authorities were vested with different powers and operated in separate fields during the period in question. The Whole Time Member (WTM), exercising powers under Sections 11, 11(4), and 11B of the SEBI Act, had the authority to take remedial measures like restraining persons from the securities market to protect investors’ interests. In contrast, the AO had the power under Section 15HA to impose monetary penalties for fraudulent and unfair trade practices.
The Court therefore observed that at the time of the proceedings, the power to levy a penalty under Section 15HA was not vested with the WTM (it was vested later by the Finance Act, 2018). Therefore, the AO rightly stepped in to exercise the distinct jurisdiction of imposing a penalty, and this did not amount to double jeopardy or an impermissible overlap of jurisdiction.
Employer is entitled to withhold gratuity and adjust penal rent from it for the unauthorised occupation of company quarters by a retired employee, in accordance with the governing service rules
The Supreme Court in the case of The Management of Steel Authority of India vs Shambhu Prasad Singh [2026 INSC 263] dated March 18, 2026, has ruled that an employer (Steel Authority of India) is entitled to withhold gratuity and adjust penal rent from it for the unauthorised occupation of company quarters by a retired employee, in accordance with the governing service rules. The Court held that the obligations to vacate the accommodation and to release gratuity are mutual and reciprocal.
However, an order passed by a court on the specific facts of a case, without laying down a legal principle, does not serve as a binding precedent. Further, where service rules authorise the withholding of gratuity for non-vacation of quarters, the employee is not entitled to any interest on the withheld amount for the period of unauthorised occupation.
However, exercising its equitable jurisdiction, the Apex Court fixed a penal rent of Rs. 1,000 per month for the present batch of cases only, considering the hardship to retired workers and other specific circumstances, explicitly stating that this shall not be treated as a precedent.
The Court observed that under Rule 3.2.1(c) of the SAIL Gratuity Rules, 1978, the management is expressly empowered to withhold the gratuity amount for non-compliance with company rules, including the non-vacation of accommodation. The rules further stipulate that no interest shall be payable on the gratuity amount so withheld during the period of unauthorised occupation.
The Court also affirmed that the obligation of the Ex-Employee to vacate the quarters and the obligation of the management to release the gratuity are mutual and reciprocal, and neither can be enforced in isolation. Citing the binding judgment in Secretary, ONGC Ltd. v. V. U. Warrier [(2005) 5 SCC 245], it was established that if an employee occupies a quarter beyond the specified period, penal rent is a natural consequence and can be adjusted against dues payable, including gratuity.
Insurance company is not statutorily liable to indemnify the insured for compensation awarded to gratuitous passengers travelling in a goods vehicle, and the liability under Section 147 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, does not extend to such passengers
Emphasising the liability of the insurance company vis-à-vis the insured on the matter of gratuitous passenger carried in a goods vehicle, the High Court of Himachal Pradesh in the case of United India Insurance Company vs Puran Chand [FAOs No. 87 to 90 of 2013] dated March 05, 2026, has ruled that the insurance company is not statutorily liable to indemnify the insured for compensation awarded to gratuitous passengers travelling in a goods vehicle, and the liability under Section 147 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, does not extend to such passengers.
The High Court pointed out that a Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal (MACT) does not have the jurisdiction to direct an insurance company to ‘pay and recover’ compensation in cases where there is no statutory liability on the insurer, such as in the case of gratuitous passengers in a goods vehicle.
Such a direction is beyond the powers of the Tribunal, as the power to issue such directions in the interest of justice is an extraordinary power vested in the Supreme Court under Article 142 of the Constitution, added the Court, while concluding that the entire liability to satisfy the award and pay the compensation rests solely with the owner of the vehicle.
The Court observed that it is undisputed that the deceased and injured individuals were gratuitous passengers in the offending vehicle, which was a goods vehicle. The Bench analysed the definitions under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, noting that a ‘goods carriage’ is a motor vehicle constructed or adapted for use ‘solely for the carriage of goods’ and that the definition of ‘goods’ explicitly excludes ‘living person’.
The Court examined Section 147 of the 1988 Act and the impact of the 1994 amendment, which inserted the words ‘including owner of the goods or his authorized representative carried in the vehicle’. Citing the Supreme Court’s decision in New India Assurance Co. Ltd. vs. Asha Rani [(2003) 2 SCC 223], the Court noted that this amendment was not merely clarificatory but was intended to bring the owner of goods or their representative within the sweep of compulsory insurance coverage for a goods vehicle.
Further, relying on National Insurance Company Limited vs. Baljit Kaur [(2004) 2 SCC 1], the Court reiterated that even after the 1994 amendment, the legislative intent was not to cover all persons travelling in a goods carriage. The statutory liability of the insurer does not extend to passengers in a goods vehicle, especially gratuitous passengers, for whom no premium was paid to cover such a risk.
Thus, the Court concluded that since the deceased and injured were gratuitous passengers for whom no additional premium was paid, the insurance company has no liability under the law to pay the compensation.
Post-dated cheques not issued as an inducement to secure the funds but given later to discharge an existing liability of investor who agreed to share profit in a movie’s release, while potentially give rise to an action under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, does not ipso facto constitute cheating
The Supreme Court in the case of V. Ganesan vs State [Criminal Appeal No. 1470 of 2026] dated March 19, 2026, has held that a mere breach of contract or the failure to fulfil a promise, especially in a high-risk commercial venture, does not automatically give rise to a criminal offence of cheating under Section 420 of the IPC. For an offence of cheating to be established, it is imperative for the complainant to demonstrate that the accused possessed a fraudulent or dishonest intention at the very inception of the transaction when the inducement was made.
The Apex Court ruled that the subsequent dishonour of a post-dated cheque, issued to discharge a pre-existing liability rather than as an initial inducement, is insufficient in itself to prove the existence of such dishonest intention from the beginning. Where the facts of a case primarily disclose a civil dispute, criminal proceedings should not be sustained, and the High Court ought to exercise its inherent powers to quash them to prevent an abuse of the process of law.
The Court concurred with the High Court’s finding that no offence under Section 406 IPC was made out because the essential element of ‘entrustment’ of property was absent in the transaction between the parties. On cheating and dishonest intention, the Court reiterated that a crucial ingredient for the offence of cheating is the existence of a fraudulent or dishonest intention at the time of making the promise or inducement.
A mere subsequent failure to keep a promise cannot be the sole basis to infer that such dishonest intention existed from the very beginning, added the Court, while emphasising that every breach of contract does not amount to cheating; it becomes cheating only if deception was played at the very inception of the transaction.
On the nature of the business transaction, the Court observed that the High Court had overlooked the fundamental nature of the transaction. Movie-making is an inherently high-risk business where returns are not guaranteed. When an individual agrees to invest in a movie for a share of the profits, they are knowingly taking the risk of a possible zero return. This commercial risk is a vital factor in determining whether the dispute is civil or criminal in nature.
On the fulfilment of the promise, the Court noted that the appellant did not make a false promise to make a movie, as the movie was, in fact, completed and released. Regarding the promise of sharing profits, the prosecution made no allegation that the movie actually generated any profits. Therefore, the failure to share profits, in this context, does not prove an initial dishonest intention.
On the dishonour of post-dated cheques, the Court clarified that the two post-dated cheques were not issued as an inducement to secure the funds but were given later to discharge an existing liability after the complainant objected to the movie’s release. The dishonour of such post-dated cheques, while potentially giving rise to an action under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, does not ipso facto constitute cheating. This is because a post-dated cheque does not represent that there are sufficient funds at the time of issuance, and for cheating, the dishonest intention must be present from the very beginning.
When comparing two trademarks, if a part of the marks is common to the trade or descriptive, that common element cannot be the decisive factor in determining similarity. The comparison must be made by giving greater regard to the uncommon elements of the marks
The Delhi High Court in the case of Volkswagen AG vs Registrar of Trade Marks [C.A.(COMM.IPD-TM) 30/2024] dated March 12, 2026, has clarified that when comparing two trademarks, if a part of the marks is common to the trade or descriptive (in this case, the word ‘MOTION’ for the automobile industry), that common element cannot be the decisive factor in determining similarity. The comparison must be made by giving greater regard to the uncommon elements of the marks. Accordingly, it rejected Volkswagen’s petition against the Registrar of Trademarks’ decision to register Maruti Suzuki’s ‘TRANSFORMOTION’ trademark.
The Court held that a trademark that is perceived as a single, composite word should be considered as a whole and should not be artificially dissected for the purpose of comparison. The presence of a distinguishing prefix (‘TRANS’) that creates a different visual and phonetic impression, coupled with a stark visual difference (numeral vs. alphabets), can render two marks dissimilar, even if they share a common suffix.
The likelihood of confusion is diminished when the goods in question are high-value items (like cars) that are purchased after due deliberation by consumers, and when the competing parties are well-known entities with their own independent goodwill and reputation in the market, added the Court.
Hence, the Court explained that a claim of confusion is significantly weakened when the defendant’s use of its mark in a specific market predates the plaintiff’s entry and use of its mark in that same market, as consumers could not have been aware of the plaintiff’s mark at the time the defendant commenced use.
The Court observed that visually, there is no plausible chance of confusion between the two marks, noting the ‘stark difference’ of the Appellant’s mark starting with a numeral ‘4’ versus the Respondent’s mark starting with alphabets. Phonetically, the Bench agreed with the Registrar that the sound of ‘TRANS’ in ‘TRANSFORMOTION’ makes it sufficiently distinct from ‘4MOTION’/‘FORMOTION’.
Regarding conceptual similarity, the Court first noted that this plea was not raised before the Registrar and the Appellant was precluded from raising it on appeal. Nevertheless, the Court found no merit in the argument, as ‘4MOTION’ denotes an existing vehicle feature, while ‘TRANSFORMOTION’ is used in an advertising campaign to convey a transition of technology.
The Court found merit in the Respondent’s submission that the word ‘MOTION’ is common to the automobile industry and descriptive in its use by both parties to denote technology. It held that the word ‘MOTION’ cannot be decisive, and the rival marks must be compared by considering their uncommon parts. The Court was also unable to accept the Appellant’s plea to dissect the impugned mark, stating that ‘TRANSFORMOTION’ ‘commends to the mind of the Court as a single word’ and there is no inclination to split it up.
On likelihood of confusion and prior use, the Court held that since the marks were found not to be deceptively similar, the Appellant’s argument of being the ‘earlier trademark’ was not relevant. The Court was persuaded that there was no likelihood of confusion, considering that both parties (Volkswagen AG and Maruti Suzuki India Limited) have substantial independent goodwill and that cars are high-value products purchased by consumers after due deliberation.
The adjustment of income tax refunds, which are assets of the corporate debtor, against pre-CIRP tax demands during the moratorium period is a form of recovery and is expressly prohibited by Section 14 of the IBC
The Ahmedabad Bench of the National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT) in the case of Wind World (India) Ltd vs Income Tax Department [IA No. 996 of 2025] dated March 06, 2026, has clarified that in view of the overriding effect of Section 238 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, (IBC), the powers conferred upon the Income Tax Department under Section 245 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, cannot be exercised during the subsistence of a moratorium under Section 14 of the IBC.
The NCLT ruled that the adjustment of income tax refunds, which are assets of the corporate debtor, against pre-CIRP tax demands during the moratorium period is a form of recovery and is expressly prohibited by Section 14 of the IBC. Consequently, any such adjustment is illegal, arbitrary, and void, and the amount so adjusted or withheld must be refunded to the corporate debtor, along with any applicable statutory interest, to be made available for the insolvency resolution process.
The NCLT observed that while Section 245 of the Income Tax Act empowers the department to set off refunds against outstanding tax dues, this power is not absolute. Section 238 of the IBC contains a non-obstante clause that gives the IBC primacy over any inconsistent provisions in other laws, including the Income Tax Act.
The Tribunal held that once a moratorium under Section 14 is in effect, all actions of recovery or enforcement of pre-CIRP claims are prohibited. Invoking Section 245 during the moratorium would defeat the protection granted by Section 14 and frustrate the objective of preserving the Corporate Debtor’s assets. Since IBC overrides the Income Tax Act in case of any inconsistency, the power under Section 245 of the Income Tax Act cannot be exercised during the CIRP.
The Tribunal noted that the refunds were determined under Section 143(1) of the Income Tax Act and had crystallized into amounts payable to the Corporate Debtor, thus constituting its assets. The Tribunal found the Respondent’s actions to be in clear violation of Section 14 read with Section 238 of the IBC. Hence, it held the adjustments to be illegal and arbitrary, and declared that the amounts adjusted are void and must be restored to the Corporate Debtor.
The Tribunal also observed that the refunds arose from tax returns filed by the Resolution Professional during the CIRP. Once determined under Section 143(1) of the Income Tax Act, the refund becomes a crystallized receivable of the Corporate Debtor.
Referencing the duties of the Resolution Professional under Section 18 and Section 25 of the IBC to preserve and protect the assets of the Corporate Debtor, the Tribunal held that these refunds form part of the insolvency estate. Any unilateral adjustment would lead to a depletion of these assets, frustrating the objective of value maximization under the IBC. The Tribunal therefore concluded that the income tax refunds are indeed assets of the Corporate Debtor and must remain under the control of the Resolution Professional.
REGULATORY UPDATES
Borrowing by Mutual Funds – Bridging temporary timing mismatches between inflow and outflow of funds
The Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) vide its Circular No: HO/(92)2026-IMD-POD-2/I/6961/2026 dated March 13, 2026, has allowed mutual funds to undertake intraday borrowings from banks or financial institutions to bridge temporary timing mismatches between inflow and outflow of funds.
SEBI noted that redemption payouts to investors are often processed in the morning, while maturity proceeds from instruments such as TREPS or reverse repos are received in the evening hours of the same day, creating a temporary timing mismatch. To address this, mutual funds may enter into formal intraday borrowing arrangements with financial institutions such as banks.
As per the circular, with effect from April 1, 2026, intraday borrowing shall be permitted only for the purpose of repurchase or redemption of units or payment of interest or income distribution payouts to unitholders. The borrowing amount must not exceed the guaranteed receivables due on the same day from the Government of India, Reserve Bank of India or the Clearing Corporation of India Limited, including receivables such as maturity proceeds from TREPS, reverse repos, government securities, treasury bills, SDLs, STRIPS, interest on government securities, and sale proceeds of such securities.
SEBI clarified that any cost of intraday borrowing, as well as any loss arising due to delay or unforeseen events in receiving the receivables, shall be borne by the Asset Management Company. The regulator further clarified that borrowing by equity-oriented index funds and equity-oriented ETFs on account of under-execution of sell trades on the stock exchange will be permitted only for participation in the closing auction session of stock exchanges, in the manner specified in SEBI’s circular on the closing auction session.
Click here to read/ download the Circular
Ease of Doing Business – SEBI has introduced a lighter certification requirement for Persons Associated with Research Services (PARS) performing sales and other non-core services
The Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) vide its Circular No: HO/38/12/(5)2026-MIRSD-POD/I/6703/2026 dated March 11, 2026, has introduced a lighter certification requirement for Persons Associated with Research Services (PARS) performing sales and other non-core services, as part of its ease of doing business initiative. Based on the feedback from market participants and as a step towards ease of doing business, it has been decided to specify a lighter NISM certification module for PARS.
Under the SEBI (Research Analysts) Regulations, 2014, PARS are required to obtain certification from the National Institute of Securities Markets (NISM). As per the notification dated February 14, 2025 under the SEBI (Certification of Associated Persons in the Securities Markets) Regulations 2007, such persons were required to pass the NISM Series-XV: Research Analyst Certification Examination.
SEBI has now specified that PARS engaged in sales, relationship management and other non-core services, who have client interaction but are not directly involved in research activities, shall obtain certification by passing the NISM Series-XXV-A (Persons Associated with Research Services – Sales and Other Non-Core Services) Certification Examination.
However, PARS, other than those who perform sales and other non-core services, will continue to be required to obtain the NISM Series-XV Research Analyst certification. The circular also clarifies that PARS who already hold the NISM Series-XV certification will be required to obtain the new certification only after the expiry of the validity of their existing certificate.
The SEBI further states that the new provisions come into effect immediately and the Research Analyst Administration and Supervisory Body has been advised to make necessary amendments to implement the changes.
Click here to read/ download the original circular
Review of Coverage of Settlement Guarantee Fund– SEBI has revised the norms related to Core Settlement Guarantee Fund (Core SGF) in the commodity derivatives segment
The Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) vide its Circular No: HO/47/16/14(1)2026-MRD-POD1/1/7115/2026 dated March 16, 2026, has revised the norms related to Core Settlement Guarantee Fund (Core SGF) in the commodity derivatives segment. Under the revised framework, clearing corporations must calculate credit exposure assuming the simultaneous default of at least three clearing members (and their associates) causing the highest credit exposure.
Earlier, the framework required credit exposure assuming simultaneous default of at least 2 clearing members. The change has been introduced following stakeholder representations and recommendations of the Risk Management Review Committee, with the objective of facilitating ease of doing business. The circular also empowers SEBI to grant case-by-case exemptions or relaxations from SGF provisions considering market conditions and investor protection. The circular has come into force with immediate effect.
Click here to read/ download the original circular
Important Judgments by SNG
Recent Deals
Read our recently published deals & articles
The Business Guardian
India Business Law Journal